Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

6-25-2008

SSRN Discipline

HIST Subject Matter eJournals; Legal Scholarship Network; PRN Subject Matter eJournals; *Humanities - Forthcoming Areas; Philosophy Research Network; African-American Studies; AFAM Subject Matter eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; Humanities Network; History

Abstract

Thomas Ruffin Of Moral Philosophy and Monuments returns to Justice Thomas Ruffins opinions particularly on slavery to excavate his jurisprudence and to try to assess what Ruffins legacy means for us today It begins with an exploration of Ruffins 1830 opinion in State v Mann where he selfconsciously separated his feelings from his legal opinion to release a man who abused a slave from criminal liability Antislavery activists frequently wrote about Mann because of its brutal honesty about the harsh nature of slavery After discussing Harriet Beecher Stowes fictional account of Ruffin and Mann in Dred A Tale of the Great Dismal Swamp which further developed the theme of separation of law and morals the paper turns to some of Ruffins other opinions It looks to slavery opinions including Heathcock v Pennington which released a renter of a slave from liability for the boys death in a coal mine and Green v Lane which dealt with a trust to give quasifreedom to slaves as well as nonslavery cases like Scroggins v Scroggins which argued against granting judicial divorces because that would encourage more of themRuffins jurisprudence took the world as it was or as he phrased it looked to the nature of things His judicial opinions the monuments he left to us illustrate a world of proslavery moral philosophy That thought separated humanity from law and then decided cases based on precedent and considerations of utility to society Ruffin was a great expositor of the system of slavery as well as a great wielder of what Stowe called cold legal logicWhat should we make of this legacy today Perhaps Ruffin aided the cause of antislavery through his honesty in State v Mann And thus perhaps we should honor him for that Moreover perhaps the honor he received in the early twentieth century when a dormitory was named in part for him on the UNC campus derives from his facility with legal reasoning outside of the slavery context However honoring him also runs the risk of honoring proslavery values Conversely removing his name from a building now runs the risk of concealing the prevalence of proslavery thought in the nineteenth century That is removing a name might facilitate a process of forgetting when universities should be trying to provide a proper context for viewing our past

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