Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

3-26-2014

SSRN Discipline

PSN Subject Matter eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; CJRN Subject Matter eJournals; Legal Scholarship Network; Criminal Law & Procedure eJournals; Social Insurance Research Network; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; Law & Society eJournals; Law & Society: Public Law eJournals; Criminal Justice Research Network; Political Science Network; Political Economy - Development eJournals

Abstract

In 1994 Congress passed 42 USC §14141 a statute authorizing the Attorney General to seek equitable relief against local and state police agencies that are engaged in a pattern or practice of unconstitutional misconduct Although police departments in some of the nation's largest cities have now undergone this sort of structural reform litigation there has been little empirical research on the topic Drawing on original interviews court documents statistical data and media reports this Article describes the federal government's use of structural reform litigation in American police departments and theorizes on its effectiveness It argues that structural reform litigation is uniquely effective at combating misconduct in police departments It forces local municipalities to prioritize investments into police misconduct regulations It utilizes external monitoring to ensure that frontline officers substantively comply with topdown mandates And it provides police executives with legal cover to implement wideranging reforms aimed at curbing misconduct Although expensive structural reform litigation may ultimately pay for itself through reducing a police department's civil liability But structural reform litigation is far from a perfect regulatory mechanism Successful organizational reform requires continual support from municipal leaders dedication by executives within the targeted agency and buyin by frontline officers This suggests that structural reform litigation alone is insufficient to transform a law enforcement agency The financial burden of structural reform litigation falls on local police agencies over a relatively short period of time Additional questions remain about whether targeted agencies will sustain reforms after federal intervention ends and about whether this type of federal intervention makes officers less aggressive This Article concludes by showing how the lessons from structural reform litigation can inform future legal regulations of law enforcement

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