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BEYOND BAIL

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Abstract

From the proliferation of community bail funds to the implementation of new risk assessment tools to the limitation and even eradication of monetary bail, reform movements have altered the landscape of pretrial detention. Yet, reform movements have paid little attention to the emerging reality of a post-monetary-bail world. With monetary bail an unavailable or disfavored option, courts have come to rely increasingly on nonmonetary conditions of release. These nonmonetary conditions can be problematic for many of the same reasons that monetary bail is problematic and can inject additional bias into the pretrial system.

In theory, nonmonetary conditions offer increased opportunities for release over monetary bail and can be narrowly tailored to accomplish specific goals. Yet, the proposition that nonmonetary conditions accomplish their purported goals is untested and unsettled. Pretrial release conditions are often imposed at the conclusion of a remarkably brief pretrial hearing and in a near rote fashion, with little or no evidence that the conditions are necessary to avoid the risk or risks that fuel them. Defendants—many of whom are unrepresented at these hearings—may be ill-equipped, financially or otherwise, to comply with these conditions. Noncompliance may place defendants at risk of either additional criminal charges or future pretrial detention.

This Article argues that the reduction or eradication of monetary bail alone has not, and will not, ensure a fair and unbiased system of pretrial detention, nor will it ensure that poor and marginalized defendants will benefit from pretrial release. Rather, these reforms have shifted the burden of release from paying monetary bail to paying fees for a laundry list of pretrial release conditions. If pretrial detention reform is to achieve meaningful results, it must address not just the most apparent barrier to release—the fee charged in the form of bail—but all barriers that promote pretrial incarceration and impose unjustified burdens on defendants awaiting trial.

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INTRODUCTION

In the last five decades, few criminal justice reform movements have enjoyed the level of success of pretrial detention reform movements. From early efforts in the 1960s by the Vera Institute for Justice to
modern community bail movements,\textsuperscript{3} reform efforts have succeeded in calling attention to the regressive bail system,\textsuperscript{4} limiting or eradicating monetary bail,\textsuperscript{5} and utilizing risk assessment tools to determine


\textsuperscript{3} The community-based bail movement is one of many community-based criminal justice reform movements that have focused on the issue of pretrial detention. For an excellent description of such movements, see Jocelyn Simonson, \textit{Bail Nullification}, 115 MICH. L. REV. 585, 599–606 (2017).


probability of flight or danger to the community. In the wake of such reform movements, much work has been done to highlight potential bias embedded in risk assessment tools—that is, whether in their construction or in the data they rely on—but little attention has been paid to the emerging reality of a post-monetary-bail world. With monetary bail an unavailable or disfavored option, courts not only refuse to release some defendants altogether, but they also rely increasingly on nonmonetary conditions of release to mitigate whatever perceived risks a defendant poses. These nonmonetary conditions of release can be problematic for many of the same reasons that monetary bail is problematic and can inject additional bias into the pretrial system. Yet, the proposition that such nonmonetary conditions accomplish their purported goals is untested and unsettled.

Nonmonetary conditions of release can include requirements of court attendance, no new law violations, drug or alcohol testing, no-contact orders, electronic home monitoring (EHM), work release, substance or mental health treatment, and maintenance of employment or school, to name a few. Such requirements are frequently imposed as a matter of course on defendants (including those in no-bail jurisdictions), and they range in terms of both the obligation they entail and the collateral consequences.


7. See, e.g., Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2228–30.


9. Ironically, such nonfinancial conditions of release were originally developed during earlier waves of bail reform in an effort to reduce pretrial detention. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289; 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (permitting a judge to impose a variety of conditions).

10. Professor Russell Gold has suggested reconceptualizing pretrial detention completely, as a kind of de facto injunctive order that denies liberty, to reign in its use. See Russell M. Gold, Jail as Injunction, 107 GEO. L.J. 501, 507–08 (2019).

11. See infra Section III.A.
consequences they threaten. Some conditions carry few additional obligations for a defendant. Others impose heavy burdens or are criminogenic (i.e., they may generate new criminal charges if violated). All curtail the defendant’s liberty in some way, all carry collateral consequences, and all rely heavily on the discretion of pretrial services officers, who monitor the defendant’s compliance with conditions of release.

In theory, conditions of release not only offer increased opportunities for release over monetary bail, but they can also be tailored to address the twin concerns identified by modern bail statutes—risk of flight and danger to the community. For example, a defendant whose alleged crime is driven by a substance abuse problem may pose a reduced risk of flight or danger to the community if she is required to participate in substance abuse treatment as a term of pretrial release. Further, court-ordered efforts to address a defendant’s underlying life conditions that may increase the likelihood of future crimes—in this hypothetical, substance abuse— may place her in a better position to negotiate an alternative disposition to her case or dismissal of the charge altogether. In comparison to monetary bail or pretrial detention, such conditions should both increase the probability of pretrial release and decrease future incarceration. From the courts’ perspective, tailored conditions of release carry an assurance that a defendant can enjoy pretrial liberty, be depended upon to return for future court dates, and live as a law-abiding and productive member of the community.

All of this in theory makes sense. All of this in theory imagines a pretrial release system that is measured, precise, and just. But the world of pretrial release operates outside of theory. Pretrial release conditions are often imposed following a remarkably brief pretrial hearing on

12. See infra Section III.A.
14. This Article uses the term “pretrial services” or “pretrial services officer” throughout to denote the administrative agency and its employees who provide information to the court about the defendant prior to trial. Not every jurisdiction refers to this agency or its employees as pretrial services. Although different jurisdictions may use a different moniker, every jurisdiction seems to have some form of this agency.
16. See Wiseman, supra note 4, at 247, 255, 263–64 (finding that monetary bail requirements impede the ability of individuals to procure pretrial liberty); Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 714 (stating individuals detained pretrial are convicted more often and commit more future crimes than those not detained pretrial).
17. See Appleman, supra note 15, at 1330, 1334.
unrepresented defendants. Judges impose conditions of release in a near rote fashion—some utilizing a checklist—often with little or no evidence that the condition is necessary to avoid the risk or risks that fuel them. For their part, defendants may be ill-equipped, financially or otherwise, to comply with such conditions. For instance, the defendant described above may in fact benefit from drug treatment, but she also may be unable to comply with the court’s order because she lacks the funds to pay for treatment and free treatment facilities are hard to come by. Noncompliance may place such a defendant at risk of either additional criminal charges or future pretrial detention.

Bail reform movements have enjoyed terrific success, and scholars have done tremendous work to uncover bias in both the assessment of pretrial risk and the imposition of pretrial detention. Little work has been done, however, to address the reality of nonmonetary pretrial release conditions. Put simply, it is a harm that hides in plain sight for poor and marginalized defendants—a harm that may not only prevent pretrial release but may also carry devastating long-term consequences for defendants and their communities. Such conditions are akin to imposing probation prior to conviction. Yet, they are often touted as a benign alternative to monetary bail or pretrial detention. This Article asserts that this perception is mistaken. In reality, conditions of release often fail to serve as a benevolent compromise that offers the court some assurance of reappearance and reduced risk, and the defendant an opportunity for release. In reality, the very people bail reform movements sought to serve are many of the same people struggling under imposed conditions of release.

The reduction or eradication of monetary bail alone has not, and will not, ensure a fair and unbiased system of pretrial detention, nor will it ensure that poor and marginalized defendants will benefit from pretrial

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18. EMILY BAZELON, CHARGED 37 (2019) (noting that pretrial detention decisions are “often made in a few minutes or less, based on the scant information presented early on at an arraignment hearing”).


20. BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37, 39.

21. See infra Part III.
Rather, bail reform movements have largely shifted the burden of release from monetary bail to fees for EHM, requirements of meetings with pretrial services officers and counselors, submission to random drug testing, compliance with no-contact orders, and a myriad of other imposed conditions. For some, the burden of such pretrial conditions is no less insurmountable than monetary bail. For others, conditions of release render a more devastating toll—generating new criminal charges upon violation and new periods of detention. To add insult to injury, there is precious little research into the utility of such conditions.

The fee charged in the form of bail may be the most apparent barrier to release, but it is not the only one. To shift the pretrial paradigm away from detention therefore requires addressing not only the most apparent barrier, but all barriers that promote pretrial incarceration and impose unjustified burdens on defendants awaiting trial, including non-monetary conditions of release that promote detention and for some re-arrest. This is not to say that courts may never set conditions of release or that they should disregard all risk factors or concerns at the pretrial stage. It is to say that the current pretrial detention regime is problematic because it carries too much risk of bias and arbitrariness, despite a lack of evidence linking the imposed conditions to the mitigation of perceived risks.

This argument unfolds in three parts. Part I considers the framework of the pretrial release system—both as a constitutional and statutory matter. Both construct a system premised on the notion that pretrial release should be the norm and that detention or conditions of release—monetary or otherwise—are appropriate only when they promote a compelling and articulated state interest. Part II turns to the question of how modern courts determine when or if pretrial conditions or detention is necessary. Charging decisions, risk assessment tools, and institutional discretion all drive such determinations, and each raises real bias concerns. Finally, Part III considers the realities of pretrial release, including the most common conditions of release, the collateral consequences they carry both for compliance and noncompliance, the role of pretrial services officers’ discretion in determining compliance, and the route forward for reform.

Despite tremendous work and reform in the pretrial detention arena, relatively little attention has been paid to the reality that courts impose criminogenic and burdensome conditions on defendants with little to no

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22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part III.
25. Modern bail statutes describe these as prevention of flight and danger to the community. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 903.046(1) (2020) (“The purpose of a bail determination in criminal proceedings is to ensure the appearance of the criminal defendant at subsequent proceedings and to protect the community against unreasonable danger from the criminal defendant.”).
demonstration that such conditions accomplish the state’s articulated goals. This is puzzling. Not only does the imposition of such conditions depend on systems and individuals that are plagued with potential bias, but the lack of evidence that such conditions either increase release rates or affect articulated risks also raises questions about their conformity with constitutional and statutory mandates or indeed their basic utility. The on-the-ground reality of such conditions is often a series of devastating impacts on defendants and their communities—impacts that undermine pretrial reform efforts and thus deserve attention.

I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF BAIL

Constitutional and statutory mandates govern pretrial conditions of release. Both rely on the notion that, prior to conviction, a defendant is entitled to release absent some evidence that she poses a risk that cannot be mitigated. Uniformly, modern statutes define relevant risks as flight and danger to the community. As a constitutional matter, pretrial conditions have been challenged under both the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses, and as an equal protection violation. Despite these challenges, however, the U.S. Supreme Court has set few limitations on pretrial conditions—monetary or otherwise.

Pretrial conditions may not act as punishment. Determining whether pretrial conditions are punitive requires examining the link between the proposed condition and the state’s articulated interests as identified by bail statutes. Pretrial conditions that are not necessary to promote the state’s interest or, more accurately, that exceed what is necessary to guard against the risk the state has identified, are deemed excessive and may violate the defendant’s substantive due process rights.

26. This Article focuses on the impacts of nonmonetary conditions on defendants and their communities. Other impacts are borne by the state, particularly if defendants cannot comply with conditions and are either never released from pretrial custody or are detained upon violation of a condition of release. When this occurs, the state bears the monetary cost of this incarceration. Pretrial detention also raises well-founded concerns regarding overincarceration of defendants pretrial. The decision not to focus on such costs in this Article does not reflect a normative judgment regarding such costs but rather reflects the reality that other scholars have documented this phenomenon well in the context of monetary bail. See generally, e.g., Heaton et al., supra note 4.


28. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 405 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the condition of confinement being challenged ‘is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal—if it is arbitrary or purposeless—a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment.’” (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539)).

29. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 754 (“The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”).
procedural due process is required in the pretrial setting seems to be constitutionally sufficient so long as it permits the lower court to determine that a nexus exists between the state’s compelling interests and the restrictions on the accused’s liberty.30

This overlapping analysis between what is excessive under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause, and what process is required to impose a condition under procedural and substantive due process requirements, has left a limited due process standard for pretrial detention hearings in its wake. Procedurally, the Court has declined to require many trial-based safeguards, holding instead that the pretrial process is sufficient so long as it establishes the required nexus between the state’s compelling interests and the pretrial condition. And lower courts have been reluctant to revive the substantive due process analysis the Court utilized in Salerno, even as they conclude that compelling liberty interests are at stake.31 Equal protection challenges to pretrial detention and conditions have largely met a similar response, with lower courts concluding that even with a protected class established, a constitutional violation occurs only if the condition imposed exceeds that necessary to maintain the state’s interest.32

As limited and circular as this constitutional framework may appear, understanding it is critical to an analysis of the pretrial detention system. The bail reform movement has used this framework to argue against monetary bail, both as biased against poor and minority defendants and as lacking a critical link with the state’s articulated goals of reappearance and safety. As discussed below, similar assertions can be made for nonmonetary conditions of release.

30. See id. at 752.
32. See, e.g., ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1052, 1140 (S.D. Tex. 2017), aff’d as modified, 892 F.3d 147 (5th Cir. 2018). In ODonnell, the court recognized an equal protection claim based on economic class but nonetheless engaged in a due process analysis with regard to the constitutional violation, again linking the violation to the process bail hearings afforded in establishing conditions linked to the state’s articulated goals as opposed to the class characteristics. Id. at 1135; see also Carroll, supra note 31.
A. The Excessive Bail Clause, Due Process, and Equal Protection

The Constitution mentions bail only once\(^{33}\) and does not mention pretrial conditions of release at all—though nonmonetary conditions of release were common at the time of the Founding and beyond.\(^{34}\) The Eighth Amendment states that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted.”\(^{35}\) Even at the time of its adoption, the Excessive Bail Clause carried an imprecise meaning. One delegate in the House of Representatives commented that “[t]he clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not think it necessary. What is meant by the terms excessive bail? Who are to be the judges?”\(^{36}\) As Professor Samuel Wiseman has noted, the Excessive Bail Clause’s “complex and obscure history . . . has made consensus over the precise function of the constitutional prohibition against excessive bail elusive.”\(^{37}\)

\(^{33}\) U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The constitutional focus on trial versus pretrial rights is likely a product of the pretrial release system at the time of the founding—one grounded in an English common law and constitutional system that required bail determinations to be made in a timely fashion, in open court, and based on evidentiary record. See Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 966 (1965) (discussing pretrial bail under English common law in the seventeenth century); William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 Alb. L. Rev. 33, 34–66 (1977) (tracing the development of pretrial release procedures in Anglo-American law); Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 Yale L.J. 966, 966–77 (1961) (connecting modern American bail practices to the development of bond in pre-Norman England and suggesting reforms). Even before the founding, colonial bail systems disfavored pretrial detention and bail. See Foote, supra, at 975 (describing the 1641 practice in Massachusetts rendering all noncapital cases bailable); June Carbone, Seeing Through the Emperor’s New Clothes: Rediscovery of Basic Principles in the Administration of Bail, 34 Syracuse L. Rev. 517, 531 (1983) (describing the colonial Pennsylvania constitution that presumed bail and provided process rights pretrial); Matthew J. Hegreness, America’s Fundamental and Vanishing Right to Bail, 55 Ariz. L. Rev. 909, 920 (2013) (noting the influence of the Pennsylvania Frame of Government on federal and state bail practices). Finally, the Judiciary Act of 1789 followed colonial practice, permitting bail in all noncapital charges and allowing pretrial detention only in the absence of a suitable alternative condition of release. ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.

\(^{34}\) See Timothy R. Schnacke, A Brief History of Bail, Judges’ J., Summer 2018, at 4, 6 (describing historical reliance on nonfinancial conditions of release in lieu of monetary bail to assure the defendant’s presence).

\(^{35}\) U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

\(^{36}\) 1 Annals of Cong. 754 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Samuel Livermore). Part of the reluctance to include such a clause may have stemmed from the well-established principle surrounding pretrial release dating back to the Magna Carta and present in colonial America. See sources cited supra note 33.

For its part, the Supreme Court has devoted precious little attention to the Excessive Bail Clause—entangling the evaluation of excessiveness in due process and equal protection analyses. Early cases defined excessiveness in terms of the underlying function of bail—the assurance of the defendant’s reappearance before the court—and the court’s ability to tailor conditions of release to that goal. In this, the constitutional requirement—that bail not be excessive—was met by a sort of circular logic. Bail was not excessive provided a court could determine that whatever condition was imposed promoted the state’s articulated purpose. In turn, whatever process might be due a defendant during a pretrial detention hearing was limited to that necessary to establish the nexus between the state’s interests and pretrial release conditions. Equal protection claims suffer a similarly retrospective (and circular) analysis, with courts concluding that equal protection concerns are satisfied provided that the deprivation of liberty is tailored to address the state’s articulated concerns.

Modern cases have maintained this interdependent construct of state interests and due process and equal protection. In *Stack v. Boyle*, the Court drew a historical arc between modern bail and the historic basis of bail. Specifically, the Court wrote that “the deposit of a sum of money

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38. U.S. Const. amend. V.
39. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
40. See *Ex parte Milburn*, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 704, 710 (1835) (noting that bail should be set in a manner to accomplish its purpose to “compel[] the party to submit to the trial and punishment”); *Hudson v. Parker*, 156 U.S. 277, 285 (1895) (holding that prior to conviction a defendant should be released or granted bail sufficient to ensure his return to court). These holdings are consistent with the post-Colonial perception of bail both as a default position (as opposed to detention) and as a mere means to prevent flight, as well as the Judiciary Act of 1789, which indicated “bail shall be admitted, except where the punishment may be death.” ch. 20, § 33, 1 Stat. 73, 91.
41. See *Stack v. Boyle*, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951) (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”); United States v. *Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987) (“[T]he Government’s general interest in preventing crime . . . is heightened when the Government musters convincing proof that the arrestee . . . presents a demonstrable danger to the community.”); United States v. *Montalvo-Murillo*, 495 U.S. 711, 716–17 (1990) (recognizing that a defendant’s liberty interest is “vital” and requires a prompt hearing on pretrial release but stating that errors in timing do not grant a defendant a remedy of release).
42. See, e.g., *Pugh v. Rainwater*, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc) (“The ultimate inquiry in each instance is what is necessary to reasonably assure defendant’s presence at trial.”).
43. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
44. See id. at 5.
subject to forfeiture serves as additional assurance of the presence of an accused.\textsuperscript{45}

The Court continued, “Bail set at a figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is ‘excessive’ under the Eighth Amendment.”\textsuperscript{46} In this, the Court defined excessiveness not in terms of whether a defendant could afford the bail but rather in the bail’s ability to accomplish the state’s goals.\textsuperscript{47} This, in turn, tied the calculation of excessiveness to the process due a defendant.\textsuperscript{48} While the \textit{Stack} Court offered little insight into the precise parameters of either pretrial flight risk or sufficient process, the Court concluded that \textit{some} process was necessary to prevent bail from becoming “punishment prior to conviction.”\textsuperscript{49} Ultimately, the Court concluded that whatever form that process took must be sufficient to link the deprivation of liberty in question to the risk articulated by the state.\textsuperscript{50} In \textit{Stack}, the bail was not excessive so long as the lower court determined that the bail set served to reduce the risk that the defendant would fail to appear at trial.\textsuperscript{51}

Thirty-six years later, in \textit{United States v. Salerno},\textsuperscript{52} the Court returned to the question of the constitutionality of pretrial detention, this time in the context of the Bail Reform Act of 1984.\textsuperscript{53} Salerno, a reputed crime boss, brought a facial challenge to the preventive detention provisions of the Act.\textsuperscript{54} The Court, in upholding the Act, again relied on an entwined analysis of the Excessive Bail and Due Process Clauses—this time in the context of substantive due process.\textsuperscript{55} Finding that the novel detention provisions of the Act were both regulatory and reasonable, as they furthered the government’s legitimate interest in the safety of the community,\textsuperscript{56} the Court again linked the meaning of “excessive” to the underlying function of bail itself—this time in terms of dangerousness as opposed to flight risk.\textsuperscript{57} Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote,
The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil. . . . [T]o determine whether the Government’s response is excessive, we must compare that response against the interest the Government seeks to protect by means of that response.\textsuperscript{58}

The Court held, as it did in \textit{Stack}, that defendants were only entitled to sufficient process to demonstrate that the deprivation of liberty could survive the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against excessive bail.\textsuperscript{59} The Court in \textit{Salerno} was clear—the imposition of bail or, in Salerno’s case, pretrial detention, requires proof “by clear and convincing evidence that an arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat.”\textsuperscript{60} Without such proof, any effort to curtail the defendant’s liberty pretrial is not only excessive but also violates the level of process required by the Fifth Amendment.\textsuperscript{61}

In both cases, as it has at times in other Eighth Amendment arenas,\textsuperscript{62} the Court declined to provide either a clear definition of excessive or the precise procedural mechanisms due a defendant in a pretrial detention consideration. Instead, the Court reiterated the position it had staked out in \textit{Stack}, relying on the Due Process Clause to hold that the calculation of excessiveness was an individualized analysis based on the defendant’s own characteristics—whether as to flight risk in \textit{Stack} or dangerousness in \textit{Salerno}—and the interests the government sought to protect.\textsuperscript{63} Bail was rendered excessive when it exceeded what was necessary to achieve legitimate state interests. As Professor Lauryn Gouldin has noted in the context of monetary bail, “Read together, these decisions support the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{58} \textit{Id.} at 754.
\item \textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 750–51.
\item \textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.} at 746–55.
\item \textsuperscript{62} Consider, for example, the Court’s interpretation of “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Eighth Amendment, under which bright-line rules have emerged only for the most extreme sentences. \textit{See} Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting the execution of individuals with diminished intellectual abilities); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005) (prohibiting the execution of juvenile offenders); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (prohibiting life without parole sentences for nonhomicide juvenile offenders).
\item \textsuperscript{63} \textit{See Salerno}, 481 U.S. at 754–55 (“Thus, when the Government has admitted that its only interest is in preventing flight, bail must be set by a court at a sum designed to ensure that goal and no more. We believe that when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight, as it has here, the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” (internal citation omitted) (citing Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951)); \textit{Stack}, 342 U.S. at 5 (“Since the function of bail is limited, the fixing of bail for any individual defendant must be based upon standards relevant to the purpose of assuring the presence of that defendant.”)).
\end{itemize}
claim that pretrial restrictions on liberty that are not tailored to the specific risk an arrestee presents are unconstitutionally ‘excessive.’”

The Court’s failure to draw a bright-line rule regarding “excessive bail” and the corresponding process may be a product of the nature of pretrial detention itself—or at least the Court’s vision of it. First, the Court’s construction of the process due a defendant pretrial rests on an embedded understanding that the purpose of pretrial detention is limited to achieving articulated state goals of reappearing for trial and safety through imposed conditions. While such concerns are certainly important, focus on these twin risks is also problematic. It seems to ignore the well-documented impact of pretrial detention decisions on defendants and the larger community. This, in turn, raises questions regarding how these risks are defined and who should define them. As discussed in the context of risk assessment tools, the calculations of safety or even flight risk are, by their nature, fraught with the potential for perspective bias. The decision to detain a defendant pretrial, or to impose restrictive conditions, may appear necessary to a court or pretrial assessment officer to ensure safety but may nonetheless run contrary to community notions of safety. To the people who know and depend on the defendant in all sorts of ways, pretrial detention or pretrial release conditions may create gaps in social, familial, and economic networks. Scholars and community groups alike have highlighted and lamented the downstream consequences of pretrial detention, but they have less vigorously explored questions about how risks are defined.

Beyond this, the pursuit of these state-articulated pretrial goals seems an odd justification for the Court’s failure to attach procedural protections to pretrial hearings, particularly in light of the Court’s requirement of such protections in other pretrial contexts. It is difficult to imagine that the benefits and necessity of counsel for a defendant in a probable cause hearing, for example, are any less urgent or required in a pretrial detention

66. See, e.g., Wiseman, supra note 4, at 239–44; Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713–14.
Certainly, the Court’s conclusion that such procedural safeguards are not required in pretrial detention hearings because any resulting deprivation of liberty is regulatory and not punitive\(^6\) may feel like a mere semantic distinction to defendants sitting in jail awaiting trial or facing other restrictions.

Second, the Court has noted that pretrial detention, because it serves these limited goals, is distinct from punishments meted out after conviction and therefore requires a distinct procedure.\(^7\) As discussed in more detail below, this distinction presents itself in several ways. For the Court’s constitutional analysis, however, the most significant is that pretrial conditions—monetary or otherwise—are limited to the pretrial period. The Court seems to accept that this period is shorter than periods of punishment—a contested proposition to be sure. Other distinctions—that pretrial conditions are imposed early in the criminal process or that the deprivations of liberty in question, particularly in cases of release on conditions or bail, are less significant and therefore require less rigorous procedural protections—both seem to overlook the significant impact of pretrial conditions.\(^8\)

In the end, pretrial decisions are, by their very nature, efforts to predict some future occurrence based on limited data. An individual defendant may present particular risks or may be a particularly safe bet in ways that are not readily apparent. Unlike sentencing, which carries its own predictive burdens, pretrial release conditions are not punitive. Therefore, they cannot be justified based on a desire to punish a defendant prior to conviction. In this, the Court’s allegiance to a process based on an individualized analysis of the defendant in comparison to the state’s articulated goals may be grounded in the recognition that courts must have some flexibility to make early decisions with limited information. Faced with little guidance as to precisely what process is necessary in the pretrial detention arena, states have increasingly constructed their own bright-line rules—usually dictated by the charged offense, the defendant’s criminal history, information that suggests a likelihood to succumb to the identified risks of flight or future danger, or a combination of all three factors.\(^9\) In the alternative, states have gravitated toward risk assessment tools that diminish discretionary decision-making and, in

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\(^6\) See Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213; Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126.

\(^7\) See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 541–46 (1979) (holding that conditions of pretrial release were not punitive as they promoted legitimate state interests for finite periods of time).

\(^8\) See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (noting that pretrial detention is distinct from punishment and therefore some procedural protections available at trial were not required).

\(^9\) See infra Part III.

\(^9\) See infra Section I.B.
some cases, eliminate a defendant interview. Even in cases where no bright-line rule is applied, pretrial conditions of release, monetary and otherwise, are often imposed routinely or based on set schedules.

For their part, equal protection challenges have focused on the unaffordability of bail, arguing that bail amounts have a disparate impact on poor and minority defendants. Like their due process counterparts, these challenges claim that unaffordable bail violates the Equal Protection Clause absent some demonstration that the bail is the least restrictive means to satisfy the compelling state interest.

Despite the limited process standards articulated by the courts, reform efforts have succeeded in shifting the modern pretrial release system increasingly away from monetary conditions toward nonmonetary conditions. They have often done so with the blessing and help of elected prosecutors. These nonmonetary conditions, however, may create equal, if not greater, burdens for the very populations such reforms sought to protect. The price of release for defendants, particularly those charged with minor offenses who appear to present a low pretrial release risk, may no longer be monetary bail, but might instead be agreed-upon conditions of release that may have little to do with any risk the defendant may pose or any compelling state interest. Such conditions may not only carry a financial burden but may also impose far-reaching consequences for defendants, their families, and their communities.

B. Statutory Regulation of Release

The constitutional ideals embodied in the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments and articulated by the Court take tangible form in state and federal rules and statutes regulating pretrial release. In federal court, the Bail Reform Act sets pretrial release as a “default” unless the judge “determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any

73. See infra Section I.B.
74. See infra Section I.B.
75. See Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1057 (5th Cir. 1978) (stating that bail should be narrowly tailored to ensure the accused’s presence at trial); ODonnell v. Harris Cnty., 892 F.3d 147, 162 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that the monetary bail for a misdemeanor was not narrowly tailored to ensuring accused’s appearance); Brangan v. Commonwealth, 80 N.E.3d 949, 959 (Mass. 2017) (holding that unaffordable bail is subject to certain due process requirements); Lee v. Lawson, 375 So. 2d 1019, 1023 (Miss. 1979) (explaining that the method and amount of bail should be relevant to ensuring accused’s appearance at trial).
76. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
78. See infra Section III.B.
79. See infra Section III.A.
80. See infra Section III.A.
other person or the community." While there is statutory variance among states and between the state and federal systems, the twin concerns of flight risk and future dangerousness are consistent. Likewise, the procedural requirements that the court first determine the level of risk the defendant poses and second craft conditions of release—monetary or otherwise—that answer those concerns are constants among such statutes, whether state or federal.

Under the Bail Reform Act, if the government or the court seeks to hold a defendant prior to trial, the court must conduct a hearing to determine the defendant's level of risk and the conditions, if any, that will ameliorate that risk. States have followed suit. Scholars and activists, however, have criticized such pretrial detention hearings as being notoriously cursory or, with increased use of risk assessment tools and some bail reform, nonexistent. In addition, while state statutes may still require or permit some level of judicial discretion with regard to pretrial release, that discretion appears increasingly formulaic at best and capable of producing inconsistent and biased results at worst.

While these critiques of pretrial hearings raise significant concerns, as discussed above, limitations in process may be a product of the nature of the pretrial inquiry itself. Pretrial detention hearings are by their nature

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81. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). While 18 U.S.C. § 3142 and § 3144 govern release prior to trial, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46(b) permits a judge to add additional conditions of release during trial. Id. §§ 3142, 3144; FED. R. CRIM. P. 46(b).

82. See Shima Baradaran Baughman, The Bail Book 3–4 (2018); Gouldin, supra note 64, at 701.

83. See § 3142; sources cited supra note 82. Admittedly, these labels may be deceptive and may at times flow into one another— with dangerousness judged in terms of flight risk and flight risk in terms of dangerousness. See Gouldin, supra note 64, at 701. However, these are the distinct interests identified by the statutes. Id.

84. § 3142(e)(1).

85. See Baughman, supra note 82, at 40–41 (discussing hearings in various state jurisdictions). See generally Patrick Liu et al., The Economics of Bail and Pretrial Detention (2018) (providing an overview of state pretrial detention processes).

86. See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 509–10 (describing the streamlining of pretrial detention hearings through the use of risk assessment tools producing cursory hearings, or in some cases, no hearings); Eaglin, supra note 6, at 61–64. In jurisdictions such as Philadelphia or New Jersey, both of which have implemented bail reforms eradicating monetary bail in all or some cases, some pretrial review hearings have vanished altogether as defendants are either released on agreements signed by the prosecutor and the defendant or the court holds a minimal uncontested hearing. See supra note 5.

87. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 314–17 (discussing the formulaic approach to risk assessment).

88. See United States v. Hurtado, 779 F.2d 1467, 1479 (11th Cir. 1985) (stating that pretrial hearings are not designed to "rehash ... probable cause" but to allow the defendant to demonstrate that he poses no flight risk or danger to the community); United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (noting that a requirement of full litigation of the pending case
predictive and often occur very early in a case before the defense has enjoyed a meaningful opportunity to investigate or challenge the prosecution’s case. In state courts, they may occur before counsel is even appointed. Therefore, such hearings often cannot, as a practical matter, result in any meaningful refutation of the allegations. This is not to say that defendants cannot or do not challenge the existence of probable cause. But such a challenge is even more of an uphill battle for the defense pretrial than at trial. The prosecutor is heavily advantaged at this stage of the case and at times uses that advantage to urge pretrial detention—asking courts to consider the weight of evidence against the defendant as a reason to “hold” the defendant or to impose strict conditions of release pretrial. Judges themselves are risk-averse regarding release, often erring towards detention or conditions rather than risking bad publicity.

Beyond this, the sheer volume of cases that arraignment courts must process on a daily basis, coupled with the promulgation of increasingly

at a pretrial hearing would not only complicate the hearing but also would be “out of proportion to the liberty interest at stake—viz. the interest in remaining free until trial, for what is by statute a period of limited duration”).

89. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2), for example, requires a pretrial detention hearing immediately following a defendant’s first appearance, but it also permits a three-day delay of the hearing on motion of the government’s attorney, or the defendant can request a five-day delay for good cause. § 3142(f)(2). Often the hearing is delayed to allow the defendant to acquire counsel. See id. Once the hearing occurs, however, § 3142(f)(2) does not permit either the government or the defendant to reopen the detention question unless new evidence that was not known at the time of the initial hearing becomes available. Id.; see also BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37 (asserting that prosecutors rely on facts in the arrest warrant to reduce the defendant to the police account of what the defendant did wrong).


91. See BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37; Appleman, supra note 15, at 1354-55.

92. Gerstein v. Pugh held that a probable cause hearing must occur either before or promptly after the defendant is arrested and charged by information (as opposed to by indictment). 420 U.S. 103, 124-25 (1975). County of Riverside v. McLaughlin held that this probable cause hearing must occur within forty-eight hours of the defendant’s arrest. 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). It is not unusual to hold the pretrial detention hearing immediately following the probable cause hearing—assuming probable cause is found. Even if the state charges the defendant by indictment, a defendant may challenge the probable cause of the indictment, though may not choose to do so at a pretrial detention hearing.

93. See BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37; Appleman, supra note 15, at 1354.

94. See BAZELON, supra note 18, at 37; Appleman, supra note 15, at 1331. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 46 permits consideration of the facts alleged in the case, and § 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act allows consideration of the crime alleged in determining flight risk, danger to the community, and the appropriate conditions of release. § 3142(g); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 46.

95. Gouldin, supra note 64, at 680–81. Recently proposed bail statutes underscore this aversion as state legislators contract bail considerations. See, e.g., H.B. 81, 2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2020) (seeking to expand the ability of courts to make “no bail” findings).
sophisticated assessment tools and strong pretrial detention reform movements (fueled in no small part by a growing distrust of judicial discretion), counsels toward limited or, in some cases, nonexistent pretrial detention hearings. In response, states have implemented risk assessment tools, altered factors for considering bail or conditions of release, and, in some cases, considered eliminating monetary bail. Each of these has streamlined the pretrial detention process—reducing hearings or eliminating them altogether and curtailing already limited pretrial procedural protections.

Regardless of the length of the hearing, or if one occurs at all, defendants generally face a limited universe of outcomes following a charge. Like its state analogs, the Bail Reform Act provides that “[u]pon the appearance before a judicial officer of a person charged with an offense, the judicial officer shall issue an order that, pending trial, the person be placed into one of four categories:

(1) released on personal recognizance or . . . an unsecured appearance bond . . . ;

(2) released on a condition or . . . conditions . . . ;

96. In conversations between the Author and defense counsel, some practitioners reported that first appearance or arraignment judges and prosecutors in their jurisdictions “determine” terms of pretrial release prior to the “hearing.” Defendants, often appearing without appointed counsel, are “told” whether they will be released pretrial and under what terms. Thus, while a hearing “technically” occurs, it is a nonsubstantive one.

97. See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 492–97 (describing a variety of risk assessment tools adopted in the wake of the bail reform movement); Englin, supra note 6, at 61–62 (describing widespread use of risk assessment algorithm tools in pretrial detention hearings).

98. See Baughman, supra note 82, at 40–41 (describing the adoption of different bail factors in new and proposed state legislation).


100. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a).
101. Id. § 3142(a)(1); see id. § 3142(b).
102. Id. § 3142(a)(2); see id. § 3142(c).
(3) temporarily detained to permit revocation of conditional release, deportation, or exclusion . . . , 103 or

(4) detained . . . . 104

Jurisdictions that have eliminated monetary bail requirements may forgo the pretrial detention hearing—permitting a defendant to be released upon agreement of the parties without ever appearing before a judge. 105 If a hearing is conducted, the court may rely on information gathered by pretrial services and, in jurisdictions with risk assessment tools, risk scores generated by such tools. 106

Setting aside the category of defendants who are detained so that a prior release may be revoked or modified or so that they may be deported or excluded (category 3 above)—who are beyond the scope of this Article—the court considers a limited range of information in determining whether to release a defendant and how that release should present. For example, § 3142(g) of the Bail Reform Act requires the judicial officer to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, 107 the weight of the evidence; the nature and seriousness of danger the release of the defendant presents; and the criminal and social history of the defendant. 108 This last category, the defendant's criminal and social history, is by far the broadest. This category permits the judge to consider the defendant's criminal history (including past arrests, convictions, and whether the defendant was on probation, parole, or other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense) and social history (including the defendant's mental and physical condition, familial ties, employment, education, financial resources, ties to the community, drug or alcohol abuse, and record of past court appearances). 109 In theory, risk assessment tools consider these factors in generating a risk score. 110 Even in jurisdictions in which risk assessment

103. Id. § 3142(a)(3); see id. § 3142(d).
104. Id. § 3142(a)(4); see id. § 3142(e).
105. See e.g., Melamed, supra note 5 (describing the practice in Philadelphia).
106. See BAUGHMAN, supra note 82, at 40–41. 18 U.S.C. § 3154(1) allows pretrial services to collect information and make recommendations to the court regarding release, detention, and any appropriate conditions in between. See § 3154(1). Section 3141(a) grants the court, or other judicial officers, the authority to release or detain defendants. Id. § 3141(a). For a state court example, see Stevenson, supra note 6, at 342–46 (describing the practice in Kentucky).
107. This may include whether the crime was violent or had an aggravating factor such as narcotics or a weapon, involved racial animus, or the defendant had a domestic relationship with the alleged victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(1).
108. Id. § 3142(g).
109. Id. § 3142(g)(3).
110. See infra Part II.
tools are used, courts may still rely on pretrial services to generate a report and to make recommendations regarding pretrial release or detention.111

As noted previously, the presumption under modern bail statutes is that in all but a very limited number of circumstances the defendant should be released either on her own recognizance, on monetary bail, or on some condition or conditions of release. For bail or conditions of release, the court must impose only those conditions necessary to mitigate whatever risk the defendant poses.112 The prosecution must demonstrate that such conditions are necessary by articulating a theory of risk—flight or danger to the community—before the court will even consider holding a defendant or imposing some conditions on his liberty.113 Despite this requirement, there have been few (if any) studies on what effects any particular condition has on either the defendant’s probability of appearance or her risk of future dangerousness. Instead, it appears that the Court’s requirement that pretrial conditions be linked to state goals is met when the state articulates its concern and requests to impose a condition. In reality, little to no consideration of the condition’s probability of success in mitigating the risk it purports to address is constitutionally necessary.

As a result, despite the default position of release and the required demonstration of necessity to trigger pretrial conditions of release, both conditions and pretrial detention remain common, even as bail requirements recede. Even a defendant released on her own recognizance is required to agree to attend all future court proceedings and to not commit any new offenses in any jurisdiction as a condition of the release (conditions, incidentally, a defendant is already required to comply with under other sections of the criminal code).114 Like bail, conditions of release can carry far-reaching consequences for the defendant and her community.115 Yet, such conditions are routinely imposed either by agreement or as a result of a cursory hearing with little attention paid to their impact or to whether they accomplish their purported goals. Defendants released on conditions are routinely characterized as being set free—as opposed to detained or released on bail. However, such conditions may do as much as, or even sometimes more than, monetary bail in terms of restricting the defendant’s current and future liberty.

111. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 345.
112. See § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception.”).
113. See § 3142(f); United States v. Butler, 165 F.R.D. 68, 71 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (“When there exists one or more grounds for holding a hearing . . . the government may proceed on the theory of risk of flight . . . danger to the community or any other person.”).
114. See § 3142(b).
115. See infra Part III.
Before turning to other aspects of pretrial release conditions, it is worth noting a significant commonality in both the constitutional and statutory aspects of pretrial release. For as little as the Supreme Court has weighed in on the constitutionality of pretrial release, it has maintained that imposition of a condition of release may not be arbitrary. 116 The Excessive Bail, Due Process, and Equal Protection Clauses require that there must be some underlying risk that the state seeks to mitigate through the infringement of liberty it seeks to impose—whether that be preventive detention in the case of Tony Salerno, monetary bail in the case of Loretta Stack, or something in between. 117

State and federal statutes echo this constitutional requirement, using pretrial release as a baseline that can be altered only upon a finding that some condition is necessary to protect the twin interests of reappearance and community safety. 118 Risk assessment tools and pretrial detention reform movements both purport a desire to get this balance “right”—to ensure that defendants are released absent some demonstration that concerns of flight risk or safety exist and are restrained in some way if such concerns are present. 119 Put another way, risk assessment tools and pretrial detention reform movements, together, seek to fulfill the function of the pretrial release process—to ensure the defendant’s liberty while protecting both the judicial process and the community at large.

The difficulty, however, is that they only get this balance half right. As discussed in Part II, risk assessment tools may remove much judicially initiated bias, and reform movements have shed light on the regressive practices of pretrial detention—particularly in the context of monetary bail and bias. Yet, each has done little to demand the fulfillment of the second half of the constitutional equation the Court articulated—the demonstration that conditions actually serve some articulated purpose and are not imposed arbitrarily or merely for the sake of curtailing the defendant’s liberty as she awaits trial. As a result, even as prosecutors and courts have backed away from the imposition of monetary bail in low-level cases, they continue to impose nonmonetary conditions, which can have an equally devastating effect on the defendant and her community and that have even greater criminogenic consequences. 120

116. See supra notes 45–63 and accompanying text.
117. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755.
118. See supra notes 100–13 and accompanying text.
119. See infra Part II.
120. See infra Section III.A.
II. DETERMINING PRETRIAL DETENTION

Pretrial detention reform movements have both worked within and pushed against the constitutional and statutory frameworks described above. In doing so, these movements have argued that current pretrial procedures reflect two entwined norms: First, that unacceptable bias has permeated pretrial detention procedures, just as it has other aspects of the criminal process; second, that while some defendants may pose either a risk of flight or danger to the community, pretrial detention procedures and the impositions on liberty they produce must be limited to those necessary to accomplish the state’s articulated interests. 121

Pretrial detention reform is hardly a new phenomenon. For the last four decades, waves of pretrial reforms have significantly altered the landscape of pretrial detention. From the Vera Institute’s efforts in the late 1960s to encourage judges to weigh particular factors in making pretrial decisions, 122 to implementation of risk assessment tools 123 and the abandonment of monetary bail, 124 “[t]here are few issues in criminal law with greater momentum than bail reform.” 125 Pretrial detention reforms have not only created widespread statutory and prosecutorial policy changes but have also tapped into, and fueled larger conversations about, criminal procedure’s function and unequal treatment of marginalized communities. 126

The lack of transparency in the pretrial detention process, 127 coupled with its apparent bias towards poor, minority, and marginalized defendants 128 and the long-term consequences of pretrial incarceration on the lives of the accused,

121. This Article does not mean to suggest that the forces behind bail and pretrial detention reform are monolithic or only bound to the norms described. These norms, however, do appear central throughout the movements.
122. See Katzive, supra note 2, at 7–8; Thomas, supra note 2, at 11; Botein, supra note 2, at 326; Ares et al., supra note 2, at 76–86.
123. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 344.
124. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
127. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2259; Gouldin, supra note 64, at 678–80, 724; Colgan, supra note 125, at 74–76.
defendants and communities,\textsuperscript{129} has driven these reform movements.\textsuperscript{130} To date, pretrial detention reform has generated two changes critical to this Article: the proliferation of machine-generated pretrial risk assessments and, most recently, the abolition of monetary bail. Risk assessment tools, which were designed to reduce bias by removing aspects of pretrial and sentencing discretion, have nonetheless garnered accusations of bias even within reform movements.\textsuperscript{131} Elimination of monetary bail, which has earned well-deserved praise for reducing bias in pretrial detention by removing one of the primary impediments to release for marginalized defendants,\textsuperscript{132} nonetheless carries problematic and underexplored consequences.\textsuperscript{133} This Part examines these products of pretrial detention reform movements.

Before continuing in the critique of risk assessment tools and the anti-bail movement, it is worth noting that this Article is not meant to undermine the real and significant work that pretrial detention reform movements have accomplished—and, hopefully, will continue to accomplish—through these reforms and others. This Article does, however, seek to push the conception of pretrial detention reform movements toward a more nuanced understanding of the reality of the battle occurring daily in courtrooms and in the lives of poor and minority defendants and to encourage yet another wave of reform.

A. Risk Assessment Tools

Heralded by proponents as a mechanism for reducing arbitrary or inaccurate calibration of the risk any particular defendant poses, actuarial risk assessment tools have become a major component of the third wave of pretrial detention reform.\textsuperscript{134} Risk assessment tools purport to predict the likelihood of future behavior—in the context of pretrial detention, to

\textsuperscript{129} See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713–14.


\textsuperscript{132} Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 492–94, 507–09.

\textsuperscript{133} See infra Section II.C, Part III.

\textsuperscript{134} Gouldin, supra note 64, at 713–16.
predict the probability that a defendant either will fail to appear, or will
commit or be arrested for a new offense. 135 These predictions are helpful
in that they focus the court’s inquiry at the pretrial detention stage and
offer a “risk assessment” score that the court (or legislators) can use to
set criteria for release, reducing opportunities for discretionary bias. 136
Put another way, a defendant who receives a “low” risk score from a risk
assessment tool is deemed unlikely to reoffend or to abscond while her
case is pending and, therefore, is a good candidate for release. 137
Alternatively, a candidate who receives a “high” risk score should be
released only under limited conditions, or not at all. 138 Others have
provided a much more in-depth analysis of the mechanics of risk
assessment tools, but at their core, these tools utilize an algorithm to
analyze a set of variables based on a dataset to produce the defendant’s
risk score. 139

Despite their promise of precise and unbiased results, risk assessment
tools are not without their critics. In 2016, ProPublica published an
exposé regarding one such tool, COMPAS, and declared that the software
was “biased against [B]lacks.” 140 Unsurprisingly, the software’s creator
hit back with its own data challenging ProPublica’s conclusions. 141
Regardless of where one falls on the COMPAS bias debate, as
Professor Sandra Mayson points out, even if the software lacks a bias

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135. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2228 (describing risk assessment tools as
“the actuarial assessment of the likelihood of some future event, usually arrest for [a] crime”);
Eaglin, supra note 6, at 61–62 (describing risk assessment tools in the context of sentencing).
136. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 62.
137. See Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, supra note 6, at 494–95.
138. See id.
139. See How the PSA Works, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RES.,
https://www.psapretrial.org/about/factors [https://perma.cc/J2QF-DYTA] (describing the PSA
tool and the database it relies upon); What Is the PSA?, ADVANCING PRETRIAL POL’Y & RES.,
https://www.psapretrial.org/about [https://perma.cc/ZSE4-TG6M]. For a description of its
application in Kentucky, see JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., JFA INST., KENTUCKY PRETRIAL RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT VALIDATION tbl.11 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/
System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=60b06cf8-f956-d6f1-d07f-a426f0465
846&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/WJ95-SSXR], MARK HEYERLY, KENTUCKY PRETRIAL
Logic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=95c0fae5-6e2c-72e0-15a2-84e
d28155d0a&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/SP6N-U3RS].
140. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), http://www.pro
publica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/XTF
5-MT3E]
141. See WILLIAM DIETERICH ET AL., NORTHPOINTE INC. RES. DEP’T, COMPAS RISK SCALES:
DEMONSTRATING ACCURACY EQUITY AND PREDICTIVE PARITY 1, 2–3, 8–13 (2016),
Key=b31d49f-9ba8-6537-4c08-983996379df&forceDialog=0 [https://perma.cc/DG2P-YCXX] (claiming, contrary to ProPublica’s claims, that COMPAS was race-neutral).
construct, it relies on biased inputs to produce the risk score. Such inputs, ranging from socioeconomic-dependent data, such as stability of housing or employment, to criminal-focused data, such as prior arrests, are both subject to and the products of racial and economic disparity. Beyond this, such data may have limited value in assessing the actual risk any given defendant poses pretrial.

Data regarding the number of times a defendant has been arrested may signal career criminality, or it may signal residence in a highly policed neighborhood, or racial, gender, or socioeconomic profiling by the police. Nevertheless, actuarial risk assessment tools rely on arrest data not because it is the best data to assess risk, but because it is cheap and readily available. In addition, the risk score itself may create a secondary form of bias. Judges may treat the same score differently depending as much on their own assessment of the defendant as the significance of the number generated by the risk assessment tool. To paraphrase Annie Hall, a defendant with a risk score of three may commit crimes constantly or hardly ever.

The critique of bias in actuarial risk assessment tools is hardly new or singular. The Department of Justice (DOJ), scholars, advocacy organizations, and the media have all warned of the possibility of bias.

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142. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2233–34.
143. See id. at 2229–30, 2233–34.
144. See id. at 2233–34.
145. Eaglin, supra note 6, at 101.
146. Id. at 102–03.
147. In Woody Allen’s film Annie Hall, the title character and her partner, Alvy, are asked by their respective therapists if they have sex anymore. ANnie HALL (Rollins-Joffe Productions 1977). Alvy responds, “Hardly ever, maybe three times a week.” Id. Annie responds, “Constantly . . . three times a week.” Id.
150. See, e.g., Angwin et al., supra note 140.
in such tools. 151 In the context of sentencing, risk assessments are valued for their predictive “accuracy,” not their fairness, creating a perverse incentive to maintain bias so long as it produces “accurate” results. 152 Even this claim of accuracy may be problematic as the presence of a conviction may create a self-fulfilling prophecy with regard to some predicted results. Beyond these critiques, it is questionable that these tools do the job they claim. Given the type of data they rely on to generate risk scores, their output reflects the historical reality of the criminal justice system as much as a prediction of any given defendant’s future behavior. 153

Reliance on risk assessment tools to determine eligibility for pretrial release is problematic on other levels. First, such tools are often used to support the imposition of particular conditions of release. 154 Such a use clearly exceeds the intended purpose of these tools to assess risk alone (as opposed to making a normative suggestion about conditions that might mitigate that risk). Second, such tools may fundamentally miscalculate the value of the defendant to her community. 155 In 1994, Professor Paul Butler made an analogous argument in the context of jury nullification. 156 He noted that a Black community may place greater value on the acquittal of defendants accused of drug possession than on their conviction, even if there was evidence to support the conviction. 157 Professor Butler argued that the devastating effect of the war on drugs on poor Black men and their communities, coupled with the lack of power within those communities to challenge police and prosecutorial policies, rendered nullification a powerful tool to alter the bias effect of such policies and, in the process, to promote and empower community values. 158 Community bail funds have made a similar argument regarding pretrial detention—noting that communities, not just defendants, benefit when a person makes bail. 159

In the context of actuarial risk assessment tools, a similar argument might be made. An assessment tool might consider a defendant who is likely either to fail to appear or to be arrested for a new offense a poor candidate for pretrial release. Members of her community, however,

151. Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2228–30.
152. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 97–98.
153. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2229–30.
154. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 62.
155. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2234.
157. Id. at 678.
158. Id. at 679.
might recognize the economic and practical challenges of court appearances or the high probability of arrest—regardless of activity—and might prioritize her continued presence in the community over any risk of flight or perceived dangerousness. Or, a community may simply value having its members remain within the community more than it fears any risk they may present. In this, the risk assessment tool might mischaracterize the community’s concerns and desires, undermining faith in its fairness or even accuracy.

Whether discussing potential bias in the tool (either as a matter of input or output) or the failure of the tool to accurately account for community values, one underlying concern is ever-present—the lack of information available about how the tool functions. Lack of transparency about both the dataset itself and the algorithm used to analyze the information requires a sort of blind faith, not only on the part of judges who rely on the scores but also on the part of the defendants and members of the community who suffer the consequences of such scores. Lack of transparency may also create obstacles to challenging actuarial risk assessment tools. Unlike allegations of discrimination by police, prosecutors, or judges—challenging claims to make in and of themselves—the algorithms risk assessment tools rely on to generate risk scores are the well-guarded secrets of the corporations who developed and marketed them. Even if the code for the algorithm is publicly available, there is insufficient and competing data on their effect on poor and minority defendants. This lack of information may make a defendant’s burden to demonstrate either bias or inaccuracy difficult to accomplish. In short, defendants may suffer bias as a result of the actuarial risk assessment tool but lack sufficient information to prove such bias to a court or other government agency. Far from infusing the pretrial detention process with certainty and consistency, risk assessment tools may therefore promote obscurity and distrust.

Despite this myriad of concerns, jurisdictions across the country continue to adopt risk assessment tools. Kentucky was one of the early

161. See id.
162. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 772.
163. The lack-of-transparency hurdle is not confined to risk assessment tools. An analogous challenge exists for defendants seeking to challenge charging decisions. Because charging decisions are made entirely within a prosecutor’s office, a defendant lacks information regarding charging and dismissal patterns. However, a defendant is not entitled to discovery to mount such a challenge unless he can first demonstrate a discriminatory pattern, which he cannot do unless he has access to discovery. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 458 (1996).
adopters of an actuarial risk assessment tool\textsuperscript{165} and, as the tools have become more widely accepted and more economical, more jurisdictions have followed suit.\textsuperscript{166} Kentucky adopted a tool known as the Public Safety Assessment (PSA).\textsuperscript{167} Developed by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, the PSA relies on a representative dataset to predict the defendant’s future dangerousness and flight probability while on pretrial release.\textsuperscript{168} Like other tools, the PSA analyzes a set of variables to determine a defendant’s risk score.\textsuperscript{169} Unlike other tools, however, it does not require a defendant interview, though it appears in Kentucky interviews do take place.\textsuperscript{170} The PSA’s lack of an interview requirement is not only a significant deviation from other actuarial risk assessment tools, but it is also a significant change from former pretrial services assessments that relied on defendant interviews, among other things, to assess risk.\textsuperscript{171} According to the PSA’s developers, by considering a

\textsuperscript{165} See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.066(2) (West 2020).
\textsuperscript{168} See How the PSA Works, supra note 139 (describing the PSA tool and the database it relies upon). For a description of its application in Kentucky, see AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 139, at tbl.11; MARK HEYERLY, supra note 139 at 3, 5.
\textsuperscript{169} See What is the PSA?, supra note 139.
\textsuperscript{170} See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 345-46 (describing the function of the PSA). The PSA weighs its assessment based on criminal history and prior failures to appear. See AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 139, at tbl.11. In addition, it considers other factors such as the defendant’s employment, housing, and the presence of a reference willing to attend court or cosign an imposed bond. Id. at tbl.6.
\textsuperscript{171} For example, the Indiana Risk Assessment System’s Community Supervision Intake Assessment relies on a structured interview. UNIV. OF CINCINNATI, INDIANA RISK ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 2-2 to 2-8 (2010), https://university.pretrial.org/HigherLogic/System/Download
closed universe of data, the tool can predict the defendant’s risk, recommend appropriate conditions of release, and avoid potential bias. 172

Kentucky, in its adoption of the PSA, did not completely eliminate pretrial hearings and the judicial discretion that accompany them. 173 However, this remnant of discretion is not without its hazards. Implementation of the pretrial assessment program in Kentucky produced uneven results depending on the judge conducting the hearing. 174 In this sense, even if the assessment tool itself was not biased—a contested proposition to be sure—the judge’s interpretation of the risk score produced by the tool was inevitably subject to the judge’s bias. 175 Concerns over bias embedded in discretionary decisions are hardly new. Before pretrial detention reform movements, sentencing reformers argued that judicial discretion was a minefield of bias and inequity. 176 Yet, in discretion also lies semblances of humanity and the opportunity for community values to emerge. The same judge that might prevent the pretrial release of a defendant based on prejudice might also be the judge who recognizes that a rote calculation generated by an algorithm and based on preordained factors might overlook the reality of a defendant and the need for release. In the end, despite Kentucky’s adoption of assessment tools, judges within the state continue to exercise broad discretion during pretrial detention hearings. 177

B. Nonmonetary Bail

In addition to the use of actuarial risk assessment tools, some jurisdictions—most notably California, New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia—have adopted policies that permit release of particular defendants without a hearing and without a requirement of monetary

172. See How the PSA Works, supra note 139; What is the PSA?, supra note 139.
173. See id.
174. Id. at 309–10, 346–48 (noting that judges in rural and predominately white counties treated risk scores differently than judges in urban, predominately Black counties).
175. See id.
177. See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 344–48.
bail.\textsuperscript{178} Eligibility for such release is a product of the defendant’s charge and her assessed risk.\textsuperscript{179} Defendants charged with relatively low-level offenses, such as minor property, drug possession, or nonviolent felony offenses, and who have little to no prior criminal history, may be released without monetary bail and no or few other conditions of release.\textsuperscript{180}

Admittedly, such reforms are imperfect. They may still rely on actuarial risk assessment tools that carry their own bias, and many are limited in scope and dependent entirely on prosecutorial discretion regarding the charge.\textsuperscript{181} A defendant in possession of narcotics, for example, may enjoy pretrial release without bail in Philadelphia if she is charged with possession of narcotics, but she may not enjoy release if she is charged with possession with intent to deliver.\textsuperscript{182} Likewise, a defendant accused of beating up his girlfriend may enjoy pretrial release without bail if he is charged with a low-level assault without a domestic violence enhancement, but he may not enjoy release if he is charged either with a higher level of assault or if the assault is charged as domestic violence.\textsuperscript{183} Charging decisions are entirely at the discretion of the prosecutor, allowing both bias and potential manipulation to come into play even as the district attorney claims to be abandoning bail policies that discriminate against poor and predominately minority defendants.\textsuperscript{184}


\textsuperscript{179} See Aurélie Ouss & Megan Stevenson, Bail, Jail, and Pretrial Misconduct: The Influence of Prosecutors 14 (June 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3335138 [https://perma.cc/EJ9K-7YX6]. In Philadelphia, for instance, the district attorney “[Larry] Krasner announced that his office would stop seeking monetary bail if the lead charge was among a set of 25 low-level offenses.” \textit{Id}. In New York, the no bail reform would eliminate bail for both misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies. See McKinley & Southall, supra note 178.

\textsuperscript{180} See Ouss & Stevenson, supra note 179, at 14.

\textsuperscript{181} See id. (noting the practice in Philadelphia where defendants only enjoy no bail when charged with specified offenses).

\textsuperscript{182} Id.

\textsuperscript{183} Id. at 14, 17 n.27.

\textsuperscript{184} Recent critiques of Philadelphia’s bail policies suggest that such manipulation is in fact occurring. See Covert, supra note 5.
Despite these imperfections, nonmonetary bail reforms are significant for several reasons. First, they signal the state’s willingness to permit release during the pendency of trial. Whether out of a recognition of the deleterious collateral effects of pretrial detention or out of some less progressive ulterior motive or motives, the result has been the same—a defendant who might previously have remained in jail while her case wound its way through court can now be released.185

As a former public defender, the Author knows firsthand what scholars and community bail reformers assert—a defendant who is not in custody can better maintain her personal dignity and identity by remaining in her community.186 Moreover, she can fight the charges against her better because she is in a better position to assist in her defense outside of jail than inside.187 Outside she can help track down witnesses or prepare to testify.188 Outside she can maintain her ties to her family, community, job, or school.189 Outside she can utilize available community resources, including mental health treatment and substance abuse treatment.190 Outside she is less likely to take a plea deal out of desperation.191 Outside she is in a better position to see her case dismissed or funneled to an alternative resolution, such as a pretrial diversion or deferral of prosecution.192 Outside she is more likely to receive a favorable plea deal or sentence.193

As countless studies over the last forty-plus years have demonstrated, even a seemingly small fine, fee, or bail amount may impose an insurmountable financial burden on a defendant and her family.194 Put plainly, a defendant may linger in jail pretrial even with a small bail

187. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 722.
188. See id. at 714.
189. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417–21, 1423, 1427.
190. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 727.
191. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419.
192. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 722. The prosecution may also have some incentive to offer a person on pretrial release a speedy resolution of the case. Not only does it promote efficiency, but it also demonstrates a type of benevolent prosecutorial discretion—if a defendant works hard and maintains a law-abiding existence, she will receive a benefit from the state that might otherwise seek her conviction.
193. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419–21.
In such cases, the incentive to resolve the case may be especially high and the bargaining position of the defendant especially low. Seen in this light, these reforms are important because they take an admittedly small step toward leveling the criminal court playing field for marginalized defendants by granting poor defendants the same advantage of pretrial release enjoyed by wealthier defendants.

Second, early studies suggest that such reforms have not resulted in an increase in either failures to appear or recidivism among defendants who have benefitted from them. Admittedly, the data are limited given the novelty of the policy. These results, however, are consistent with longitudinal studies conducted by the Vera Institute and the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, which concluded that relatively low-risk defendants—those with little to no criminal history, charged with minor offenses, and with community ties—are highly likely to reappear in court and to avoid new charges even with few or no conditions of release.

Admittedly, the reform efforts in Philadelphia have come under criticism, as community stakeholders assert that prosecutors are both erratic and nontransparent in their bail requests—requesting bail in cases that appear to fall within the no bail policy inconsistently and without explanation or warning. This may signal either additional bias within the prosecutor’s office—even as it seeks to implement a progressive policy—or a lack of genuineness regarding the reform. Either is difficult to diagnose from afar. The fact that the policies are internal to the prosecutor’s office (as opposed to the product of a court mandate or legislative reform) render them difficult to enforce. As frustrating as the failure to conform to the policy may be, the continued public critique of

195. Kalief Browder, whose suicide ignited New York’s bail reform movement, was held in pretrial detention for two years when his bail was set at $3,000, an amount his family could not post on his behalf. McKinley & Southall, supra note 178.


197. Even in this progress, clearly the power dynamic is still skewed. Policing and prosecutorial discretion still cut against marginal and minority defendants. Police still overpatrol poor neighborhoods, and prosecutors continue to charge low-level offenses against minority defendants as a result of these patrols. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2251–57 (noting this phenomenon in the context of risk assessment tools that rely on arrests as indicia of risk).


199. Id.

200. See Katzive, supra note 2, at 14–15; Thomas, supra note 2, at 25; Botein, supra note 2, at 327; Ares et al., supra note 2, at 86; What Is the PSA?, supra note 139.

201. See Covert, supra note 5.
the office’s policies demonstrates a continued commitment towards both eradicating bail within the community the office purports to serve and holding the elected prosecutor accountable. These commitments can and should be seen as a real sign of progress, even as the policy itself may be imperfect in its implementation.

C. 2020 and Pretrial Release

Events of 2020 have highlighted shortcomings in the pretrial detention system—both in the context of monetary bail and in the context of nonmonetary conditions of release. The global pandemic of COVID-19 has not only created new risks for pretrial detainees, but it has also called into question calculations of safety and unrealistic compliance requirements for release. In addition, George Floyd’s killing and the protests that followed have not only sparked new calls for reform, disaggregation, and abolition within the criminal system in general and the pretrial detention system in particular, but these events have also laid bare judicial reliance on pretrial release conditions as a means to silence dissent and promote a singular conception of safety. These combined occurrences—COVID-19, Floyd’s death, and the social unrest that followed—are not the products of the pretrial detention system (though police killed Floyd as they took him into custody). Nor do they solely affect this system. But they do bring to the surface in an exaggerated sense the flaws that have always existed in the system. This Section explores what these crises have exposed.

1. COVID-19

In many ways, COVID-19 has exposed the flaws in existing pretrial detention systems. As jail administrators witnessed the shutdown of courts in the face of the pandemic, pretrial detention populations, already disproportionately large, burgeoned. With speedy trial checks no longer in place, pretrial detainees lingered in jails, increasing not only the population but the contagion risk. Even before COVID-19 outbreaks in jails and prisons across the nation, advocates urged a reconsideration of pretrial detention policies. They noted not only that social distancing was impossible in jail but also that many pretrial detainees were...
especially vulnerable to the coronavirus and were held on accusations of nonviolent or minor offenses more because of their poverty than their dangerousness or risk of flight.\footnote{206}

Admittedly, different actors reacted differently to these calls for release. Consider the Mobile Jail in Alabama. Early in the pandemic, the jail decided to release a third of its inmate population—including many pretrial detainees.\footnote{207} Other responses were less vigorous. Mayor Bill DeBlasio’s office, which promised release of nonviolent, older, and medically vulnerable inmates as well as those held on small bail holds, was criticized for releasing few inmates even as COVID-19 rates rose at Riker’s Island.\footnote{208} And Attorney General William Barr was widely criticized for the DOJ’s failure to make good on COVID-19 releases within the federal system.\footnote{209} Regardless of these reactions, the reality that COVID-19 exposed was threefold. The first was well-documented previously: as judges calculate pretrial detention risks and mitigation, they either tend toward detention or conditions of release (monetary or otherwise) that are out of reach of those to whom the conditions are applied.\footnote{210} In short, current pretrial detention models produce huge jail populations. Second, many pretrial release efforts failed in the midst of COVID-19 because inmates and their communities could not comply with the required conditions of release. While monetary bail requirements were often waived, conditions of release, such as EHM or housing

requirements, were not Without resources for these conditions of release, inmates lingered in jail in the midst of the crisis. Finally, pretrial detention models are inflexible or too singular in their construction of safety. During a global pandemic such as COVID-19, the safety calculations that ordinarily occur in a pretrial setting failed to consider that a community and a defendant might be safer if allowed to shelter at home as opposed to remaining detained. As discussed above, calculations of safety rely on rigid assumptions not only about what safety means but also about who should have the opportunity to define safety.

2. George Floyd’s Death and the Protests that Followed

Like COVID-19, George Floyd’s death and the protests that followed revealed preexisting global flaws in the criminal system that are informative to thinking about pretrial detention. On a basic level, the crisis following Floyd’s death, like COVID-19, highlighted a need to reconsider concepts of safety within the criminal system. Protestors took to the streets across the nation and the globe to question both the value of the criminal system defining safety and the wisdom of relying on the criminal system’s actors to enforce those notions of safety. Calls for reforming the criminal system, decriminalizing low-level offenses, and defunding, disaggregating, or even abolishing the police are, in many ways, challenges to criminal laws’ efforts to monopolize both definitions


of safety and the conditions that promote safety in the face of a criminal accusation.

For its part, the criminal system’s response to these challenges has been a rejection of any effort to realign definitions of safety and resistance to protestors’ acts of dissent. Local police have tear gassed, pepper sprayed and bulleted, beaten, and arrested protestors.217 They have done so in riot gear in plain view218 and through stealth detainment by plainclothes officers in unmarked vans.219 Federal agents have joined in quelling the protests.220 U.S. Attorneys have indicted221 and courts have


imposed bail and pretrial conditions of release—including, in at least one jurisdiction, the imposition of a pretrial condition of release that prohibited further participation in protest movements. While this may appear at first blush to be a novel pretrial condition of release, in reality, it is consistent with the imposition of pretrial conditions that restrict the accused’s liberty and thus triggers substantive due process concerns.

D. The Takeaway from Years of Reform and a Year of Unrest

Just as it is hard to understate the impact of the twin crises of 2020—COVID-19 and social unrest following George Floyd’s death—on conceptions of the criminal system and the calculus of pretrial detention, it is hard to understate the positive impact of years of bail reform for poor and marginalized defendants. Despite reform efforts, the events of 2020 make clear that criminal law, in its construction of safety, often miscalculates community needs—particularly the needs of marginalized communities. While this argument can certainly be made broadly, it is also clear that continued emphasis on the twin concerns of future dangerousness and flight risk in the pretrial detention context—despite reform efforts—has created a system more likely to detain the poorest and most marginalized. In addition, conditions of release imposed during the COVID-19 crisis emphasize how difficult it is for marginalized individuals to comply. The absence of support systems or even EHM capability in communities resulted in continued detention for many in the midst of the pandemic despite release orders. These defendants could not get out of jail because there was no way for them to comply with the court’s release order. This disconnect between the court’s calculus of what is necessary to mitigate pretrial release and what is actually available in the community for defendants exacerbates the nation’s current swollen pretrial detention population.

It is also worth noting that bail reforms, whether in states like New Jersey, California, New York, or Kentucky, or in jurisdictions like Philadelphia or New York City, are imperfect even as they are beneficial. First, pretrial detention hearings remain truncated affairs. In Kentucky, for example, there is little evidence that the use of the actuarial risk
assessment tool has rendered the hearing more nuanced or lengthier.\(^{224}\) Judges still rely on the assessment tool to set the baseline, and studies suggest that bail hearings remain one- to five-minute events.\(^{225}\) This is significant not only because it suggests that major decisions are being made quickly and based on relatively little information but also because, once a bail decision is made, a party may not request reconsideration of that decision absent evidence of some new circumstance.\(^{226}\) This restriction has the effect of rendering a pretrial detention decision, once made, nearly irreversible from the defendant’s perspective.\(^{227}\)

Beyond this, pretrial detention hearings often fail to engage in a meaningful analysis of appropriate conditions of release.\(^{228}\) Instead, these hearings tend to be quick, relatively superficial, and formulaic, with courts routinely imposing conditions on defendants regardless of the perceived risks—and often based on the perception of the risk alone with little or no effort to establish the nexus between the risk and the proposed cure.\(^{229}\) Such conditions include avoiding new arrests, refraining from the use of illegal drugs (and in some jurisdictions alcohol), reporting to a pretrial services officer, and complying with a no-contact order if the allegation involved either a particular location (for property crimes) or a

\(^{224}\) See Stevenson, supra note 6, at 310, 345–46.

\(^{225}\) See id. Data from other jurisdictions are similar. A study in Prince George’s County, Maryland, found that pretrial detention decisions were made in a matter of minutes. See Color of Change & Progressive MD., Prince George’s County: A Study of Bail 4, 9, 13 (2018), https://static.colorofchange.org/static/v3/pg_report.pdf?akid=14740.3112990.lZ6o/eM&rd=1&t=8 [https://perma.cc/PX43-KP9F] (describing bail hearings in Prince George’s County as quick affairs with “most lasting no more than five minutes, and some concluding within one minute”); Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right to Counsel at Bail, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 1719, 1755 (2002) (observing that pretrial detention hearings in Baltimore City with counsel lasted “on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus one minute, forty-seven seconds without counsel”).

\(^{226}\) See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (providing that a judge may reopen a pretrial detention question only when there is new evidence that is material to the decision of whether detention is appropriate). Courts have found that the statute limits a judge’s discretion to reopen bail issues. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 606 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.P.R. 2009) (stating that the judge’s discretion to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142(f)(2)(B)); United States v. Cannon, 711 F. Supp. 2d 602, 605–06 (E.D. Va. 2010) (stating that the judge’s discretion to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142 but noting the statute did not apply in the case).

\(^{227}\) See § 3142(f); see also Rodriguez-Adorno, 606 F. Supp. 2d at 237 (stating that the judge’s discretion to reopen a detention hearing is limited by § 3142(f)(2)(B)). In contrast, from the prosecutor’s perspective, decisions of release are reversed when defendants violate conditions of release.

\(^{228}\) See Gold, supra note 10, at 515, 519; Samuel R. Wiseman, Fixing Bail, 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 417, 446–47 (2016); see also Colbert et al., supra note 225, at 1755–56 (finding that the presence of an attorney “improved the substantive justice” for defendants at bail hearings).

particular victim (for crimes against a person). In cases involving narcotics, random urinalysis is also routinely ordered regardless of whether the defendant has demonstrated any risk for drug use or whether that risk of drug use is related to the articulated interests of bail statutes—preventing flight and ensuring safety. All such conditions carry consequences—monetary and otherwise—for the defendants and their communities.

Even in jurisdictions that have adopted no bail positions, prosecutors ask for, and defendants often agree to, set conditions of release. In other words, it is disingenuous to label the pretrial release that occurs in jurisdictions like Philadelphia or New York City for designated offenses “unregulated” release. In fact, this form of release may still require defendants, for example, to report to pretrial services, maintain no-contact orders, submit to drug testing, or maintain work or educational commitments. When asked what happens if a defendant does not agree to these conditions, a defense attorney responded, “I don’t know. No one has ever not signed the release papers.”

All of this raises a real and neglected concern in the context of pretrial detention reform. Even as the bail reform movement has succeeded in ensuring pretrial release more frequently for marginalized defendants, it has failed to address the reality that marginalized defendants may still be subject to release conditions that are costly, carry significant collateral consequences, and receive relatively little scrutiny as to their necessity. Whether talking about statutory or constitutional aspects of bail, the requirement of a link between the risk and the infringement on liberty is constant. A court may only impose a condition of release if it promotes the state’s interest. Otherwise, a condition of release is arbitrary and, by its very nature, excessive. This is true whether discussing monetary bail or other conditions of release. And yet, nonmonetary conditions of

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230. § 3142(c) (listing possible conditions of release in federal court); see also Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289–90, 290 nn.83–84 (listing state conditions of release).
231. See Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 309–10, 310 n.146.
232. See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417.
234. Id.
235. Id. This Article does not mean to suggest that this response reveals a lack of zealous advocacy by Ms. Levya or her colleagues but rather reflects a sentiment that when faced with the prospect of pretrial detention, the lure of release is too great and defendants will, understandably, accept curtailment of their liberty. The Author’s own experience in arraignment court as a public defender was much the same. Defendants wanted to be free and would accept conditions that promoted that freedom, even if such conditions ultimately proved impossible to conform with.
236. See supra Sections I.A, I.B.
237. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
238. See Gouldin, supra note 64, at 699–700.
239. See id.
release are routinely imposed on defendants prior to trial with little to no consideration of the function they actually serve.\textsuperscript{240} Part III considers the effects of nonmonetary conditions of release, arguing they are worthy not only of increased scrutiny but also constitutional challenge.

### III. The Reality of Conditions of Release

Even as the most recent iteration of bail reform has enjoyed tremendous success in curtailing and, in some states, removing monetary bail requirements for some or all offenses, the reality lingers that barring bail may increase the probability that a defendant will be released on stricter conditions, or not at all.\textsuperscript{241} Conditions of release carry equally, if not more devastating, collateral consequences for the defendant and her community. Courts impose such conditions with minimal or sometimes no effort to ascertain their necessity or their utility in mitigating perceived risk.\textsuperscript{242} Further, the administration of such conditions grants tremendous discretionary power to pretrial services officers, essentially placing the defendant on probation prior to conviction or sentence.\textsuperscript{243} Not only is this reality contrary to the Supreme Court’s characterization of permissible bail—that linked to the mitigation of legitimate state-identified risks—but it also perpetuates racial and social inequity in the pretrial system.\textsuperscript{244} This Part explores the realities of nonmonetary conditions of pretrial release, arguing that these conditions represent a potentially more insidious form of control and future incarceration than the system of bail they replaced. As writer and civil rights advocate Michelle Alexander notes, “Freedom—even when it’s granted, it turns out—isn’t really free.”\textsuperscript{245}

#### A. The Cost of Conditions of Release

Modern bail reform movements have focused in no small part on the consequences of pretrial detention on marginalized communities.\textsuperscript{246}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{240} See id. at 700 & n.22.
\item \textsuperscript{241} See Baughman, supra note 82, at 52; Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289–90 (noting that nonmonetary conditions of release were designed to replace bail).
\item \textsuperscript{242} Professor Fiona Doherty has also noted this in the context of post-conviction release. See Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 1012–13 (2013).
\item \textsuperscript{243} See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
\item \textsuperscript{244} See supra notes 45–63 and accompanying text.
There is little question that pretrial detention carries tremendous and multifaceted burdens for the defendant, her family, and her community.\textsuperscript{247} Even a short period of detention can cost a defendant her home, child custody, or her job.\textsuperscript{248} Detained defendants are more likely to accept plea offers and are less able to assist in their defense than defendants who are not detained.\textsuperscript{249} The bail reform movement recognizes that bail, even in small or bondable amounts, creates a sort of Sophie’s choice\textsuperscript{250} for marginalized defendants. They can either forgo bail and remain detained, or they—or often more accurately their community, family, or friends—can pay bail by selling valuables, handing over meager savings, or relying on a bond system with its own notoriously predatory nature.\textsuperscript{251} For someone without even $500 to post for bail or bond, there is no winning choice.

The difficulty, however, is that in the face of a bail reform movement that advocates the wholesale abandonment of monetary bail, courts and legislatures have turned to conditions of release as a substitute for monetary bail, particularly for defendants with criminal histories, past noncompliance with conditions of release (including bail jumping), or charges of noneligible offenses.\textsuperscript{252} Such conditions, however, carry their own set of underexplored consequences.\textsuperscript{253} Consider three, for example: monetary costs, social costs, and criminogenic effects.

\textsuperscript{247} See Yang, supra note 186, at 1417–29; Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713–14; Simonson, supra note 3, at 595.

\textsuperscript{248} Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713.

\textsuperscript{249} See Yang, supra note 186, at 1419.

\textsuperscript{250} See generally William Styron, Sophie’s Choice (1979). In the novel, the title character, Sophie, must choose between her two children. A personally catastrophic choice has become known colloquially as a “Sophie’s choice.”

\textsuperscript{251} See Bazelon, supra note 18, at 44–45.

\textsuperscript{252} See Tobolowsky & Quin, supra note 8, at 289 (stating that the legislature has developed alternatives to pretrial release in response to public concern regarding crime). Conditions of release are often offered as viable alternatives for monetary bail. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 186, at 1480–82 (comparing the benefits and risks of electronic monitoring as opposed to pretrial detention); Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1364–68 (2014) (describing the use of electronic monitoring in place of pretrial detention).

\textsuperscript{253} Yang, supra note 186, at 1480–82 (noting that little work has been done regarding the practical realities of electronic monitoring); Wiseman, supra note 252, at 1364, 1368–69 (describing the concerns surrounding electronic monitoring and the limited research available on its effectiveness).
To understand such consequences, it is helpful to think of them in the context of typical release conditions.\textsuperscript{254} Some conditions, such as the requirement for avoiding new law violations or appearing at all future court appearances, carry fewer additional obligations for a defendant than others. A defendant must already appear at all future proceedings or risk a new arrest for a failure to appear. And like everyone, a defendant risks arrest (and detention) if she commits new law violations.\textsuperscript{255}

Other conditions, however, carry more onerous obligations, and with them, higher collateral consequences whether the defendant complies or not. A court may order a defendant, for example, to remain employed or in school, to refrain from the use of illegal drugs or alcohol, or to report to an assigned pretrial services officer either in person or by phone.\textsuperscript{256} A court may order a defendant to submit to random urinalysis or other forms of randomized drug testing.\textsuperscript{257} A court may condition a defendant’s release on her agreement to be tethered to an electronic ankle bracelet that utilizes GPS to track her movements (i.e., EHM).\textsuperscript{258} Or, a court may require her to accept placement at a monitored facility, such as a halfway house, mental health institution, or drug treatment center.\textsuperscript{259} A court may also order a defendant to submit to work release, where she is permitted to leave the pretrial detention facility—usually the county jail—only to go to work or school.\textsuperscript{260} A court, particularly in cases involving known victims, may order a defendant to have no contact with a person or place during the pendency of the defendant’s case.\textsuperscript{261} Finally, a court in Oregon

\textsuperscript{254} For a list of typical release conditions in federal court, see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B). In state court, these types of conditions are common, but broader conditions may also exist (e.g., conditions to be good or avoid bad people or bad behavior). See Fiona Doherty, \textit{Obey All Laws and Be Good: Probation and the Meaning of Recidivism}, 104 Geo. L.J. 291, 303–09 (2016). As Professor Doherty notes, enforcement of such vague conditions further already broad pretrial discretion. Id. at 308. The National Conference of State Legislatures and the National Association of Pretrial Services Agencies both provide information about conditions of release in state court which includes most commonly the conditions described below. See \textit{Pretrial Release Conditions, Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures} (Sept. 15, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/pretrial-release-conditions.aspx [https://perma.cc/B48Q-B3X8]; \textit{Pretrial Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Pretrial Servs. Agencies}, https://napsa.org/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=napsa&WebCode=Release [https://perma.cc/85DX-ZUCG]. Release documents are surprisingly hard to locate outside of electronic court dockets. For an example of one such release order available in a court’s opinion, see United States v. Harcevic, No. 4:15 CR 49, 2015 WL 1821509, at *1–2 (E.D. Mo. 2015).

\textsuperscript{255} Though, as will be discussed, for a defendant, a new law violation may be calculated in terms of a new arrest. See infra note 296 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{256} 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B).

\textsuperscript{257} See id.

\textsuperscript{258} See id.

\textsuperscript{259} See id.

\textsuperscript{260} See id.

\textsuperscript{261} Id.
ordered arrested protestors to “not attend any other protests, rallies, assemblies or public gatherings in the state of Oregon” as a condition of pretrial release. This is by no means an exhaustive list of pretrial conditions; it is meant to give a sense of what conditions the court might impose pretrial.

Each of these conditions, by their very nature, curtail the defendant’s liberty to some extent. Some curtailments are minor, others more severe. All carry some form of collateral consequence. At the most extreme end, the conditions imposed by the Oregon court implicate the defendant’s First Amendment rights of speech, assembly, and to petition the government. Less extreme conditions may create their own burdens. Attendance requirements—whether at the next court appearance, a meeting with a pretrial services officer, urine or blood collection for drug testing, court-ordered drug or mental health treatment, or a particular workplace or school—may impose burdens on defendants with little access to transportation. Similarly, attendance requirements may prove disruptive to other obligations. A defendant who waits for several hours in a crowded courtroom for her case to be called may miss work, school, or familial obligations. Defendants who work jobs with inflexible schedules and poor job security may find that absences for court, pretrial services meetings (even those by phone), or drug testing or treatment are rewarded with either a reduced work schedule or termination.

Although some attendance obligations are scheduled in advance and may accommodate a defendant’s schedule, even these are not always reliable. Courts—particularly heavily docketed arraignment, motions, and status conference courts—are often overscheduled with multiple defendants calendared for a single appearance time. Add overburdened prosecutors and defenders to the mix, and even a scheduled appearance can consume more time than a defendant’s counsel may have predicted or a defendant may have allotted. In addition, given the stigma attached to criminalization, a defendant may not want to share with an employer, teacher, or daycare provider that she has a pending criminal charge, leaving the impression that the defendant is unreliable, negligent, or uninterested. Ironically, then, for defendants ordered to remain employed or enrolled in school, the additional court-imposed attendance requirements may challenge the defendant’s compliance with the employment or education conditions.


263. Superficially, attendance requirements may seem a mere necessary burden to a criminal charge. Many court appearances, however, do not require a defendant’s participation per se, and yet the court may require her attendance as a pretrial condition of release. Motions to continue in which the defendant agrees with the need for a continuance, for example, do not benefit from the
Attendance requirements may also carry financial burdens for defendants. In addition to lost work time (and therefore wages), defendants with obligations to care for children or elderly or disabled family members may have to hire someone else to provide the care. Few criminal courtrooms are hospitable to young children (if they are allowed at all).\textsuperscript{264} Fewer still offer day care, childcare, or eldercare centers.\textsuperscript{265} Transportation may also prove costly for defendants and their families. Outside of major metropolitan areas, access to public transportation is limited. What does exist may run on an infrequent schedule, rendering some attendance obligations all-day, or near all-day, events.\textsuperscript{266} Defendants without access to public transportation must rely on private transportation—either their own, borrowed, or rented. Private transportation carries additional costs of gas and parking. Many courthouses that also house pretrial services offices are located in downtown areas, away from residential communities and with limited free parking, so defendants may find hidden costs to court attendance or in-person pretrial services meetings. Work, school, and treatment facilities may enjoy the advantage of proximity to the defendant’s home, though not always.

Attendance requirements are not the only conditions that carry a monetary burden for defendants.\textsuperscript{267} EHM requires a “hook up” fee, which...
can range between $350 and $450, and a monthly maintenance fee, usually in the range of $190 to $450 (specific fees vary by jurisdiction).\textsuperscript{268} In addition, defendants are required to maintain internet services at their designated location to facilitate tracking.\textsuperscript{269} Fees for EHM services can also vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, creating further disparity.\textsuperscript{270} School and treatment programs—assuming an opening at either exists—may carry tuition or enrollment fees. Work release programs often charge a defendant a “housing” fee to remain in the pretrial detention facility when not working.\textsuperscript{271} Even pretrial services meetings in which a defendant is permitted to call a service and confirm their location often come with a service fee between $2 and $4 per call.\textsuperscript{272}


\textsuperscript{272} Service fees are imposed because call-in services are administered by private companies that set fee schedules. For an example of one, see Offender Mgmt., supra note 268. Admittedly, not all aspects of pretrial services require a fee. Many jurisdictions offer free court date reminder services either through calls, texts, or emails. For an example of one in Durham County, see Pretrial Services, Durham Cnty. N.C., https://www.dconc.gov/ government/departments-a-
Urinalysis can also carry monetary consequences. Some jurisdictions charge pretrial detainees a fee for leaving urine samples at designated locations, analysis of the urine, or both. 273

Pretrial conditions can also curtail physical liberty. For example, defendants on EHM or work release may only travel within court-designated perimeters. 274 Even within those perimeters, the presence of an EHM bracelet may carry a stigma that curtails movement. 275 No-contact orders also often rely on perimeters for ease of enforcement. 276 A court will therefore order a defendant to remain a particular distance—say 300 feet—from a person or place. Depending on the defendant’s living, work, or community situation, such perimeters around people or locations can necessitate acquiring a new home, job, or neighborhood.

Like their monetary bail counterparts, nonmonetary conditions of release can carry collateral effects as well. In addition to burdens that directly affect the defendant—the loss of employment, educational opportunities, housing, and money—nonmonetary conditions of release and the collateral losses they carry can impact the defendant’s family and community. As with monetary bail, financial and other obligations are often borne not only by the defendant herself but also by those in her immediate and larger community. 277 Costs of EHM or a taxi to meet a pretrial services officer may be a communal financial obligation in the sense that the defendant will not be able to use that money for other needs, or the obligation will literally be paid by the community.

No-contact orders also carry criminogenic effects. 278 A defendant accused of either a property crime or a crime against a person may be
ordered to have no contact with either the property or alleged victim. Oftentimes, no-contact orders are surprisingly broad. For example, defendants accused of shoplifting from a drug store, such as CVS, may not only be ordered to have no contact with the particular CVS store alleged in the complaint but with all CVS stores. Likewise, a defendant accused of assaulting a particular person may not only be ordered to have no contact with that person but also to remain a designated distance from that person or to avoid contact with other persons related to the alleged victim. The consequences of violating a no-contact order are twofold. First, the defendant violates a condition of release. This may result in her incarceration in the immediate case, and in future risk assessments she will score as a higher risk as a result of the violation. Second, the defendant violating a no-contact order imposed as a pretrial condition of release may face a new, previously unavailable criminal charge of either trespass or violation of a no-contact order. These new charges stem entirely from the existence of the pretrial no-contact order and may proceed regardless of whether the defendant is convicted of the offense that spawned the no-contact order to begin with. In short, the condition of release generates a new crime for which the defendant may be convicted and sentenced.

Beyond these costs, conditions of release, like pretrial detention, may impact the defendant’s ability to maintain housing, custody of children, or social stability. Even seemingly innocuous conditions, such as reporting to pretrial services, may present significant challenges to marginalized defendants. Yet, failure to comply with conditions of release, even minor ones, may result in detention and increased risk scores on future assessments. For their part, pretrial services officers carry tremendous discretionary power to report violations to the court and to seek remand to custody. Even a report of a violation alone can

279. See § 3142(c)(B).
280. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
281. See Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 766.
282. Criminal trespass is defined in most jurisdictions as unlawful entry onto property. E.g., Fla. Stat. § 810.12 (2020). Under this common statute, a defendant does not have to intend to commit an additional crime upon entry. Id. Her entry alone is sufficient for conviction. Id. The presence of the no-contact order renders the entry unlawful even for public and semipublic spaces, such as the CVS in the hypothetical.
283. See, e.g., Anaya, 976 P.2d at 1253; § 18-920.
284. See Anaya, 976 P.2d at 1253; § 18-920.
285. Heaton et al., supra note 4, at 713.
286. Id. at 760, 766.
287. See 18 U.S.C. § 3152 (allowing for the creation of pretrial services); id. § 3154 (granting power to pretrial services to monitor and report violations of conditions of release); 8E GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY §§ 620.10(a), 620.40.10, 620.40.20 (2010), http://www.madisonattorney.com/
trigger detention. Reform movements have rightly bemoaned the bias that is often embedded in judicial discretion, but little attention has been paid to the power of unelected, and largely unseen, pretrial services officers.

Pretrial services officers serve as an informational conduit to the court—gathering information about the defendant and monitoring compliance with conditions of release. Once the officer suspects a violation, he has the discretion to order the defendant’s arrest for noncompliance with the conditions of release. To be sure, a judge must determine whether the reported violation has occurred and whether, given the violation, modifications to the defendant’s conditions of release are necessary. But just as short periods of pretrial detention can carry devastating collateral consequences, so too can brief periods of detention triggered by alleged violations.

For a condition requiring no new law violations, this problem is compounded by the fact that an arrest or a new charge can constitute a violation, even if it never leads to a conviction. Accordingly, pretrial services offices rely entirely on police discretion to support an allegation of a violation. Given the overwhelming data that poor and minority populations are overpoliced and most often arrested, this condition is stacked against marginalized defendants. Beyond this, pretrial services officers often fail to take into account whether the offense that forms the basis of the “new” charge occurred before or after the matter for which the defendant is released. In other words, a preceding charge may trigger a detention hearing for a defendant. Admittedly, a defendant may raise the sequence at the detention hearing or argue that the subsequent arrest or even charge is baseless. Regardless of whether the judge ultimately finds this argument persuasive, the defendant may still have

cjoblog/Monograph109.pdf [https://perma.cc/GL2Z-VGMU] (noting that pretrial services officers may exercise discretion regarding their response and offering a list of possible responses).

288. See § 3154(5), (12)(B).
289. Professor Doherty has called attention to this in the context of post-conviction supervision, see Doherty, supra note 254, at 324, but there is no corresponding work in the context of pretrial supervision.
290. See § 3154(5), (12)(B).
291. § 3154(12)(B) requires immediate reporting of pretrial violations, but as noted above, pretrial services officers exercise discretion regarding such reporting. See 8E GUIDE TO JUDICARY POLICY, supra note 287, at §§ 620.40.10, 620.40.20.
293. See id. § 3154(5), (12)(B); Eaglin, supra note 6, at 76; Doherty, supra note 254, at 324.
294. See Doherty, supra note 254, at 346.
295. See Mayson, Bias in, Bias out, supra note 6, at 2284–85.
296. See Eaglin, supra note 6, at 76.
297. See § 3148(b) (authorizing a hearing for allegations of violations of pretrial conditions).
spent twenty-four hours in jail awaiting a hearing after a pretrial services officer found her to be in violation of condition of release.

B. Bail Reform and Conditions of Release

Even as California sat poised to become one of the first states to go to a nonmonetary bail system, a position the state ultimately delayed, last-minute changes to the bill replaced presumptive release with presumptive detention. The bill, which got rid of the bail schedule whereby defendants were previously assessed a predetermined bail based on the charge and the defendant’s criminal history, sought to individualize release decisions. Changes to the bill, however, complicated this calculation. First, and least controversially, under the bill, some misdemeanor charges trigger pretrial release within twelve hours of arrest. All other defendants must undergo a risk assessment using an algorithmic tool, such as those described in Part II. Defendants who receive a low or medium risk assessment score could be released either on their own recognizance or subject to conditions. Those who receive a high risk assessment score must remain detained until a judge conducts a hearing to assess their level of risk and what conditions, if any, will ameliorate such risks.

Not only do these changes in California’s bail reform statute mirror those adopted in other no bail jurisdictions, such as New Jersey and New York, but the adoption of the risk assessment tool as a component of such reforms also ensures that they will maintain the very bias the reform sought to eradicate. Defendants who are members of overpoliced and underresourced communities will continue to face an increased probability of pretrial detention or release under conditions that may be challenging to meet.

Compared with the highly problematic realities of risk assessment tools, which others have extensively explored and that have been the greatest challenge to bail reform, the shift from release because a

298. See Ulloa, supra note 5.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.; Alexander, supra note 245.
303. See Flynn, supra note 299.
304. Id.
305. See supra Section II.B.
306. See supra Section II.B.
defendant can post bail toward release on conditions is equally troublesome. Put simply, for some defendants, these mechanisms of bail reform have replaced one broken system with another—another system that systematically disadvantages poor and marginalized defendants.

C. Going Forward

Each of the collateral consequences of pretrial release carries its own significant concerns, yet little work has been done to challenge their imposition or even to determine if the imposed conditions actually achieve their purported goals. Perhaps conditions of release, despite their impact, are seen as more benign or desirable than monetary bail or detention. It is important to recognize, however, that such conditions, like bail or detention, place burdens on defendants who have neither been convicted nor sentenced for the alleged crime that is used to justify the imposition of the conditions in the first place. Courts impose conditions following truncated hearings, often relying on checklists or party agreements, with little proof as to whether such conditions accomplish their perceived goals of ensuring appearance or reducing whatever danger the defendant’s presence in the community might pose.

For their part, scholars, activists, and advocates have likewise done little work to draw the link between the perceived risk and the conditions imposed. What data are available suggest that intensive pretrial supervision of defendants has done little to reduce recidivism or promote community well-being. Instead, a Brookings Institute report concluded that reducing the burden of pretrial supervision would promote jobs, improve childcare, and reduce stigmatization. “This would be a good first step toward breaking the vicious incarceration cycle.”

Going forward, it is clear that more work needs to be done regarding the impact and efficacy of pretrial release conditions. This work needs to focus not only on the text of the statutes and rules that govern these conditions but also on the actual outcomes they produce.

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307. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 186, at 1481–82; Wiseman, supra note 252, at 1364; Tobolowsky & Quinn, supra note 8, at 289.
308. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
311. See Doleac, supra note 310.
312. Id.
conditions but also their application. The on-the-ground view of such conditions is one of saddled communities and defendants for whom the promise of release is burdened and sometimes impossible. Some have taken an abolitionist stance regarding particular conditions.\footnote{313. See Alexander, supra note 245.} This stance—particularly as it relates to extreme conditions of release—is beneficial but alone it is insufficient. Courts and advocates alike need to take the realities of conditions of release seriously. They need to take seriously the charge that impositions on pretrial liberties must be justified by more than mere fear, but by evidence that a condition is needed and that it actually promotes articulated goals. They need to take seriously the cultural, social, and political realities that have rendered the criminal system a tool of racial and economic oppression.

As a result, while this Article acknowledges that some pretrial release conditions curtail more liberty than others, it has not tried to rank or categorize conditions of release in terms of their acceptability based on the harm they carry. There is a temptation to do so. There is a temptation to conclude that some conditions would be tolerable if they were offered at a reduced cost or more discerningly. There is a temptation to conclude that some minor impositions on pretrial liberty could be forgiven if other conditions were barred altogether. There is a temptation to conclude that human psychology suggests that judges in many cases will avoid greater impositions on liberty if they can readily impose lesser ones. For each of these reasons, there is a temptation to offer up a ranking of pretrial release conditions and to conclude that because some conditions are admittedly less imposing than others that these lesser conditions are acceptable. To give in to this temptation, however, would be to miss one of this Article’s primary claims—that the imposition of conditions of pretrial release should not be lawless or a due process free-for-all. Any pretrial deprivation of liberty demands process and justification. No matter how small the imposition—even an agreement to return to court, to maintain employment, or to avoid a new arrest—the fact that the imposition occurs at all requires the state and the court to justify the need for the condition in the first place.

Certainly, there are different ways to think about honing pretrial release to its constitutionally defined purpose. Most obviously, courts could develop a robust process around pretrial detention—engaging in an examination not only of the risk a defendant presents but also the conditions that might actually mitigate that risk and the community’s assessment of that risk. This process could require the traditional procedural rights associated with trial—appointment of counsel, right to discovery, right to call and cross-examine witnesses, presumption of innocence, and even a right to a jury. It should also acknowledge that
multiple stakeholders—the state represented by the judge and prosecutor, the defendant, the complaining witness, and the community—may have distinct calibrations of risk and appropriate conditions, prompting the questions of who precisely poses a danger to the community and what is that danger.

Building flexibility into the conditions themselves may also hone pretrial conditions. Allow defendants to bring children to court or establish day or night care facilities to accommodate defendants and their families. Allow “off-hour” courts to accommodate defendants’ work schedules. Offer multiple satellite pretrial services offices to reduce travel obligations. Send free reminders to defendants regarding upcoming court dates and establish meaningful grace periods for failures to appear. Permit telephonic appearances for some court dates. Allow meaningful reconsideration of imposed conditions. The list goes on and could go on far beyond any permitted word count for a law review submission. Each of these proposals, some of which have been instituted in limited jurisdictions, acknowledge a defendant’s lived experience in crafting the conditions of her pretrial release. They, in turn, require a court to contemplate the humanity of the defendant—the defendant as a person—as opposed to the defendant as a danger that must be contained and controlled by conditions.

Contemplating the humanity of a defendant in pretrial release conditions also highlights the reality that pretrial detention considerations are one stage in a criminal justice process that is riddled with bias and inequities and that is premised on the dehumanization of the people who move within it as defendants. To think of pretrial release conditions as one point on a continuum raises questions akin to those above of what is a sufficient risk or danger, as well as more fundamental questions of what is criminal and what is a “just” response? As jurisdictions experiment with the decriminalization of marijuana possession, the question becomes why not decriminalize all nonviolent misdemeanors? Or, in the alternative, why not adopt mechanisms beyond a carceral system to address these types of offenses? Why not seek more community input at the outset as to the appropriate resolution of an alleged offense? It is beyond the scope of this Article to explore such proposals in a way they deserve—they are admittedly complex and raise their own risks of cruel punitiveness and intergenerational burdens. But it would also be remiss not to acknowledge, even in this last paragraph, that pretrial detention considerations and the conditions they generate are symptoms of a system built on the backs of poor and marginalized people—a system that has lost credibility as it has languished too long in cruelty and prejudice.
CONCLUSION

The fight against monetary bail is in no small part a fight against economic discrimination. It was, and still is, a fight against the reality in which, to borrow Professor Butler’s assessment of the appointed counsel system, poor people lose because they are poor. 314 Under a monetary bail system, defendants are detained as much because they cannot pay bail as they are because they represent a real risk of flight or danger to the community. Studies have demonstrated that monetary bail does little to mitigate such risks. With or without monetary bail, defendants return to court and reoffend at the same rate. For its part, pretrial detention carries awful consequences for an already marginalized population. In jail, awaiting trial, a defendant may lose her dignity, her home, her family, her job, her educational opportunities and, eventually, her ability or willingness to contest her charges. As others have observed, pretrial detention becomes the means by which the state grinds a guilty plea out of a defendant.

In contrast, release is good. Release permits a defendant to maintain all that she might lose in pretrial detention, and it creates the opportunities to either fight an accusation or to negotiate a disposition from a position of (relative) power. Yet, without monetary bail, courts increasingly rely on nonmonetary conditions of release to guard against risk of flight or danger to the community. These conditions, like their purely monetary counterparts, carry their own consequences—consequences that fall harder and faster on poor and minority defendants. Nonmonetary conditions of release are imposed with an assumption that they will produce the desired mitigation of risk, yet with no supporting data that they accomplish their purported goals.

Pretrial detention has always been a predictive balancing process—with courts weighing the potential risk the defendant poses against the presumption of innocence and the right to be set free. Ask any criminal defendant in any courthouse in America and she will tell you that accusations carry a burden of curtailed liberty no matter who you are or how good your defense might be. For years, courts accepted at face value that defendants with “skin in the game” in the form of bail would return to court and those without it would not. Analysis has proved this assumption both false and biased, and the use of monetary bail has receded. In its place, conditions of release have emerged, premised on the same assumption that supported the monetary bail system—some conditions must be imposed to ensure appearance and safety. Yet, that assumption has not been justified, and courts and commentators alike

have overlooked the extent to which nonmonetary conditions of release place unwarranted burdens on defendants awaiting trial.

For all the good work that has been done to right that balance of pretrial detention and to reduce bias, little work has been done to push back against the untested proposition that pretrial conditions of release serve a desired end. This is a mistake. It is a mistake as a constitutional matter, as the ability of nonmonetary conditions of release to promote the state’s goals remains unvetted. And it is a mistake as a matter of social policy, as these conditions carry debilitating consequences for marginal defendants and their communities. If society is to be serious about correcting the devastating impact of pretrial detention, it must be serious about demanding that all conditions of release, monetary or otherwise, be both fair and justified.