Document Type
Working Paper
Publication Date
3-26-2012
SSRN Discipline
Legal Scholarship Network; PSN Subject Matter eJournals; Social Insurance Research Network; Law School Research Papers - Legal Studies; LSN Subject Matter eJournals; Constitutional Law, Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy eJournals; Political Institutions eJournals; Political Science Network
Abstract
Scholars have long treated the Exceptions Clause of Article III as a serious threat to the Supreme Court's central constitutional function establishing definitive and uniform rules of federal law This Article argues that scholars have overlooked an important function of the Clause Congress has repeatedly used its broad "exceptions power" to facilitate not to undermine the Supreme Court's constitutional role Drawing on insights from social science this Article asserts that Congress has an incentive to use its control over federal jurisdiction to promote the Court's role in settling disputed federal questions Notably this argument has considerable historical support When the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate docket grew to the point that it was unmanageable for a single tribunal Congress responded by exercising its authority under the Exceptions Clause Congress made "exceptions" to the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction and replaced it with discretionary review via writs of certiorari "” precisely so that the Court could concentrate its limited resources on resolving important federal questions Thus contrary to conventional wisdom Congress has often used its broad exceptions power to safeguard the Supreme Court's role in the constitutional scheme
Recommended Citation
Felicia A. Burton & Tara L. Grove,
The Exceptions Clause as a Structural Safeguard,
(2012).
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ua.edu/fac_working_papers/111