Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

10-27-2008

SSRN Discipline

Delete; PSN Subject Matter eJournals; Test Network; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Network for Deleted Journals; Legal Scholarship Network; Corporate, Securities & Finance Law eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; Administrative Law eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Public Law & Legal Theory; Political Institutions eJournals; Political Science Network; Employment, Labor, Compensation & Pension Law eJournals

Abstract

With average Americans perturbed about executive pay government officials are taking action Officials appear to be racing against each other to battle corporate excess The US Securities and Exchange Commission SEC engaged in major rulemaking related to the disclosure of executive compensation and Congress quickly considered executive compensation legislation More reform however is not always better Concurrent reform by multiple regulators presents perilsThis Article adds to the dialogue about scandaldriven reform While much discussion exists about the advisability of particular reforms the focus here is on the process of reform The Article conducts a comparative analysis of the SEC and House of Representatives reform processes which reveals that different policymaking processes may be more or less likely to yield positive reforms The Article argues that promoting distinct more delineated roles for certain public actors could improve synergies between regulatory reform effortsPart I explores how the SECs response to the public notice and comment process for its compensation disclosure rulemaking shows how administrative agencies properly can tailor regulation in a deliberative fashion Part II then provides the contrasting story of the Houses passage of HR 1257 that illustrates the pitfalls of scandaldriven reform Unfortunately the Houses actions followed disturbing trends in mandating content for SEC regulation and in failing to account adequately for synergies between concurrent regulatory effortsPart III concludes by suggesting a framework identifying when congressional action on business regulation seems most appropriate given concurrent regulatory efforts The Article identifies Congresss important potential role in settling authority issues providing oversight to administrative agency reforms and being prepared to intervene when agencies are recalcitrant about enacting necessary rule changes In offering this framework the Article moves beyond executive compensation issues to see how Congress might deal with other crises of confidence in business regulation Areas for potential application of the framework include the regulation of hedge funds imported toys and other consumer products proxy voting and subprime lending

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