The Problem with Inference for Juvenile Defendants

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ABSTRACT

Much of criminal law relies on proof by inference. In criminal law, fact finders untangle not only what happened, but why it happened. It is answering the “why” question that places an act and its result on the legal spectrum of liability. To reach that answer, the fact finder must engage in an interpretive act, considering not only what can be seen or heard, but the significance of that testimony or physical evidence in real world contexts – the world in which they occurred but also the fact finder’s own world.

Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that in the context of juvenile defendants, this moment of interpretation is fraught with particular risks. The emergence of fMRI technology has provided significant insights into adolescent brain development and its effect on adolescent thought processes. As a result, scientists (and courts) recognize that adolescent actors are more likely to engage in risky behavior, fail to properly comprehend long term consequences and over value reward. In short, science has proven what most long suspected: kids think and react differently than do adults.

Although criminal law has long accounted for this difference procedurally – most evidently in the creation of an independent juvenile justice system – there has been little exploration of its significance in the realm of substantive criminal law. This Article argues that what is known of adolescent brain development suggests that adult fact finders are poorly positioned to accurately assess a juvenile defendant’s state of mind, because adults lack the perspective of those whose actions and words they seek to interpret – juvenile defendants. Rather than asking fact finders to perform the impossible task of placing themselves in the adolescent’s mind, substantive criminal law should instead acknowledge the difference in perspective and permit evidentiary presentation

* Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Thanks to Rachel Barkow, Paul Butler, Richard Delgado, Deborah Denno, Andrew Ferguson, Heather Gerken, Rachel Godsil, Kristin Henning, Susan Klein, Ronald Krotoszynski, Daniel Medwed, Michael Pardo, John Rapping, Alice Ristroph, Stephen Rushin, Megan Ryan, Adam Steinman and Matthew Tokson. Special thanks to CrimFest 2016, the National Juvenile Defender’s Conference, the Southeast Regional Juvenile Defender’s Conference, and to Hank Greely and the Stanford Law School Center for Law and Biosciences First Annual Law and Biosciences Conference.
and jury instructions akin to defenses that rely on the defendant’s actual, as opposed to imagined, perspective.

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INTRODUCTION

Much of criminal law relies on proof by inference.\(^1\) The value of evidence frequently lies in what it suggests as much as what it shows.\(^2\) An outstretched hand in a dark alley is either an illicit drug deal or a handshake; a semi-coherent moan is either encouragement of or resistance to a sexual advance; shouted words to “fuck up” a school principal could be either a promise of harm to come or meaningless bravado. In criminal law, fact finders untangle not only what happened, but why it happened. It is answering the “why” question that places an act and its result on the legal spectrum of liability.\(^3\) To reach that answer, the fact finder must engage in an interpretive act, considering not only what can be seen or heard, but the significance of that testimony or physical evidence in real world contexts – the world in which they occurred but also the fact finder’s own world.

The significance of a handshake, or a moan, or shouted words to criminal law depends both on the context in which each occurred and the fact

\(^1\) Inferences, or presumptions, are used as synonymous terms by the courts and scholars to describe the legal construct that permits juries to “infer an essential element for a crime from proof of some other fact commonly associated with it.” See Charles R. Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and Permissive Inferences: The Value of Complexity, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1979).

\(^2\) See Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 512-13 (1979) (permitting circumstantial evidence alone to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt proof requirement of mens rea by holding “the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts”). The Court’s position that inference does not violate due process requirements by lessening the burden of proof is not without controversy. See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 1; James F. Ponsoldt, A Due Process Analysis of Judicially-Authorized Presumptions in Federal Aggravated Bank Robbery Cases, 74 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 363 (1983); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and the Burden of Proof in Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979) (all arguing that inferences, while facilitating ease of proof, create significant constitutional concerns including lessening and/or impermissible shifting the burden of proof).

\(^3\) Distinct from motive, the “why” question asks what the actor intended and so assigns legal significance to the act and result. See Jenny E. Carroll, Brain Science and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N.C. L. REV. 539, 545 (2015) (noting that the mental state behind an action serves as a means of distinguishing the criminal from the purely accidental and calibrates degrees of culpability); Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime To Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1547–48 (1997) (contending that mens rea distinguishes degrees of legal blameworthiness).
finder’s own perception of the events and their context. The outstretched hands of two men in an alley become a drug deal in the context of testimony by police officers that drug paraphernalia littered the alley way and that both men ran when the police shone lights on them. The outstretched hands of the two men become a drug deal as jurors consider their own perception of the area in question and the defendant himself. Would they ever enter that alley in “that” part of town if they weren’t buying drugs? Would they ever sit hunched and sallow at counsel table looking nervously around the courtroom as the defendant did if they weren’t addicted to drugs? As the fact finder deliberates, he inevitably recalls not only the evidence presented at trial, but how that evidence conforms to his own observations, life experiences and expectations.

To cabin this process as a mere credibility analysis is to belie the full scope of its significance. The fact finder does more than merely assess whether or not the evidence is true or believable. He engages in an act of interpretation by which he assigns a legal meaning to evidence in light of his own worldview.

This act of interpretation is fraught with the risk of error or bias. Procedurally, criminal law seeks to control and to reduce such risks. Before

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4 See ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 8, 23 (2005) (discussing evidence law’s efforts to ensure decisional accuracy by controlling the flow of information to the fact finder).

5 See Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. ___ (forthcoming 2017) (noting that credibility assessments aside, a significant value of evidence lies in the fact finder’s ability to assess it based on “their own powers of observation and reasoning”).


7 One of the most significant efforts to prevent error and bias is to promote a representative cross section in juror selection. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting), quoted in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975) (noting that “[b]road, representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as an assurance of diffuse impartiality . . . .”); JOHN M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMITMENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 7, 18 (1977) (“[J]urors bring to the jury box prejudice and perspectives gained from their lifetimes of experience” this variance can be mitigated with a mix of jurors who “will be impartial in the sense that they will reflect the range of the community's attitudes.”). In the context of evidence, evidentiary and procedural rules work together to limit the risks of interpretation by limiting admissible evidence, promoting impeachment and corroboration and timely
the trial even begins, jurors submit to the tedium of juror questionnaires and
the rigor of voir dire in an effort to ascertain potential bias and to instill a sense
of duty and seriousness of purpose in the juror. 8 Prior to deliberation, jury
instructions seek to channel juror discretion by defining the boundaries and
terms of interpretation. 9 In the trial itself, evidentiary rules set limits on
admissible evidence and insulate against prejudice with twin guardians of
relevancy and reliability. 10

In reality, however, facts are as much a product of the evidence used to
support them as the inferences drawn from them. In this, procedural
safeguards risk failure not because they lack rigor (though they may), but
because they overlook a critical component of the substantive law to which
they apply – the fact finder’s interpretation. This interpretation is based not
only on the law’s construct but on the fact finder’s own view of that construct
in the context of his sense of the world as it is or ought to be. We interpret the
acts of others though our own subjective lens, reflecting our life experiences
onto those we judge.

In the context of juvenile defendants, this habit of ascribing our own
potential motive to others is deeply problematic. In the past two decades
advances in neuroscience have revealed what many, including the court system,
long suspected – kids simply do not reason like adults. 11 Their thought

production. See Roth, supra note 5, at 11; Roger C. Park, “I Didn’t Tell Them Anything
About You”: Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 MINN. L.
REV. 783, 788 (1990) (noting in the context of implied assertions that the accuracy of
the interpretation of language or evidence relies on the perceptive abilities of the
listener).

8 See Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Racial Bias in Voir Dire, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV.
843, 846-847 (2015) (describing the value of juror selection processes); see also
Development in the Law, Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1451-
1456 (1997).

9 See Elizabeth Ingriselli, Mitigating Juror’s Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and
Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690 (2015) (arguing for a variety of
innovative reforms to jury instruction models, but noting that such instructions offer
a mechanism to guide interpretation).

10 See STEIN, supra note 4, at 23.

11 See Carroll, supra note 3, 39-45; Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming
Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 801 (2003); Richard J. Bonnie & Elizabeth S. Scott, The
Teenage Brain: Adolescent Brain Research and the Law, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 158 (2013); Terry A. Maroney, Adolescent Brain Science After
Graham v. Florida, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (2011) [hereinafter, Maroney, Brain
Science After Graham]; Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The
Fourth Option, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2009), and Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of
processes are not merely immature versions of their future adult selves. They are different in kind and reflect evolving epistemological mechanisms that carry with them fundamentally different valuations of risk, consequence, and reward. In everyday life this difference matters, as evidenced by a variety of protective rules for juveniles. To varying degrees juveniles cannot marry, drink, vote, join the army, get a tattoo, or engage in consensual sexual activity.

In criminal law, this difference in thought process creates a dilemma when determining a juvenile’s mental state, or mens rea. In the vast majority of cases, the accused’s mental state defines the degrees of culpability and offers justification for punishment. Although some mental state elements contain an objective component or are objective in nature, each mental state requires consideration of the accused’s thought processes and perceptions in an effort to ascertain his or her actual, as opposed to hypothetical, guilt.

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12 See, e.g., B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, The Teenage Brain: Self Control, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 82, 82–83 (2013) (noting distinct differences between adolescent and adult thought processes and further noting that such differences are the norm, as opposed to a deviation). For a description of the law’s treatment of this difference, see Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547, 558–62 (2000)

13 See infra note 158.

14 See, e.g., Anita Greene, Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99 (1986) (as individuals age they are better able to project events into the future).

15 See, e.g., Jeffrey Arnett, Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New Scale, 16 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289 (1994) (discussing adolescent focus on reward in decision making processes).

16 See Carroll, supra note 3, at 27–31 (describing restrictions on juvenile activities)


18 See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 123 n.73 (1996) (discussing the ALI’s regularization of mental states into categories based on subject or objective classifications – all of which required proof that the mental state alleged was in fact the defendant’s mental state).
Despite the crucial role that mens rea plays in criminal law, the mental state element is an elusive one. Unlike other elements of a criminal offense, assessing mens rea requires the fact finder to make an assessment of what a defendant was actually thinking, whether through the defendant’s own statements or through inference drawn from objective evidence. Accuracy in assessing mens rea depends on the fact finder’s ability to approximate the defendant’s own subjective thought processes. How would the juror or judge act or react in a like situation? This determination is as much about what the fact finder perceives of the person being judged as it is about what that person actually thought at the moment of the offense.

Unfortunately when an adult fact finder contemplates a juvenile defendant’s mental state, he seeks to interpret what a juvenile defendant was thinking through the lens of his own adult thought processes. The significance of the juvenile’s actions or reactions are calibrated and checked against what they would mean in the adult fact finder’s life. As advances in neuroscience have increased our knowledge of adolescent brain development, it has become increasingly apparent that the juvenile justice system relies on a false inferential rubric and invites an imperfect application of the substantive law.

As adult fact finders – whether judge or jury – contemplate a juvenile offender’s guilt, they inevitably contemplate the juvenile’s state of mind. In doing this, the adult fact finder utilizes a distinct perspective that the defendant herself likely does not share – that of an adult. Even though adult fact finders were once adolescents and as such enjoyed adolescent thought processes, time and aging have erased or mitigated this perspective. Put another way, almost any adult can recount likely with a degree of nostalgia all the “stupid” things they did as a teenager, but few if any are capable of recounting why those “stupid” things seemed like a good idea when the adult was a teen. To understand this, would require turning back time and neurological development, to return to way of thinking that the adult brain has abandoned. It is to reassess and reprioritize basic cognitive influences such as risk, reward, and the value of peer approval. In this, the criminal law asks the adult fact finder to undertake an impossible task.

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19 All jurisdictions in the United States require jurors to be at least eighteen years of age and many jurisdictions link juror rolls to voter registration, property records and/or driver’s license records – all of which carry an age eligibility component. See Jon M. Van Dyke, Jury Selection Procedure 258-62 (1977). In practice, most jurors tend to be significantly older than eighteen, though some states do set age limits on who can serve as a juror. Id.

20 See supra notes 12-15.
As a result there is conceptual gap in the current application of substantive criminal law to juvenile offenders. Juveniles are tried and convicted based on what an adult believes their state of mind would have been, as opposed to their actual adolescent-centered state of mind. This Article seeks to address this conceptual gap by arguing that the fundamental value of neuroscience in the juvenile justice system is not as a litmus test of guilt or responsibility, but rather as a means to properly calibrate and contextualize the fact finder’s calculation of the offender’s mental state. To be clear, I am not arguing that a new “juvenile centered” substantive law must be created, but rather that the current law must be held to its purported aims: to assess each defendant’s actual state of mind based on the evidence presented. In the context of juveniles, this requires re-centering the fact finder’s consideration of mens rea through an interpretive rubric that considers what is known of the juvenile brain and thought processes.

Such an approach will produce a more accurate understanding of the significance of the adolescent defendant’s thoughts and words, and will more precisely assess the juvenile’s culpability. It will allow the law to maintain a cognitive integrity – preserving the conceptual core of substantive criminal law as it seeks to assign culpability based on state of mind analysis, while recognizing the fundamental differences between youth and adulthood. The need to address this problem is especially urgent in light of an ongoing trend of increasingly punitive juvenile justice systems and increasingly rigorous application of transfer laws that move juvenile offenders to adult court system.

21 Despite President Obama’s recent ban on juvenile solitary confinement in the federal system, juveniles in state facilities are still subjected to such confinement. Juliette Eilperin, Obama Bans Solitary Confinement for Juveniles in Federal Prison, THE WASHINGTON POST, January 26, 2016, available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-bans-solitary-confinement-for-juveniles-in-federal-prisons/2016/01/25/056e14b2-c3a2-11e5-9693-933a4d31bce8_story.html?utm_term=.2c884dc84f63. In addition, given that Obama’s ban was the product of an Executive Order, it is possible that even this advancement may be undone by the new administration. See generally Catherine L. Carpenter, Throw Away Children: The Tragic Consequences of a False Narrative, 45 SW. L. REV. 461 (2016); Ira M. Schwartz, Juvenile Crime-Fighting Policies: What the Public Wants, in JUVENILE JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA at 69 (Ira M. Schwartz ed., 1992) (both describing trends in the increasingly punitive treatment of juvenile offenders); see also ANDREW J. HARRIS ET AL., Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Sex Offender Registration and Notification: Results From a Survey of Treatment Providers, SEXUAL ABUSE: A JOURNAL OF RESEARCH AND TREATMENT 1, 2 (2015) (describing this punitive trend in the context of juvenile sex offenders).
has emerged.22 Despite a better understanding that adolescents are in fact different from adult actors, juvenile and criminal justice system increasingly treat juvenile suspects as adults and punish them as such.23

Although a handful of judicial opinions and scholars have suggested a limited role for neuroscience in the context of Fifth24 and Eighth Amendment25 jurisprudence as applied to juveniles, judges and academics have largely failed to explore with sufficient depth the significance of adolescent brain science to the mental state question.26 This Article offers a new vision of how to assess juvenile mens rea – a vision that allows such judgments to be informed by what neuroscience knows of adolescent thought processes. I do not advocate a broad rule precluding juvenile culpability, nor do I argue that juveniles are incapable of forming mental states as articulated in criminal law. The data

22 See Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1787, 1793-94 (2016) (noting the increase of direct file or direct transfer statutes that resulted in greater numbers of juvenile offenders being tried and sentenced as adults); David O. Brink, Immaturity, Normative Competence, and Juvenile Transfer: How (Not) to Punish Minors for Major Crimes, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (2004) (arguing that trends towards greater transfer is not diminishing crime rates among juvenile offenders).

23 See Jodi Kent Levy, Supreme Court’s Will on Juvenile Offenders Thwarted, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 2, 2017 (noting that despite the Supreme Court’s rulings in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana requiring hearings for children sentenced to life without parole, states are either balking at providing hearings (Montgomery who is now 70 still has not received a hearing) or judges are denying access to experts and are using hearings to reinstate the life without parole sentence).


26 This is not to say scholars have not written about neuroscience and the juvenile justice system, but it is to say that most have dismissed the notion that adolescent brain development provides useful insights to mental state questions. This dismissal is premised on the inability of neuroscience to either predict future or recall past mental states. See infra note 174. In contrast, this Article makes the more nuanced argument that neuroscience provides evidence of adolescent thought processes that serve to contextualize and inform the fact finder’s analysis of evidence of the juvenile offender’s mental state.
supports neither global conclusion. Recognizing that there are limits to the value of neuroscientific evidence, this Article proposes several ways to allow neuroscience to facilitate its proper use with respect to the state of mind element.

First, evidentiary rules of relevancy should permit the introduction of neuroscientific evidence akin to testimony that establishes context. Just as a police officer is permitted to testify, often without expert qualification, that based on years of experience she recognized that the proffered hand in the alley was a drug deal, so a neuroscientist should be permitted to testify that an adolescent’s decision to shout that he would “fuck up” the school principal is evidence of his immature thought process as opposed to his genuine intent to assault a school administrator. Such testimony contextualizes factual evidence for the jury and offers a perspective that the fact finder may otherwise lack.

Second, jury instructions should be tailored to incorporate what is known about adolescent brain development to provide a rubric for assessing the state of mind element. Similar to proposed instructions on implicit or culture bias or defenses such as mistake of law or fact, battered women’s, PTSD, or self-defense, such instructions would both recognize that fact finders may be ill-equipped or unable to fully process the significance of the defendant’s thought processes without guidance. Such instructions would recognize that although the fact finder might have once been an adolescent and engaged in adolescent thought processes, that reality does not mean that the fact finder is capable now, as an adult, of properly interpreting the legal significance of facts as they apply to the juvenile actor’s mental state. The model jury instruction would provide the context through which the fact finder can interpret the evidence of the defendant’s state of mind.27

My argument for these proposed changes in the treatment of neuroscience evidence proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the genesis of the juvenile court and its development over the last century, including the emphasis on the emergence and use of neuroscience in the context of Fifth and

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27 Based on instructions used in the context of the other defenses that hinge on the defendant’s perspective, as will be discussed further in Part III, a model jury instruction might suggest that the fact finder “could infer the defendant’s state of mind from her actions, however, such an inference should be made in light of the established fact that an adolescent such as the defendant may lack the ability to properly calculate or appreciate risk in the same way an adult might. This failure to properly calculate risk may render the defendant unable to understand the significance of her actions or words. As a result, a defendant’s actions which if taken by an adult might suggest one mental state, might suggest a wholly different, lesser mental state in the context of an adolescent.”
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Part II considers the evidentiary construct of proof in criminal law, in particular the entwined role of relevance and inference. Part III considers the intersection of these concepts of proof with the aims of the juvenile system and what neuroscience has revealed about adolescent brain development, and argues that criminal law’s construction of relevancy and reliance on inference to prove the mental state is fundamentally flawed in its application to juvenile defendants. As adult fact finders seek to interpret evidence in an effort to assess a juvenile defendant’s mental state, they seek to imagine a perspective they no longer enjoy. In this the purported goals of substantive criminal law to assign culpability based on the defendant’s actual state of mind is lost and we risk inaccurate and unjust outcomes for juvenile defendants.

PART I: THE STORY OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE ADOLESCENT BRAIN

A. In the Beginning

The history of the American juvenile justice system is in many ways the history of the nation’s evolving vision of children themselves. Until the early nineteenth-century, the American legal system made no age distinction. Courts treated children who committed crimes in the same way as adult offenders. Suspects who happened to be children were charged, tried, convicted, and sentenced in the same way as their adult counterparts. This treatment of children as “small” adults was consistent with social norms of the time that drew few distinctions between adult and child actors.

This early justice system was not completely without acts of mercy. Judges might, and at times did, dismiss charges against children. Juries

30 See Watkins, supra note 29, at 46-50 (describing social attitudes towards childhood).
nullified, acquitting what appeared to be factually guilty children. But these acts of mercy were the product of extra-legal sympathies and social attitudes.

The common law defense of infancy did provide a legal doctrine to shelter accused children, but the doctrinal cover of the defense was limited. Infancy sought to differentiate actors who lacked criminal responsibility and as such were not culpable for their acts. Children who were so young that they could not differentiate right from wrong were immune under the doctrine. Common law presumed that children under the age of seven lacked criminal capacity and that those over fourteen were fully responsible, or as responsible as adults. Those in between – seven to fourteen – enjoyed a rebuttable presumption that they lacked criminal capacity. Outside of the limited defense of infancy, substantive criminal law offered little shelter for youth and procedural protections for youth did not exist.

1. The Progressives and the Kids

As social constructs of childhood began to evolve, most notably with recognition of adolescence as a distinct developmental stage in the early nineteenth century, support for the criminal law’s treatment of children as no different than adults began to wane. As early social reformers began to create special institutions for children, they pushed back on the court system that would seek to hold them criminally liable as if they were adults.

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33 See generally 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 9.6(a) (2d ed. 2003).
34 Id.
35 See Walkover, supra note 32, at 511.
36 See LaFave, supra note 33.
37 See Simon I. Singer, Recriminalizing Delinquency: Violent Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Reform 29-39 (1996) (describing how social changes, including changing views of children fueled reform in the juvenile justice system); Watkins, supra note 29, at 46 (describing the early Progressive argument for a “disassociate” juvenile law to reflect the reality that children were different than adults).
38 See Sutton, supra note 31; Joseph Hawes, Children in Urban Society: Juvenile Delinquency in Nineteenth-Century America (1971); Thomas J.
It was not long before the first juvenile court appeared in Chicago and its model spread throughout the country. Premised on Progressive ideals, the early juvenile court focused on the interlocking premises that childhood was a distinct period and children required social control in ways that adults might not. As such, the prototype juvenile court systems sought to foster opaque and normative values such as morality and good citizenship. They eschewed the adult criminal court’s allegiance to formalized procedure and punitive sentencing schemes, instead adopting informal methods and dispositions that promoted the child’s rehabilitation and best interests.

While the history of the juvenile court system is well documented, it is worth a brief discussion of the historical factors that drove its creation. By the end of the nineteenth century America itself had begun to change significantly. Modernization and industrialization fueled significant demographic changes. Large populations began to migrate from rural

BERNARD & MEGAN C. KURLYCHEK, THE CYCLE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE (2d ed. 2010); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM (1971); ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 29, at 43-81 (all describing the creation of Houses of Refuges to serve as age-segregated institutions that sought to intervene on behalf of youth and provide a social safety network for children).


40 See Mack, supra note 39, at 107; ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 29, at 43-81.

41 See Mack, supra note 39, at 107; Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691, 693-95 (1991) (noting that the Progressives believe that benign state intervention would prevent and reduce delinquency).

42 See Feld, supra note 41, at 693 (noting the informality of the emerging juvenile system).

43 See, e.g., ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE, supra note 29, 206-07; WATKINS, supra note 29; SUTTON, supra note 31; HAWES, supra note 38; Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 474 (1987); Singer, supra note 39.

communities to urban centers with their promise of industrial work. At the same time burgeoning immigrant populations fleeing oppression and poverty in Europe and Asia flooded to the same industrial centers. These influxes not only altered the American landscape, they also posed distinct social problems. Growing populations in urban centers translated to a growing class of urban poor -- particularly poor urban youth -- replete with crowded housing environments, poor labor conditions, and often informal or absent social support systems.

Changes in family structure and functions accompanied migration and economic changes. Women’s roles became more domestic – with women described as the primary familial role model, even as many women bore extra-familial work responsibilities. Childhood and adolescence were recognized as distinct and critical periods of development. Children were no longer viewed as smaller versions of adults, but were viewed as vulnerable, passive and innocent – they needed adults to prepare them and nurture them. As notions of children shifted, so did notions of parental responsibility as the new-found preparatory responsibility for children fell in greater force upon the parent.

Viewed through the lens of Progressivism, this new vision of childhood and parenting encompassed an obligation to ensure moral and social development. Progressives viewed the state and the social agencies it could

45 See McGerr, supra note 44, at 234.
46 Id. at 14.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 14-36.
49 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083 (1991)
51 See Joseph Kett, Rites of Passage: Adolescence in America 1790 to Present (1980); See Mack, supra note 39, at 107; Rothman, Conscience, supra note 29, at 43-81.
52 Id.; Rothman, Conscience, supra note 29, 43-76 (describing Progressive’s creation of public institutions such as compulsory public schools, hospitals and child refuge organizations designed to help foster the child’s moral development); Feld, supra note 41, at 693 (stating that during this period the idea emerged that children should be treated differently than adults due to their lack of life experience and maturity).
53 See Singer, supra note 37, at 29-39.
54 See Singer, supra note 39, at 511-12.
create as bearing a responsibility for the burgeoning urban populations.\textsuperscript{55} Progressives imagined the state as a benevolent and unifying force that could address social ills through the creation of public agencies that would introduce and reinforce middle-class social values as they promoted assimilation.\textsuperscript{56} An overview of Progressive reform programs demonstrates a strong allegiance to child-centered change.\textsuperscript{57} Progressives championed child labor movements, welfare laws, compulsory school attendance laws, and the creation of a distinct juvenile court system.\textsuperscript{58}

The Progressive concept of social ills did more than just create juvenile centered reform, however. It also drove the resulting juvenile justice system’s sense of the source of juvenile delinquency itself. While criminal law historically attributed crime to the free will of actors, the emerging study of criminology cast crime in more positivist terms.\textsuperscript{59} Efforts to remedy crime therefore required the identification of the causes of criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{60} In the process, the previously dominant question of the actor’s moral responsibility receded and the inquiry was refocused on the reforming the offender and the circumstances that created him.\textsuperscript{61} Progressives drew a causal line between moral decay and criminal behavior.\textsuperscript{62}

Accordingly, they fashioned a juvenile justice system meant to address moral failing and, as a side benefit, delinquency. This system’s goal was rehabilitation of the offender.\textsuperscript{63} Possible remedies for findings of delinquency ranged from mentorship to removal from the family\textsuperscript{64} to removal from the

\textsuperscript{55} Id.

\textsuperscript{56} See Feld, \textit{supra} note 52, at 693-95 (“[T]he Progressives believed that benevolent state action guided by experts could alleviate social ills.”).

\textsuperscript{57} See Singer, \textit{supra} note 39, at 511-12.

\textsuperscript{58} See ROTHMAN, \textit{CONSCIENCE}, \textit{supra} note 29, at 43-76.

\textsuperscript{59} See DAVID MATZA, \textit{DELINQUENCY AND DRIFT} 5 (1964); ROTHMAN, \textit{CONSCIENCE}, \textit{supra} note 29, at 50-51 (describing positivism theories as identifying the “antecedent variables [that] produce[d] crime and deviance” in contrast to classic formulations which attributed crime to free will).

\textsuperscript{60} See TROJANOWICZ & MORASH, \textit{supra} note 29, at 40-42 (describing the rise of positivist theories of criminology).

\textsuperscript{61} Id.

\textsuperscript{62} Id. at 41-42.

\textsuperscript{63} See Ainsworth, \textit{supra} note 49 (noting that the juvenile court purports to act in the child’s best interests as opposed to recognizing that the State often has goals that are inconsistent with and undermine the child’s autonomy).

\textsuperscript{64} See HAWES, \textit{supra} note 38, at 170 n.1.
jurisdiction on an orphan train. This model rejected the adversarial system. In the juvenile justice system the Progressives envisioned, judges, probation officers, police and prosecutors, were all representatives of a benevolent State intent on “rescuing” the wayward child. This conceptualization of the system justified addressing juvenile delinquency prior to any criminal act actually occurring. In addition, juveniles in this system required neither procedural protections nor counsel, as all actors in the system – from the prosecutor to the probation officer to the judge – acted in the child’s best interest substituting as parent and moral compass.

65 This fascinating (and misnamed) phenomena was popular in major metropolitan centers and actually predated the Progressive Movement. See generally Rebecca S. Trammell, Orphan Trains: Myths and Legal Reality, 5 MOD. AM. 3 (2009). These orphan or mercy trains, removed “misplaced”, “at risk”, foundling and orphaned children from urban centers and placed them in foster houses primarily in the rural mid-west. In the 1850’s faced with a growing problem of vagrant and often gang affiliated children, police in New York began arresting children, holding them and trying them as adults. Social organizations intervened offering first Houses of Refuge and eventually “Orphan Trains.” These trains sought to remove children from urban centers and return them to rural communities where they could be raised with “Christian values.” While the trains themselves were organized by charitable welfare organizations, the early juvenile court system often used the trains as a “rehabilitative” alternative. While the trains themselves were supervised, once a child was placed in a foster home, there was little supervision to ensure that the child was treated well. Foster parents were screened only for their self proclaimed need for a child and for their “moral standing.” As a result, the record of placement from orphan trains was mixed. Andrew Burke and John Brady, both Orphan Train riders grew up to become governors of North Dakota and of Alaska, respectively. For other children, the placements were not nearly as successful. Children suffered physical and sexual abuse in foster homes. Some farmers saw the children as nothing more than a cheap source of labor. The runaway rate, particularly among boys was high as was the rejection rate by foster families. Id.

66 See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15 (noting that juvenile offenders were made to feel that the juvenile justice system was “saving” them immorality and a criminal career and that the state was acting in their best interests); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 471, 476-77 (1987).

67 See Feld, supra note 66, at 476-77 (noting that under the Progressive model, juvenile proceedings “were initiated by a petition in the welfare of the child, rather than by a criminal complaint”).

68 See id.; Keegan, supra note 66, at 811 (stating that the state assumed the role of the surrogate parent).
This model was not without difficulties. One Progressive’s humanitarian, “child saving” model is another’s expansion of social control over poor, minority and/or immigrant populations.\textsuperscript{69} It is beyond the scope of this paper to delve deeply into the devastating effect such “well intended” systems had on families and juveniles, but it would be remiss in this brief history of the juvenile court system not to acknowledge the disparate impact orphan trains, juvenile homes and even Houses of Refuge had on the poor and children of color.\textsuperscript{70} It would also be remiss not to acknowledge the gendered component of the Progressive reform movement, which created and endorsed an early juvenile justice system that punished girls for sexual promiscuity and boys for unruliness under a blanket charge of incorrigibility, on the premise that such behavior was a harbinger not only of immorality but of corruption and criminality to come.\textsuperscript{71}

At its core, the Progressive movement viewed adolescent autonomy as a source of criminality. Children needed guidance and the Progressives structured a juvenile court system around this proposition. It reinforced parental control, and when parental influence was inadequate or non-existent, it allowed the state to intervene.\textsuperscript{72} Through the legal doctrine of \textit{paren patriae}, the State assumed the role of parent to justify ever widening circles of control and intervention and ever decreasing circles of formality and procedure.\textsuperscript{73} The juvenile court had to be able to diagnose the causes of delinquency and to ascertain the cure.\textsuperscript{74} To constrain the court with procedural requirements such as counsel, juries, or doctrines against self-incrimination, would only hinder its underlying mission to rehabilitate rather than punish.

2. The Constitution and the Kids

Fifty years ago, the Court’s decision in \textit{In re Gault} upended the Progressive’s benign vision of the juvenile justice system. In granting limited constitutional procedural rights to youth in delinquency hearings, the Court

\textsuperscript{69} For an excellent discussion of competing views of the juvenile justice system and the results of its reform efforts, see \textsc{Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency} at xxiv, 36, 46, 98-100 (2d ed. 1977).

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{See}, e.g., \textit{id}.\textsuperscript{71} \textit{See id.}

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{See Bernard, supra} note 38, at 87.

\textsuperscript{73} \textit{See Mack, supra} note 39 (describing budding Progressive ideals and promoting the doctrine of \textit{paren patriae}, arguing that the state be permitted to act as parent when parental supervision was inadequate or absent); \textit{Keegan, supra} note 66.

\textsuperscript{74} \textit{See Rothman, Conscience, supra} note 29, at 50-52.
noted that the rosy presentation of the juvenile system shrouded a much darker reality in which children were punished without process and often for behavior or characteristics that were not criminalized.\textsuperscript{75}

Gerald Gault was 15 years old in June 8, 1964, when he was taken from his home by a county sheriff's deputy after a neighbor complained about having received an offensive call originating from the Gault family trailer.\textsuperscript{76} Gault’s parents were never notified that he had been taken, and when his mother attempted to retrieve him from the sheriff’s department later that evening, she was turned away.\textsuperscript{77} The next day, Gault appeared without counsel at a preliminary hearing where, after hearing the statement of probable cause, the presiding judge told Gault he would think about whether or not to release him.\textsuperscript{78}

A few days later, and without any explanation, Gault was released and his family received a single notice that the judge had set the matter for trial.\textsuperscript{79} At trial, again unrepresented, Gault was convicted and ordered confined at a State Industrial School for the period of his minority, which was until 21 under state law, or for a lesser period as deemed appropriate.\textsuperscript{80}

Gault was convicted of having made a “lewd call” without sworn testimony from witnesses, or any meaningful opportunity to contest the charge.\textsuperscript{81} The victim never even appeared in court, having been informed that it was unnecessary for her to do so as she would not be giving testimony.\textsuperscript{82} The judge found that Gault had confessed to the call, an issue his family, and Gault himself, disputed.\textsuperscript{83} No transcript of the proceeding was made.\textsuperscript{84} If convicted as an adult, Gault would have faced a maximum sentence of two months and a fine between $5 and $50.\textsuperscript{85}

Gault challenged his conviction, claiming that for all its rhetoric about rehabilitation and protection of the child’s best interest, the juvenile justice system had deprived him of his liberty arbitrarily.\textsuperscript{86} In its decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged the historical motives behind the creation of the juvenile

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\textsuperscript{75} See Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
\textsuperscript{76} Id. at 4.
\textsuperscript{77} Id.
\textsuperscript{78} Id. at 5.
\textsuperscript{79} Id.
\textsuperscript{80} Id. at 7-8.
\textsuperscript{81} Id. at 6.
\textsuperscript{82} Id.
\textsuperscript{83} Id.
\textsuperscript{84} Id.
\textsuperscript{85} Id. at 9.
\textsuperscript{86} Id. at 1.
\end{flushleft}
system. Describing the historical treatment of juveniles, the Court observed that early reformers rejected formalism and procedural protections in an effort to recast juvenile court not as a criminal proceeding with punitive motives, but as a civil proceeding driven by rehabilitative aims and the child’s best interests. The Court noted that despite the benevolent motivations that led to the system’s genesis, the day to day practice of the juvenile system presented a different story. Juveniles suffered “unbridled discretion” in a system that sought to grant the state the power of the parent. This discretion, even if motivated by the best of intentions, “is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure.”

The Court further noted that “[t]he absence of substantive standards has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, individualized treatment” and “[t]he absence of procedural rules based upon constitutional principles has not always produced fair, efficient, and effective procedures.” Instead, children like Gault were as likely to suffer arbitrariness as they were to experience “justice” in the juvenile court system. The Court famously concluded “[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court.” Accordingly, the Court found that the Due Process Clause applied to juveniles charged in juvenile court. Procedural protections, the Court reasoned, were necessary to avoid unfairness, “inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact” and arbitrary dispositions. For his trouble, Gault won the right to counsel, the right to formal notice of charges against him, the right to formal notice of his right against self-incrimination, and the right to confront witnesses.

This grant of procedural rights in juvenile court was limited. Four years later in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania the Court reconsidered the appropriate levels of procedural protections in the juvenile justice system. The McKeiver Court concluded that the procedural protections the Court had contemplated in Gault

87 Id. at 14-18.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 17-18
90 Id. at 18.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 27-28.
95 Id. at 28.
96 Id. at 58.
97 Id. at 20.
98 See id. at 42-57.
did not extend as far as to create a constitutional requirement of juries in juvenile courts.\(^\text{100}\) The Court in \textit{McKeiver} expressed frustration that \textit{Gault} was both too broad and too narrow.\(^\text{101}\) It was overly broad in the sense that the opinion criticized the informality of the juvenile system.\(^\text{102}\) But it was also too narrow in the sense that the \textit{Gault} court had limited its procedural requirements to four rights, declining to reach the question of other procedural rights.\(^\text{103}\)

This left state courts uncertain of the precise procedural requirements of the juvenile court system post-\textit{Gault}.\(^\text{104}\) \textit{McKeiver} was not the first opinion to attempt to draw procedural boundaries for the juvenile justice system. Prior to \textit{McKeiver}, \textit{Haley}, \textit{Gallegos}, \textit{Kent}, \textit{DeBacker}, and \textit{Winship} all attempted to define the precise procedural protections required in the juvenile court system.\(^\text{105}\) In the process, the Court confronted a post \textit{Gault} paradox.

On the one hand, the Court in \textit{Gault} had rejected the juvenile court system’s informality and lack of procedural protections.\(^\text{106}\) But on the other, in \textit{Gault} and the cases that followed, the Court attempted to maintain the core values of the juvenile court system – to protect the child.\(^\text{107}\) Central to the maintenance of this goal was the acknowledgement that children were fundamentally different than adults, simultaneously more vulnerable and more redeemable. A distinct juvenile justice system recognized this difference – focusing on the child’s particular needs and not just his guilt.\(^\text{108}\) As a result the juvenile system was not constitutionally compelled to follow the same process requirements as the adult court system, particularly when such procedural requirements jeopardized the restorative power of the juvenile court.\(^\text{109}\) So when the presence of a jury threatened to undermine the goals and value of the juvenile justice system by being less sensitive to the unique condition of youth, the Court found it was not constitutionally required.\(^\text{110}\) The Court reasoned

\(^{100}\) \textit{Id.} at 551.
\(^{101}\) \textit{Id.} at 531-34.
\(^{102}\) \textit{Id.} at 534, 541.
\(^{103}\) \textit{Id.} at 541.
\(^{104}\) \textit{Id.} at 541-42.
\(^{105}\) \textit{Id.} (describing each case).
\(^{107}\) \textit{See McKeiver}, 403 U.S. at 41.
\(^{108}\) The \textit{McKeiver} Court noted that while “faith in the quality of the juvenile bench is not an entirely satisfactory substitute for due process,” \textit{Id.} at 539, the judges of the juvenile court “do take a different view of their role than that taken by their counterparts in the criminal courts.” \textit{Id.}
\(^{109}\) \textit{Id.} at 551.
\(^{110}\) \textit{Id.} at 550.
that a juvenile court judge as fact finder might offer more promise of mercy and redemption for the child defendant than a jury.\textsuperscript{111}

Whether or not the \textit{McKeiver} Court’s ultimate conclusion was correct,\textsuperscript{112} the Court did begin to reckon with the inherent tension of the \textit{Gault} decision. The Court recognized that the Progressive ideal of the juvenile justice system was better in theory than practice. To ensure appropriate protection for the accused, some procedural regularity was necessary. The extent of these protections, however, was curtailed in comparison to the adult court system out of a recognition that the two systems served fundamentally different goals and fundamentally different populations. Juvenile court systems, the \textit{McKeiver} Court held, must balance the need for procedural protections with the underlying goal to protect and promote the child’s best interests.\textsuperscript{113}

Striking this balance has long been a contested proposition. At various points, the balance has shifted. As juvenile crime rates rose in the 1980s and 1990s a new narrative emerged.\textsuperscript{114} Politicians began to speak not of the need to protect juveniles within the juvenile court system, but of the need to protect society from a growing class of “super predators.”\textsuperscript{115} Super predator was a

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id.} (holding that a judge who was accustomed to juvenile cases was more likely than a jury to be sensitive and schooled to the realities of the juvenile justice system).
\textsuperscript{112} In fact the conclusion would seem to contradict the Court’s assessment in \textit{Gault} that the judge alone could not be relied on to treat the child fairly and so required procedural monitoring. \textit{Gault}, 387 U.S. at 28.
\textsuperscript{113} See \textit{McKeiver}, 403 U.S. at 550-51.
\textsuperscript{115} See Sara Sun Beale, \textit{The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness}, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 400-05 (2006) (arguing that the news media's coverage of crime resulted in punitive criminal and juvenile justice policies); Barry C. Feld, \textit{supra} note 114, at 1517-18, 1527-28 (arguing that increasing rates of violent juvenile offenses, particularly black youth homicide rates in the late 1980s “provided the immediate political impetus to ‘get tough’ and to ‘crack down’ on youth crime” and that the “[n]ews media coverage ... overemphasize[d] the role of minority perpetrators in the commission of violent crime,” so that “distorted
term used to describe children whose raw criminality rendered them not only incorrigible and unruly (to borrow the Progressive diagnosis), but also bent on committing increasingly violent or predatory crime. 116

In response to the threat of super predation, states scrambled not only to increase the rate of transfer from juvenile court to adult court, often at increasingly younger ages, but to increase sentencing regularity in juvenile court. 117 In short, children were not only more likely to be tried as adults as a result of fear over super predators, but if they were retained in the juvenile court system they faced a sentencing regime that began to resemble the adult system more closely. 118 Like their adult analog, juvenile dispositions were divided into presumptive sentencing ranges with decreased judicial discretion.

While the predicted class of super predators failed to materialize, the reforms they prompted lingered. The rate of transfer of juveniles to the adult court system remains high, as does the rate of automatic state transfer regimes or statutes that permit transfer of the child with no hearing or procedural protection. 119 Likewise, sentencing schemes in the juvenile court system

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116 The term “super predator” was coined by the conservative criminologist John DiIulio. See, e.g., John DiIulio ET AL., Body Count: Moral Poverty ... and How to Win America’s War Against Crime & Drugs 27 (1996). Interestingly enough, DiIulio did not recommend either increasing adult prosecution of juveniles or prolonged incarceration for “super predators.” Rather he recommended faith-based rehabilitation for juveniles. Id. at 19 n.26. DiIulio later regretted the creation of the term and rejected the sentencing reforms and statutory modifications that resulted. DiIulio actually joined an amicus brief in the Miller case which argued that life without parole sentences were inappropriate for juveniles. For a discussion of the term, and phenomena of “super predators,” see Joseph Marguiles, Deviance, Risk, and Law: Reflections on the Demand for Preventive Detention of Suspected Terrorist, 101 J. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 729, 732-58 (2011); Jane Rutherford, Juvenile Justice Caught Between the Exorcist and the Clockwork Orange, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 715, 720 (2002).


118 See id.

continue to bear a strong resemblance to the adult court system, with presumptive ranges calculated based on a combination of prior criminal history and the level of the offense. Beyond this, states show increasing willingness to allow juvenile adjudications of guilt to “score” in calculation of the adult criminal history for future, adult sentences.

In the last two decades the post-*Gault* conundrum has both re-trod old ground and taken on a new dimension. Advances in neuroscience have reaffirmed the premise of early Progressives and the post-*Gault* Court alike – children are, in fact, fundamentally different than adults. The Supreme Court’s newest line of constitutional cases on juvenile justice has begun to reckon with this science.

3. Science, the Constitution, and the Kids

In some ways, the Supreme Court’s recent line shares an affinity with the Progressive’s early vision of the juvenile justice system, albeit a modernized version of that vision. Children are recognized as different and, as such, their perceptions of custody and the calculation of their culpability must be recalibrated. In a series of cases starting with *Roper v. Simmons*, the modern Court has done what previous Courts failed to do: it has created an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence informed by the age of the offender. In *J.D.B.*, the Court extended its logic with regard to youth to the custodial analysis required for *Miranda*. While these cases struck new ground in the context of the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, the basis for the ruling drew heavily on the Court’s previous treatment of the condition of youth. A jurisprudence of youth has developed that is premised on the fundamental notion that juveniles in general – and adolescents in particular – are a distinct class of actors, and that distinction carries a legal significance.

Scientific evidence confirms this premise.

a. Youth and the Eighth Amendment

Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8278 (2016) (overturning Ohio’s statute permitting transfer of juveniles to the adult court system without a hearing).

120 See Hoeffel, supra note 119, at 41.

121 Id.


124 See Carroll, supra note 3, at 569-74 (discussing regulations and decisions based on the “jurisprudence of youth”).
Prior to the Court’s decisions in the *Roper* line and in *J.D.B.*, the Court had begun to develop an Eighth Amendment jurisprudence based on the premise that juveniles categorically lacked the mental sophistication of adults and that this immaturity could effect culpability. While these early cases did not have the benefit of modern neuro-scientific studies and did not categorically overturn punishments for juveniles over the age of sixteen, they laid the critical groundwork for the Court’s more recent decisions linking notions of culpability to the science of cognitive development.

In 2005 the Court in *Roper v. Simmons* concluded that the Eighth Amendment categorically precluded the execution juvenile offenders. In doing this, the Court rejected the need for an individualized assessment of the juvenile offender. Relying on scientific evidence, the Court found that the differences between juvenile and adult offenders were “too marked” and “well understood” to require individual analysis. Juveniles were simply

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125 See *Eddings v Oklahoma*, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982) (holding “[e]ven the normal sixteen year old customarily lacks the maturity of an adult”); *Thompson v. Oklahoma*, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23, 835 (1988) (holding that the Eighth Amendment barred the execution of defendants who were under the age of sixteen at the time they committed their offense because these juveniles lacked experience, education, and intelligence compared to adults); *Stanford v. Kentucky*, 492 U.S. 361, 369-71 (1989) (limiting *Thompson* but holding that the minimum age for execution was sixteen as those younger lacked a demonstration of culpability based on their immaturity and susceptibility to peer influence); *Johnson v. Texas*, 509 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1993) (holding that age should serve as a mitigator at sentencing because “[a] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than adults and are more understandable among the young” and “[t]hese qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions”).

126 In 2002, the Court first used neuroscience to draw categorical conclusions about culpability, though not in the context of juvenile offenders. In *Atkins v. Virginia*, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded persons. *Id.* at 320-21. The *Atkins* Court based its holding in no small part on its conclusion that mentally retarded individuals lacked the cognitive capacity to warrant the death penalty. *Id.* at 318 (“[T]here is abundant evidence that [persons with mental retardation] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.”). For a more complete discussion of *Atkins* and the cases referenced in note 125, see *Carroll*, supra note 3, at 562-66.


128 *Id.* at 555.

129 *Id.* at 572-73.

130 *Id.*
categorically less culpable than adult criminals.\textsuperscript{131} Their lack of fully formed identity,\textsuperscript{132} their lack of control,\textsuperscript{133} and their incomplete cognitive and behavioral development\textsuperscript{134} all led the Court to conclude that the behavior of a juvenile could not be equated to that of an adult.\textsuperscript{135} Accordingly, the Constitution prohibited the execution of child actors.\textsuperscript{136}

In the subsequent cases of \textit{Graham v. Florida}\textsuperscript{137} and \textit{Miller v. Alabama},\textsuperscript{138} the Court held that given what was known about juvenile decision making processes and cognitive development, sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole for non-homicide offenses after a sentencing hearing,\textsuperscript{139} and automatically for homicide offenses,\textsuperscript{140} categorically violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.\textsuperscript{141}

\textit{b. Youth, Reasonableness and the Fifth Amendment}

In 2011, a year after the Court’s decision in \textit{Graham} and the year before \textit{Miller}, the Supreme Court once again considered brain science – this time in the context of the \textit{Miranda’s}\textsuperscript{142} custody analysis.\textsuperscript{143} In \textit{J.D.B. v. North Carolina}, the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{131} \textit{Id.} at 567.
  \item \textsuperscript{132} \textit{Id.} at 570 (citing ERIK H. ERIKSON, \textit{IDENTITY: YOUTH AND CRISIS} (1968)).
  \item \textsuperscript{133} \textit{Id.} at 569 (citing Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, \textit{Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence}, 58 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1009, 1014 (2003)).
  \item \textsuperscript{134} \textit{Id.} at 566.
  \item \textsuperscript{135} \textit{Id.} at 570.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} \textit{Id.} (holding that given juvenile’s incomplete neurodevelopment, juvenile offenders were neither the most culpable offenders nor did the death penalty offer a deterrent benefit).
  \item \textsuperscript{137} 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
  \item \textsuperscript{138} 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
  \item \textsuperscript{139} \textit{Graham}, 560 U.S. at 58.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} \textit{Miller}, 132 S. Ct. at 2460.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} The Court again rejected the need for an individualized analysis of the juvenile offender in question, noting in \textit{Graham} that “[c]ategorical rules tend to be imperfect, … one is necessary here.” 560 U.S. at 75. In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that advances in “psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavioral control continue to mature through late adolescence.” \textit{Id.} at 68.
  \item \textsuperscript{142} See \textit{Miranda v. Arizona}, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that prior to questioning, suspects in police custody “must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”).}
\end{itemize}
Court held that the test for determining whether or not a juvenile was in custody must be evaluated based on what was reasonable for a juvenile, not what was reasonable for an adult.\textsuperscript{144}

Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor ruled that a child suspect’s age was relevant to determining whether or not he reasonably believed he was free to leave, and so was relevant to the necessity of the \textit{Miranda} warnings.\textsuperscript{145} Citing brain science data similar to that discussed in \textit{Roper} and \textit{Graham}, the Court noted that the risk of coercion is “all the more acute” during youth.\textsuperscript{146} Accordingly, officers and the court must take the suspect’s youth into account in determining whether or not \textit{Miranda} should be administered.\textsuperscript{147}

Justice Sotomayor noted that the law has long recognized that children are different than adults and that they may feel bound to submit to police questioning under circumstances in which an adult might feel free to terminate the encounter.\textsuperscript{148} As a result, she concluded that “the child’s age must inform the custody analysis”\textsuperscript{149} and that this conclusion should apply to “children as a class.”\textsuperscript{150} She noted that unlike idiosyncratic or particularized characteristics that the Court had previously rejected under the \textit{Miranda} line, relevant characteristics including susceptibility to influence and “outside pressures” were shared by all children and “in no way involves a determination of how youth ‘subjectively affect[s] the mindset’ of any particular child.”\textsuperscript{151} In short, to understand the effect of the interrogation on J.D.B., Sotomayor reasoned that the court must put the event of the interrogation into the context of his thirteen-year-old mindset.\textsuperscript{152} Further, to ignore the child’s age in this analysis undermines the purpose of \textit{Miranda}’s protection and produces an artificial judicial inquiry that ignores the coercive effect of the interrogation on the juvenile defendant.\textsuperscript{153} Courts must therefore take the suspect’s age into account when evaluating the circumstances of the interrogation.\textsuperscript{154}

\textbf{B. Science and Kids’ Brains}

\textsuperscript{144} \textit{Id.} at 272.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Id.} at 277.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Id.} at 275.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Id.} at 273.
\textsuperscript{148} \textit{Id.} at 264.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Id.} at 264–65.
\textsuperscript{150} \textit{Id.} at 272.
\textsuperscript{151} \textit{Id.} at 275 (internal citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{152} \textit{Id.} at 276.
\textsuperscript{153} \textit{Id.} at 278–79.
\textsuperscript{154} \textit{Id.} at 279.
The Court’s most recent case line on the difference of youth draws heavily from a burgeoning body of scientific study. The emergence of imaging technology, including fMRI’s coupled with longitudinal studies, have significantly increased our knowledge of adolescent brain development.155 Emerging data suggest that adolescents display four broad categories of traits that are relevant to legal doctrines.156 First they lack maturity and have an underdeveloped sense of responsibility. Second they are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressure. Third their character is not well formed and their personalities are transitory. And fourth their decision making processes differ from their adult counterparts.157

Turning first to their lack of maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility, teens are more likely both to underappreciate risk158 and to engage in reckless behavior.159 Compared to adults, adolescents suffer deficiencies in their capacity for risk perception160 and the calculation of future

155 For a discussion of such advances, see B.J. Casey, Rebecca Jones & Todd A. Hare, The Adolescent Brain, ANN. N.Y. ACAD. SCI., Mar. 2008, at 1124.
156 As will be discussed shortly, there are admittedly limitations to the value of this data. For a more detailed description of these findings, traits, and their limitations, see Carroll, supra note 3, at 575-91.
157 I do not mean to suggest that these four categories are not interlinked; in fact they are. But I do mean to suggest that each category presents different behavior and that this behavior may have different legal consequences.
158 See ADOLESCENT RISK TAKING (Nancy J. Bell & Robert W. Bell eds., 1993); Elizabeth S. Scott et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision-Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 223 (1995); Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339 (1992) [hereinafter, Arnett, Reckless Behavior]; Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity in Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in Adolescent Decision Making, 20 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 267-68 (1996). Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg suggest that risk taking may be linked to adolescent’s limited ability to think hypothetically and into the future, which causes them to value short term gain or loss disproportionally. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 814.
159 See Jeffrey Arnett, Sensation Seeking: A New Conceptualization and a New Scale, 16 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289 (1994); Arnett, Reckless Behavior, supra note 158, at 344-46 (1992).
consequences.\textsuperscript{161} In real terms this means that adolescents tend to under-appreciate the risks they engage in while over-valuing the reward or benefit of such risks.\textsuperscript{162}

Second, adolescents are especially vulnerable to outside influence and pressure. Compared to adults, adolescents not only suffer deficiencies in their capacity for autonomous choice\textsuperscript{163} and self-management,\textsuperscript{164} but they are more susceptible to peer influence.\textsuperscript{165}

Third, their personalities are not well developed and often shift dramatically during adolescent development.\textsuperscript{166} Adolescence is a period in which children attempt to figure out where precisely they “fit in” both in terms of their peer groups and in terms of adult social groups.\textsuperscript{167} As a result, adolescents may try different identities on for size before settling on their more permanent adult persona. Adolescent brain development and the corresponding maturity such development generates is a constantly evolving

\textsuperscript{161} See Anita Greene, \textit{Future-Time Perspective in Adolescence}, 15 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 99 (1986) (as individuals age they are better able to project events into the future).

\textsuperscript{162} See Beatriz Luna, David J. Paulsen, Aarthi Padanabhan & Charles Geir, \textit{The Teenage Brain: Cognitive Control and Motivation}, 22 CURRENT DIRECTION IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 94, 96-99 (2013) (describing studies cataloging adolescents heightened reward response that may contribute to their failure to properly access risk).

\textsuperscript{163} See id. at 99 (noting that even when adolescents are capable of exercising control akin to adults, they show less consistency and less integration of brain processes in decision making); Steinberg & Cauffman, \textit{supra} note 158; Catherine Lewis, \textit{How Adolescents Approach Decisions: Changes Over Grades Seven to Twelve and Policy Implications}, 52 CHILD DEV. 538 (1981).

\textsuperscript{164} See B.J. Casey & Kristina Caudle, \textit{The Teenage Brain: Self Control}, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 82, at 83, 86 (2013) (arguing that in emotional contexts akin to real world situations, impulse control of adolescents is severely taxed relative to adults or children).


\textsuperscript{166} See Scott & Steinberg, \textit{supra} note 11, at 801.

event. As adolescents grow so do their decision making capabilities and their identities.

Finally, adolescents’ decision making processes differ significantly than adults’. Generally, and not surprisingly, studies of adolescence reveal that teens as a class are less competent decision-makers than adults. Even as teens’ cognitive capacities approach that of adults in mid-adolescence, they are less skilled than their adult counterparts in using these capacities to make real-life decisions.

From the standpoint of criminal law, each of the scientific conclusions outlined above are significant in their own right, but collectively they confirm that the behavior and curtailed decision making they describe are the products of normal adolescent development and are common across the age class and they distinguish adolescents from adults. They confirm that adolescents engage in different decision-making processes than adults as a necessary and ordinary part of their development.

As valuable as this science is in explaining adolescent brain development and thought processes, it has its limitations. First, it risks “over application.” While there has been a historical lure to use science as a means of injecting certainty into legal classifications and sentences, there is no data that suggest that current neurological studies can either predict future criminal activity or

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168 See id.
169 See Steinberg & Cauffman, supra note 158, at 260 (noting that both impulsivity and sensation seeking increases between mid-adolescent years and early adulthood, but declines thereafter).
170 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 11, at 801.
171 See Casey & Caudle, supra note 164; Luna et al., supra note 162 (both noting that even when adolescents show neural capacities on par with adults, other factors, including external factors such as susceptibility to peer influence and internal factors such as inefficient decision making processes result in poorer decision making capabilities); see also Shawn C. Ward & Willis F. Overton, Semantic Familiarity, Relevance, and the Development of Deductive Reasoning, 26 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 488, 492 (1990) (concluding that while teens are capable of making decisions that approximate those of their adult counterparts in familiar settings, their inability to fully engage in deductive reasoning and their limited experiences render them comparatively poor decision makers in unfamiliar situations).
172 Casey & Caudle, supra note 164, at 82-83 (noting that while it may be understandable to characterize adolescent behavior as deviant given high rates of mental health issues and crime during this period, this over-generalization is inaccurate).
173 Id. at 82 (cautioning against pathologizing adolescent behavior and noting that risk taking and immature decision making are necessary components of maturing).
determine a mental state in the past. Likewise, while science is able to describe general adolescent characteristics, such generalizations fail to provide any information about whether or not a particular defendant suffers the described traits. In this, the information about what is common among adolescents may provide little insight into how a fact finder should treat the particular adolescent who happens to be the defendant. This problem of the value of such generalizations is further complicated by evidence of variations within the general class of adolescence. Girls, for example, mature more quickly than boys. Induction of trauma before and during adolescence can alter developmental trajectories in unpredictable and highly individualized ways. Factors such as IQ, learning disabilities, and mental illness, all introduce variables that can alter adolescent development as described in studies. Given the number of moving parts in any analysis of the adolescent brain development, the utility of scientific studies to a legal analysis may appear dubious.

Whatever limitation the science may pose, another competing tension remains in play: to what extent should a court apply the doctrine of difference when considering a substantive criminal law question? Is perhaps the fundamental value of emerging neuroscience not in its ability to predict future behavior or to account for a state of mind at a precise moment (something it does not appear capable of doing), but rather its ability to properly re-center the fact finder’s analysis of the juvenile’s actions within the framework of his thought processes? Have critics who warn against the use of adolescent brain science in the substantive realm perhaps misperceived the value of such science, ignoring its ability to promote criminal law’s fundamental goal of assessing actual, not imagined culpability? Before turning to the procedural and evidentiary constructs of proof in the context of the mental state element and finally in Part III to an answer to this question, a brief examination of a second area of scientific study – the study of adult memory and reflection – is informative.

C. Science and How Adults Think About Facts

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174 See, e.g., Bonnie & Scott, supra note 11, at 158; Maroney, Brain Science After Graham, supra note 11; Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 11; Terry A. Maroney, False Promise, supra note 11; Buss, supra note 11.
175 See, e.g., Terry Maroney, False Promise, supra note 11.
176 See Casey, supra note 167.
177 Id.
178 Id.
Despite having once been adolescents, it is clear that developmentally normal adults do not share adolescent thought processes. Maturity, and its corresponding neurobiological development, alters not only the physical structure of the brain, but the mechanisms by which adults make decisions and judge risks and rewards.179 This change not only bodes well for society, but impacts the way that adults interpret facts. While adults may remember decisions made as a teenagers, they are unlikely to remember the thought processes the produced such decisions. To the contrary, they are likely to impose their own thought processes onto such decisions180 – often concluding that what seemed like a great idea in youth was in retrospect a bad idea.

In the context of criminal law generally, and in assessments of a defendant’s state of mind in particular, these studies suggest that contrary to Justice Sotomayor’s claim, a fact finder’s ability to evaluate a juvenile’s perspective may not be intuitive at all.181 In fact, to assume that, having been an adolescent, an adult fact finder is capable of accurately assessing the juvenile’s state of mind based on circumstantial evidence is to assume that the fact finder is capable of remembering not only his youth, but of replicating his youthful thought processes. In reality, adult fact finders lack this critical capacity and are more likely to interpret the significance of such evidence as it


180 See Raymond S. Nickerson, How We Know—and Sometimes Misjudge—What Others Know: Imputing One’s Own Knowledge to Others, 125 PSYCH. BULL. 737, 745-49 (1999) (comparing studies that indicate people tend to attribute their own thought processes to others in assessing facts); Boaz Keysar, et al., States of Affairs and States of Mind: The Effect of Knowledge of Beliefs, 64 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES 283, 284 (1995) (describing “people’s tendency to behave as if others have access to their own privileged information—even when they are fully aware they do not”). For an excellent discussion of this interpretive failure in the context of judicial decision making, see Matthew Tokson, Judicial Resistance and Legal Change, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 901, 913-16 (2015).

181 See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 279-80 (stating “officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7–year–old is not a 13–year–old and neither is an adult.”). As will be discussed further in Part III, this portion of the decision was heavily criticized by the dissent for the assumption that understanding that a child thinks differently is not the same as understanding how a child thinks. See id. at 293 (Alito, J., dissenting).
relates to state of mind through the rubric of their own adult thought processes.

PART II. CONSTRUCTING PROOF

Armed with a basic understanding of the jurisprudence of youth and neuroscientific conclusions surrounding adolescent brain development, this part turns to the evidentiary construct of proof in criminal law, in particular the role of relevance and inference. When courts and scholars speak of evidence, they often resort to epistemological dichotomies. Evidence is either testimonial or physical; relevant or not; direct or circumstantial. Each division is driven by the desire to find truth. But these categorizations alone are insufficient to accomplish the goal of decisional accuracy. Additional classifications and protections regulate the admission of evidence and the narrative of a trial in the hope of providing fact finders with the necessary information upon which to deliberate while excluding information that is either irrelevant to the decision before the fact finder or likely to produce decisional inaccuracy.

182 See 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 25, at 224-25 (2d ed. 1923) (citing 1 THOMAS STARKIE, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (1824)) (noting that “testimony [is] information derived … from those who had actual knowledge of the facts” and physical evidence [is] either objects or conduct “capable of being assessed through actual and personal observation” by the fact finder).

183 See FED. R. EVID. 402 (permitting the admission of relevant evidence and the exclusion of irrelevant evidence).

184 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, §185 at 397 (7th ed. 2006) (noting that “[d]irect evidence is evidence that, if believed, resolves a matter in issue” and circumstantial evidence, even if true, requires “additional reasoning …. to reach the desired conclusion”).

185 See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1194 (noting that the “generally articulated and popularly understood objective of the trial system is to determine the truth about a particular disputed event”).

186 Protections such as disclosure requirements (18 U.S.C. § 3500 (JENCKS ACT)(requiring disclosure of prior statements of testifying witnesses)); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c) (requiring disclosure of the basis of an expert’s opinion), impeachment (see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. Rules 609, 801(d) (2013)), corroboration (see MCCORMICK, supra note 184, §145 at 291-295 (describing the rationale for the requirement of corroboration)), rules of production (see e.g., FED. R. EVID. 703, 705 (2013)(describing production and disclosure requirements for expert witnesses), see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (ordering production of eye witness
As substantive criminal law defines the elements of an offense and defenses to it, relevancy is defined not only in terms of what the evidence directly shows, but also in terms of what may be inferred from this evidence.\textsuperscript{187} In this, relevancy and inference are joined. Inference allows a fact finder to conclude a fact based on the establishment of another fact.\textsuperscript{188} As a practical matter, inferences ease proof requirements, allowing fact finders to draw conclusions about one fact based on their interpretation of another.\textsuperscript{189} Inferences are not without their limitations, however, they must be supported by credible evidence and pertain to an element to be proven. An assessment of the “relevancy” of circumstantial evidence hinges on the inference of a fact it

\textsuperscript{187} See George F. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941) (noting famously that “[r]elevancy, as the word itself indicates, is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists as a relationship between an item of evidence and the proposition sought to be proved.”).

\textsuperscript{188} For example if a fact finder concludes that it is proven that the defendant was at a still during its operation, federal law permits the fact finder to also conclude that the defendant operated the still. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70 (1965). This inference was permissive, meaning the jury did not have to infer the second fact, even upon proof of the first fact. \textit{Id.} Not all “still” related inferences fared as well, however, a year after the decision in \textit{Gainey}, in \textit{Romano}, the Court struck down a statute authorizing jurors to infer that a person present at the still was in “possession, custody, or control of it.” United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 & n.4 (1965); 26 U.S.C. § 5601 (b)(1)(1970) (repealed 1976). The Court distinguished the two cases by noting that Gainey had to be present while the still was operating, but Romano only had to be present at the still, operating or otherwise, for the inferences to be triggered. \textit{Id.} at 140-41. In each case and later cases, as will be discussed further in Part II B., the inferences were supported by circumstantial evidence that supported a finding of guilt.

\textsuperscript{189} See Nesson, supra note 1, at 1187 (“Legislatures typically enact permissive inferences in order to assist prosecutors in providing criminal offenses when the prosecution’s best evidence on one of the elements is (a) wholly circumstantial and (b)not entirely convincing.”).
seeks to prove and its relationship to the proof of that fact. The more remote the relationship between the evidence and the fact it might prove, the higher the risk that the evidence is not probative. Likewise, even if the relationship is close, if the fact proven does not demonstrate an element of the offense, its materiality may be called into question. Thus questions of relevancy are inherently entwined with questions of what type of inferences should be permitted in criminal law or when an element may be proven by circumstantial evidence and what type of circumstantial evidence may be allowed. And so begins the cycle between inference and relevancy – evidence may be relevant because it supports the inference of a fact, but the inference is only permitted if its conclusion is relevant to the question before the fact finder. To disentangle questions of relevancy and inference is to unpack criminal law’s proof requirement.

A. Disentangling Relevancy

Relevancy is the threshold to admissibility. Federal Rule of Evidence 401 establishes the test for relevancy in terms of probative value and

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190 See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 401, Definition of “Relevant Evidence” (2011).
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 See James, supra note 187, at 689 (“Since scholars first attempted to treat the common law of evidence as a rational system, relevancy has been recognized as a basic concept underlying all further discussion.”); RONALD J. ALLEN, RICHARD B. KUHNS & ELEANOR SWIFT, EVIDENCE TEXT, PROBLEMS, AND CASES 139 (3d ed. 2002) (“Relevancy is the foundational principle for all modern systems of evidence law.”); 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 401.02[1], at 401-5 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2011) (“The concept [of relevance] is, however, fundamental to the law of evidence; it is the cornerstone on which any rational system of evidence rests.”). Some scholars contest this characterization, arguing that “foundation” is in fact the threshold to admissibility, with relevance following as a close second. See David S. Schwartz, A Foundation Theory of Evidence, 100 GEO. L.J. 95, 99 (2011) (arguing that foundation requires that “evidence be case-specific, assertive, and probably true” and “[a]s such, it is a logical precondition for relevance.”).
194 See FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if … it has any tendency to make a fact more less probable than it would be without the evidence.”).
materiality. But defining these terms is an elusive task. As then-not-yet Justice Holmes suggested, the limits of relevancy are “a concession to the shortness of life.” If all evidence were admissible because it in some way altered the probability of a material element, trials would end in exhaustion and bewilderment, and rarely in accurate verdicts. Instead, Holmes suggested that the value of relevancy lay in its ability to limit the story parties told. In fact, Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence on the grounds that it may produce decisional inaccuracy.

And so, substantive criminal law and evidentiary rules seek to define relevancy in terms of ever narrowing circles around the event or events in question. Substantive criminal law defines elements that the state must prove and the defenses that may be offered in response. These elements serve as a guide as the rules of evidence shear away collateral issues and concerns to admit only the “relevant” evidence. As the law cabins the narrative the fact finder will hear and judge, the rules of evidence narrow the scope of the narrative until the fact finder is left only with the most essential of stories. The theory of relevancy is that in this narrowing the fact finder may focus on the question at hand and arrive at some truth untainted by distraction or prejudice.

The defendant’s alleged act, committed with a particular mens rea, that produced a result, in the presence of particular attendant circumstances are the requisites for a guilty (or in the presence of a defense, a not guilty) verdict. A defendant accused of bringing a gun to a party and firing a shot at a rival may face an assault with a deadly weapon charge. The story of his guilt will unfold in terms of the elements of his charge: that the defendant did intentionally engage in conduct that placed another in fear of imminent injury through the use of a deadly weapon, to wit a gun.

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195 Id. (“Evidence is relevant if ... the fact is of consequence in determining the action.”). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 184, § 185, at 395 (“Materiality concerns the fit between the evidence and the case.”).
196 Reeve v. Dennet, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887).
197 Id.
198 See FED. R. EVID. 403-415 (2013) (all excluding relevant evidence because of potential prejudicial effect).
199 It could certainly be argued that procedural law also imposes limitations on the admission of evidence without the goal of achieving accuracy. See Tom Stacy, The Search for Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1370-73 (1991)(arguing that Fourth and Fifth Amendment jurisprudence as well as the development of privilege serve to exclude evidence that may promote truth finding functions).
200 See James, supra note 187, at 701.
As each witness takes the stand and recalls some part or all of the component parts of the offense or defense in response to the questions of direct and cross examination they narrate the story of the verdict. They offer the fact finder a glimpse of a moment upon which the fact finder must then render judgment. The defendant was there, the witness saw him. The defendant fired the shot, the witness smelled the smoke and heard the shot. The defendant’s hands tested positive for lead, antimony and barium (the trilogy that compose gun shot residue), the witness ran a test. Likewise the introduction of physical objects contributes to the narrative. Their presence suggests or confirms a fact. The gun was found on the defendant when he was arrested. It is real. It could fire a shot.

This story told in court is often non-linear and non-sequential. It is jagged and told in the starts and stops as each witness testifies and is inevitably interrupted by objections and their accompanying legal arguments and recesses. It is by its nature a story bounded on all sides by the terms the law sets forth – both in terms of what may be told and how it may be told.

It is more often than not bad story telling, but it serves a purpose that exceeds its literary value. The story told in court is a compact one surrounding a particular moment and the consequences of that moment. That which proves or disproves an element directly is relevant and, barring other concerns, is admissible as evidence. That which does not is not relevant and is therefore not admissible.

That the defendant had a difficult childhood, or misunderstood the nature of the party he was attending, or has a prior conviction for theft are all likely irrelevant to the question of his guilt. These facts and circumstances may admittedly provide more detail, or help on some level to explain the defendant’s actions, or even render a material fact more or less likely, but they are simply too remote and pose too great a risk of injecting prejudice or distraction that they would likely fail Holmes’ and Article IV’s relevancy test and could be excluded.

Evidence by its nature can give rise to decisional inaccuracy. Human sources suffer a litany of potential risks. A witness may be insincere or inarticulate. She may make errors in memory or in perception. Likewise a physical object, unless offered of evidence of its very existence, demands interpretation by the fact finder to be rendered relevant. This act of interpretation may skew the tale the evidence would tell.

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Other evidentiary rules and procedural protections serve to guard against these inaccuracies. As relevancy confines the scope of the in-court narrative in the hopes of promoting accurate decision making, so rules of exclusion, disclosure, impeachment, and corroboration – coupled with jury instructions – seek both to exclude non-credible evidence and to empower fact finders with sufficient information to discern inaccuracy. These protections ostensibly guard against the common dangers of insincerity, erroneous memory, faulty perception, the ambiguity of language itself, and false inference. And while the parameters of protections may vary both in existence and effectiveness depending on the jurisdiction and the judicial actor interpreting them, their presence speaks to a desire to promote accurate decision making by controlling not only the evidence the fact finder considers, but the form and scope of that evidence. Assessments of relevancy serve an important gate keeper function for these exclusions – permitting limitations on the narrative in the name of promoting accuracy.

This approach to evidence and proof inevitably presents an incomplete or partial narrative to the fact finder. Inevitably only part of the story is told. Criminal law unfolds as a snapshot, a single moment in a defendant’s and victim’s life. Despite this limitation, however, this approach to evidence and proof is also premised on the notion that fact finders are capable not only of hearing the story of the case with all its limitations and disjointed narrative, but also interpreting that unlikely story in a way that is consistent with the law’s aim of an accurate and just result.

This act of interpretation is a critical and potentially fraught moment for criminal law. It requires a fact finder – often a lay person serving as juror – to consider the law as written and to apply that law to the facts of the case as he or she understands them to be. This understanding is based not only on what evidence was presented but also what the fact finder knows of the world around him or her. For all the hard work that evidentiary and legal rules may do, ultimately judgments of credibility, relevancy, truth and guilt come down to

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202 The defendant mentioned above may exclude testimony relating to his prior conviction, even if it is found relevant, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Likewise, he or the state may prevent hearsay evidence or supposition.

203 While relevancy serves an important gate keeper function, alone it is insufficient to ensure accurate decision making. See Fed. R. Evid. 401 Advisory Committee Notes. Federal Rule of Evidence 402 notes that “all relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.”
the fact finder’s assessment of the evidence itself. In this decision, accuracy is a product of both the law’s regulation of the narrative of the case and the fact finder’s understanding of that narrative based on his or her life experience. Here relevancy and inference entwine.

B. Disentangling Inference

The use of inference or presumption in criminal law as a mechanism of proof opens the possibility that relevancy can and should be defined in ever widening circles. Inference allows a fact to be proven by proof of another fact. The concept of inference suffers its own binary constructs. Inference may be mandatory or permissive, the product of circumstantial evidence

204 The terms inference and presumption both refer to the concept that one fact may be proven by proof of another. For the purpose of ease I will use the term inference though courts and scholars use both.


206 Mandatory inferences are often called “true” or “conclusive” presumptions and require the fact finder to draw the inference from the proof of the predicate fact unless the defendant rebuts it. See Julian P. Alexander, Presumptions: Their Use and Abuse, 17 Miss. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1945); John Calvin Jeffries, Jr. & Paul B. Stephan III, Defenses, Presumptions, and Burden of Proof in Criminal Law, 88 YALE L.J. 1325, 1335 (1979). Some legal scholars distinguish “conclusive” presumptions from mandatory presumptions, defining conclusive presumptions as foreclosing any further argument once the predicate fact is shown. See Neil S. Hecht & William M. Pinzler, Rebutting Presumptions: Order out of Chaos, 58 B. U. L. REV. 527, 529 (1978).

207 Permissive inferences are also called “non-mandatory presumptions” or “permissive presumptions” and allow the fact finder to infer one fact from the proof of another. As their name suggests, they do not require the fact finder to make the inference. See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979) (holding permissive inference instruction with regard to an element of an offense is constitutional if the instruction with respect to the element makes it clear that each element must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is a rational connection between the predicate and inferred facts and the inferred fact are more likely than not to flow from the predicate fact); Leslie J. Harris, Constitutional Limits on Criminal Presumptions as an Expression of Changing Concepts of Fundamental Fairness, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 308, 310 (1986); Jeffries & Stephens, supra note 206, at 1335-36; Peter D. Bewley, Note, The Unconstitutionality of Statutory Criminal Presumptions, 22 STAN. L. REV. 341, 343 (1970).
or statute. Statutory inferences are most common around areas of public safety concerns such as narcotics, alcohol, or weapon regulation. Non-statutory inferences tend to focus on the state of mind element.

Jurors are instructed that they may infer a defendant’s state of mind from his conduct. A jury may infer that a defendant’s intent to distribute narcotics from the quantity of drugs found in his possession, for example. That the defendant either actively denies this state of mind, or that there may be a myriad of alternative explanations, does not undo the permissive inference. Likewise that the conduct in question either precedes or proceeds the criminal act does not undo its inferential value as circumstantial evidence. Put another way, a defendant’s flight from the scene of a crime or his

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210 See, e.g., Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 400 (1970) (statute permitted inference that heroin was imported based on possession); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 9 (1969) (statute permitted inference that marijuana was imported based on possession); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 64 (1965) (statute permitted inference that defendant operated still from presence); United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 137 (1965) (statute permitted inference of possession from the presence of a firearm in a vehicle); Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943) (statute permitted inference that operated still from presence).

211 See Deborah Denno, Concocting Criminal Intent, 105 GEO. L.J. 323, 328 (2017); Denno, supra note 208, at 692-93 (discussing jury instructions on permissive inference of the state of mind element from proof of conduct).

212 See Denno, supra note 208, at 691 and Appendix Table 1 (showing 34 states and the District of Columbia permit an inference of a mental state from conduct or other circumstantial evidence); Julie Schmidt Chauvin, Comment, “For It Must Seem Their Guilt”: Diluting Reasonable Doubt by Rejecting the Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence Standard, 53 LOY. L. REV. 217, 221-22 (2007).

213 See United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A large quantity of narcotics alone provides sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer an intent to distribute it.”); Francis Paul Greene, Comment, I Ain’t Got No Body: The Moral Uncertainty of Bodiless Murder Jurisprudence In New York After People v. Bierenbaum, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2863, 2876 (2003) (arguing that in such cases fact finders “must make a leap of logic and infer the existence of a fact at issue, connecting a circumstantial fact to a directly incriminating fact”).

214 See, e.g., Thompson v. State, 901 A.2d 208, 212 (M.D. App. 2006); State v. Perry, 725 A.2d 264, 266 (R.I. 1999) (all permitting a jury instruction on inference of state of
preparation for a potential crime both suffice as circumstantial evidence for state of mind inferences.  

On its most basic level an inference eases proof requirements by allowing the state to bootstrap proof of a fact through the proof of another. There is a necessity to their easing; scholars and courts have long recognized that without inference it would at times be impossible to prove mental states. An inference also often contains a burden-shifting component. For this, the concept of inference has received substantial criticism. Although each of

mind based on the defendant’s flight after the crime. But see Albery v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 511 (1896) (noting that a desire to avoid contact with the police is not necessarily indicative of a guilty mind). Outside the context of mens rea, flight has served as a basis for the suspicion required for a brief stop under the Fourth Amendment, see Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).

See Wright, 739 F.3d at 1169 (holding that the defendant’s accumulation of narcotics even prior to distribution could be used as evidence of his intent to distribute).


See 29A AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 1392 (2015); see also United States v. Sullivan, 522 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.”), CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, 2A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 411 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that the proof of mental state through inference is, in some cases, “indispensable”); see also United States v. Stoker, 706 F.3d 643, 646 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Intent may, and generally must, be proven circumstantially.”) (quoting United States v. Maggitt, 784 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (noting that a jury “rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s knowledge, [and] it is generally established through circumstantial evidence” (quoting United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994))).

To rebut an inference, a defendant may have to present evidence that offers an alternative explanation for the proven fact. See Alexander, supra note 206, at 3 n. 6; Nesson, supra note 1, at 1214-15; Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 173 (1969); Bewley, supra note 207, at 343 n. 21 (“The import of the language appears to be that a procedure shifting to the defendant the burden of proof on an element of the crime would be unconstitutional, while one putting the burden of proof of an affirmative defense on him is not.”). Some inferences shift burdens of production as opposed to burdens of persuasion. See Bewley, supra note 207, at 343.

See, e.g., Nesson, supra note 1; James, supra note 187; Ashford & Risinger, supra note 218. The Supreme Court has also held some inferences to be unconstitutional per se. See, e.g., Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 703-04 (1975) (holding a rebuttable presumption that shifted the burden of persuasion to the defendant violated the due
these critiques are valid, they arguably neglect the reality that inference simply gives a name to a process that fact finders likely engage in anyway in rendering a verdict.\textsuperscript{220}

A more fundamental flaw with the concept of inference is that it is premised on a notion that any fact finder can accurately use inferences to reach a particular conclusion.\textsuperscript{221} This idea that one fact carries universal and knowable meaning in the context of the mental state element is particularly problematic.\textsuperscript{222} In fact, depending on the defendant’s thought processes, the meaning of an act or omission can change.\textsuperscript{223} This reality is recognized not only in constitutional protections and procedural and evidentiary rules that set guidelines for the admission of evidence, but also in statutory and common law defenses such as self-defense, battered women’s/batter child’s defenses, cultural defenses, some mental health based defenses such as the PTSD defense\textsuperscript{224} and in mitigating defenses such as mistake of fact and law.\textsuperscript{225}

\textsuperscript{220} See Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 71, 102 (2001) (noting that allowing jurors to infer a mental state from action not only mirrors what is likely occurring in deliberation, but avoids “fruitless inquiry into mental processes”).

\textsuperscript{221} See James, supra note 187, at 695-97 (noting that inferences only work if facts upon which they are based carry universal or near universal meanings), Nesson, supra note 1 (arguing that there is a value in complexity that is often lost in pursuit of the ease of inference and universal meanings).

\textsuperscript{222} See Denno, supra note 208, at 692-96 (using jury instructions to highlight particular interpretive conflicts that may arise around inferences of mental state from the defendant); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Minds/State of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POLY REV. 143, 158-59 (2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson Empty Votes in Jury Deliberations, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1261, 1275 (2000) (noting that jurors “often must infer the actor’s state of mind form conduct open to numerous interpretations”).

\textsuperscript{223} See Taylor-Thompson, Empty Votes, supra note 222 at 1275 (observing that the juror’s interpretation of a fact often hinges on the juror’s personal experiences).

\textsuperscript{224} Each of these defenses permit the introduction of evidence that might otherwise be excluded as irrelevant including the defendant’s past interactions with the victim including prior acts of violence, prior traumatic experiences unrelated to the crime such as war experiences or childhood abuse, and medical evidence of illness or injury unconnected to the crime itself. See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §§16-20 (7TH ed. 2015) (discussing proof requirements and relevancy for defenses).
Constitutional due process, the right to counsel, the right to an impartial jury, the right against self incrimination, and the Double Jeopardy Clause all carry with them procedural protections designed to promote both fairness and decisional accuracy. These protections seek to guard against the possibility that a conviction is the product of something other than the fact finder’s careful deliberation of reliable evidence presented at trial.

Similarly, rules of evidence seek to ensure decisional accuracy by limiting information provided to fact finders. The Rules of Evidence limit admissibility in a variety of ways. Experts may not opine on the ultimate issue of fact.

225 See Model Penal Code § 2.04 at 267 (Official Draft with Revised Comments 1985) Mistake of law and fact defenses emphasize the “circumstances as the actor believes them to be rather than as they actually exist.” Id. at 297.

226 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that while not present in the text of the Constitution, beyond a reasonable doubt burdens of proof and the presumption of innocence were critical components of due process and served to protect against wrongful conviction).

227 See U.S. CONST. Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right … to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (“The Sixth Amendment [and the right to counsel contained there in] stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not ‘still be done.’” (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938)).

228 See U.S. CONST. Amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury.”); Jenny E. Carroll, The Jury as Democracy, 66 ALA. L. REV. 825 (2015) (discussing the necessity of a diverse jury in ensuring accurate, accountable, and legitimate outcomes in criminal trials); see also Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-66 (1979) (discussing the importance of procedural mechanism that promote the selection of a representative jury).

229 See U.S. CONST. Amendment V (“No person shall be … compelled in a criminal case to be a witness against himself…”). This right against self-incrimination prohibits the fact finder from inferring the defendant’s guilt from his silence and instead requires the fact finder’s verdict to be based on evidence offered. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (prohibiting the use of pre and post arrest silence to suggest guilt); Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 213 n.11 (1988) (prohibiting the use of silence at trial to infer guilt).


231 That these constitutional protections may fail or be deficient in some way – and I do not doubt their day-to-day mechanisms could be improved upon – does not undermine their aim.
regarding mens rea. Hearsay is not generally admissible. Neither testimony nor physical evidence may not be introduced without first establishing its foundation. Information about a witness’s character or other bad acts is generally not admissible. Leading questions are prohibited on direct examination. This list goes on, but in each restriction to admissibility, the rules recognize not only the frailties of evidence itself, but also that fact finders may be ill equipped to dodge potentially prejudicial or distracting material. Taken together with procedural rules that set limits on how and when evidence may be presented, these rules seek to hone the fact finders’ interpretive powers.

All of these limitations, whether rule based or constitutionally based, are premised on the notion that decision making by fact finders must be guided, and that fact finders may make inaccurate or unreliable decisions if they are not guided. This suggests that the meaning a fact finder may draw from any given fact will shift as exposure to other facts shift. Put another way, the need for these limitations suggests that the significance of a fact to any given element is not constant, but is a product of the context in which it is presented.

Likewise, defenses may hinge on the defendant’s ability to persuade the fact finder that ordinarily prohibited conduct viewed through the lens of the defendant’s experiences and thought process may be excused or mitigated. These defenses require the fact finder to assess the defendant’s mental state in

232 See Fed. R. Evid. 704(b) (“In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.”)
233 See Fed. R. Evid. 802 (stating that “[h]earsay is not admissible” unless it falls within some exception to the “hearsay rule”); Edmond Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177 (1948) (noting hearsay risks particular dangers of insincerity, ambiguity, memory loss, and misperception).
234 See Fed. R. Evid. 104 (requiring the court to answer preliminary questions before permitting the admission of evidence); Schwartz, supra note 193.
235 See Fed. R. Evid. 404 (limiting the introduction of character evidence and evidence of prior crimes or bad acts).
236 See 3 John H. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 769-79 (3d ed. 1940) (noting that evidentiary restrictions on impeachment of one’s own witnesses resulted in a general prohibition on leading a witness during direct examination).
237 See Roth, supra note 5 (noting that a variety of procedural and evidentiary rules as discussed above seek to promote accurate decision making by fact finders).
238 See supra notes 226-236.
239 See Denno, supra note 211; Nesson, supra note 1 (both discussing how context and complexity can shift perceptions of facts).
the context of her thought process and perception of her circumstances. Mistake of law or fact defenses mitigate the mental state element by emphasizing the “circumstances as the actor believes them to be rather than as they actually exist.” This subjective approach requires the fact finder to judge the defendant’s mental state based on the defendant’s mistaken perception of the world. Self-defense asks the fact finder to determine not only if the defendant’s use of force was proportional, but also what was her perception of the risk she faced and her available response. A battered women’s or battered child defense or a PTSD defense asks a fact finder to make similar judgments – to account for the defendant’s particular trauma and its effect on her assessment of risk and response. Finally, cultural defenses seek to contextualize the defendant’s actions based on cultural norms that may be foreign (literally and figuratively) to the fact finder. In each of these the use of an inference is not curtailed – the fact finder is still permitted to infer a mental state from evidence of the defendant’s act or acts. Rather, the inference is contextualized in recognition that the defendant’s state of mind may be the product of factors and perspectives that the average fact finder may not share.

240 See Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 262-63, 265 (1987) (categorizing excuse and mitigation defenses as based on either the circumstances the actor faced or the actor’s mental deficiencies or differences).

241 See Model Penal Code § 2.04, supra note 225, at 297.


243 See Dressler, supra note 242. An impressive amount of scholarship has been devoted to the discussion and development of battered women’s and batter child’s defenses, for a sampling of literature discussing the development of these defenses. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BOCHNAK, WOMEN’S SELF-DEFENSE CASES: THEORY AND PRACTICE (1981); CHARLES P. EWING, BATTERED WOMEN WHO KILL: PSYCHOLOGICAL SELF-DEFENSE AS LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1987); V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1280-87 (2001); Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1994).


245 Admittedly, the inference the fact finder may make with regard to such defenses may also be influenced by the fact finder’s own bias. This reality has received significant attention as of late in the context of self-defense. See Kevin Jon Heller,
As a result, the question that a fact finder might seek to answer in their interpretation of law as applied to a given set of facts becomes not just “what would the defendant’s actions signify in my own life?” but also “what would the defendant’s actions signify if my own life mirrored hers?” In this subtle difference lies the heart of a theory of culpability that strives to move from imagined to actual – to convict and punish based on what a defendant did, as opposed to what she might have done.

It is crucial, therefore, to re-center the point of reference for any such inference to the defendant’s actual thought processes. In doing so, the fact finder may require evidence that might previously have been seen as tangential, and therefore irrelevant and excludable. Questions on topics as diverse as the defendant’s past relationship with the victim, past traumatic events unrelated to the victim, biases, physical injury, and mental health history become part of a larger context and a necessary component to proper assessment of the defendant’s mental state. That which criminal courts would normally seek to exclude as irrelevant is rendered critical to the fact finder’s ability to properly interpret evidence.

PART III: PROOF, SCIENCE, AND THE PROBLEM WITH INFEERENCE

Recent neuroscience studies and the jurisprudence that has developed around them suggests that juvenile defendants present a particular challenge for substantive criminal law and its reliance on inference to prove a defendant’s mental state. The juvenile justice system is premised on the notion that kids

Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 4 (1998) (“[C]ourts have slowly come to accept the widespread scholarly belief that the formal neutrality of the objective standard is systematically biased against the self-defense and provocation claims of individuals from groups that lack significant economic, political, and social power in American society—particularly women, the poor, and nonwhites.”); Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1555, 1580-86 (2013) (surveying social science studies that demonstrate the effect implicit racial bias has on the perception of fear); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 402-23 (1996) [hereinafter Lee, Race and Self-Defense] (explicating the “Black-as-criminal” stereotype); V.F. Nourse, supra note 243, at 1279–80 & n.215 (explaining the debate surrounding the role of subjectivity and gender in homicides resulting from battered women syndrome); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspcion Heuristic, 98 Iowa L. Rev. 293, 314-15 (2012) (observing that individuals rely on stereotypes when assessing risk posed by other people).
are different than adults. The Progressives recognized this in the creation of
the stand-alone juvenile justice system,246 and the Court has recognized this as
it sought balance in a post-*Gault* juvenile justice system.247 Courts and
lawmakers have addressed this difference largely in the procedural realm,
demarcating lines of protection – constitutional and systematic – around
juvenile offenders. A child has a right to counsel,248 but not the right to a
jury.249 A child may not be sentenced to death,250 but can be tried as an
adult.251 The balance has always been tenuous, as notions of childhood ebb
toward vulnerability and flow toward predatory. The modern jurisprudence
of youth allows simultaneously for the highest rate of juvenile transfer252 and for a
youth-oriented calculation of custody for *Miranda* purposes.253 Despite these
seeming incongruities, the recognition of difference and its significance for law
lingers.

Neuroscience confirms what most folks already knew: kids think and
react differently than adults. Adolescents’ perceptions of risk, reward, and the
value of peer approval result from their distinct mental processes.254 The Court
has utilized science to bolster its youth-based Fifth and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence.255 In each the Court has created doctrine premised not on an
individual defendant’s characteristics, but on those characteristics that span the
category of youth.256

The Court however has yet to expand these doctrines to the substantive
realm of calculation of the defendant’s state of mind. Instead, adult fact finders
are left to assign a mental state to youthful defendant’s based on the fact
finder’s, not the defendant’s, perception of the world. This seems an odd
position given criminal law’s simultaneous reliance on mens rea to assess
culpability and its purported aim to ascertain a defendant’s actual, as opposed
to imagined, mental state.257

246 *See supra* notes 29-65 and accompanying text.
247 *See supra* notes 66-154 and accompanying text.
249 *McKeiver*, 403 U.S. at 539.
250 *Roper*, 543 U.S. at 571-72.
251 *See* Drinan, *supra* note 22, at 1793-94; Brink, *supra* note 22, at 1557.
252 *Id.*
253 *J.D.B.*, 564 U.S. at 277.
254 *See supra* notes 155-179 and accompanying text.
255 *See supra* notes 122-154 and accompanying text.
256 *Id.*
257 *See* Denno, *supra* note 208, at 608 (describing criminal law’s aim to determine
actual, as opposed to imagined states of min).
This Part offers a brief discussion of the value of neuroscientific evidence in the determination of juvenile defendants’ mental states. To be clear, I do not contend that such evidence predicts or confirms a particular thought at any given moment. Likewise, such scientific evidence does not suggest that juveniles are incapable of forming mental states or that youth dictates the whole-cloth creation of new mens rea classifications. Rather this Part suggests that evidence of adolescent thought processes are relevant to questions of guilt and should guide inferential proof calculations.

A. It’s Always, All About Proof

At the end of the day criminal law is about proof.258 Suspicions may fester and swirl but without proof they are of little consequence. Al Capone may have run a notorious crime syndicate, but the Government could only prove tax fraud.259 For all the rumors and all the whispered certainties of greater crimes, he went to jail for a tax violation.260 Proof, while a requisite for conviction, is also a complicated, multilayered proposition.

At its base proof requires evidence – some tangible demonstration of what is sought to be proven.261 Investigators gather factual components to support suspicions. Prosecutors process and interpret this information in support of a charge. Judges sift through and interpret the information again, culling the admissible from the inadmissible, presenting the fact finder with only the most reliable and the most relevant evidence. But in it all, evidence alone is not proof. And in the end, only proof matters.

Presented the admissible evidence in the case, a judge or jury is left to interpret its meaning in the context of the law. The means of this interpretation may vary. Different criminal statutes require a myriad of elements, from voluntary acts to attendant circumstances to mental states to causation and results.262 While these elements may vary, the law relies on a citizen – whether judge or juror – to consider the evidence presented and

258 And also about regulation of behavior, but only after proof of an offense. See DRESSLER, supra note 225, §1.02 (describing proof requirements).
260 Id.
determine if the elements are proven. The citizen, in turn, relies on his or her own sense of the world to lend meaning to the evidence.

An outstretched hand in dark alley is either an illicit drug deal or a hand shake; a semi-coherent moan is either encouragement of or resistance to a sexual advance; shouted words to “fuck up” a school principal are either a promise of harm to come or meaningless bravado. It all depends on who interprets them and how. The harmless is rendered criminal or the criminal harmless in the mind of the fact finder.

On some level, the flexibility of interpretation is a critical part of proof.\(^{263}\) Allowing the citizenry to weigh the meaning of evidence injects substantive criminal law with a responsiveness and agility that static law might otherwise lack.\(^{264}\) Through interpretation, evidence is placed in context. The hand is outstretched in an alley littered with the remnants of the drug trade. A small packet of drugs was tossed as the police stormed the alley. The moaner is so inebriated she is unaware of the man atop her who separated her from her friends when he noticed she was unable to stand and was slurring her words. The shouted words are those of a frustrated eleven year old who, feeling unfairly accused by the principal, cries out what he fanaticizes about doing to the offending adult.

The fact finder considers each of these facts and the context in which they occurred. The context, in turn, promotes the accuracy of fact finder’s ultimate decision.\(^{265}\) But in reaching a verdict the fact finder engages in one final and ultimately decisive act of interpretation – he considers the evidence not only in the context of the case, but in the context of what the fact finder knows of the world. The evidence takes on a legal meaning previously absent based on the fact finder’s own sense of what the law means and the significance of the fact to that meaning.\(^{266}\) Based on this final act of interpretation, the fact finder concludes that the outstretched hands traded drugs for cash, that the moan was a precursor to a rape, and that the shouted words were not a threat.

The law in turn relies on the citizen-as-fact-finder’s ability to lay this larger, legally infused meaning atop any given set of facts. But beyond this, it relies on the citizen’s ability to ground this meaning in some communal sense of what facts themselves signify. If the citizen cannot do this, the verdict that


\(^{264}\) Id.

\(^{265}\) See Roth, *supra* note 5.

\(^{266}\) See Carroll, *supra* note 263.
emerges is foreign, discordant, inaccurate, unjust.\textsuperscript{267} Criminal law enforcement loses some, if not all, of its value. The accusation is not truly proven, but is rather the product of misinterpreted or badly interpreted facts.

Of all the factual determinations fact finders are asked to make on their road to a verdict, accessing the defendant’s state of mind is an especially fraught act of interpretation.\textsuperscript{268} Though classified as a “factual” determination, what the defendant was thinking at any given moment is more ephemeral than other binary factual questions.\textsuperscript{269} The defendant stole the purse or he did not. The defendant shot the victim or he did not. The defendant set the fire to the occupied structure or he did not. But criminal law demands more than liability based on act and cause alone.\textsuperscript{270} In all but the most exceptional cases, criminal law requires the fact finder to access what the defendant was thinking at the moment the purse was taken, the shot was fired, or the fire was set.\textsuperscript{271} What the defendant was thinking at that critical moment may remain elusive, perhaps even to the defendant himself. So criminal law asks fact finders to perform the near impossible task of inferring the defendant’s thoughts from the other.

In this, we daily ask jurors to engage in a multi-layered fictional interpretation of what the defendant \textit{must} have been thinking, based on what the fact finder imagines he, the fact finder, would have been thinking had he found himself in the defendant’s place. Even in the best of circumstances this fictional construction and interpretation of the defendant’s thought process is complex. In the context of adolescent defendants it is further complicated when adult fact finders seek to imagine or recreate what science informs us is a distinct and foreign thought process.

In this search for accurate interpretation of evidence, neuroscience’s conclusions about adolescent development fill a void in fact finders’ interpretive ability. These conclusions inform the fact finder of the significance of given acts or circumstances to the adolescent defendant. Such a perspective is not only distinct from an adult’s, but it may elude adult fact finders as they weigh evidence in the context of their own view of the world.

\textsuperscript{267} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{268} \textit{See} Denno, \textit{supra} note 208, at 605-06; Denno, \textit{supra} note 211, at 328.
\textsuperscript{269} \textit{See supra} notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{270} Though early criminal law was premised on strict liability, by the sixth century mental state elements were appearing with greater frequency. \textit{See} Paul H. Robinson, \textit{A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability}, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815, 819–20 (1980).
\textsuperscript{271} \textit{See id.} at 823-25.
For all their good intentions and efforts at accuracy, adult fact finders may lack the ability to recall their own decision making process as a youth. They may recall foolish, dangerous or even criminal decisions they made, but they may not recall why they made such decisions. Did they intend their act to produce a particular result? Were their acts mere products of a failure to properly assess a risk? Did they know and understand the probability of harm when they committed them? Or do they simply remember and recognize the folly of the choice once made? Even a confession may take on different meaning the context of adolescent thought processes. Is it an accurate description of what the confessor did? Or is it a misguided attempt to achieve some other reward?

In the context of criminal law, what the suspect thought matters as much as what he did or what harm his action caused. What the defendant thought drives the state of mind analysis, which serves as a proxy for culpability. As a practical matter this means that even if neuroscience cannot either predict future behavior or explain what precisely a defendant knew or understood at a given moment in time, it can offer an interpretive model through which a fact finder can accurately assess the meaning of the an adolescent defendant’s actions and words. The question that lingers is how?

B. Using Neuroscience to Guide Mental State Assessments

There are two mechanisms to guide a fact finder’s evaluation of evidence: first through the regulation of the evidence itself and second through the jury instructions that guide the interpretation of the evidence. At their core both are designed to ensure decisional accuracy. Evidentiary rules serve not only to exclude unreliable evidence, but also to lend context to allow for accurate assessment of the reliability of the evidence admitted. Likewise, jury

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272 See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
273 Gault, 387 U.S. at 52 (expressing doubts about the reliability of juvenile confessions); Steven Drizin, Symposium, Stealing Innocence: Juvenile Legal Issues and the Innocence Project, 18 CARDozo J.L. & GENDER 577, 580, 582 (2012) (estimating that juveniles falsely confess at a rate of two to three times that of adults).
274 See id. (attributing false confession rates to mistaken beliefs that confessing will allow the juvenile to “go home”); B.J. Casey, Rebecca M. Jones & Leah H. Somerville, Braking and Accelerating of the Adolescent Brain, 21 J. Res. On Adolescence, no. 1, 2011 at 21, 26 (noting that adolescent bias to short term gain).
275 See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952) (linking the state of mind element to culpability determinations).
276 See STEIN, supra note 4, at 23.
277 See Roth, supra note 5, at 43.
instructions guide the fact finder’s interpretation.\textsuperscript{278} Both offer a vehicle through which neuroscience can be used to guide assessments of juvenile defendants’ mental states.\textsuperscript{279} While the discussion of these mechanisms are grounded in and reference the theoretical and jurisprudential discussions of Parts I and II, they are designed to be practical. Put another way, they are designed to move the discussion from how neuroscience might be used, to how it should be used and what that use would like in actual cases.

1. Experts

The most obvious means to introduce fact finders to the science of adolescent brain development is through the introduction of expert testimony. Such testimony could occur in two forms: an expert could evaluate a particular defendant and testify as to her cognitive processes,\textsuperscript{280} or an expert could speak more broadly to what is generally known of adolescent brain development and its corresponding thought processes.\textsuperscript{281} Before considering the introduction of expert testimony – either specific or general – it is worth noting that “generalized” expert testimony presents some fundamental evidentiary challenges.

First, generalized evidence is likely to draw relevancy and Rule 702 objections. As discussed in Part II, relevancy seeks to limit admissible evidence to only that demonstrating the probability of a material fact.\textsuperscript{282} Trials, after all, are narrow narratives. To push for the admission of generalized information surrounding trends in thought process is not only to push to widen the story told at trial, but it is to push against the notion that the significance of youth is intuitively knowable.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702,\textsuperscript{283} and the state law analogs, permits expert testimony based on the premise that the expert is able to explain a


\textsuperscript{279} This is not to say that these are the only vehicle through which such evidence might be used, but that they are two readily accessible vehicles.

\textsuperscript{280} This type of direct evidence of the defendant’s idiosyncratic condition would be akin to evidentiary presentations made in insanity or diminished capacity defenses.

\textsuperscript{281} While not precisely analogous, this type of generalized evidence would be similar to evidence presented in battered women and child defenses that seek to provide (along with evidence of the defendant’s abuse) general information about cycles of violence, as opposed to the defendant’s particular perception of that cycle.

\textsuperscript{282} See supra notes 187-200 and accompanying text.

\textsuperscript{283} In addition to \textit{Fed. R. Evid.} 702, \textit{Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.} established gate keeping functions for determining the reliability and admissibility of
matter that exceeds the lay person’s understanding.\textsuperscript{284} Rule 702 works in conjunction with relevancy rules to prevent offering an expert pedigree to information that is commonly knowable.

In developing its age-based Fifth and Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has stressed not only that juveniles were different from adults, but that that difference was readily apparent. \textit{Roper} concluded that the difference between a child and adult was based in what “any parent knows.”\textsuperscript{285} In \textit{J.D.B.}, Justice Sotomayor defended categorical classifications based on age noting that “officers and judges need no imaginative powers, knowledge of developmental psychology, training in cognitive science, or expertise in social and cultural anthropology to account for a child’s age. They simply need the common sense to know that a 7–year–old is not a 13–year–old and neither is an adult.”\textsuperscript{286}

At first blush, the Court’s frequent invocation of the intuitive nature of the difference between adolescents and adults creates both relevancy and Rule 702 dilemmas. If adolescent thought processes are known to adult based on their former status as children (or current status as parents of children) then fact finders should be able to access such knowledge without the assistance of an expert. In fact the introduction of generalized expert testimony would neither render the mental state more or less likely in a particular defendant, nor would it provide the fact finder with knowledge they did not already possess.

But first impression of the value of evidence can be deceiving. As the dissent in \textit{J.D.B.} noted it is not the biological fact of youth that is significant to a \textit{Miranda} inquiry but the effect of that fact on perceptions of custody.\textsuperscript{287} Likewise, for a mental state analysis it is the distinct adolescent thought processes that matter. Neuroscience suggests that these thought processes are both generalizable across an age based set,\textsuperscript{288} but also that they are less intuitively accessible to a adult fact finder than Justice Sotomayor might suggest. Justice Alito noted that in the context of any given case, an officer would need to distinguish between the perceptions of a thirteen-year-old and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{284} \textit{See} 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993). \textit{Daubert} requires that scientific evidence be (1) testable; (2) subject to peer review and publication; (3) articulate its error rate; (4) have a controlling standard; (5) be generally accepted. In addition, the evidence could be excluded if other factors counseled towards exclusion. \textit{Id.} Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, expert testimony surrounding adolescent brain development in question likely meets the criteria articulated in \textit{Daubert}.
\item \textsuperscript{285} \textit{Roper}, 543 U.S. at 554.
\item \textsuperscript{286} \textit{J.D.B.}, 564 U.S. at 279-80.
\item \textsuperscript{287} \textit{Id.} at 293.
\item \textsuperscript{288} \textit{See} Scott & Steinberg, \textit{supra} note 11, at 801.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
that of a seven-year-old. This creates challenges as “judges attempt to put themselves in the shoes of the average sixteen-year-old, or fifteen-year-old, or thirteen-year-old, as the case may be.” This perspective and its subtle impact on notions of custody, were not matters of common sense, but on the contrary required expert knowledge to decipher.

In J.D.B., Justice Alito couched these concerns in terms of the erosion of Miranda’s clarity. He warned that officers and courts will be left unable to properly assess the significance of age with regard to the custody analysis without the assistance of expert testimony. Put another way, Justice Alito did not contest that traits were shared across age strata but did contest that the significance of such traits were intuitively knowable. In this, Justice Alito’s dissent in J.D.B. makes a strong case that generalized evidence is both relevant and necessary to ensure accuracy in the assessment of a juvenile’s thought process.

The nuance of the difference age makes – and how it affects a child’s decisions – is both relevant and a less intuitive assessment than the majority in J.D.B. might suggest. It may be an assessment that exceeds the ordinary ability of a fact finder. Despite the dizzying pace of science’s understanding of adolescence and the shared intuitive sense of difference, a forty-five-year-old judge is unlikely to remember not only what she did as a thirteen-year-old, but why. Events thirty-plus years in the past may not only present as hazy to the forty-five year old judge, but the judge may lack the ability to recollect or recreate the thought processes that fueled those events in the first place.

In the context of Miranda, this gap between what is readily apparent and what lurks beneath the adolescent surface may be less significant. It may be enough, as Justice Sotomayor noted, for an officer to understand broadly that in the life of thirteen-year-old J.D.B., removal from class and questioning by officers was both coercive and custodial. In this context, common sense may suffice. Despite the dissent’s warnings, the nature of the Miranda analysis itself suggests that such a common sense assessment may be sufficient. Miranda requires officers to make a decision in situ. Under any Miranda analysis they

289 J.D.B., 564 U.S at 293.
290 Id. at 293-94.
291 Id.
292 Id. at 293.
293 See supra note 180, and accompanying text.
294 See Yale Kamisar, Abe Krash, Anthony Lewis, Ellen S. Podgor, Gideon at 40: Facing the Crisis, Fulfilling the Promise, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 135, 151-52 (2004) (noting that Miranda requires police officers to make “quick decisions” in the field or at the stationhouse).
are required to place themselves in the position of their subject and consider
the custodial nature of the encounter. If the encounter is assessed to be
custodial in nature, they must offer the warning.

The elusiveness of officer precision of which Justice Alito warns seems
both inherent in a *Miranda*-type decision and easily guarded against by “over
warning” rather than “under warning.” In other words, the quick nature of the
*Miranda* decision may indeed lead to error when interrogators fail to properly
assess the suspect’s perception of custody. But if the officer is unsure about
the suspect’s age or the significance of that age to perceptions of custody, the
officer can remedy any risk of suppression by offering a *Miranda* warning prior
to interrogation.

In this sense the *Miranda* analysis is very different than the mens rea
analysis for two reasons. First, by its nature *Miranda* requires a “split second”
style decision in the field. In contrast, like all elements, proof of a mental state
encompasses the calculation of the defendant’s state of mind as ascertained by
analysis of the evidence presented in the case under a beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard. As a result, Justices Alito and Sotomayor may both be right –
the analysis of adolescence is both the product of common sense based on the
common experience of youth and the product of more nuanced analysis that
assesses significance of the youth they can observe in the defendant in the
context of the facts of the case they have heard and seen.

But beyond this, *Miranda* is also different from the mental state element
in terms of the ultimate result. The failure to properly Mirandize a suspect may
result in the suppression of statements or evidence acquired in the course of
improper interrogation. In contrast, failure to properly calibrate or instruct
on the assessment of the defendant’s state of mind may produce not only a
verdict that is inaccurate, but also one that may elude substantive criminal law’s
aims to assign culpability based on the defendant’s state of mind. Whatever
high stakes may exist in the context of *Miranda* they increase in the context of a
mental state analysis. This would seem to suggest that expert witness testimony
on what is generally known of adolescent thought processes is in fact relevant
and necessary.

The admissibility of the evidence, however, is only half the battle, and
the second half at that. In many jurisdictions the prospect of locating an expert
and persuading her to testify may be a daunting proposition. Not only may the

296 *Id.*
297 *Id.* at 444 (requiring warning only if the defendant is in custody when subjected to
interrogation).
298 *Id.* at 436.
neuroscientist not be available in the community where the case is pending, but funds for the expert may not be available, particularly for indigent defendants. This dilemma of a lack of funding becomes more salient when one considers that juveniles themselves tend not to have funds and, given the high rate of prosecution of indigent juveniles, they may not have access to funds either. As will be discussed momentarily, jury instructions may serve as a means of providing the necessary guidance to the fact finder without having to produce an expert witness. The availability of an alternative method of communicating the desired information is not to say that this method alone is either best or sufficient. It is, however, to say that in a system in which funds are limited and free experts are rare, it is better than providing no information.

2. Jury Instructions and Judicial Motions

As helpful as expert testimony may be in offering the fact finder insight into the juvenile’s developmental capacities and decision-making processes, it alone is not sufficient. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), and the state analogs, prohibits experts in criminal cases from “stat[ing] an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense.” The Rule concludes: “[t]hose matters are for the trier of fact alone.” This creates an evidentiary disjinder of sorts. The expert’s testimony is relevant because it informs the fact finder of what is known of the difference in decision making processes and brain development between juveniles and adults, but the expert is unable to explain

299 In Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), the Supreme Court held that indigent defendants had a right to experts for their defense. Despite this grant, lack of funds often result in indigent defendants being unable to procure an expert or only being able to chose among limited experts. See Jack B. Weinstein, Science, and the Challenges of Expert Testimony in the Courtroom, 77 OR. L. REV. 1005, 1008 (1998) (“Courts, as gatekeepers, must be aware of how difficult it can be for some parties particularly indigent criminal defendants—to obtain an expert to testify. The fact that one side may lack adequate resources with which to fully develop its case is a constant problem.”); Paul C. Gianelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post Daubert, Post DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004); John M. West, Expert Services and the Indigent Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1326 (1986).

300 This dilemma is evident as courts attempt to provide Miller hearings with experts for juvenile defendants. See Stephen K. Harper, Resentencing Juveniles Convicted of Homicide Post-Miller, THE CHAMPION at 34 (March 2004).

301 See FED. R. EVID. 704(b).

302 Id.
why that matters to the jury’s calculation of mens rea. The evidentiary rule and indeed due process leave that question to the fact finder.\textsuperscript{303}

Accordingly, jury instructions (or a judicial motion, in cases where the fact finder is a judge) regarding what is known of adolescent brain development are required regardless of whether or not the court is willing to admit expert testimony. Such instructions serve to properly orient the fact finder in his interpretation of the evidence.\textsuperscript{304}

As a general matter jury instructions guide the fact finder in terms of law, but also in terms of acceptable interpretive norms.\textsuperscript{305} In the context of juvenile defendant’s mental states, such instructions serve to remind the fact finder that despite their intuitive sense of “difference” between a juvenile and adult, and perhaps their own fond memories of a misspent youth, calculation of guilt requires more.

Ideally such instructions would be multifaceted and would include reference to the fact that adolescents’ brains are not fully developed in the areas that control impulses, foresee consequences, and temper emotions. As a result, the instructions would remind the fact finder that adolescents act impetuously with little thought or consideration of consequences.\textsuperscript{306} Such attributes of adolescence must be considered in interpreting evidence of the defendant’s mental state.

The instructions proposed below include first a general instruction regarding the difference between adult and adolescent thought processes. This instruction would serve as a guide for the juror as he interpreted the evidence before him. Such an instruction would be appropriate regardless of whether an objective or subjective state of mind\textsuperscript{307} was utilized and regardless of whether or not an expert testified. The instruction acknowledges that while there is a degree of intuition about the difference between juvenile and adult thought

\textsuperscript{303} See id.; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (holding that due process requires the fact finder to determine whether all elements of an offense have been proven).

\textsuperscript{304} See Powers, supra note 278, at 56.

\textsuperscript{305} Id. (noting judges teach jurors the law through instructions).

\textsuperscript{306} For example, such an instruction might state: In determining whether a child/adolescent has acted reasonably you must/may consider that a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults. These attributes/qualities of youth often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.

\textsuperscript{307} Objective states of mind consider the defendant’s mental state in comparison to that of a “reasonable man.” In contrast, subjective states of mind consider the defendant’s actual mental state. The MPC breaks the mental state element into three subjective states of mind (purpose, knowledge and recklessness) and one objective state of mind (negligence). See Dressler, supra note 242.
processes a more nuanced understanding of adolescent brain development is required for assessments of mental states. The instruction could be given as both a preliminary instruction and at the conclusion of the trial. It might state:

Anyone who remembers being a teenager, who has been the parent or caretaker of a teenager, or who has observed adolescent behavior, knows intuitively what scientific research shows – that adolescents do not think or behave like adults; their brains are not yet fully developed in the areas that control impulses, ability to foresee the consequences of their actions, and to temper their emotions. As a result, an adolescent may overvalue a reward or undervalue a risk in making a decision. What may appear to be a logical consequence of a decision to you, an adult, may elude an adolescent entirely or may only become apparent after the consequences is realized. These differences are “normal” characteristics of adolescence and do not represent a defect or deficiency. As such, you may consider this difference as you listen to the evidence in this case or make findings based on the evidence in this case.

Following such a generalized instruction, the court should provide a specific instruction depending on the mental state that must be proven. For crimes requiring purpose or knowledge, the court may instruct on the significance of neuroscience in assessing the factual presence of the requisite mental state. In offering this instruction the court guides the jury by informing it that a child who shouts that he will “fuck up” a school principal may have a distinct understanding of the significance of those words than his adult counterpart. Accordingly, an assessment of whether or not he intended to place the school principal in fear with his utterance must be made in the context of the child’s own perception. A jury instruction in such a case might state:

A deliberate act is one ‘characterized by or resulting from careful and thorough consideration’ or one ‘characterized by awareness of the consequences.’ The defendant here is an adolescent and one of the differences between adults and adolescents is that

308 The MPC states people act purposely if it is their “conscious object to engage in conduct or to cause a result.” MPC § 2.02(2)(a). Under the MPC a person acts knowingly if they “are aware that it is practically certain that their conduct will cause [the required] result.” Id. at § 2.02(2)(b).
adolescents’ brains are not fully developed in the areas that control impulses, foresee consequences, and temper emotions. Adolescents are susceptible to acting impetuously with little thought or consideration of consequences, a fact shown by brain development research as well as common sense. You must/may consider these attributes of adolescence when determining whether the defendant acted intentionally.

For offenses relying on a “reasonableness” standard – a standard that in other contexts requires the fact finder make his assessment from the perspective of the defendant⁵⁰⁹ – the jury instruction should remind the fact finder that this reasonableness should not be calculated from an adult perspective, but from a reasonable child’s perspective.⁵¹⁰ This recalibrated perspective should contemplate the adolescent’s lack of maturity, underdeveloped sense of responsibility, failure to predict the causal connections between action and harm, and susceptibility to negative influences. For example such an instruction might state:

In determining whether a child/adolescent has acted reasonably you must/may consider that a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults. These attributes/qualities of youth often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.⁵¹¹

Alternative language in such instructions might include:

- The questions of the defendant’s/juvenile’s intent, as opposed to an adult, must be decided with consideration of what we know about adolescents of similar age and development.
- Special caution must be taken when determining whether the juvenile acted with the intent required for this offense.

⁵⁰⁹ For a discussion of jury instructions that take into account the defendant’s perception, see Lee, Race and Self-Defense, supra note 245.
⁵¹⁰ This is akin to J.D.B.’s reasonable child standard. See 564 U.S. at 277-78.
⁵¹¹ Additional instructions regarding the significance of peer influence or impulsivity could likewise be constructed. For example the jury could be informed that: “Adolescents routinely travel in groups with no nefarious intent and this fact should be considered in your deliberations.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 570. Or that: “Juveniles have less control, or less experience with control, over their own environment and lack the ability to extricate themselves from certain settings.” Id.
Adolescents are susceptible of acting impetuously with little thought or consideration of consequences, a fact shown by brain development research as well as common sense.

Adolescents’ decisions often reflect an inability to adequately consider their options and appreciate consequences.

Adolescents often fail to appreciate the risks associated with their actions and have unreasonable belief that their actions are unlikely to cause harm.

Drawing heavily from the Court’s decisions in the Roper line and in J.D.B., the language in each of these proposed instructions serves to properly orient the fact finder in order to accurately assess the defendant’s mental state. In this sense, such proposed instructions mirror those already permitted for defenses that rely on the defendant’s particular perspective for their viability and serve to guide the fact finder towards decisional accuracy.

* * *

Both the use of expert testimony and the proposed jury instructions regarding adolescent brain development serve to promote the underlying aims of criminal law: to convict and punish based on the defendant’s degree of culpability as determined by her state of mind. Given criminal law’s strong reliance on inference to make such a mens rea assessment and given both the Court’s and the scientific community’s acknowledgement that adolescent thought processes are distinct from adult, such evidence and instruction serve a critical function. They properly orient the fact finder to insure that inferences are accurate and verdicts are based on what actually happened, as opposed to what might have happened.

CONCLUSION

Frequently, criminal law relies on inference to prove mental states as much out of necessity as out of a recognition that fact finders inevitably engage in acts of interpretation in reaching verdicts. This Article argues that in the context of juvenile defendants such reliance on inference is fundamentally flawed as it fails to account for the distinctive thought processes of adolescent actors. Recent developments in neuroscience confirm this difference. The impulsive, risk taking, reward centered, consequence blind existence that is adolescence is both a shared right of passage and a lost moment for adult fact finders. While a juror or judge may remember youth, he will not remember the
decision-making processes that drove his daily adolescent existence. Therefore as criminal law asks him to sit in judgment of juvenile defendants, it asks him to perform the impossible task of placing himself back in time into the mind of an adolescent.

Without guidance on adolescent brain development and its corresponding implications for mental state analysis, fact finders risk misaligned interpretive models and decision inaccuracies. Proposed use of expert testimony and jury instructions seek to properly orient the fact finder and so achieve criminal law’s purported goals of discerning the defendant’s actual state of mind.