Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
2-7-2018
SSRN Discipline
Legal Scholarship Network; Criminal Law & Procedure eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; Law & Society eJournals; Law & Society: Public Law eJournals; CSN Subject Matter eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; AARN Subject Matter eJournals; Cognitive Science Network; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; Anthropology & Archaeology Research Network
Abstract
This paper prepared for a symposium honoring the work of Michael Risinger examines Risinger's theory of "estimative surprise" for explaining legal standards of proof The paper first situates the theory in the set of psychological and epistemological considerations that underlie proof standards and it argues that the theory is aimed at explaining the psychological rather than the epistemological component of such standards Focusing on the criminal standard of proof "beyond a reasonable doubt" the paper then discusses two epistemic considerations that may fit with and supplement Risinger's theory epistemic safety and explanatory inferences Finally the paper illustrates the connections between surprise safety and explanations with detailed discussions of two cases in which defendants challenged the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions
Recommended Citation
Michael S. Pardo,
Epistemology, Psychology, and Standards of Proof: An Essay on Risinger's "Surprise" Theory,
(2018).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_working_papers/305