Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
3-5-2016
SSRN Discipline
Economics Research Network; Legal Scholarship Network; PSN Subject Matter eJournals; Political Economy - Comparative eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; Law & Society eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; SRPN Subject Matter eJournals; Political Institutions eJournals; Sustainability Research & Policy Network; Political Science Network; Environmental & Natural Resources Law eJournals
Abstract
A common policy question confronting federal systems is how best to apportion environmental regulatory authority between the federal government and states While that power could theoretically be committed exclusively to one level of government a common approach is a system of shared regulatory authority often referred to as cooperative federalism That term can apply to a wide variety of arrangements One example would be a predominantly statebased system in which federal authority is limited to narrowly delineated areas providing technical or financial support or publishing nonbinding guidelines to encourage harmonization Another "classical" form would encompass centrally enacted or promulgated standards with permitting and enforcement left entirely to state authority A more dynamic approach recognizes the strengths in a system in which authority is more closely intertwined and overlapping rather than kept within largely separate spheresThis chapter compares federal systems utilizing approaches that span the spectrum from classical to more dynamic with a focus on regulation of water pollution as the organizing mechanism for exploring different forms of cooperative federalism
Recommended Citation
William L. Andreen,
Federalism, Delegated Permitting, and Enforcement,
(2016).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_working_papers/331