Document Type

Working Paper

Publication Date

10-16-2018

SSRN Discipline

ISN Subject Matter eJournals; Computer Science Research Network; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Financial Economics Network; CJRN Subject Matter eJournals; Economics Research Network; Legal Scholarship Network; Banking & Financial Institutions eJournals; CompSciRN Subject Matter eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; FEN Subject Matter eJournals; Criminal Justice Research Network; Information Systems & eBusiness Network

Abstract

Computer hackers are capable of anonymously stealing billions of dollars through fraudulent wire transfers Banks in Ecuador Bangladesh Vietnam Nepal India Russia and elsewhere have been attacked When law enforcement is unsuccessful in tracking down the hackers parties to the fraudulent transaction turn to the law to determine who must bear the loss In the United States responsibility for fraudulent wire transfers is governed by Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial Code Because wire transfers are often routed through the United States or transferred pursuant to contracts with US choice of law provisions Article 4A will ultimately apportion the loss of at least some international cyber bank heists This article explains how Article 4A works by considering the facts of a 2006 heist at Bangladesh Bank It shows that Article 4A is unlikely to help most originators who find their SWIFT systems have been hacked Originators of payment orders should carefully consider security procedures used to authenticate payment orders

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