Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
5-24-2011
SSRN Discipline
Legal Scholarship Network; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; CSN Subject Matter eJournals; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Law School Research Papers - Public Law & Legal Theory; Cognitive Science Network; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; Humanities Network
Abstract
In a previous article "The Gettier Problem and Legal Proof" I argued that epistemic conditions that undermine knowledge in Gettiertype cases also potentially undermine legal verdicts For this reason I argued there is a deeper connection between knowledge and legal proof than is typically presupposed or argued for in the scholarly legal literature Thus I concluded legal proof includes something like a knowledge requirement "“ in the sense that legal verdicts aim not only at truth and sufficient evidential support but also as with knowledge an appropriate connection between their truth and justifying evidential supportThis conclusion is compatible with different ways of articulating further epistemological details and the argument that supports it does not depend on any novel or particularly controversial conceptions of the epistemic concepts or analysis of the Gettier problem In a thoughtful reply to my article Mark McBride focuses on the epistemic concept of safety as it applies to legal proof McBride argues that my analysis depends on an account of knowledge in which safety is a necessary condition and he argues that this dependence challenges my central claim In this response I explain why neither McBride's specific examples nor general analysis undermine my central claim They do however further clarify and illuminate epistemological issues underlying my central claim in ways that are useful and instructive
Recommended Citation
Michael S. Pardo,
More on the Gettier Problem and Legal Proof: Unsafe Nonknowledge Does Not Mean that Knowledge Must Be Safe,
(2011).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_working_papers/291