Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

7-17-2014

SSRN Discipline

Legal Scholarship Network; Criminal Law & Procedure eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; CSN Subject Matter eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Cognitive Science Network; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; Law, Brain & Behavior eJournals

Abstract

Stephen Morses illuminating scholarship on law and neuroscience relies on a folk psychological account of human behavior in order to defend the laws foundations for ascribing legal responsibility The heart of Morses account is the notion of mental state causation in which mental states eg beliefs desires and intentions cause behavior Morse argues that causation of this sort is necessary to support legal responsibility We challenge this claim First we discuss problems with the conception of mental causation on which Morse appears to rely Second we present an alternative account to explain the link between mental states reasons and actions the rationalteleological account We argue that the alternative account avoids the conceptual problems that arise for Morses conception of mental causation and that it also undergirds ascriptions of legal responsibility If the alternative succeeds then Morses conception of mental state causation is not necessary to support legal responsibility

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