Two Hats, One Head, No Heart: The Anatomy of the ERISA Settlor/Fiduciary Distinction

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TWO HATS, ONE HEAD, NO HEART: THE ANATOMY OF THE ERISA SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DISTINCTION*

DANA MUIR** & NORMAN STEIN***

Congress enacted ERISA, the comprehensive employee benefits reform statute, in 1974. ERISA created a strict fiduciary standard for those involved in the administration or management of employee benefit plans or their assets, a standard that requires such actors to make decisions solely in the interests of the plan’s participants and their beneficiaries. The Department of Labor and the federal courts, however, have held that employer decisions on whether to adopt or terminate a plan, or how to design the provisions of a plan, are plan “settlor” functions, akin to a grantor’s design of a trust under the common law, and thus not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties. Courts have used this distinction between “settlor” and “fiduciary” functions to recognize the employer’s own interests in employee benefit plans and to mediate between those interests and the statute’s command that plan decisions be made in the exclusive interest of the plan’s participants.

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*** Professor of Law, Drexel University Earle Mack School of Law. Nps32@drexel.edu. (215) 571-4740. Professor Stein also thanks those acknowledged by Professor Muir. He dedicates this Article to Ian Lanoff, who in 1975 hired him as a summer eligibility hearing officer for the United Mineworkers Health and Retirement Funds, told him he was a fiduciary, and thereby kindled an almost forty-year interest (and counting) in pension policy and employee benefits law.
The Department of Labor based its version of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine on a quasi-common-law notion concerning the voluntary nature of plan sponsorship under ERISA and the legitimacy of an employer considering its own interests in designing a plan’s provisions in a voluntary system. The Supreme Court, however, based its version of the doctrine on a narrow reading of ERISA’s statutory definition of plan fiduciary, under which a person is unfettered by fiduciary concerns when it amends a plan or implements specific language in the plan. Thus, for the Supreme Court, the determination of whether fiduciary considerations apply to an administrative action is a mechanical test: they do not if the action is either the drafting of a plan provision or the implementation of a plan provision.

This Article shows that the Supreme Court’s settlor/fiduciary doctrine has become the central theme in ERISA jurisprudence. While the doctrine has worked well and is not controversial in routine cases, the Article shows that the doctrine has permitted employers in some cases to bypass express and implied ERISA requirements through artful plan drafting and, perhaps more troubling, has also permitted employers to exploit ERISA’s broad preemption of state law to insulate plans’ actions from judicial or state legislative oversight, even in areas where there is broad national consensus, such as limits on claim subrogation and liability for negligent medical decision making. The Article argues that while the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has made it relatively easy for courts to decide cases, it has resulted and will continue to result in decisions that are unmoored from the policy considerations that animated Congress in enacting ERISA, considerations that in our view should anchor ERISA jurisprudence. The Article concludes by suggesting three limiting principles that courts could use to provide a more nuanced approach to balancing employer and employee interests in and related to ERISA plans. These principles would leave intact the core of the doctrine while mitigating its most troubling effects.
II. DOCTRINAL BOUNDARIES AND APPLICATION .......................... 484
A. Implementing the Definition of Implementation .............. 485
B. Formalism—Beyond Adoption, Amendment, Termination ................................................................. 490
C. The Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine’s Reach Across Employee Benefits ....................................................... 493
  1. DB Plan Funding ............................................................. 493
  2. DC Plan Investments ...................................................... 497
     a. 401(k) Plans .............................................................. 498
     b. ESOPs ..................................................................... 501
  3. Welfare Benefit Plan Decisions .................................. 503
  4. Benefit Structures—Different Benefits for Different Participants ......................................................... 507
  5. Fundamental Corporate Changes .......................... 510
  6. Inadequate or Misleading Disclosures to Plan Participants ................................................................. 512
  7. Claims Processing and Review ........................................... 514
III. CRITIQUE OF THE SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE ...... 514
A. Problems with the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine .................. 516
  1. Formalism, Contracts of Adhesion, and Employee Expectations ................................................................. 518
  2. Settlor Override of Statutory Provisions .................. 522
  3. Settlor Decisions Exploiting Regulatory Vacuums .... 528
B. The Statutory Basis for the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine .... 531
IV. PRUNING BACK THE DOCTRINE ............................................. 536
A. Collateral Modification of the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine ............................................................... 538
  1. Prohibition on Enforcing a Plan Term Inconsistent with Statutory Provisions ................................................... 538
  2. Distinguishing Implementation from Design .................. 543
  3. Limiting ERISA’s Preemptive Reach ...................................... 544
B. Treating Plan Management Decisions As Fiduciary Decisions ................................................. 545
C. Outcome-Oriented Decision Making ..................................... 547
CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 548
INTRODUCTION

The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA")\(^1\) celebrates its fortieth birthday this year and now totters on the brink of what would be middle age for a person and what one would hope would be maturity for a statute. But it was during ERISA’s adolescence that Professors Daniel Fischel and John Langbein detected a fundamental fissure in its statutory geography\(^2\): the exclusive benefit rule of section 404(a).\(^3\) Borrowed from trust law and forming both the centerpiece and core of ERISA’s first title, ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule unyieldingly commands employee benefit plan fiduciaries to discharge their duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the plan’s participants and for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to them and their beneficiaries.\(^4\) Fischel and Langbein told us that these straightforward injunctions deny the essential nature of employee benefit plans in which the plan sponsors and the plan participants share the plan’s beneficial interest (and also share in the settlement of the trust vehicle).\(^5\) Although their article influenced scholarly understanding of an important statutory problem, the problems they raised have not been directly engaged by the federal courts or the federal regulatory agencies that administer ERISA. In legal scholarship, their article is among the most cited of all ERISA articles, but the article has rarely been discussed in the courts and never by the Supreme Court.\(^6\)

But this is not to say that the courts and agencies have ignored the tensions that run along this statutory fault line, particularly with respect to the “beneficial” interests of the employer in employee benefit plans. And perhaps the most important of the mediating tools that judges and the agencies have used to recognize the employer’s interests is the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.\(^7\) The doctrine delineates

3. ERISA § 404(a).
5. Id. at 1118.
6. Federal courts have occasionally cited to the article, but only one judicial opinion has directly engaged the article’s central point. See Tibble v. Edison Int’l, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1105 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 729 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 43 (2014).
7. See infra notes 114–28 and accompanying text; see also Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of the Settlor Doctrine, 15 LAB. LAW. 205, 205–06 (1999) (examining a trilogy of Supreme Court cases in which employers are empowered to amend retirement/benefit plans freely).
plan sponsor decisions into two distinct types: (1) decisions that are made in a fiduciary capacity and thus are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary requirements, including the exclusive benefit rule; and (2) decisions that are made in a “settlor” or other business capacity and are thus unconstrained by the statute’s fiduciary paradigm. The metaphor courts have used to describe this distinction is millinery in nature: a plan sponsor might be wearing a fiduciary hat or might be wearing a settlor hat. And as we will show, a fiduciary can, like Dr. Seuss’s Bartholomew Cubbins, sometimes wear multiple hats and may have more than two hats in its wardrobe.

As we will explain below, the Supreme Court’s “settlor/fiduciary” doctrine relies on an interpretation of the actual statutory language defining fiduciary, while the Department of Labor’s (“DOL” or “Department”) original version of the doctrine relied on the more ethereal notion that the statute must be applied in the context of the voluntariness of the employee benefit plans that the statute regulates. The Supreme Court’s reading of the statutory language, which was plausible but not compelled by the statute’s

8. See Muir, supra note 7, at 205–06.
9. Sonoco Prods. Co. v. Physicians Health Plan, Inc., 338 F.3d 366, 373 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Accordingly, a plan sponsor is entitled to wear different hats: it may perform some functions as a fiduciary to the plan, while it may perform other functions on its own behalf, i.e., in a non-fiduciary capacity.”); Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 718 (6th Cir. 2000) (“We have recognized that employers who are also plan sponsors wear two hats: one as a fiduciary . . . and the other as employer performing settlor functions . . . .”); Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm., 168 F.3d 671, 679 (3d Cir. 1999) (“ERISA permits employers to ‘wear “two hats,” ’ one as plan administrator, the other as plan sponsor.”); Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (“It is therefore perfectly consistent for an employer to wear ‘two hats’ and act both as a fiduciary and as an employer without breaching fiduciary duties.”).

[T]he real Dr. Seuss, Theodor Seuss Geisel, was a hat lover himself. He collected hundreds of them, plummed, beribboned and spiked, and kept them in a closet hidden behind a bookcase in his home in the La Jolla section of San Diego. He incorporated them into his personal paintings, his advertising work and his books. He even insisted that guests to his home don the most elaborate ones he could find.

Id.
11. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 197–98 (explicitly referring to multiple hats).
12. See infra text accompanying note 96.
actual words, unfortunately leaves courts only marginal flexibility to rein in some of the serious problems that we argue have resulted and will in the future likely result from the application of what has become a formalistic and mechanically applied rule. Indeed, the ultimate point of this Article is that while the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has made it relatively easy for courts to decide cases, it has resulted and will continue to result in decisions that are unmoored from the nuanced policy considerations that animated Congress in enacting ERISA and in our view should anchor ERISA jurisprudence.

So what are the problems? In broad terms, there are two, one of which we just suggested: the settlor/fiduciary doctrine ignores policies and concerns that should be balanced against the interests that the doctrine advances, such as encouraging employers to adopt employee plans in the first place and recognizing the economic interests that employers have in employee benefit plans. Professors Fischel and Langbein, after all, noted that the plan sponsor and plan participant are both, in effect, settlors and beneficiaries of an employee benefit plan and that benefits law should recognize that they share these functions. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine implicitly recognizes the employer’s beneficial interest in plans but ignores the participant’s economic interest as the statutorily protected beneficiary of the employer’s promise, if not as co-settlor.

The second concern is related to the first: the settlor/fiduciary doctrine can allow employers to design plans to permit fiduciary behavior that would be flatly impermissible if not expressly provided by the plan’s terms. An aspect of this concern is that, besides the reputational effects that a plan sponsor might consider in deciding how to act, there are few limitations on the doctrine’s scope. Indeed, the only unambiguous statutory constraints on an employer exercising a settlor function are the minimum standards that ERISA imposes on plan design. And once a plan is adopted, the fiduciary is

14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1117.
16. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.1 (discussing how the doctrine is applied to unsettle employee expectations).
17. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1132.
18. See, e.g., infra Part III.A.2 (discussing how the doctrine allows plans to undermine ERISA’s protective provisions).
19. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW 5-1 to 5-115, 6-1 to 6-68 (Jeffrey Lewis et al. eds., 2012). Many of the minimum requirements are mirrored in the Internal Revenue Code.
obligated to follow the plan’s terms insofar as the terms of the plan are consistent with the statute.\(^{20}\)

But as we will show, this statutory brake on plan design—that the plan cannot effectively license a fiduciary to do what the statute prohibits—has not prevented plan sponsors from designing plans in ways that arguably dilute the ERISA fiduciary duties of prudence and loyalty\(^{21}\) or from creating plan-specific exceptions to some of ERISA’s prohibited transaction rules.\(^{22}\) Moreover, because of ERISA’s broad preemptive reach, the employer can design a plan to accomplish harsh outcomes that would otherwise be prohibited by law in virtually all fifty states, were never endorsed by Congress, and arguably are antithetical to any coherent policy rationale.\(^{23}\) And as the employee benefits landscape (and the ingenuity of plan designers) continues to evolve, these problems are likely to become more salient, troubling, and intractable.\(^{24}\)

Consider what happened to James McCutchen after he suffered egregious injuries in a car accident that was the fault of another driver. His health insurance paid almost $67,000 in medical costs but that did not come close to compensating him for the more than one million dollars in lost income and other damages he suffered.\(^{25}\) Mr. McCutchen sued and eventually recovered $110,000 from his and the other driver’s automobile insurance (the policy maximums), leaving Mr. McCutchen with $66,000 after attorney’s fees. But after the lawsuit, Mr. McCutchen’s health plan demanded to be reimbursed—from the $110,000 settlement—in full for the amount it had paid for his medical costs.\(^{26}\) This would have left Mr. McCutchen almost $1,000 out-of-pocket ($66,000 – $67,000) simply because he brought the tort suit in an attempt to recover some of his extensive damages. Longstanding equitable doctrines in state insurance law safeguard against that outcome, but the Supreme Court of the United States held that employers, while wearing their settlor hat, may negate application of those doctrines by including exclusionary language in the plan.\(^{27}\)

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22. See infra text accompanying notes 401–09.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 295–304.
24. See infra Part III.A.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1551.
Mr. McCutchen’s case is neither unique nor representative of the broad array of problems we address in this Article. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine, or variants on it, is relevant to a surprisingly wide range of employee benefits contexts, including: use of defined benefit (“DB”)\(^{28}\) plan assets, selection and management of defined contribution (“DC”)\(^{29}\) plan investment assets (including stock of the employer), choice of medical providers and access to certain courses of treatment in health care plans, review of claims denials and choice of limitations periods, disclosures to plan participants, subrogation of rights to insurance proceeds in health care plans, plan mergers and spinoffs in corporate reorganizations, and employer interference with a participant’s attainment of benefits under a plan.\(^{30}\) The wide range of topics to which the doctrine has relevance is partly a reflection of how changes in benefits law, benefits delivery, and benefits policy have interacted with ERISA’s fiduciary provisions.\(^{31}\) This process is ongoing and the number of benefit issues—and, in some cases, nonbenefit issues—aFFECTED by the doctrine is likely to increase over time.

We have divided the remainder of this Article into four parts. Part I traces the development of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, beginning with some discussion about the evolution of employee benefits and their regulation. Part II explores some of the less

\(^{28}\) Defined benefit pension plans promise a lifetime stream of income, or its lump-sum equivalent, to retirees. The amount of an employee’s benefit frequently is based on years of service and a salary calculation. The employer assumes the investment risk because the employer must fund the plan sufficiently to pay the promised benefits. Dana M. Muir, Plant Closings and ERISA’s Noninterference Provision, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 201, 205–06 (1995).

\(^{29}\) Defined contribution benefit plans establish an account for each employee who participates in the plan. Employees become entitled to whatever assets are in the account at times established by the plan terms, frequently when they terminate employment or reach a particular age. Employees assume the investment risk in these accounts. Id. at 205. 401(k) plans are the most widely used type of DC plan. See Retirement Assets Total $18.9 Trillion in First Quarter 2012, ICI GLOBAL (June 28, 2012), http://www.iciglobal.org/portal/site/ICI/menuitem.905dc9f48cce5dfa30fc6010a52001ca/?vgnextoid=56c5056c25f28310VgnVCM1000005a0210acRCRD&vgnextchannel=a04317281ae3f110VgnVCM1000005b0210acRCRD&vgnextfmt=print (reporting 401(k) plans as holding more than $3.4 trillion).

\(^{30}\) See infra Part II.C (discussing these situations).

\(^{31}\) The settlor/fiduciary doctrine in ERISA can dilute employee rights in areas of law beyond employee benefits. For example, in the second of a quintet of Supreme Court cases on the doctrine, the Court permitted an employer to condition benefits on an employee waiving a variety of rights under federal labor law and state labor and contract law that were unrelated to the benefits in question. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 888 (1996). The doctrine can also affect, for example, the viability of a state-law malpractice claim against a physician or rights to proceeds from a tortfeasor in a state court. See infra text accompanying notes 295–304, 441–44.
definitively evolved corners of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. It then continues to reflect on the penumbras of the doctrine while also cataloging the various benefits issues in which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has relevance. Part III critiques the doctrine in light of the two broad concerns we identified above—that the policies it advances should be balanced with those it negates and that it permits plan sponsors to design plans in ways that undermine some of ERISA’s participant-protective provisions—keeping in mind the unanswered questions explored in Part II. It also explains that the regulatory vacuum created by ERISA’s broad preemption provision precludes the problems from being addressed at the state level. Part IV looks forward and argues that either the courts need to develop limiting principles on the doctrine’s scope or Congress needs to consider legislatively taming a doctrine that has the potential to spin out of control. Because we believe congressional action is unlikely, we suggest three limiting principles that courts might use to better assess what hat an employer is wearing when taking action that affects its benefit plan.

I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE

This Part provides a history of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as it has developed in the federal courts and the federal agencies charged with enforcement of employee benefits law. The Part begins with what we hope will be some context-creating reflections about the evolution of employee benefits law over the last century or so, with special emphasis on ERISA and its purposes and goals. The Part then turns to ERISA’s debt to, and variations on, the common law of trusts. We then provide an account of the administrative and judicial creation of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.

A. A Brief History of the Regulation of Employee Benefit Plans

Employee benefit plans existed long before ERISA was a sparkle in Congress’s eyes. The conventional account of the development of pension plans generally begins in 1875, when the American Express Company adopted a retirement plan for its
employees. Pension plans proliferated over the next fifty years, with their growth ultimately truncated by the Great Depression.

There was, of course, no comprehensive federal regulatory scheme regulating pensions or other employee benefit plans during this first half century of employee benefit plans, although the adoption of an income tax in 1916 necessitated the creation of a framework for the taxation of the employer who sponsored an employee benefit plan, the beneficiaries who participated in an employee benefit plan, and the plan itself. But other than the tax laws, regulation of employee benefit plans was at the time left to the states, where applicable legal principles crisscrossed such areas of legal doctrine as trust law, contract law, employment law, and insurance law. It should be said that employers typically included in employee benefit plans “reservation of rights clauses,” which described the benefits under the plan as future gifts from, rather than enforceable obligations against, the sponsoring employer. State courts generally respected these clauses, which were described in one early article on legal aspects of private pension plans as “weasel clauses.”

Over the next half century, culminating in 1974 with the enactment of ERISA, the law of employee benefits, and particularly the law of private-sector pension plans, became increasingly federalized. The reasons for this were manifold, complex, and interrelated but included the expanding import of the federal income

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33. See Michael S. Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, in U.S. Senate, Special Committee on Aging, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The First Decade 1, 2 (1984). The account in this subpart relies heavily on Mr. Gordon’s chapter, to which he brought his personal in-depth knowledge of the history of ERISA. In 1930, an author of an early text on the actuarial and legal aspects of pensions, found a total of 413 “formal” industrial pension systems, concentrated in firms with large numbers of employees. Arthur David Cloud, Pensions in Modern Industry 53–54 (1930). In addition, a number of labor organizations sponsored their own pension plans without direct employer involvement. Murray Webb Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems 27–29 (1932).

34. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 2.


36. See Cloud, supra note 33, at 131–32.

tax and the concomitant value of employee benefit plans in tax planning, the growing economic and social importance of employee benefit plans nationally (especially retirement plans\textsuperscript{38}), the significance of employee benefit plans to the federally regulated arena of labor and employment policy, and a developing federal interest in consumer protection.\textsuperscript{39} Thus, beginning in the 1930s, the nation saw increasingly detailed and sophisticated tax regulation of employee benefit plans, regulation that had both tax-avoidance and social-welfare policy aspects.\textsuperscript{40} And in 1947, concerned about the potentially enormous power of union-run pension plans, Congress included in the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act)\textsuperscript{41} provisions curbing union domination of negotiated employee benefit plans and expressly subjected the trustees of such plans to a somewhat primitive federal fiduciary regime.\textsuperscript{42}

By the 1950s, congressional hearings had identified serious shortcomings with employee benefit plans, including mismanagement, theft and other misuses of plan assets; excessive investment in employer stock and debt; inadequate funding; and plan terms and plan administrative practices that were inconsistent with employee benefit expectations.\textsuperscript{43} In response to these concerns, Congress enacted the Welfare and Pension Plan Disclosure Act ("WPPDA") in 1958.\textsuperscript{44} The Act, though, reflecting its title, was based on disclosure and did not create substantive rules governing plan administration or investment of plan assets. "The theory of the law was that full disclosure to participants and beneficiaries of the provisions of their plan and its financial operations would deter abuse (‘sunlight being the best disinfectant’) and would enable them to police the plans themselves without requiring greater Government regulations or interference."\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{38} Following World War II, wage and price controls that limited new cash compensation but permitted fringe benefits, and a burgeoning interest by labor unions in pension and retirement benefits for their members and as a source of economic and political power for the unions, led to substantial growth in retirement and health care plans. HARBRECHT, \textit{supra} note 35, at 7–10.

\textsuperscript{39} Gordon, \textit{supra} note 33, at 15–24.

\textsuperscript{40} \textit{See} \textit{EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra} note 19, at 1-4 to -7.


\textsuperscript{42} \textit{See} \textit{EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra} note 19, at 1-7 to -8.

\textsuperscript{43} Gordon, \textit{supra} note 33, at 6.


\textsuperscript{45} Gordon, \textit{supra} note 33, at 6.
Sunlight did not prove to be an especially effective disinfectant. A 1964 book by Merton Bernstein and a 1965 report issued by a cabinet-level task force created three years earlier by President Kennedy to study private-sector retirement plans identified serious shortcomings with retirement plans in the private sector, most prominently the following: (1) forfeiture of benefits, primarily because some plans had restrictive vesting rules; (2) inadequate funding of DB pension plans; (3) lapses in judgment and honesty by some of the people investing plan assets; (4) conflicts of interest affecting plan assets; (5) disparate treatment of certain categories of employees in retirement plans; (6) benefit losses when plans terminated with insufficient assets; and (7) tax equity. The Bernstein book and the President’s Committee’s report made specific recommendations for legislative change or further study in each of these areas.

On one issue in particular the Committee’s report was cautious, however: whether there was a need for new, presumably federal, standards for those who manage plan assets. The Committee’s report was equivocal:

This Committee recognizes the need for additional measures for the protection of the interests of employees, but doubts whether [the] problem is the lack of appropriate standards of prudence. On the basis of present evidence, the Committee does not propose the substitution of a new set of statutory standards for the recognized standards of fiduciary responsibility, although there appears to be a need for strengthening statutory provisions for assuring compliance with these standards.

47. PRESIDENT’S COMM. ON CORPORATE PENSION FUNDS & OTHER PRIVATE RETIREMENT & WELFARE PROGRAMS, 89TH CONG., PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE PROGRAMS, A REP. TO THE PRESIDENT ON PRIVATE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT PLANS (Comm. Print 1965) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM.].
48. Id. at 39; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 259–60.
49. PRESIDENT’S COMM., supra note 47, at 47; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 44–46.
50. PRESIDENT’S COMM., supra note 47, at 75.
51. Id. at 75–76.
52. Id. at 59.
53. See id. at 55; BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 86, 254–55.
54. BERNSTEIN, supra note 46, at 44–45.
55. See Gordon, supra note 33, at 9–10.
56. PRESIDENT’S COMM., supra note 47, at 73–74.
The year after the report was issued, however, an investigation by the Senate Committee on Government Operations suggested that the law did not adequately constrain fiduciary misbehavior in pension plans. The investigation focused on a Taft-Hartley plan that paid substantial fees to a consulting company set up by one of its trustees.

A few months after the hearings, the chairman of the Committee, Senator McClellan, introduced legislation that would have amended the WPPDA to create federal fiduciary standards for those who managed private-sector employee benefit plans. In 1967, the Johnson Administration introduced a similar bill, which, like the McClellan bill, was confined to fiduciary issues. And later that same year, Senator Jacob Javits introduced the first comprehensive pension reform bill, which included, among other things, federal fiduciary rules, minimum pension standards, minimum pension-funding rules, and a federal insurance program. These three bills, and especially the comprehensive Javits bill, set the legislative stage for pension reform. Seven years later, on Labor Day, President Gerald Ford signed the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 into law.

ERISA was a lengthy, complex legislative achievement, which federalized employee benefits law and centered its regulation in three federal agencies—agencies whose missions are sometimes in tension but nevertheless were tasked with jointly implementing the new statutory order. Six aspects of ERISA are particularly relevant to the themes we develop in this Article, and we note them here.

First, Congress created substantive rules for pension plans, including minimum vesting and accrual rules, spousal protection rules, and funding rules. A plan’s favorable tax status is contingent on the plan complying with these rules, but the rules are also generally enforceable by participants under jurisdictional grants

57. Gordon, supra note 33, at 10–11.
58. See id.
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1.
provided in the labor section of ERISA. As discussed below, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine permits plan sponsors to undermine certain of these requirements.

Second, Congress did not impose parallel substantive standards on health care or other welfare benefit plans. Beginning in the mid-1980s, Congress began to add some substantive standards for health care plans. Most importantly for purposes of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, ERISA’s fiduciary standards have always applied to health care and other welfare benefit plans.

Third, Congress wrote broad, field-occupying preemption language into the statute, which largely precluded states from regulating private-sector employee benefit plans. While the preemption rules have had a substantial effect on the applicability of state law in numerous areas, their effect on health care and other welfare benefit plans has been especially profound because of ERISA’s failure to create federal substantive standards for such plans. Thus, the federal government simultaneously barred the states from regulating employer-provided welfare benefits while declining to do so itself.

Fourth, Congress included a provision in ERISA that, among other things, made it unlawful to discharge or discriminate against a participant for the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to which the participant may become entitled under the plan or

68. See ERISA § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a).
69. See infra text Part III.A.2.
70. See ERISA § 201, 29 U.S.C. § 1051 (“This part [containing participation and vesting standards] shall apply to any employee benefit plan . . . other than . . . an employee welfare benefit plan.”); ERISA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 1081 (“This part [containing funding standards] shall apply to any employee benefit plan . . . other than . . . an employee welfare benefit plan.”).
72. See ERISA § 401, 29 U.S.C. § 1101 (“This part [containing the fiduciary provisions] shall apply to any employee benefit plan . . . .”).
74. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 70.
statute. As discussed below, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine permits plan sponsors to treat some plan participants more favorably than others in ways that we argue undermine this provision.

Fifth, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have opined that in enacting ERISA, Congress was attempting to balance competing tensions: “Congress’ desire to offer employees enhanced protection for their benefits, on the one hand, and, on the other, its desire not to create a system that is so complex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage employers from offering . . . benefit plans in the first place.” We recognize the importance of encouraging plan sponsorship in a voluntary system but argue below that the current scope of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine fails to give appropriate recognition to congressional intent to protect participant benefits.

Sixth, Congress created a federal fiduciary law for employee plans, which we describe below.

B. ERISA Reinvention of Fiduciary Law

Prior to ERISA, the many retirement plans whose assets were held in trust were subject to the fiduciary law of trusts, which was typically found in state law. It is far from clear, however, from the historical record whether state trust law had much impact on the behavior of the individuals who were responsible for administering a trust or managing its assets. There were, in any event, few reported cases involving retirement plans that turned on principles of trust law. This may be the reason why the President’s Committee in its 1965 report found that “there appears to be a need for strengthening statutory provisions for assuring compliance with [existing fiduciary]
standards,” even though the Committee found “no evidence” that the standards themselves were inadequate.  

It is not difficult to speculate on why there were few state-law trust cases involving retirement plans. Some retirement plans were unfunded and those that were funded were not always implemented through trust agreements. Most pre-ERISA pension plans, including trustee plans, included clauses that disclaimed any employee interest in the trust corpus, which would have created obstacles for any employee to bring a trust-based action against the plan or the plan trustee. Indeed, when employees brought pre-ERISA cases in state court, the cases were generally based on contractual rather than trust-based legal theories, and they were generally brought against the employer rather than against a plan trustee. Moreover, the common law of trusts essentially prescribes a series of default rules that the trust instrument can modify, and we think it reasonable to assume that some pension trusts were drafted to ease or eliminate various trust duties. Each of these reasons alone, and certainly in combination, would explain why so few trust-based civil actions were brought in state court.

The situation was different in the federal courts after Taft-Hartley was enacted. Taft-Hartley required that a plan with a union role in plan management be structured as a trust if it received employer contributions, with a union-designated trustee and a

83. President’s Comm., supra note 47, at xv.
84. See Wooten, supra note 59, at 21–22 (describing methods for funding retirement plans other than trusts).
85. See David Gregory, The Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 427, 438–39 (1987) (“Early private pension plans were usually unfunded. No viable safeguards insured that current employees would ever receive pensions upon retirement, or that retirees would continue to receive their benefits. Employers reinforced paternalism with express exculpatory language, disavowing all liability for pension plan terminations or deficiencies.”).
86. See Kathryn J. Kennedy, Judicial Standard of Review in ERISA Benefit Claim Cases, 50 Am. U. L. Rev. 1083, 1114 (2001) (“[T]he Supreme Court noted that the resulting standard was consistent with the judicial standard pre-ERISA, which applied principles of contract law in lieu of labor law.”).
88. Decreasing the legal duties imposed on a trustee logically would have decreased fees charged by trustees or increased the willingness of trustees to serve as such for pension plans.
management-designated trustee. The trust had to be established for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to employees and their beneficiaries. From its passage until the enactment of ERISA, the federal courts were fora to Taft-Hartley pension cases in which participants contended that the plan trustees violated their fiduciary responsibilities, primarily in adopting allegedly arbitrary plan amendments to adjust benefits or misinterpreting a plan’s benefit eligibility provisions. This may have suggested to Congress that creating a federal law of trusts for pension plans was familiar territory for federal judges.

Building on the three bills introduced between 1965 and 1967, a centerpiece of the legislation that became ERISA was the creation of a federal law of fiduciary behavior. Congress, however, did not willy-nilly incorporate the common law of trusts into the statute; rather, it “in essence, codifie[d] and ma[d]e[] applicable to [employee plan] fiduciaries certain principles developed in trusts.” ERISA’s statutory fiduciary regime builds on those principles but diverges from the common law of trusts. Perhaps the two most significant ways in which this fiduciary law departs from that common law are in the law’s reach. Trust law regulates the conduct of a trustee of a trust. ERISA, in contrast, regulates a broad class of actors, not just trustees, and it regulates substantially all employee benefit plans regardless of whether the plan is trusteed.

The actors regulated by ERISA’s fiduciary provisions are labeled, appropriately enough, “fiduciaries,” which is a defined term under the statute. Under the statute,

a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee . . . with respect to

90. Id.
91. See Local 144 Nursing Home Pension Fund v. Demisay, 508 U.S. 581, 587–88 (1993). The Supreme Court in 1993 held that the Taft-Hartley Act did not create federal jurisdiction for such claims. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 59–62.
94. See, e.g., Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586 (1990) (“Trust law . . . long has required trustees to serve the interests of all beneficiaries . . . .”).
any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.96

An aspect of this definition to which we will return later in the Article is that a person is a fiduciary only to the extent he exercises one of the enumerated functions.97 The statute, however, also makes a fiduciary responsible for the breaches of another fiduciary for knowingly participating in or concealing the other’s breach, for enabling the other’s breach through his own breach, or for not making reasonable efforts to correct the other’s breach if he has knowledge of it.98

ERISA imposes four general requirements on fiduciaries, all of which are framed within an overarching command that the fiduciary shall discharge her duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries: a duty of prudence, a duty to act for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable expenses of administering the plan, a duty to diversify investments to minimize the risk of large losses except to the extent it is clearly prudent not to do so, and a duty to administer the plan in accordance with the plan’s instruments “insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this [title].”99

The quoted language is an explicit rejection of that aspect of the common law of trusts that, as it developed, permitted a trust agreement to modify the fiduciary standards that would otherwise apply as default law.100 ERISA also provides that any plan or separate agreement purporting to relieve a fiduciary of a statutory duty is void as against public policy.101

In addition to these general fiduciary standards, ERISA includes a list of absolutely proscribed transactions between an employee benefit plan and parties-in-interest, which are actors with a pre-existing relationship with the plan.102 Unless a specific exemption

97. See Muir, supra note 95, at 15.
98. ERISA, § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a).
applies, a plan fiduciary that knowingly causes a plan to engage in a prohibited transaction is liable for any harm to the plan, regardless of whether the fiduciary’s actions were prudent and made solely in the best interests of the participants. The statutory framework appears to assume that such actions are fraught with such potential peril to the plan that liability should attach to the fiduciary, regardless of the circumstances. It is better, Congress implicitly said, to squelch all such interested-party transactions pretransaction—even those that might have benefited the plan—than to try to assess liability posttransaction. And the fiduciary can have liability to the plan even if the plan benefits from the prohibited transaction. In addition, the Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) imposes an excise tax on the interested party, regardless of either the fiduciary’s or the party’s intent.

The prohibited transaction rules would bar many necessary and often routine transactions in a plan’s life—for example, the payment of benefits to a participant or payments to service providers. Congress therefore included in the statute a number of exemptions from the prohibited transaction rules and also vested the Department of Labor with authority to grant individual and class exemptions if the Secretary of Labor finds that the exemption request satisfies statutory criteria.

ERISA also includes some exceptions to the general fiduciary rules. The duty to diversify does not apply to DC plans that are designed to invest primarily in employer stock. The fiduciary rules do not apply to an individual’s personal investment decisions in certain “self-directed” DC plans. And ERISA specifically provides that terminating DB plans and welfare benefit plans may distribute assets to the employer notwithstanding ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule.

103. For a comprehensive list of exemptions from these prohibited transactions, see ERISA § 408, 29 U.S.C. § 1108.
105. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406, 1418–19 (9th Cir. 1988) (deciding that even where benefits were paid in full, a breaching fiduciary cannot retain ill-gotten profits).
109. See ERISA § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c).
110. See ERISA § 404(d), 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d).
There is one other aspect of ERISA’s fiduciary scheme that merits attention here. The common law of trusts imposed a general duty on trustees to furnish beneficiaries with information concerning the administration of the trust and a separate duty to account to beneficiaries for the investment and disbursement of plan assets. ERISA imposes specific disclosure obligations on plan administrators. The courts have at least suggested that the ERISA disclosure obligations define the only required disclosures, although there is an open question of whether a fiduciary may have additional disclosure obligations in certain circumstances under the general ERISA duties of prudence and loyalty. And the courts have held that a fiduciary that does provide information—even if not required by the statute—may not mislead participants and their beneficiaries.

C. Development of the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine and the Supreme Court Trilogy

The settlor/fiduciary doctrine is an accretion of guidance from the Department of Labor and decisions by the courts. The first explicit iteration of the settlor/fiduciary distinction came in the form of a 1986 DOL information letter in response to “questions regarding the extent to which ERISA’s fiduciary duty rules would apply to the decision to terminate a pension plan.” The DOL letter indicated

112. See Clovis Trevino Bravo, ERISA Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure Claims: Securities Litigation Under the Guise of ERISA?, 26 Hofstra Lab. & Emp. L.J. 497, 510–12 (2009) (discussing ERISA’s disclosure obligations and various courts’ considerations of whether a fiduciary’s duties are limited to those enumerated in the statute).
113. See generally Dana M. Muir, Truth or Consequences: Varity v. Howe and Beyond, 13 Lab. Law. 411 (1998) (discussing cases in which courts have held that a fiduciary’s material misrepresentation to employees is a violation of fiduciary duty, even if the fiduciary was not obligated to make the disclosure).
114. Letter from Dennis M. Kass, Assistant Sec’y, Dept’l of Labor, to John N. Erlenborn (Mar. 13, 1986) [hereinafter Letter from Kass to Erlenborn], available at http://www.dol.gov/esa/regs/il/031386.html. John Erlenborn was a ten-term Congressman from Illinois who helped create a House Pension Task Force and was a key participant in the legislative process that produced ERISA. See, e.g., Nicholas Braude, John Erlenborn, Patriarch of Pension Legislation, Dead at 78, Pensions & Investments (Nov. 14, 2005), http://www.pionline.com/article/20051114/PRINT/200511140711/john-erlenborn-patriarch-of-pension-legislation-dead-at-78. We found some discussion of the idea of a settlor function as early as 1975, in the 1975 proceedings of the American Bar Association (“ABA”) National Institute in New York, the proceedings of which were published by the ABA’s Business Lawyer. See Panel Discussion, Who Are Fiduciaries?, 31
in light of the voluntary nature of the private pension system governed by ERISA, the Department has concluded that there is a class of discretionary activities which relate to the formation, rather than the management, of plans. These so-called “settlor” functions include decisions relating to the establishment, termination and design of plans and are not fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA.\textsuperscript{115}

The letter went on, however, to express the view that “[a]lthough the decision to terminate is generally not subject to the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA, the Department has emphasized that activities undertaken to implement the termination decision are generally fiduciary in nature.”\textsuperscript{116}

In an important sense, though, the letter was disingenuous in the way it set up the issue, for there was no genuine disagreement that an employer enjoyed virtually unfettered control over the decision to establish, terminate, or design (subject to ERISA’s substantive requirements) an employee benefit plan, for these were not controversial issues,\textsuperscript{117} although perhaps they should have been in certain contexts. Rather, the letter was effectively focused on a narrower issue, which was controversial: did an employer’s decision to terminate an overfunded pension plan for the purpose of capturing its surplus assets implicate fiduciary duties, particularly when the employer had to amend the plan to create an employer right to the surplus assets?\textsuperscript{118} Given that the ERISA definition of fiduciary includes a person “to the extent . . . he exercises . . . any authority or control respecting management or disposition of [a plan’s] assets,”\textsuperscript{119} it was certainly within the parameters of plausible argument that the decision to amend a plan to create an employer right to capture a DB plan’s surplus assets was a fiduciary decision and perhaps even that

\begin{footnotes}
\item[115] Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, \textit{supra} note 114.
\item[116] \textit{Id.}
\item[118] \textit{See} Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, \textit{supra} note 114.
\end{footnotes}
the mere decision to terminate an overfunded plan for the purpose of recovering plan assets was a fiduciary decision. After all, both the decision to terminate the plan and the recapture of the assets involve the exercise of authority or control of the disposition of a plan’s assets, even if they involve the exercise of an employer power to do so. The question here would not have been whether there was an employer power but rather whether the exercise of that power was subject to fiduciary constraints. But the federal courts largely agreed with the Department’s position, with the Supreme Court endorsing and demarcating the distinction between settlor and fiduciary functions in a trilogy of cases, with the last of those cases giving the doctrine particularly broad scope.

The Court decided the three trilogy cases in a relatively short period between 1995 and 1999. The first case, Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, involved a health care plan that did not include a detailed amendment procedure. For the first time, the Supreme Court decided that employers had a fundamental right to amend or terminate their employee benefit plans even if the plans themselves did not explicitly provide for amendments or termination at the discretion of the employer. The Court did so with little analysis other than a citation to a Sixth Circuit decision.

In the Sixth Circuit case, the employer amended an unwritten severance benefit plan by adopting a written severance plan that denied benefits to employees who remained employed after a sale of the business. The plaintiffs argued that this amendment of the plan constituted a fiduciary breach. In determining that no breach

120. See Amato v. W. Union Int’l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416–17 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding, at least arguably, that an employer’s decision to capture plan assets could be a fiduciary decision). For a discussion of Amato and cases from the same period addressing plan terminations that affect early retirement benefits, see generally Muir, supra note 63, at 1051–54. We return to this argument infra Part IV.B.

121. See generally Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432 (1999) (holding that fiduciary duties do not arise from an employer’s decision to amend a plan even when the employer receives incidental benefits as a result of the amendment).


123. See id. at 79–80 (describing the employer’s amendment plan as the “simplest of plans” with the “barest of procedures”).

124. See id. at 78–80, 85 (holding that an employer did not violate ERISA by terminating its benefit plan because, although simple and without a termination provision, the employer’s plan for amendment satisfied ERISA’s requirements).

125. See id. at 78 (citing Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir. 1990)).


127. See id. at 946–47.
occurred, the Sixth Circuit drew a line between decisions relating to plan assets or plan administration (fiduciary actions) and decisions such as plan adoptions, terminations, and amendments, which firms undertake as business decisions (not fiduciary actions).128

The very next year the Supreme Court again took up the question of an employer’s right to amend its plan in *Lockheed Corp. v. Spink*,129 a case involving a DB pension plan.130 The facts of the case were simple: the employer added an early retirement provision to its plan, a provision that required a participant electing to retire early to release all employment claims against the employer.131 In *Spink*, the Court went beyond its cursory determination in *Curtiss-Wright* and considered the question of what employer actions vis-à-vis a plan constitute fiduciary actions.132 In contrast to the policy-based approach the DOL took in its 1986 letter,133 the Supreme Court based its decision squarely on an interpretation of ERISA’s definition of the term “fiduciary.”134 According to the Court, the statute’s activity-based fiduciary definition meant that some employer actions are fiduciary actions and others are not.135 Since ERISA’s language does not specifically include plan design among the discretionary actions that give rise to fiduciary status, as compared to its inclusion of plan administration, management, and control of plan assets, the Court determined that the act of amending a plan is not a fiduciary act.136 Its discussion of the distinction between discretionary acts of plan design (not fiduciary acts) and discretionary acts of plan administration and

128. *Id.* at 947.
130. *Id.* at 885.
131. *Id.*
132. *Id.* at 890–91.
134. *Spink*, 517 U.S. at 890–91. For the language of the definition, see *supra* text accompanying note 96.
136. *Id.* at 890 ("When employers undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust. This rule is rooted in the text of ERISA’s definition of fiduciary. As the Second Circuit has observed, ‘only when fulfilling certain defined functions, including the exercise of discretionary authority or control over plan management or administration,’ does a person become a fiduciary under § 3(21)(A). ‘[B]ecause [the] defined functions [in the definition of fiduciary] do not include plan design, an employer may decide to amend an employee benefit plan without being subject to fiduciary review.’ We recently recognized this very point, noting that ‘it may be true that amending or terminating a plan . . . cannot be an act of plan “management” or “administration.” ’ (alteration in original) (citations omitted)).
management (fiduciary acts) is where we find the Court’s first reference in an ERISA case to “the settlor-fiduciary distinction.”

By the third case of the trilogy, the Court became impatient with the limitations being imposed by the lower courts on employer actions and wrote in broad terms. In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, a plan sponsor amended a DB plan to require participating employees to make annual contributions. It was this facet of requiring employee contributions that distinguished the Hughes plan from the plan that had been at issue in Spink. Over time, the Hughes plan had become overfunded, which permitted Hughes to cease making any contributions to the plan for a period of eight years, even though employees continued to contribute during this period. Hughes then amended the plan on two occasions: first, to use some of the surplus assets to provide enhanced early retirement benefits for selected employees and, second, to eliminate the contribution requirement for newly hired employees.

A group of plan participants alleged that Hughes had breached its ERISA fiduciary duties when it amended the plan to use the surplus assets to benefit some contributing employees disproportionately (the first amendment) and when it amended the plan to use the surplus assets to provide benefits for employees who had not contributed to the plan at all (the second amendment). The Ninth Circuit ruled that, to the extent that the surplus assets were attributable to the employee contributions, the participants had stated a cause of action for an ERISA fiduciary breach. One way of understanding the distinction drawn by the Ninth Circuit is that the employees’ contributions made them co-settlors of the plan. Thus, Hughes would not have the power to unilaterally amend the terms of the plan, at least in a manner that harmed the participants who had been contributing to the plan.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, using expansive and unambiguous language that left little

137. Id. at 891.
139. Id. at 435.
140. Id. at 436.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 436–37.
144. See id. at 1311–12 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“The majority seems to be saying that employees are co-settlors of contributory plans.”).
145. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 435.
room for the lower courts to continue to draw distinctions between various types of benefit plans.\textsuperscript{146}

We made clear in \textit{Spink} that our reasoning applied both to “pension benefit plans” and “welfare benefit plans,” since “[t]he definition of fiduciary makes no distinction between persons exercising authority over” these different types of plans. Our conclusion applies with equal force to persons exercising authority over a contributory plan, a noncontributory plan, or any other type of plan. Our holding did not turn, as the Court of Appeals below thought, on the type of plan being amended for the simple reason that the plain language of the statute defining fiduciary makes no distinction. Rather, it turned on whether the employer’s act of amending its plan constituted an exercise of fiduciary duty. In \textit{Spink}, we concluded it did not.\textsuperscript{147}

The \textit{Hughes} Court’s approach thus directly links back to its interpretation in \textit{Spink} of ERISA’s definition of fiduciary. Again, the Court focused on the difference between design decisions and discretionary plan administration.\textsuperscript{148} Even in the context of a plan where employees made contributions and the employer had stopped making contributions, the decision treats Hughes as the only plan settlor. And, as the settlor, Hughes was free even to design the plan’s terms, including who would receive plan benefits. In the words of the Court:

\begin{quote}
The same act of amending here also does not constitute the action of a fiduciary, although Hughes’ Plan happens to be one to which employees contribute. In general, an employer’s decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer’s fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the administration of the plan’s assets. ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not implicated where Hughes, acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how such benefits are
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{146} In 1986 Congress amended ERISA to provide for employees sharing in surplus assets on termination, but that would not have applied in the Hughes situation because it did not involve a plan termination. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1132(a), 100 Stat. 2085, 2478–81 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 4980 (2012)).
\textsuperscript{147} Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443–44 (citations omitted).
\textsuperscript{148} Id. at 444 (“In general, an employer’s decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer’s fiduciary duties which consist of such actions as the administration of the plan’s assets.”).
calculated. A settlor’s powers include the ability to add a new benefit structure to an existing plan. Respondents’ three fiduciary duty claims are directly foreclosed by Spink’s holding that, without exception, “[p]lan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries.”149

The Hughes decision also quoted language from Spink that listed specific actions that are settlor actions and not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.

Plan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the category of fiduciaries. As we said with respect to the amendment of welfare benefit plans, “[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, modify, or terminate welfare plans.” When employers undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, but are analogous to the settlors of a trust.150

This language, with its inclusion of the modifier “generally,” arguably left some room for lower courts to maneuver. As a general matter, however, that has not happened.151

In Hughes, the Court ignored rather than engaged the interests of employees. This was not a necessary outcome. The Court could have recognized that, at least because of the direct contributions they made to the pension plan, the employees also held interests in the plan and acted as plan settlors, or at least were entitled to the employer considering their interests in the plan in the amendment process. In our judgment, the broad sweep of the Court’s language in Hughes regarding the settlor/fiduciary doctrine sometimes (but not always) yields questionable policy outcomes.152

II. DOCTRINAL BOUNDARIES AND APPLICATION

Despite the rigidity in the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, there are at least two difficult questions that the courts have not yet been able to

149. Id. at 444–45 (emphasis added) (other citations omitted) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (alteration in original)).

150. Id. at 443 (other citations omitted) (quoting Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890 (1996) (alteration in original)).

151. See generally infra Part II.C (analyzing the contextual application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine). The Court’s use of the term “generally,” we note, can be construed to refer to ERISA’s substantive limitations on the power to design a plan, but the Spink reference to “generally” might also be viewed as a bit of hedging, allowing the development of limiting principles on settlor freedom in subsequent cases. See Spink, 517 U.S. at 890.

152. See infra Part III.A.
coherently and fully answer about the doctrine: first, where is the demarcation line between settlor decisions and fiduciary implementation of settlor decisions;\(^\text{153}\) and second, to what extent does the doctrine protect plan sponsors when they engage in business or settlor-type activities that do not include adopting, formally amending, or terminating a plan?\(^\text{154}\) The first question is perhaps the more important, for it is one moving part of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine that might be judicially engineered to control some of the doctrine’s potential excesses.\(^\text{155}\)

After the Supreme Court’s *Hughes* decision, the parameters of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine were not clearly defined.\(^\text{156}\) More than thirteen years later, some lack of clarity remains, but overall the trend has been to find that employers wear their settlor hats when engaging in many plan-related activities.\(^\text{157}\) Courts continue to address questions that turn on the distinction between plan design and termination, which are not fiduciary acts, and implementation of those decisions, which are fiduciary acts.\(^\text{158}\) The first subsection below analyzes the doctrine in that area, beginning with one of the Supreme Court decisions since the trilogy that directly addressed the settlor/fiduciary distinction. We designate this strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as the plan structure strand. The application of doctrinal boundaries also occurs when plan sponsors engage in business or settlor-type activities but do not formally adopt, amend, or terminate a plan. We designate this strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as the business decision strand. The second subsection below engages those situations. The third subsection considers the settlor/fiduciary doctrine’s boundaries in the context of many of the employee benefits situations to which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine applies.

### A. Implementing the Definition of Implementation

In 1999, Professor Muir wrote about the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, stating that the “dichotomy between actions taken to amend plans, and actions taken to implement amendments [and, by implication, terminations,] is likely to continue to create problems.”\(^\text{159}\)
That has proven to be true. On the one hand, the lack of doctrinal clarity surrounding these questions is problematic for all the usual reasons that uncertainty in law is sometimes considered problematic. But, we also see the lack of clarity as offering judges an opportunity to tame some of the more problematic aspects of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, an issue to which we will return in the last Part of this Article.

In its 2007 decision in Beck v. PACE International Union, the Supreme Court took up the line-drawing challenge in a case involving a plan termination. Crown Paper and its parent (“Crown”) sponsored multiple DB plans at the time Crown declared bankruptcy. Some of the plans, which covered unionized employees, had enjoyed more financial success than Crown and in total were overfunded by approximately five million dollars. Crown decided to terminate the plans by purchasing annuities, which is the typical way of terminating a fully or overfunded plan. Through the annuities, the employees and retirees would receive all of their promised pension benefits assuming the continued claims-paying ability of the insurance company. The remaining five million dollars of overfunding would go into the bankruptcy estate to be allocated to Crown’s creditors.

The union, PACE International Union (“PACE”), had other ideas. PACE proposed that Crown transfer all of the liabilities and assets in the relevant plans to a multiemployer pension plan that covered PACE union members. That would have enabled the multiemployer plan to capture the five million dollars in excess funding. Crown proceeded with its purchase of annuities without seriously considering PACE’s proposition. PACE then alleged that Crown had violated its fiduciary obligation to act for the exclusive

161. Id. at 98.
162. Id. at 98–99.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 100, 103.
165. Id. at 106.
166. Id. at 99.
167. Id.
168. Id. At the Supreme Court, PACE indicated it would have agreed to a transfer of plan assets to its multiemployer fund even if Crown retained the five million dollar surplus. Id. at 100 n.2. Multiemployer pension plans provide benefits for the unionized employees of multiple employers. See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 82–88 (2011) (explaining the basics of multiemployer plans).
169. Beck, 551 U.S. at 100–01.
The purpose of providing plan benefits when it decided to implement the plan terminations through annuity purchases in order to recapture assets for Crown’s creditors.170

The first issue, and the relevant one for this Article, on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari was whether the decision to purchase annuities was part of the decision to terminate the plan, and thus was not a fiduciary decision, or whether it constituted implementation of the termination decision, and thus was a fiduciary decision.171 The bankruptcy court, district court, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals all found in PACE’s favor; Crown’s decisions not to consider PACE’s plan merger proposal and to purchase the annuities were acts undertaken in the implementation of the termination.172

The Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, disagreed.173 The Court relied on ERISA’s language governing plan terminations and guidance by the applicable regulatory agencies, which both indicated that a plan merger is not a permissible way to achieve a plan termination.174 PACE had argued that the statutory language clearly permitted merger as an allowable way to implement a plan termination.175 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation’s (“PBGC”) interpretation of the statute to mean that “merger is an alternative to (rather than an example of) plan termination.”176 Applying this view of the statute, once Crown decided to terminate the pension plans, which it was entitled to do without fiduciary ramifications under the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, the decision to purchase annuities was subsumed in that termination decision.177

It is worth focusing on precise language in the Beck decision and teasing out its implications. The Court set the stage for its analysis by stating that “[w]hich hat the employer is proverbially wearing depends upon the nature of the function performed.”178 It also noted that this “inquiry . . . is aided by the common law of trusts.”179 This suggests that if the nature of the action is one that historically would have been performed by a trust settlor, then the action is not subject

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170. Id. at 100.
171. Id. at 101–02.
172. Id.
173. See id. at 98, 110–11.
174. Id. at 102–10.
175. Id. at 105.
176. Id. at 104.
177. See id. at 102.
178. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
179. Id.
to ERISA’s fiduciary standards. The *Beck* Court quoted a phrase from the *Hughes* decision that has been cited by a number of lower courts: “[D]ecision[s] regarding the form or structure’ of a plan are generally settlor functions.” This language implies that the settlor/fiduciary analysis takes into account the effect of a decision so that even decisions not implemented by plan amendment may be settlor decisions.

Consider the Court’s approach to the settlor/fiduciary distinction in *Beck*. The Court appeared willing, if ERISA provided for multiple ways to implement a termination, to treat the selection of a particular implementation method as a fiduciary decision. The Court decided, however, that the condition precedent did not exist; a merger is not a statutorily permitted way to implement a plan termination. Thus, Crown’s decision to terminate was a decision on the plan’s structure or form, making it a settlor decision, and, as a result, Crown had no obligation to consider PACE’s merger proposal.

*Varity Corp. v. Howe* is the only case in which the Supreme Court applied the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to find that employer acts were fiduciary in nature because they constituted plan administration. The employer and plan sponsor, Varity, had consolidated its financially unsuccessful divisions into a new subsidiary. To encourage active employees in those divisions to transfer voluntarily to the new subsidiary, Varity engaged in an

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181. *See, e.g.*, *Bennett v. Conrail Matched Sav. Plan Admin. Comm.*, 168 F.3d 671, 679 (3d Cir. 1999); *Coriale v. Xerox Corp.*, 775 F. Supp. 2d 583, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also Slusarski v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am.*, 632 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.R.I. 2009) (“ERISA’s fiduciary duty requirement simply is not implicated where [the company], acting as the Plan’s settlor, makes a decision regarding the form or structure of the Plan such as who is entitled to receive Plan benefits and in what amounts, or how such benefits are calculated.” (alteration in original) (emphasis added)).
183. *See id.* at 110.
184. *See id.* at 101–02.
185. *See id.* It is not clear, even if termination could have been accomplished by means of a merger, that Crown would have been obligated to merge the plans. The Court found it unnecessary to address the issue of whether a decision on a plan merger “could switch from a settlor to a fiduciary function depending upon the context in which the merger proposal is raised.” *Id.* at 102. The Court termed that “an odd” idea. *Id.* It should be said, though, that the Court’s decision was based on its holding that a merger was different than a termination. *Id.* at 106. It is plausible that the Court might have held that decisions on how to implement a termination are subject to fiduciary constraints.
187. *Id.* at 492.
188. *Id.* at 493.
extensive communications program.\textsuperscript{189} Although Varity had intentionally structured the new subsidiary to be financially insolvent, the communications program omitted that information.\textsuperscript{190} Instead, Varity represented to the employees that they could expect benefits equivalent to those they had enjoyed while employed at Varity.\textsuperscript{191} The business results were predictable: the subsidiary failed.\textsuperscript{192} The health care plans then terminated, leaving participants without those benefits.\textsuperscript{193} The participants sued, alleging that Varity's communications violated ERISA's fiduciary standards.\textsuperscript{194} The preliminary question, though, was whether Varity acted as a fiduciary when communicating about the plan with the employees.\textsuperscript{195} The Supreme Court held that Varity undertook the communications program as part of its plan administration, and thus Varity was a fiduciary when communicating with the employees about the plan.\textsuperscript{196}

The Court looked to trust law to determine whether Varity was wearing its fiduciary or settlor hat. According to the Court: “The ordinary trust law understanding of fiduciary ‘administration’ of a trust is that to act as an administrator is to perform the duties imposed, or exercise the powers conferred, by the trust documents.”\textsuperscript{197} This includes powers “necessary or appropriate” to carry out the purposes of the trust, even when the trust documents do not explicitly grant specific powers.\textsuperscript{198} Communicating forward-looking information about the plan to employees asked to make decisions based on that information is an act in furtherance of the trust’s purposes.\textsuperscript{199} From a contextual perspective, the Court thought that reasonable employees could think that their employer was acting, at least in part, as administrator of the plan when talking about the plan’s future.\textsuperscript{200}

We can speculate that the Court may have come to a different conclusion if Varity’s communications with its employees had not

\textsuperscript{189}. See \textit{id.} at 499–501.
\textsuperscript{190}. See \textit{id.} at 494.
\textsuperscript{191}. \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{192}. \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{193}. \textit{id.} at 493–94.
\textsuperscript{194}. See \textit{id.} at 492.
\textsuperscript{195}. \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{196}. \textit{id.} at 505. Varity also transferred approximately four thousand retirees to the benefit plans of the new organization without obtaining the retirees’ consent. \textit{id.} at 494.
\textsuperscript{197}. \textit{id.} at 502.
\textsuperscript{198}. \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{199}. \textit{id.}
\textsuperscript{200}. \textit{id.} at 503.
been so transparently dishonest. The lack of a definitive boundary between fiduciary and nonfiduciary acts means that courts have some discretion in characterizing particular actions. Varity was wearing at least two hats and arguably three during this time period. Varity determined the terms of its plans while wearing its settlor hat. Arguably, the decision to create a new subsidiary and to offer employees the opportunity to transfer to that subsidiary was made while wearing its business decision-maker hat. And when Varity communicated with employees about the plan it was wearing its fiduciary hat.

In sum, the courts have confronted questions involving the distinction between plan adoption, amendment, and termination, which are settlor actions, and conduct that occurs while implementing those settlor actions or engaging in plan management, which is subject to fiduciary standards in a wide variety of contexts. For ease of reference, we will refer to this strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as the “plan structure” strand. Before considering the contexts in which those questions arise, the next subsection explains the second strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.

B. Formalism—Beyond Adoption, Amendment, Termination

In each of the trilogy cases, Spink, Curtiss-Wright, and Hughes, the Supreme Court decided that a plan amendment constituted a settlor act, not a fiduciary act. And, in Varity Corp., the Court found that communications, which obviously were not plan amendments, were fiduciary acts. The factual differences among those cases, along with the Beck and Varity Corp. Courts’ reliance on the common law of trusts, raise the possibility that the distinction between settlor and fiduciary acts is a formalistic one. Indeed, the plan structure strand of the doctrine suggests that acts

201. See infra notes 348–51 and accompanying text (discussing some cases characterizing employer actions as business decisions rather than fiduciary acts). This question was not before the Court in Varity. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 492.

202. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 503.

203. See discussion infra Part II.C (discussing cases addressing the boundary between settlor functions and fiduciary functions and categorizing the cases by the type of benefits context in which they arose).


207. Varity, 516 U.S. at 505.


209. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 497.
taken through plan amendments always are settlor acts. In theory, formalism could apply in the opposite direction as well. Discretionary acts other than plan adoption, amendment, and termination may always be fiduciary acts.

But, even if, under current Supreme Court doctrine, all plan amendments constitute settlor acts, it does not necessarily follow that all plan-related actions not taken through a plan amendment constitute fiduciary acts. The Hughes Court referred to settlor actions as those that “‘adopt, modify, or terminate’” benefit plans.210 The term “modify” might indicate that settlor actions encompass a broader range of actions than just formal plan amendments.

As a reminder, the Supreme Court’s development of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine was premised on its interpretation of the statutory definition of fiduciary.211 The statute defines fiduciary functions as including discretionary acts of plan management and plan administration.212 Arguably then, the definition encompasses a more limited set of actions than the entire set of discretionary acts that affect benefit plans. Many discretionary business decisions, such as entering a new market, setting appropriate levels of cash reserves, developing research and development programs, or developing and implementing employment policies, have an indirect, and sometimes even a direct, effect on an employer’s benefit plans. The challenge then is to distinguish between instances where an employer is wearing its ERISA fiduciary hat because it is engaging in discretionary plan administration or management or controlling plan assets and those circumstances where the employer is wearing its business hat because it is engaged in decision making about its business operations.

The Supreme Court has yet to address the distinction between an employer’s fiduciary role in administering a plan and its role in running its business. The Third Circuit, however, confronted such a situation in Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp.,213 which it decided shortly after the Court’s Hughes decision.214 Thomas & Betts Corporation (“T&B”) asked certain engineering employees to relocate from New Jersey to Tennessee.215 T&B’s severance plan provided for the payment of benefits to “employees who were ‘involuntarily terminated’ when ‘the terminating manager believes the

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210. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 78).
211. See supra text accompanying notes 134–36.
213. 188 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999).
215. See Noorily, 188 F.3d at 156.
granting of such pay is appropriate.’ 216 T&B indicated in an initial communication to employees that employees who received but rejected a relocation offer would receive severance benefits.217 Once T&B realized, however, that substantial numbers of the engineering employers were going to refuse to relocate, it decided to deny them severance benefits in an effort to encourage them to move.218 The employees alleged that T&B’s refusal to pay the severance benefits constituted a violation of T&B’s ERISA fiduciary duties.219

The Third Circuit held that T&B’s decision not to pay severance benefits was an action that T&B undertook while wearing its business hat, not its fiduciary hat.220 It was irrelevant to the analysis that T&B had not amended the severance plan. Instead of focusing on whether the plan had been amended,221 which is important to the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, the court found it compelling that T&B exercised its “discretion . . . as an employer through its terminating manager rather than as an administrator through its Corporate Benefits Committee.”222 Under this analysis, the denial of severance benefits to employees was made by T&B in its capacity as an employer because it was in T&B’s business interest to encourage the employees to transfer to Tennessee.223 The decision illustrates an employer’s right to make business decisions that affect employee benefit plans without the constraints of ERISA fiduciary obligations. This is the strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine that we refer to as the “business decision” strand.

The Third Circuit’s approach in the Noorily decision provides an interesting counterpoint to the Supreme Court’s decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe.224 As discussed above, Varity arguably was wearing its management hat when it decided to form a new subsidiary.225 Its discussion with employees on their transfer to the new subsidiary then could have been viewed as also occurring while wearing that management hat.

216. Id. (quoting plan language).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See id. at 158–59 (discussing claim for fiduciary breach).
220. See id. at 159.
221. The Third Circuit might have categorized each of the employment decisions made by a T&B manager as being the equivalent of a plan amendment.
222. Noorily, 188 F.3d at 159.
223. Id.
225. See supra text accompanying note 201.
In sum, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine should be understood as comprising two strands, either of which may result in an employer action being found to be a settlor action and not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary constraints. One strand, the plan structure strand, holds definitively that plan sponsors act as settlors and not fiduciaries whenever they adopt, amend, or terminate a benefit plan. The second strand, the business decision strand, is more flexible in its application and permits an employer’s actions taken with a business purpose to be recognized as settlor actions, or at least their equivalent, even though they are taken through a mechanism other than the adoption, amendment, or termination of a benefit plan. The next subsection considers the wide range of employee benefit situations in which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has application.

C. The Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine’s Reach Across Employee Benefits

The breadth of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine’s reach through its two strands illustrates what is at stake in the application of the doctrine for both the employers that sponsor plans and the employees who expect to earn benefits from them. Courts have applied the settlor/fiduciary doctrine across many types of employee benefit plans, ranging from traditional pension plans to health care plans, from cases involving one employee to decisions that affect the benefits of all or large sections of an employer’s workforce. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine also arises in the context of corporate reorganizations and restructurings and when an employer communicates, directly or indirectly, with its employees. As we analyze the contextual application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine here, we further consider the application of its plan structure and business decision strands before critiquing the doctrine in the next Part.

1. DB Plan Funding

As referenced above, ERISA contains a series of funding rules intended to ensure that DB plans have sufficient assets to pay the benefits they promise. However, the plan structure strand of the

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226. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1–7.
228. See, e.g., infra Part II.C.1–7.
229. See supra text accompanying note 66.
settlor/fiduciary doctrine protects the adoption of plan amendments even if those amendments result in significant plan underfunding. This occurred in one multiemployer DB plan when the employers and union agreed to terminate the employers’ contribution obligation.231 The plan’s actuary proposed that the plan trustees adopt a benefit structure consistent with the plan remaining fully funded in perpetuity.232 Whether intentionally or because they failed to understand the actuary’s proposal, the trustees instead amended the plan to provide a level of benefits that was not sustainable.233 As a result, the plan became severely underfunded.234

In addressing allegations that the trustees breached their fiduciary duty by adopting the generous benefit structure,235 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals applied what we have identified as the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. Because the trustees took action through a plan amendment, their decision on the benefit structure was not fiduciary in nature.236 Instead it was a plan design decision, protected by the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.237 The Supreme Court of the United States also has applied the plan structure strand to protect employer decisions that increase benefits for a subset of employees at some cost, direct or indirect, to other employees.238

In an effort to decrease the risk associated with DB benefit promises made to retirees, several companies have shifted the responsibility for the retirees’ pension annuities to insurance companies. For example, Verizon caused its pension plan for management employees to purchase annuities from Prudential Insurance Company of America (“Prudential”) for approximately

authority in enforcing plan funding obligations. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 3-20.

232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 726.
236. Id. at 728.
237. Id. at 728; see also Hartline v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Nat’l Pension Fund, 134 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2000) (finding that a variety of plan decisions made by multiemployer plan trustees regarding contribution rates were not fiduciary actions because they were plan design decisions), aff’d, 286 F.3d 598, 599 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
238. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443–44 (1999) (stating that “[i]n general, an employer’s decision to amend a pension plan concerns the composition or design of the plan itself and does not implicate the employer’s fiduciary duties”). For a discussion of the Hughes decision more generally, see supra text accompanying notes 143–52.
41,000 retirees. For the future, the annuities will provide the full amount of the benefits owed to those retirees, approximately $7.4 billion at the time of the annuity purchase. The benefits to Verizon of this transaction, one of the types of transactions used as part of a “de-risking” strategy, are numerous and include avoiding future longevity risk, removing the pension liabilities from its balance sheet, and decreasing the potential increase in Verizon’s minimum pension contributions as a result of interest rate decreases. Some retirees whose pensions now will be paid by Prudential realize at least one potential benefit as a result of the transaction. If in the future the PBGC assumes responsibility for the Verizon plan at a time when it is underfunded, retiree benefits would be capped according to the statutory cap for benefits paid by the PBGC. Generally, however, the potential implications for the retirees are troubling. Because their benefits are no longer paid from an ERISA plan, the benefits of those retirees may no longer receive federal protection in the case of personal bankruptcy. And, if in the future, Prudential is unable to pay their benefits, the retirees will not have any guarantee from the PBGC. Instead, their protections will be limited to those provided by the relevant state law governing insurance companies.

The retirees whose benefit obligations Verizon transferred to Prudential sued, alleging a variety of claims, including that Verizon

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242. See Lee, 954 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (citation omitted) (“[P]articipant benefits are guaranteed by the PBGC up to a statutory level.”). The PBGC’s current cap on benefits for a retiree who is age sixty-five at the time plan terminates is $4,943.18 per month. Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, http://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee.html (last visited January 6, 2014).

243. The rights of annuitants against creditors would be decided by state law, as would the ability of the annuitant to assign future benefits. See, e.g., Laura S. McAlister, Comment, The Inefficiencies of Exclusion: The Importance of Including Insurance Companies in the Bankruptcy Code, 24 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 129, 130–34 (2008) (discussing the application of state law to insurance company (the typical annuity providers) insolvency).
breached its fiduciary duty of loyalty to them.²⁴⁴ The court rejected the retirees' fiduciary claim on the basis of the plan design strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. As the court explained: “Because amending a plan is not a fiduciary function, Verizon was not acting in a fiduciary capacity when it amended the Plan to direct the purchase of an annuity for participants meeting certain criteria.”²⁴⁵

Some employers have also amended DB plans to transfer financial risk directly to retirees by giving them a one-time post-retirement election to transform their annuity benefit into a lump-sum option.²⁴⁶ While this is a bonanza for those individuals with known terminal illnesses, for most participants it is a honey-trap, with far less financial value than the continuing annuity that they would be giving up. But employers offer this option not because they want to reward employees with terminal illnesses, but because they believe that enough relatively healthy employees will make financially irrational decisions to forego the continuing annuity for the less valuable lump sum to make the lump sum less costly to the employer than retaining the benefit in the plan or paying a premium to transfer it to an insurer. What is more, we believe it is likely that some retirees will be suffering diminished mental capacity and therefore will not be in a good position to make a reasoned choice. But the decision to offer the lump sum is nevertheless a settlor decision, even if there is clear evidence that the employer is offering it with the expectation that most employees who choose the option will be damaging their financial welfare in retirement.

The business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine also may protect employer actions that implicate plan funding. When an employer with limited financial resources decides to pay corporate obligations instead of making contributions to a DB plan, the relationship between the business decision and plan funding is relatively direct. Courts typically categorize those choices as business decisions rather than ERISA fiduciary actions.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵. Id. at 493.
²⁴⁶. See, e.g., Susan Tompor, Lump-Sum Pension a Tough Call for General Motors, Ford Retirees, DETROIT FREE PRESS (June 14, 2012), http://www.freep.com/article/20120614/COL07/206140488/Lump-sum-pension-offer-a-tough-call-for-General-Motors-Ford-retirees (reporting that Ford and GM offered their retirees an option to receive lump-sum benefits).
²⁴⁷. See Harpster v. AARQUE Mgmt. Corp., No. 4:03CV1282, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30811, at *23–25 (N.D. Ohio July 22, 2005) (holding that a decision to pay dividends was a discretionary business decision and not alone a fiduciary breach); In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison, LLP, 414 B.R. 627, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (“The clear majority of the
2. DC Plan Investments

Whatever assets are in a participant’s DC plan account at retirement constitute the participant’s benefit. Thus, net investment returns are an important factor in a participant’s ability to build wealth in those accounts. It is necessary here to take a short detour to explain two prevalent types of DC plans: 401(k) plans and employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”). Although the terms of 401(k) plans vary, the defining characteristic of such plans is that they must permit employees who are eligible to take part in a 401(k) plan to choose whether to contribute pre-tax earnings to that employee’s own plan account. ESOPs differ from 401(k) plans in two ways that are important for this Article. First, ERISA requires ESOPs to invest primarily in employer stock, whereas no such provision exists for standard 401(k) plans. Second, ESOPs typically hold employer stock in a suspense account. Over time, as employees earn plan contributions, the plan transfers stock from the suspense account to participant accounts. Finally, a KSOP is a hybrid of a 401(k) and an ESOP. KSOPs permit employees to make contributions that are treated as 401(k) contributions, although they may be invested in employer stock. In addition, the employer may also contribute employer stock, which typically is used to “match” employee contributions at a specified rate.

few courts dealing with the issue of unpaid employer contributions, regardless of the plan type, hold that choosing not to make employer contributions is a business or corporate function, not a fiduciary function with respect to a plan.”), aff’d, 430 B.R. 898 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Holdeman v. Devine, 474 F.3d 770, 778 (10th Cir. 2007) (deciding that an employer was not acting as a fiduciary in allocating assets to business debts instead of to health care plan premiums), aff’d, 572 F.3d 1190 (10th Cir. 2009).

248. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and the New Economic Order, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1519, 1546 (1997) (stating that an employee gets the value of his or her account when he or she retires).

249. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 6-15. Roth 401(k) plans receive contributions from post-tax earnings. See id. at 6-20.


251. See Michael W. Melton, Demythologizing ESOPs, 45 TAX L. REV. 363, 364 (1990) (stating that an ESOP includes those “employee plans that invest in employer stock”).

252. See id. at 364–65.


254. See id. (explaining that an employee uses a KSOP to defer part of her compensation to be invested in company stock).

255. Id.
a. 401(k) Plans

With that background on plan typology behind us, we can return to the plan sponsor’s role in selecting investment menus in the typical 401(k) plan and the use of employer stock for matching contributions. Most 401(k) plans are participant-directed plans, which delegate to employees decisions on investment selection. If the plan meets certain regulatory requirements, including diversity in terms of the risk/reward characteristics of the options and sufficient disclosure, then plan sponsors and all fiduciaries, other than plan participants, are insulated from fiduciary liability for the decision to invest account assets in a particular investment product. Plan sponsors play an important role in these plans because they typically determine which investment vehicles are available to plan participants. Most plans have a limited “menu” of available investments, with the average number of options being eighteen.

In addition to employers’ decisions on the composition of the plan’s investment menu, employers that contribute to a 401(k) plan may permit employees to invest their contributions in employer stock (turning part of the plan into a KSOP). Or, an employer may make contributions on behalf of participants in the form of employer stock. Either use of employer stock will affect the investment allocations in employee accounts.

257. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c5(b) (2013); see also Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment Advice and Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 10 (2002) (“[P]lans that delegate investment decisionmaking to plan investors in compliance with the 404(c) requirements protect the sponsoring employer from fiduciary liability associated with poor investment choices.”).
258. See Susan J. Stabile, Freedom to Choose Unwisely: Congress’ Misguided Decision to Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 361, 381 (2002) (“By controlling which investment options are offered in a plan . . . employers retain significant control over employee choices.”).
260. See Diamond, supra note 253, at 236 (explaining that an employee uses a KSOP to defer part of his compensation to be invested in company stock).
261. See Muir, supra note 257, at 15 (noting that employees allocate a larger percentage of their voluntary contributions to employer stock where employers make matching contributions using employer stock).
262. See id.
The DOL’s position is that a plan sponsor’s selection and monitoring of plan investments is a fiduciary function. The preamble to the 1991 final regulation on participant-directed plans stated:

[T]he act of limiting or designating investment options which are intended to constitute all or part of the investment universe of a [participant-directed 401(k)] plan is a fiduciary function . . . whether achieved through fiduciary designation or express plan language . . . Thus . . . the plan fiduciary has a fiduciary obligation to prudently select such [investment options], as well as a residual fiduciary obligation to periodically evaluate the performance of such [investment options].

Generally courts have agreed with the DOL and treated the choice of investments for plan menus and employer matching as fiduciary decisions, although, as we will discuss later, this position seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that plan amendments are always settlor decisions. In analyzing whether employers have met their fiduciary duties, particularly with respect to continuing to allow purchases of employer stock, some courts have found that the employer’s decisions are entitled to some level of deference. Some courts, however, limit this presumption to situations where the plan’s terms “require or encourage” the availability of company stock as an investment. This term the Supreme Court will decide whether the potential application of any presumption that might exist should be evaluated at the motion to dismiss stage or as part of the merits. A full discussion of the

263. Final Regulation Regarding Participant Directed Individual Account Plans (ERISA Section 404(c) Plans), 57 Fed. Reg. 46,906, 46,924 n.27 (Oct. 13, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2550); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-5(b)(2) (2013) (“Nothing in this [regulation] shall relieve a fiduciary from his or her duties under . . . ERISA to prudently select and monitor any qualified default investment alternative under the plan or from any liability that results from a failure to satisfy these duties, including liability for any resulting losses.”).

264. See supra text accompanying notes 256–58.

265. See, e.g., Quan v. Computer Sci. Corp., 623 F.3d 870, 880–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (providing examples of courts that have given deference to employer’s decisions with respect to allowing purchases of company stock).

266. Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 717 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh’g en banc, 738 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (mem.); see also Taveras v. UBS AG, 708 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that if a reference to employer stock in plan terms were sufficient to give rise to the presumption of prudence, then the presumption would nearly always apply).

presumption of prudence and application of ERISA’s fiduciary standards to the selection of a plan’s investment menu is beyond the scope of this Article.\textsuperscript{268}

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has put into question the basic premise of the DOL’s position, reserving decision on whether a plan sponsor acts as a fiduciary when selecting investments for its plan menu.\textsuperscript{269} In the court’s words: “We . . . question whether [the plan sponsor’s] decision to restrict the direct investment choices in its Plans . . . is even a decision within [the plan sponsor’s] fiduciary responsibilities.”\textsuperscript{270}

The Seventh Circuit’s dicta may sweep even more broadly than the usual application of the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. The court implied that a decision on the composition of a plan’s investment menu may not need to be formalized in the plan documents, as is typical of the plan structure cases, in order to be categorized as a settlor action.\textsuperscript{271} The court premised its skepticism about the employer’s fiduciary status on its view that the choice of investments for the plan’s menu “bears more resemblance to the basic structuring of a Plan than to its day-to-day management.”\textsuperscript{272} This arguably is consistent with the Hughes Court’s language stating that “decision[s] regarding the form or structure” of a plan are generally settlor functions.\textsuperscript{273} And the Seventh Circuit’s reference to “day-to-day management”\textsuperscript{274} of plans links to the DOL’s

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\textsuperscript{269} Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2009).

\textsuperscript{270} Id. at 586–87. The plaintiffs had alleged that the employer breached its fiduciary duty by offering investment options with excessive fees. Id. Even assuming, though, that the plan sponsor’s decisions were fiduciary decisions, the Seventh Circuit found that the employer had not violated its fiduciary obligation because the fees varied across the twenty-six investment options. Id.

\textsuperscript{271} See id. at 586.

\textsuperscript{272} Id.


\textsuperscript{274} Hecker, 556 F.3d at 586.
first information letter on the scope of settlor functions, which distinguished as fiduciary activities “the management[] of plans.”

b. ESOPs

Earlier we explained basic differences between 401(k) plans and ESOPs. Beyond the decision to use employer stock, ESOPs give rise to additional categories of settlor/fiduciary doctrine cases. Recall that ESOPs employ a sort of turbo version of the use of employer stock; as a statutory requirement, ESOPs must invest primarily in employer securities. The concentration of their investments in employer stock means that ESOPs are rife with potential conflicts of interest; the creation of an ESOP may benefit the company whose shares were sold to the ESOP, an acquirer of that company who uses an ESOP to fund the acquisition, or a shareholder, such as a company founder, who sells stock to the ESOP. In spite of the inherent dangers of self-interested transactions, courts have consistently applied the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to determine that a decision to establish an ESOP is, like the decision to establish any other type of employee benefit plan, not a fiduciary decision. One

275. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18 (discussing the DOL information letter).
276. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114.
277. Neil v. Zell, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1022 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (finding that board members who decided to establish ESOP did not become fiduciaries as a result of that decision). Every ESOP, however, must have a named fiduciary and that fiduciary must ensure that the ESOP acquires employer stock at an appropriate valuation. Id. at 1018. As the Neil court stated: “Case law imposes on an ESOP fiduciary a still more demanding duty of prudence than a typical ERISA fiduciary because an ESOP holds employer stock only, making diversification impossible.” Id. at 1019 (citations omitted). As discussed above regarding the use of the Moench presumption, which was initially developed in the ESOP context, in 401(k) plans, the analysis of whether a named fiduciary has met ERISA’s standard of care is a different question from whether there is a fiduciary obligation. See, e.g., Akers v. Palmer, 71 F.3d 226, 231 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding that the employer’s “decision to establish an ESOP and to fund it with newly-issued stock was the act of a settlor . . .”); Chesemore v. Alliance Holdings, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1040 (W.D. Wis. 2012) (“Employers who sponsor ESOPs wear ‘two hats,’ acting . . . as an employer to the extent [that] they engage in settlor functions such as establishing, funding, amending or terminating the trust.”); Beauchem v. Rockford Prods. Corp., No. 01-C-50134, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5546, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (rejecting argument that employer sponsoring ESOP was a fiduciary). In Fifth Third Bancorp v. Dudenhoeffer, 134 S. Ct. 2459 (2014), decided after this Article was written, the Supreme Court ruled that the standard of prudent care for fiduciaries in ESOP cases was, apart from the duty to diversify investments, identical to that in any other case. Id. at 2463.
of the particularly vexing issues from a fiduciary standpoint has been the valuation of stock purchased by an ESOP.\(^{278}\)

Once an ESOP is established and holds employer stock, a question arises whether company officers who also act as ESOP fiduciaries are wearing their fiduciary or settlor hats when making decisions that may affect the value of that employer. In many instances an ESOP owns a high percentage, sometimes one hundred percent, of the company’s issued stock.\(^{279}\) Because all or most of the value of the ESOP accounts is attributable to employer stock, business-related decisions that affect the price of that stock obviously have a particularly strong effect on the value of employees’ ESOP accounts at such companies.

One court confronted the issue of whether a particular decision was a business decision or fiduciary decision after ESOP participants alleged that the executives who were named fiduciaries of the ESOP violated ERISA’s fiduciary standards because they paid themselves excessive compensation.\(^{280}\) The company’s overpayment of compensation allegedly caused dividends paid on the stock held by the ESOP to be lower than they otherwise would have been.\(^{281}\) In rejecting the participants’ claim of fiduciary breach, the court wrote:

> Setting compensation levels is a business decision or judgment made in connection with the on-going operation of a business. . . . Such a decision may ultimately affect a plan indirectly but it does not implicate fiduciary concerns regarding plan administration or assets. Business decisions can still be made for business reasons, notwithstanding their collateral effect on prospective, contingent employee benefits.\(^{282}\)

Without using the term “settlor,” the court, in effect, applied the business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.

The settlor/fiduciary doctrine cannot be stretched so far, however, as to protect a decision by a company’s president and board


279. Norman Stein, Three and Possibly Four Lessons About ERISA That We Should, but Probably Will Not, Learn from Enron, 76 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 855, 860 (2002) (“[T]here are more than ten thousand ESOPs in which virtually one hundred percent of plan assets are invested in employer stock.”).

280. Eckelkamp v. Beste, 201 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1013–14 (E.D. Mo.) (finding that plaintiffs’ expert’s testimony was insufficient to establish breach of fiduciary duty), aff’d, 315 F.3d 863 (8th Cir. 2002).

281. Id. at 1014.

282. Id. at 1023.
members, who served as ESOP trustees, to buy out the president’s deferred compensation agreements for a sum that exceeded a third of the company’s value. The Ninth Circuit rejected the trustees’ argument that compensation decisions are business, not fiduciary, decisions. According to the court, the distinction between the typical business decision that might implicate stock value, which would be protected by the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, and the instant situation was the direct profit to the company president. In the court’s view, application of fiduciary duties in this context “does not risk encompassing within its confines any and all day-to-day corporate decisions shielded by the business judgment rule.” This decision raises as many questions as it answers. It is not clear how the court distinguished between “direct profit” to the company president, which would be evaluated as an ERISA fiduciary decision due to its potential implications for stock value, and “normal” compensation, which presumably would be a business decision. Perhaps, somewhat like the Supreme Court’s decision in Varity Corp., the distinction turns on whether the action is so egregious that it offends the court.

3. Welfare Benefit Plan Decisions

Health care and other welfare benefit plans, such as disability plans, give rise to sometimes difficult decisions about whether a plan covers specific health treatments or whether a claimant’s disability meets the plan’s criteria for benefits. In Pegram v. Herdich, the question of whether the decision maker acted as a fiduciary intersected with the denial of a participant’s entitlement to a particular health care treatment. In Pegram, a physician-owned health maintenance organization (“HMO”) created a conflict of interest with its patients by using financial incentives to encourage its physicians to ration medical care. After one of the HMO’s physicians delayed a patient’s treatment, the patient sued on the theory that the HMO’s incentives constituted a violation of ERISA’s fiduciary standards.

283. Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2009).
284. Id. at 1077.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See infra Part IV.C (discussing Supreme Court decisions that may fit this pattern).
289. Id. at 211–14.
290. Id. at 215, 226.
291. Id.
The Court, in effect, addressed the issue of whether the decision to delay treatment was a fiduciary decision or was protected by a version of the business decision strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. The Court explained that “the analogy between ERISA fiduciary and [the] common law trustee becomes problematic” because “the trustee under ERISA may wear different hats.” According to basic settlor/fiduciary doctrine principles, an employer could adopt a health care plan that contained payment incentives equivalent to those established by the HMO. Here, though, it was the HMO making the decision.

In its analysis of what it characterized as the mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by the HMO through its physicians, the Court looked once again to trust law and determined that the treatment portion of the physician’s decisions bore little to no likeness to the typical decisions made by trustees. Thus, the mixed decisions made by physicians do not constitute ERISA fiduciary decisions. The Court’s deference to the right of physicians to make treatment decisions qua physician parallels the right of employers to make business decisions while wearing their business hats, even where those decisions have an effect on employee benefits.

As a general matter, in contrast to the situation presented in Pegram, discretionary decisions on the payment of health care and other welfare benefit claims are fiduciary decisions. According to well-established doctrine, a plan sponsor may, in the terms of a benefit plan, grant discretion to the plan administrator that makes benefit decisions. Where plans clearly grant discretion, courts review eligibility decisions using an abuse of discretion standard; otherwise they use a de novo standard. As with the ESOP situation,

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292. See id. at 214.
293. Id. at 225.
294. Id. at 226–27.
295. Id. at 231–32.
296. Id. at 237.
297. A patient could, of course, bring a malpractice action under state law against a physician, but there would be a substantial preemption question to the extent that the physician denies treatment based on plan eligibility provisions. See supra notes 72–74 and accompanying text (discussing ERISA preemption).
300. See, e.g., Cosey v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 735 F.3d 161, 165 (4th Cir. 2013) (“In the ERISA context, courts conduct de novo review of an administrator’s denial of benefits unless the plan grants the administrator discretion to determine a claimant’s
however, conflicts of interest are inherent in situations where the same entity determines whether a participant is eligible for a benefit and bears the financial cost of paying that benefit. As a result, the Supreme Court has determined that the existence of such conflicts is among the factors to be considered in determining whether a fiduciary abused its discretion in denying a claim for benefits.\footnote{301}{Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 116–17 (2008); see also Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1649 (2010) (holding that a plan administrator’s second interpretation was entitled to deference where the administrator had made an honest mistake in its first interpretation).}

In some instances, benefit plans seek to recover benefits they paid to or on behalf of plan participants. Health care plans typically include provisions permitting the plan to recover the cost of health care benefits provided to a participant who is injured in an accident and subsequently receives an award or settlement from the tortfeasor that caused the accident or the tortfeasor’s insurance company.\footnote{302}{See, e.g., U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537, 1542 (2013); see also EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 14–21 (“ERISA health care benefit plans typically include both a subrogation clause and a reimbursement clause . . . .”).}

Three Supreme Court decisions have addressed whether ERISA’s remedial provisions permit the health plan’s recovery, with the application of the remedial provisions being highly fact dependent.\footnote{303}{CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1867 (2011) (finding that the district court was authorized to reform and enforce the terms of an ERISA pension plan for use as a remedy); Sereboff v. Mid-Atl. Med. Servs., Inc., 547 U.S. 356, 368 (2006) (finding that recovery was possible against a separate trust established pending resolution of the health care plan’s claim); Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 221 (2002) (holding that the health care plan could not recover from a special needs trust established in an insurance settlement on behalf of the participant).}


For purposes of this Article, rather than delve into the vagaries of the remedial doctrine, it is sufficient to consider the most recent Supreme Court decision on ERISA remedies, \textit{U.S. Airways v.}
The Court took up the issue of whether plan participants are able to rely on the equitable “double recovery” and “common fund” doctrines, which are equitable doctrines that are relevant to state insurance law, to defeat health insurance plan terms intended to permit recoveries of benefits paid to participants.

The background story was sad and simple—it is the scenario in the opening section of this Article. Mr. McCutchen’s health insurance covered substantial medical costs that resulted when he was profoundly injured in an automobile accident. The plan demanded a reimbursement from Mr. McCutchen that exceeded the amount he received after attorney’s fees in a tort suit. In summary, as will be detailed in the next paragraphs, he argued that (1) he should be able to raise equitable principles to limit the plan’s recovery; and (2) in any event, the plan should not be able to recover in excess of the participant’s recovery net of attorney’s fees.

Mr. McCutchen cited two equitable doctrines. The common fund doctrine provides that if an attorney recovers monies on behalf of third parties, then the attorney’s fees should be paid from the recovery. The double recovery doctrine permits insurers to recover expenses only from any excess that the insured obtains through a private claim over the insured’s total loss. The U.S. Airways health care plan required participants “to reimburse [U.S. Airways] for amounts paid for claims out of any monies recovered from [the] third
Based on this language, U.S. Airways sought to recover the entire amount it had paid for the participant’s medical expenses even though the participant still had not been made whole and the participant would have to pay out-of-pocket the attorney’s fees associated with the settlement.314

The Supreme Court used a contract analysis to find that the plan’s language precluded application of the double recovery doctrine and remanded for a determination of whether the language also negated the common fund doctrine.315 According to the Court: “Courts construe ERISA plans, as they do other contracts, by ‘looking to the terms of the plan’ as well as to ‘other manifestations of the parties’ intent.’ ”316 The U.S. Airways decision has important implications for plan terms in addition to those that permit plans to recover medical benefits. As we will explain in the next section, the Supreme Court’s decision implies that a plan may enforce any written terms that are not directly inconsistent with ERISA’s requirements, suggesting few legal limits on onerous plan terms.

4. Benefit Structures—Different Benefits for Different Participants

Since at least 1964, the United States has expanded federal statutory prohibitions against workplace discrimination.317 ERISA, however, continues to permit employers to engage in arbitrary line drawing among employees with respect to their benefit eligibility.318

The plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine typically protects an employer’s right to distinguish among employees so long as the line drawing is not in direct conflict with ERISA or IRC

313. Id. at 1543 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
314. See id.
315. Id. at 1551.
317. See generally Anastasia Niedrich, Removing Categorical Constraints on Equal Employment Opportunities and Anti-Discrimination Protections, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 25 (2011) (discussing the development of federal discrimination law, particularly Title VII). The statement that protections have expanded since 1964 is not to imply that the authors believe discrimination protections are sufficient. See id. at 50–73 (discussing issues with relying on categories to define those entitled to protections).
318. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 319–36.
requirements or federal nondiscrimination provisions, such as that of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

Not surprisingly then, participants have been unsuccessful with allegations that employers breached their fiduciary duty by adopting plan amendments that draw distinctions perceived as unfair by some participants. One employer adopted a plan amendment that granted early retirement benefits to a handful of recently laid-off employees. The employer did not extend those benefits to other similarly, but not equivalently, situated laid-off employees. Because the employer amended the plan to provide the benefits to the subgroup of former employees, the benefit change was a settlor decision and not subject to fiduciary challenge. This is the type of plan amendment that T&B arguably could have adopted in Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., where it denied severance benefits to certain employees who refused to relocate. If T&B had taken the approach of formally amending its plan, the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine would have applied. The outcome of the case would have been unchanged—T&B’s actions would have been valid settlor actions. Another court confirmed that an employer’s amendment of its severance pay plan to eliminate benefits for employees who refused to join a successor employer was a settlor act even though it was taken in conjunction with the employer’s sale of a business unit to that successor employer. Consider the selling employer’s two-fold conflict of interest. First, the amendment decreased the amount of severance benefits that employer owed. Second, that employer could demand a higher price for the business unit because of the increased likelihood that the successor employer would be able to retain the unit’s workforce. Yet the employer’s conflict of interest played no role in assessing the employer’s obligation; the employer acted as a settlor when it amended the plan. Spink and Hughes are variations on this theme, with the employers using the plan amendments to facilitate downsizing.

321. Schultz v. Windstream Commc’ns, 600 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 2010).
322. Id. at 952.
323. Id. at 952.
324. 188 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999). Noorily is discussed supra at text accompanying notes 177–85.
325. Campbell v. BankBoston, 327 F.3d 1, 6–7 (1st Cir. 2003).
326. See id.
327. See supra text accompanying footnotes 129–41.
Broader scale changes to benefit plans also may affect various employee cohorts in different ways. For example, a significant number of plan sponsors with DB plans have converted those plans to cash balance plans. An understanding of the technicalities of those conversions is not necessary here. The point for this Article is that the conversions tend to defeat the benefit expectations of long- and middle-term service employees, leaving them disproportionately worse off than shorter service employees. Because the plan conversions are accomplished through the mechanism of a plan amendment, the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine protects them from fiduciary challenge.

ERISA and the IRC provide some limitations on employers’ ability to favor some employees over others in benefit plans. The IRS requirements limit the amount of benefits that can go to highly compensated employees as compared to nonhighly compensated employees. ERISA’s nondiscrimination provision, section 510, prohibits anyone, including an employer, from taking specified actions, such as termination of employment, against benefit plan participants in retaliation for exercising benefit rights or in order to prevent them from becoming entitled to benefits. As a result, it is a violation of ERISA to fire an individual employee or the workforce at an entire plant in order to avoid the payment of benefits.

Although section 510 operates as a constraint on an employer’s ability to make business decisions, namely to make employment

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329. For an explanation of cash balance plans, see Employee Benefits Law, supra note 19, at 2-8.


331. Campbell, 327 F.3d at 6 (applying explicitly the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to amendment of a separation pay plan but implicitly also applying it to permit conversion of a traditional pension plan to a cash balance plan); see also Muir, supra note 7, at 214–16.

332. Moore, supra note 319, at 41-42.


decisions based on benefit plan costs, the settlor/fiduciary doctrine provides employers with another option: amend the plan to achieve the same result. For example, an employer reduced the lifetime cap in its health insurance plan from $1,000,000 to $5,000 for expenses related to AIDS shortly after learning that one of its employees had contracted AIDS. Because the reduction applied to all employees who might file AIDS-related claims, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the employer’s explanation that its motivation was to reduce the costs of its health care plan and that it was not impermissibly targeting the specific employee. This was almost certainly not entirely true, for it is obvious, at least to these authors, that other medical conditions could impose similarly devastating costs on the plan, yet the plan narrowly carved out expenses related to AIDS. The case might also be read to hold that a decision to amend the plan, no matter what the effect or intent, is simply not an action covered by section 510.

5. Fundamental Corporate Changes

When companies engage in fundamental corporate changes, such as mergers, acquisitions, or dispositions, those changes may result in modifications to benefit plans that affect an entire workforce or a subset of employees. The doctrinal results are similar to those discussed in the prior subsection. As evidenced in the case discussed in the next paragraph, courts may uphold an employer’s right, relying on the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, to amend plans in the context of fundamental corporate changes, even when a plan amendment makes arbitrary distinctions among employees or groups of employees. In other cases, courts categorize the employer’s decision as a business decision, and thus free of ERISA fiduciary constraints, even though that business decision may have significant effects on employee benefit plans.

In a case, Sengpiel v. B.F. Goodrich Co., that predated the Supreme Court’s Hughes decision, the Sixth Circuit decided that the

337. Id. at 405–08. The decision might be read as leaving open the question of whether using the amendment power to target a specific employee is a section 510 violation.
338. See, e.g., Renée M. Scire & Christopher A. Raimondi, Employment Benefits: Will Your Significant Other Be Covered?, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 357, 379 (2000) (“The cost of treating AIDS has fallen to approximately $100,000 per case, while the cost of treating a premature baby can rise as high as $1 million.” (citations omitted)).
339. See infra text accompanying notes 340–43.
340. 156 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 1998).
plan sponsor did not act as a fiduciary when it drew arbitrary distinctions among retirees as part of a spin-off.\textsuperscript{341} When B.F. Goodrich ("Goodrich") spun off its tire operations, the new entity assumed the pension and welfare benefit obligations for the active and retired employees of those operations.\textsuperscript{342} Goodrich transferred approximately forty-two percent of its headquarters retirees to the new pension and welfare benefit plans since the tire operations had constituted that percentage of Goodrich’s total operations.\textsuperscript{343} The company determined which retirees would be transferred by looking to the last four digits of their social security numbers.\textsuperscript{344} Those retirees with numbers ending in 4254 or lower were transferred, while those with higher numbers remained in the Goodrich plan.\textsuperscript{345}

Nine years later the company that had assumed the welfare benefit obligations of the retirees assigned to the spin-off reduced those retirees’ health and life insurance benefits.\textsuperscript{346} The retirees alleged, among other things, that Goodrich had violated its ERISA fiduciary obligations when it arbitrarily assigned retirees to the new entity.\textsuperscript{347} The Sixth Circuit rejected the retirees’ \textit{Varity Corp.}-based argument that assigning retirees to the transferred plans was a discretionary act of plan management or administration and, thus, a fiduciary act.\textsuperscript{348} According to the court, “the exercise of discretion alone”\textsuperscript{349} does not cause an act to be a fiduciary act. Instead, the plan sponsor’s acts must involve carrying out the plan purposes or discretion with respect to plan administration or management.\textsuperscript{350} The Sixth Circuit then opined that “the actions undertaken by [Goodrich] to implement its business decision were simply not the kind of plan management or administration that trigger ERISA’s fiduciary duties.”\textsuperscript{351}

More recent decisions have consistently upheld the right of employers to make decisions in the context of fundamental corporate changes free of ERISA’s fiduciary constraints, even where the decisions affect benefit plans. For example, when General Electric

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{341} Id. at 662–63.
  \item \textsuperscript{342} Id. at 663.
  \item \textsuperscript{343} Id. at 663–64.
  \item \textsuperscript{344} See id.
  \item \textsuperscript{345} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{346} Id. at 664.
  \item \textsuperscript{347} See id. at 665–66.
  \item \textsuperscript{348} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{349} Id. at 666.
  \item \textsuperscript{350} Id.
  \item \textsuperscript{351} Id.
\end{itemize}
Company ("GE") sold a defense division to Martin Marietta Corp., GE transferred pension assets from its overfunded DB plan to Martin Marietta’s DB plan to offset benefit promises Martin Marietta would make to the former GE employees it hired. Former GE employees brought a variety of fiduciary challenges related to GE’s transfer of those assets. One of those claims alleged that GE violated its fiduciary duty of loyalty to pension plan participants by transferring more pension assets than liabilities to Martin Marietta and, in return, getting a higher sale price for the division. According to the court, however, “GE’s decision to spin-off the division along with its pension plan was, at its core, a corporate business decision, and not one of a plan administrator, [therefore] GE was acting as a settlor, not a fiduciary, when it transferred the surplus to [Martin Marietta].”

6. Inadequate or Misleading Disclosures to Plan Participants

As explained above, the Supreme Court held in Varity Corp. v. Howe that the employer acted as a fiduciary, and not a plan sponsor, when communicating with employees about the benefits they could expect if they voluntarily transferred to a new subsidiary. In subsequent cases challenging the accuracy of communications, courts have typically followed Varity Corp. in holding that the communicator is a fiduciary so long as the communications are intentionally or closely connected to employee benefits. Where, however, the communications are more attenuated from employee benefit plans, courts may apply the business decision strand of the

353. Id.
354. Id. at 87.
355. Id. at 88; see also Hunter v. Caliber Sys., Inc., 220 F.3d 702, 719 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding decisions as to the staffing level needed to transfer plan assets and transferring plan assets as company stock to be business decisions).
358. See, e.g., Bouboulis v. Transp. Workers Union, 442 F.3d 55, 66 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that “if the plaintiffs can establish that [defendant] made intentional misrepresentations” about benefits, they would establish a fiduciary claim), dismissed on other grounds, No. 03 Civ. 0373 (SAS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74238, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2006); In re Gen. Growth Props., No. 08 CV 6680, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *27 (N.D. Ill. May 6, 2010) (“Communications are fiduciary in nature only if statements are ‘intentionally connected’ to benefits.”); see also In re Wachovia Corp. ERISA Litig., No. 3:09cv262, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79971, at *53 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 6, 2010) (citation omitted) (“In Varity Corp. v. Howe, the Supreme Court held that statements about a company’s financial condition become subject to ERISA’s fiduciary duties only if they . . . are intentionally connected to statements about a plan’s benefits.”).
settlor/fiduciary doctrine to determine that communications are not subject to ERISA’s fiduciary obligations.\footnote{359. See supra note 358 and accompanying text.}

For example, participants in one 401(k) plan alleged that public statements made by the company via a variety of fora, such as Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) filings and press releases, were misleading and in violation of fiduciary obligations owed by various individuals who were fiduciaries of the company’s 401(k) plan.\footnote{360. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *8–9.} The court decided, in what it believed to be the then-current trend, that SEC filings are made in a corporate capacity, not an ERISA fiduciary capacity, even though the plan incorporated the filings by reference.\footnote{361. Id. at *16; see also In re Citigroup ERISA Litig., No. 07 Civ. 9790, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78055, at *72–73 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2009) (“[E]merging case law makes clear that ‘those who prepare SEC filings do not become ERISA fiduciaries through those acts.’ “), aff’d, 662 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2011). But see Dudenhoeler v. Fifth Third Bancorp, 692 F.3d 410, 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (reviewing Sixth Circuit cases in which a majority “found that incorporation of SEC filings into plan documents is a fiduciary act”).} Similarly, the court rejected the claims based on some of the defendants’ public statements on the grounds that those statements also were made in a corporate capacity. According to the court: “Communications are fiduciary in nature only if statements are ‘intentionally connected’ to benefits.”\footnote{362. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *17. But see In re Sprint Corp. ERISA Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1227 (D. Kan. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss on basis that statements of CEO, board chair, president, and COO made in company newsletter to employees could be made in fiduciary capacity); Stein v. Smith, 270 F. Supp. 2d 157, 173–74 (D. Mass. 2003) (holding that employees may be able to show that six communications by the CEO to employees explaining the company’s general economic position were made wearing a fiduciary hat).}

The court also determined that employees who held company stock in the 401(k) plan did not have any right to disclosures about the company’s allegedly “precarious financial condition and the real risk that it might collapse under the weight of its reckless business practices.”\footnote{363. Gen. Growth Props., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44234, at *28–29.} The court noted that the defendants’ nondisclosure was a “byproduct of keeping such information from creditors and competitors.”\footnote{364. Id. at *31–32.} And, requiring such disclosures to plan participants could “distur[b] the carefully delineated corporate disclosure laws.”\footnote{365. Id.}
7. Claims Processing and Review

While ERISA does require that a plan have a full and fair review process, the statute itself does not specify the requirements for such a review process. In addition, ERISA does not include a statute of limitations for benefit claims. The DOL has partly filled the first gap by promulgating regulations on the meaning of full and fair review, and the courts have filled in the second gap by holding that comparable state limitations periods and federal tolling principles control. Some plans, however, have sought to vary the limitations period and to augment the regulations with specific plan provisions. In 2013 the Supreme Court considered the issue where an employer’s disability plan required that a claimant file a disability proof of claim within three years of “the time written proof of loss is required to be furnished according to the terms of the policy.” But for the plan provision, the statute of limitations would not have been triggered until the plan denied the claim. The Court unanimously held that the terms of the plan were enforceable.

In sum, this Part explains that the courts’ application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine can be divided into two major strands: the plan structure strand and the business decision strand. After establishing the basic parameters of the two strands, the Part enumerates a wide variety of employee benefit situations to which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine applies. The next Part shows that this central doctrine that crosses so many areas of employee benefits plans is inconsistent at times with ERISA’s complex statutory provisions and policy compromises.

III. CRITIQUE OF THE SETTLOR/FIDUCIARY DOCTRINE

The settlor/fiduciary doctrine draws a formal distinction between business and fiduciary conduct. ERISA applies to the latter conduct but not the former, which because of ERISA preemption is ordinarily subject only to specific ERISA constraints on plan design in areas

370. See id. at *12–13.
371. Id. at *30.
such as vesting and benefit accrual. Business conduct affecting employee benefit plans can be separated into two strands: (1) conduct involving the design and termination of plans (traditional settlor functions) and (2) traditional business decisions.

Both the Supreme Court and the DOL have identified three areas of conduct that are conclusively settlor functions: adopting a plan, amending a plan, and terminating a plan. We can simplify these three by noting that, in a system of voluntary benefit plan sponsorship, adoption of a plan is by definition a voluntary, unreviewable action and that is obvious and noncontroversial. But the acts of adopting a plan, amending a plan, and terminating a plan share functional DNA, for each is a formal mechanism by which an employer implements or alters or ends a plan’s written design, which includes the definition of plan benefits, the conditions for benefit eligibility, and the prerogatives and responsibilities of the plan sponsor and the plan’s participants. One can say, then, that settlor functions are in essence actions that implement two sets of choices: first, the binary choice of having a plan or not having a plan (which is effected through plan adoption and through plan termination); and second, the almost infinite number of choices that shape a plan’s design (which is effected through both plan adoption and through plan amendment). Under the plan structure strand of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, these choices belong to the employer and are neither constrained by, nor subject to review under, ERISA’s fiduciary rules.

Committing these functions to the business rather than fiduciary judgment of the plan sponsor has considerable surface appeal. On an abstract level, it reflects the business autonomy of the employer in a system that makes entry into the system voluntary. It allows the employer to consider business purposes and business goals in its plan-related decisions. And on a practical level, it often, if not generally, provides an easy, mechanical test to demarcate conduct subject to ERISA’s fiduciary rules. Moreover, for the overwhelming number of events in the life of a plan, the settlor/fiduciary distinction produces outcomes that are unequivocally correct, events that neither cause controversy nor produce litigation.

372. See supra text accompanying notes 64, 73–75.
374. See supra Part II.A.
In this section of the Article we review some problems with the doctrine, problems that we foreshadowed in the Article’s earlier sections. These problems are significant enough to suggest that the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has not served the statute well, in large measure because it obscures difficult policy judgments, creates structural problems in the statutory architecture, and has unintended consequences in a surprising array of situations. Moreover, as we have already discussed, the scope of the doctrine is blurry at its edges, undermining one of the appealing aspects of the doctrine: the ease of application suggested by a superficial examination of its focus on plan adoption, amendment, and termination.

The fact that a doctrine produces problems, even serious problems, is not, of course, a condemnation of the courts and agencies that developed it if the doctrine was compelled, or at least strongly implied, by the statute’s language and structure. Thus, in this section, we also critique the statutory basis for the doctrine. Our conclusion is that, while the statute did imply a version of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, the Supreme Court’s expansive and rigid iteration of the doctrine was inconsistent with the statute’s structure and not compelled by the statute’s language.

A. Problems with the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine

We have already suggested through specific contexts that the settlor/fiduciary distinction, at least as interpreted by the federal courts, is not entirely free of problems. In this section, we attempt to identify the central concerns that we have with the doctrine, essentially moving from the specific to the general. We have grouped our concerns into three categories: (1) concerns related to employee expectations; (2) concerns related to undermining ERISA protections; and (3) concerns related to the creation of regulatory voids, particularly in welfare plans.

We want to make four initial points, however, before proceeding to these concerns.

First, as we have already observed, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea of an employee as co-settlor of an employee benefit plan, even when the plan itself was funded primarily (and we assume even if it were funded exclusively) by voluntary employee contributions. To us, the result in a case such as Jacobson v. Hughes seems unjust, but this is our subjective sense of fair play speaking.

375. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court’s position that a plan participant is, in essence, contracting for a specific benefit and not for a right to the underlying plan assets is a plausible overlay to the statute, particularly in the type of plan in which the ultimate risk of underfunding falls, at least nominally, on the employer. Besides, a workable contrary rule—that the fiduciary must consider and balance the competing interests of employer and employee—would be difficult to fashion and difficult for both fiduciaries and courts to apply. Thus, for purposes of this section, we do not list failure to consider the employee as co-settlor as a concern.

Second, accepting the notion that the employee is not a settlor does not mean, however, that we reject the interests of plan participants as a legitimate policy and statutory concern, particularly in three contexts. First, one of ERISA’s central themes is that the employee should be able to rely (or at least reasonably rely) upon the promises contained in an employee benefit plan and that the plan should provide sufficient information for the employee to understand what is promised and what is not promised. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine sometimes allows the employer to change or abandon promises midstream, and this, in our view, can be problematic in some situations—for example, when employees had a reasonable reliance interest on the promise. Second, ERISA is intended to protect employee interests through its fiduciary rules, through its enforcement provisions, and through its substantive standards. The settlor/fiduciary doctrine is problematic to the extent that it allows the employer to reduce these intended statutory protections for participants in employee benefit plans. Third, the settlor function should not shield the employer from misleading the employees. While the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. held that the employer could not deliberately mislead employees, the settlor/fiduciary function would allow the employer to amend the plan and not inform employees of the potentially adverse impact of the amendments on them. We return to this problem in the concluding section of the Article.

376. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.
377. This is an issue that in an ideal world Congress might want to consider.
378. John Langbein and Daniel Fischel have argued that trust law is an awkward legal framework for employee benefit plans. Trust law was developed in the context of private, donative trusts, which were traditionally irrevocable and where the settlor was in any event often deceased. See Fischel and Langbein, supra note 2, at 1105.
379. See supra notes 63–79 and accompanying text.
380. See supra notes 181–96 and accompanying text.
Our third preliminary point relates to the lack of clarity in parts of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine and the difficulty this poses for courts. Although the settlor/fiduciary doctrine is often easy to apply, we have noted two areas in which courts have experienced difficulty and in which they will likely continue to have difficulty: first, in distinguishing settlor decisions from implementation decisions and, second, in determining when the employer is acting in a nonfiduciary capacity outside orthodox settlor functions (adopting, amending, or terminating a plan). This includes situations in which the plan sponsor takes actions equivalent to a plan amendment and situations in which the sponsor acts in its business rather than settlor capacity.\(^{381}\)

These parts of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine may pose difficulties for courts and plan administrators, but any limitations on the scope of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine will pose difficulties, so this does not seem grounds to object to the doctrine itself. Indeed, in the final section of this Article, in which we suggest judicial strategies to limit some of the problems of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, we focus on how these judicial limitations might be usefully adapted to address concerns about the doctrine’s problems.

Fourth, the policy concerns justifying the settlor/fiduciary doctrine—that in a voluntary pension system employers will not play unless they have considerable flexibility—has considerably more resonance in a defined benefit world, where the employer bore heavy risks: inflation risk, longevity risk, investment risk, and balance-sheet risk. Managing those risks justifies giving employers reasonable flexibility, which the fiduciary/settlor doctrine accommodates. As we have moved to a defined contribution world where those risks have either been shifted to plan participants or dissipated, the policy underpinnings of the doctrine are considerably weaker.\(^{382}\)

1. Formalism, Contracts of Adhesion, and Employee Expectations

The difference between pension as contract and pension as gratuity has been a theme of employee benefits law for more than a century, and ERISA is sometimes reckoned to be the culmination of an evolutionary move from employee benefit plan as gratuity to employee benefit plan as contract.\(^{383}\) There are, of course, some conceptual problems with the contract paradigm because employee
benefit plans are typically not the bilateral product of active bargaining by the parties but rather are drafted by the employer without direct, and certainly not individual, negotiation with the employees. The resulting issues are not unique to employee benefit plans; they are common to all contracts of adhesion. And by the time ERISA had evolved, concerns about contracts of adhesion were addressed judicially by a common-law approach favoring the consumer over the drafter in matters of interpretation and administratively by the adoption of particular statutory measures to counter unambiguous contractual provisions that violated public policy.384

ERISA did include minimum standards for pension plans,385 which can be likened to the legislative approach to limiting contracts of adhesion, but federal courts have been resistant to adopting modes of contractual interpretation to ERISA plans that construed plan provisions in favor of the plan participants—i.e., the consumer.386

Employee benefit plans generally include two types of clauses that exploit this judicial reluctance to construe pension plans as contracts of adhesion: reservation of rights clauses and clauses providing plan administrators with discretionary interpretative authority over the contract. The discretionary clauses shield an administrator’s contractual interpretations from the de novo judicial review accorded to most contracts that arise from bilateral bargaining.387

In effect, these clauses, which are design clauses that appear in the plan document either at initial adoption or plan amendment, turn the normal judicial approach to interpreting unilateral contracts on its head. The plan sponsor is bound by nothing that is not mandated by ERISA’s minimum standards; a reservation of rights clause388 allows

385. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 384 and accompanying text.
388. See, e.g., Windstream Corp. v. Da Gragnano, No. 13-1723, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12810, at *8 (8th Cir. Apr. 16, 2014) (referring to a variety of plan-related documents containing “reservation of rights clauses securing the company’s right to modify the retiree health benefits plan”).
an employer to make virtually any changes to a plan that are not expressly prohibited by the statute’s minimum standards. If the employer neglects to reserve its rights in the initial plan document, it may subsequently amend the plan to do so under the Supreme Court’s Curtiss-Wright decision. Thus, courts have permitted an employer to amend a plan that had provided for employees to receive any surplus assets on plan termination to provide that the surplus assets would go to the employer,\textsuperscript{389} to amend a retiree health care plan that provided lifetime health benefits to a plan that did not,\textsuperscript{390} or to amend a health care plan to cap at a low-dollar-level AIDS benefits, which resulted in a loss of benefits to an employee who, while covered by the plan, contracted AIDS.\textsuperscript{391} In contracts of adhesion outside the judicial arena for employee benefits, courts typically would have used an interpretative framework far less tolerant of the reserved rights of the contract’s drafter to upset the contract’s original provisions or ignore the probable understanding of the contract’s terms to the nondrafting party.

Indeed, an employer’s broad “settlor” privileges arguably prevent the employer and employee from contractually agreeing to any benefits that are not expressly identified and protected by a specific provision in the statute, because the employer would always retain the right to amend the plan. This would be a peculiar result in a statute that requires a written contract and elaborate disclosure to ensure the satisfaction of a plan’s contractual obligations to its participants.

Clauses that give the plan administrator, who is generally an alter-ego of the employer, authority to interpret plan language, are also treated differently from the way similar clauses in contracts of adhesion are typically handled by state courts: some courts will simply ignore such language and others will limit its reach to interpretations that do not favor the contract’s drafter.\textsuperscript{392} Increasingly, states are


\textsuperscript{390} See generally Janilyn S. Brouwer, Retiree Health Benefits: The Promise of a Lifetime?, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 985 (1990) (discussing the legal theories on which various cases have been litigated).

\textsuperscript{391} McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 403 (5th Cir. 1991).

incorporating bans on discretionary clauses in state insurance law.\(^{393}\)

As noted above,\(^ {394}\) this approach has limited effect because most employees with ERISA-governed health care plans are in self-insured plans that are exempt from state law.

Courts\(^ {395}\) and commentators\(^ {396}\) may justify broad “settlor” powers to override employee expectations because of Congress’s concern about employers’ willingness to offer employee benefit plans\(^ {397}\) if the law narrowed those powers. But this is a variation of an argument that can be made against almost any type of consumer protection, whether legislatively or judicially crafted: such protections will increase costs or decrease choices to the consumer. The overarching theme of ERISA was to protect reasonable employee benefit expectations\(^ {398}\) and Congress implicitly recognized that this would at the margins increase employer cost and willingness to sponsor plans.\(^ {399}\) Allowing the employer, the drafter of the contract, unchecked and unreviewable power of contract modification and broad discretion to interpret contested contractual terms or facts relating to eligibility, seems to us inconsistent with the statutory framework that Congress adopted in ERISA.\(^ {400}\)

394. See supra note 75.
395. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp. Secs., Derivatives & ERISA, 284 F. Supp. 2d 511, 676 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (“The settlor function protection was created to encourage employers to establish plans.”).
396. See, e.g., Kathryn J. Kennedy, *The Perilous and Ever-Changing Procedural Rules of Pursuing an ERISA Claims Case*, 70 UMKC L. REV. 329, 331–32 (2001) (“As these employee benefit plans are voluntary in nature, the courts have been cognizant of the plan sponsor’s settlor rights in the drafting, amending, and termination of such plans.”); Medill, supra note 304, at 919–20 (“The policy purpose behind the settlor function doctrine is to encourage employers voluntarily to sponsor benefit plans by preserving the autonomy of the employer to make decisions concerning the benefits offered to employees based upon the nature of the employer’s business, budget, and workforce.”).
397. See, e.g., LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assoc., 552 U.S. 248, 259 (2008) (Roberts, C.J. and Kennedy, J., concurring) (referencing statutory provisions to “encourage employers and others to undertake the voluntary step of providing medical and retirement benefits to plan participants”).
398. See, e.g., ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to protect . . . the interests of participants in employee benefit plans . . . .”).
399. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
400. This is not to say that the employer should be locked into a nonamendable framework; employers require flexibility to change plan terms and benefits. Thus, we are not critical of an employer’s ability to change plan terms, only that the power to amend is unchecked by fiduciary restraints in all situations.

ERISA sets minimum standards for pension plans (and federal law sets some standards for health care plans), imposes strict duties on those who are fiduciaries under the statute, provides an enforcement scheme that is intended to provide “ready access to the Federal courts,” and prohibits any person from interfering with the attainment of benefits under a plan. Yet in numerous cases the courts have allowed plan sponsors to use the settlor/fiduciary doctrine to dilute or negate statutory requirements. In our view, this is problematic: there would have been little reason for Congress to create requirements if the plan sponsor could choose to ignore them in certain situations.

We offer a partial catalog of some of the ways in which the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has trumped statutory requirements:

(i) Use of plan assets for the benefit of the plan sponsor.

ERISA’s exclusive benefit rule and its prohibited transaction rules bar the employer from using plan assets for its own account. Thus, a plan sponsor could not, for example, use plan assets to settle a Title VII or torts claim brought by an employee. Moreover, it seems plain that a fiduciary could not condition payment of promised benefits on an employee releasing the plan sponsor from such claims. Yet in the second leg of the Supreme Court trilogy, Lockheed Corporation had conditioned an early retirement benefit on an employee’s waiver of all employment-based claims against the employer. The employee argued that this violated both ERISA’s prohibited-transaction rules and its duty-of-care rule. The Court, held, however, that the provision was one of plan design and thus not subject to the restraints on fiduciary behavior.

In principle, there does not seem to be a limit on the types of claims that the employee could be required to sign away. There also, in principle, does not seem to be any reason that the employer could

401. See supra notes 64–72 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
403. ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
404. See supra Part II.C.4.
405. See supra Part II.C (describing the application of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine).
406. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
408. Id. at 886.
409. Id. at 890–91.
not require the employee to waive future claims or, for that matter, to tattoo the corporate logo onto the employee’s forehead. Thus, the employer is able, in effect, to use plan assets for, in the words of the statute, its own account.

In *Lockheed*, the Court’s decision was sensitive to this point, to a point. The Court noted that the plaintiff had conceded that an employer could receive legitimate benefits from adopting a plan, including “attracting and retaining employees, paying deferred compensation, settling or avoiding strikes, providing increased compensation without increasing wages,” and inducing employees to decide to retire. The Court then wrote that “[w]e do not see how obtaining waivers of employment-related claims can meaningfully be distinguished from these [other] admittedly permissible objectives.” But there is, of course, a difference: the other objectives come about by sponsoring an employee benefit plan and the benefits the employer receives are incidental to the sponsorship of a benefits plan. Requiring the employee to waive claims against the employer is not merely incidental to the sponsorship of a plan. And we note that in *Spink*, the benefits were offered to a class of individuals. There is, however, no overriding limiting principle in ERISA that would prevent an employer from negotiating special benefits to induce a particular employee to settle a lawsuit or barter away other rights.

(ii) Selection of investment options in a self-directed defined contribution plan.

When a fiduciary selects investment options for the menu of a defined contribution plan, the choices are subject to ERISA’s fiduciary standards. If the plan specifies the investments, however, the investment menu would be a settlor decision under Supreme Court precedent, although the DOL has signaled that it believes the development of an investment menu is a fiduciary function, even if

410. *Id.* at 893.
411. *Id.* at 894.
412. *Id.* at 885.
413. There may be other constraints: for example, the nondiscrimination rules of the Internal Revenue Code would presumably make problematic a special benefit for a highly compensated employee if some nonhighly compensated employees did not also obtain the benefit. See, e.g., Moore, *supra* note 319, at 41–42. And, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 might in some situations make it unlawful to direct benefit improvements to a particular class of individuals. *Id.*
414. *See supra* note 263 and accompanying text.
effected through a plan amendment. In any event, as we will explain in the concluding section, the fiduciary would still be under an obligation to monitor the investment options and presumably to stop offering them if they were imprudent.

But as we have noted, the Seventh Circuit effectively held that a decision to offer a large array of funds was a settlor decision and that such a choice was inherently prudent. The irony here is that the Seventh Circuit decision will provide incentives to plan designers, at least in the Seventh Circuit, to choose a wide variety of funds to insulate plan officials from fiduciary liability, even though many commentators argue that a wide array of funds is not in the best interests of employees who do not have substantial experience in managing investments.

A similar dynamic comes into play when a plan selects a brokerage window. Arguably, a fiduciary that makes a decision to provide a brokerage window has an obligation to consider its value and cost to the plan population before selecting a window. But if the window is written into the terms of the plan, the decision to include it would be a settlor decision, even if the fiduciary believed it would be an attractive nuisance to many or even most employees.

415. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
416. See supra notes 269–76 and accompanying text.
418. See DEP’T OF LABOR, FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. No. 2012-02R, FEE DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE 23 (2012) (“[F]iduciaries of . . . plans with platforms or brokerage windows, self-directed brokerage accounts, or similar plan arrangements that enable participants and beneficiaries to select investments beyond those designated by the plan are still bound by ERISA section 404(a)’s statutory duties of prudence and loyalty to participants and beneficiaries . . . .”).
(iii) Discrimination by plan amendment.

Section 510 of ERISA makes it unlawful for any person to interfere “with the attainment of any right to which [a] participant may become entitled under the plan” 419 or under ERISA. Thus, an employer would violate section 510 if it fired an employee with an expensive medical condition to prevent the employee from obtaining benefits from an employer health plan. 420 But the employer’s amendment of the plan to eliminate payment for the particular medical condition afflicting the employee, or to amend the plan to eliminate coverage of the employee, is arguably a settlor decision and not actionable under ERISA. 421

(iv) Impeding access to the federal courts.

ERISA was intended to provide participants with ready access to the federal courts. 422 The statute imposes no amount-in-controversy thresholds and provides nationwide service of process and generous venue provisions. 423 While ERISA does not provide a statute of limitations for benefit claims, courts have incorporated state-law limitations periods, although claims accrual is determined under federal law. 424

Some plan sponsors have used their settlor role to constrict access to the federal courts by drafting plans to reduce the time in which participants can bring a civil action challenging a benefit denial. 425 Plans, particularly in the disability and health benefit areas, may include a plan-specific limitations period, which can be substantially shorter than applicable state limitations periods, which also can trigger the running of the limitations clock earlier than would be the case under federal claims accrual case law, and which can

420. See, e.g., Muir, supra note 28, at 241–42.
421. There is an oddity to this result because here a pure business decision to, for example, terminate the employee to prevent attainment of a benefit would violate ERISA section 510, but an amendment of a plan would not.
422. See ERISA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of this chapter to . . . provid[e] . . . ready access to the federal courts.”).
423. ERISA § 502(d), (e)(2), (f), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(d), (e)(2), (f).
424. See EMPLOYEE BENEFITS LAW, supra note 19, at 12-21 to -24.
result in claims accrual before the plan has formally and finally denied the claim. The Supreme Court recently upheld such a limitation.

The use of the settlor function to set accelerated limitations periods undercut the congressional goal of providing ready access to the federal courts. We note here that the Supreme Court has indicated that any plan-defined limitations period must be reasonable. It appears, however, that substantially accelerated limitations periods meet that requirement.

(v) Allowing a fiduciary to interpret legal requirements.

In *Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch*, the Supreme Court indicated that a plan could include a provision giving a fiduciary discretion to interpret plan terms, which limits the scope of subsequent judicial review to an arbitrary and capricious standard. In some cases, courts have held that this deferential standard of review can apply to a fiduciary’s interpretation of plan provisions incorporating legal requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.

For example, consider a Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision. The plan, as required by the Internal Revenue Code, included language providing for vesting on a partial termination of the plan. The plan administrator determined that there had been no plan termination when substantial percentages of the plan’s participants left service in each of two successive years. A class of participants brought a civil action, contesting the administrator’s

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426. See id. at 608.
427. Id.
428. Id. at 610.
429. Id. at 612 (noting that the claimant had about one year of the three-year limitation period after administrative resolution).
431. Id. at 111.
432. See infra notes 433–37.
434. Robinson, 164 F.3d at 984.
435. See id. at 983.
decision that there had not been a partial termination. Rather than
decide whether there had been a partial termination under the
applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, the panel limited
its review to whether the plan administrator’s determination had been
arbitrary and capricious and determined that it was not. It is
certainly questionable whether a plan provision should be able to
substitute a plan administrator’s legal interpretation of a statutory
requirement for a court’s interpretation.

(vi) Bypassing ERISA’s writing requirement.

ERISA straightforwardly requires employee benefit plans to be
written. Courts and commentators have explained this requirement
as necessary so that participants will understand the terms of the plan,
their rights, and their responsibilities. In addition, Treasury
regulations predating ERISA require that DB pension plans provide
definitely determinable benefits at retirement—that is, benefits that
can be determined under a plan formula. Pension plans would fail
the definitely determinable requirement, and other types of plans
arguably would fail the writing requirement if they provided that
benefit eligibility were entirely contingent on the discretion of the
employer to grant or determine the size of the benefit. But courts

436. See id.
437. Id. at 989.
439. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 83 (1995) (“In the
words of the key congressional report, ‘[a] written plan is to be required in order that
every employee may, on examining the plan documents, determine exactly what his
rights and obligations are under the plan.’ ” (emphasis added by the Court) (quoting H. R. Rep.
James E. Holloway, The ERISA Amendment Provision As a Disclosure Function:
Including Workable Termination Procedures in the Functional Purpose of Section
informational scheme that is created by disclosure and reporting requirements to apprise
plan participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations under benefit plans.”);
Medill, supra note 304, at 894–95 (“The purpose of the written plan document rule is to
provide assurance to participants that they may examine the plan document and know
with certainty their rights under the plan and who is responsible for operating the plan.”);
Frank P. VanderPloeg, Role-Playing Under ERISA: The Company As “Employer” and
441. See id.
442. See Bogan, supra note 387, at 684 n.246 (discussing the Solicitor General’s view
that “benefit denials based upon language giving the administrator unbounded
discretionary authority may be unreasonable and in bad faith”). But see Hamilton v. Air
Jamaica, Ltd., 945 F.2d 74, 75–76 (3d Cir. 1991) (reversing the district court’s holding that
have approved clauses in plans that give the employer the ability to designate who is entitled to a benefit. In the T&B case, for example, the plan provided that severance benefits would be paid only if “the terminating manager believes the granting of such pay is appropriate.” The eligibility terms for the benefit, then, were committed to the determination that they were “appropriate” in the subjective judgment of the terminating manager. The eligibility terms thus did not, in substance, appear in the plan. And as we noted earlier, the court held that the manager’s decision as to whether it was “appropriate” to pay benefits was made in a business rather than fiduciary capacity.

(vii) The decision to invest in employer stock.

A retirement plan invested in employer stock is rife with problems: it can leave employees with a risky, undiversified portfolio and it creates myriad conflicts of interest. Thus, ERISA limits a DB plan’s investment in employer stock to ten percent of its assets. However, a plan sponsor may design a plan to invest primarily in employer stock or sponsor a 401(k) plan. Some of the diversification rules are waived in each of those types of plans.

Thus, a settlor decision to design a plan primarily to invest in employer stock is, in essence, a decision to opt out of much of ERISA’s fiduciary rules. But unlike other problems identified in this section, Congress expressly authorized the plan sponsor to design a plan to be an ESOP and thus subject to a weaker fiduciary regime.

3. Settlor Decisions Exploiting Regulatory Vacuums

ERISA includes a field-occupying preemption provision preempting, with only limited exceptions, any state law that relates to an employee benefit plan. Thus, ERISA ousts states from

the plan violates the writing requirement if it makes the benefit contingent on the employer’s discretion).

444. Id. at 159.
445. Id. at 162.
449. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144; see Andrew Stumpff, Darkness at Noon: Judicial Interpretation May Have Made Things Worse for Benefit Plan Participants Under ERISA
regulating even those aspects of employee benefit plans that ERISA itself does not regulate.450

ERISA, from its 1974 origins, imposed various consumer-protection standards on the design of retirement plans, primarily in the areas of vesting and benefit accrual.451 And the statute did of course create fiduciary rules that applied to all benefit plans.452 But ERISA did not initially impose consumer protections on welfare benefit plans,453 although some protections were later added to federal law, most recently by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.454 But there remain large swathes of benefit topics that are not regulated by ERISA and cannot, because of ERISA’s sweeping preemptive reach, be regulated by the states.

This creates fertile ground for various problematic plan design features to take root, features that may violate state-federal consensus on legal behavior outside the arena of employee benefit plans. As discussed above, the Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to explore this issue in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, in which a plan participant challenged the validity and reach of a health care plan’s subrogation provision.455 The provision required the participant to reimburse the plan for medical expenses from any tort recovery.456

Notwithstanding the fact that some states would not have enforced any subrogation clause under a medical insurance policy457 and states consistently have refused to enforce a subrogation clause

than Had the Statute Never Been Enacted, 23 St. Thomas L. Rev. 221, 229 (2011) (“From the standpoint of a plan participant, ERISA’s preemption clause has for practical purposes indeed cleared the employee benefits field of state law.”).

450. There is an exception to ERISA preemption for state insurance laws, but the exception does not apply to plans that self-insure and applies only to laws that relate to insured plans, which do not, for example, include separate state regulation of claims procedures. See supra note 75 (discussing application of the insurance law exception).

451. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.

452. See supra Part I.B.

453. See supra text accompanying note 70.


455. 133 S. Ct. 1542, 1542–43 (2013). For more detailed discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying notes 305–16.

456. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct at 1543.

457. See Brief for Respondents at 52, U.S. Airways, Inc. v. McCutchen, 133 S. Ct. 1537 (2013) (No. 11-1285) (explaining that categorical bans of reimbursement have not caused insurers to refuse to issue coverage in states with those bans).
against a recovery without prior deduction for attorney’s fees,\(^{458}\) and notwithstanding that the subrogation rights claimed by the U.S. Airways plan exceeded the subrogation rights of the federal government for its payment of medical expenses under Medicare, Medicaid, and the Federal Employee’s Health Benefits Act,\(^{459}\) the Supreme Court ruled that nothing in ERISA prohibited or in any way limited a plan’s subrogation clause, which the Court equated to a contractual provision.\(^ {460}\) The majority, however, found that the subrogation clause in question was not sufficiently clear on whether attorney’s fees should first be deducted and was unwilling to interpret the clause in such an unnatural way in the absence of clearer language.\(^ {461}\)

Thus, the Supreme Court has provided that an ERISA plan can include and enforce a subrogation clause that neither the federal government nor any state would enforce as written. It is difficult to articulate a persuasive argument why employer-sponsored health care plans should be the only species of health care plan unaffected by a federal and state consensus that subrogation clauses in health care plans should be limited.

Settlor choices on plan design can also shield, or at least partly shield, medical professionals from state malpractice claims. In the case of \textit{Pegram v. Herdrich},\(^ {462}\) the Supreme Court ruled that a doctor for a health maintenance organization was not acting as a fiduciary when she made a mixed treatment/eligibility decision and thus a participant denied needed medical care had no action against the HMO.\(^ {463}\) But the decision was widely understood to mean that the participant could bring a state-law civil action for malpractice against the doctor and in some states perhaps against the HMO itself.\(^ {464}\) Plan sponsors, however, were able to find a plan design solution that protected both the physician and the HMO from liability by vesting the eligibility question to a plan official other than the treating physician; the plan official’s decision would be a plan benefit determination, subject to deferential review, and malpractice actions

\(^ {458}\). See id. at 26–27.

\(^ {459}\). See id. at 53.

\(^ {460}\). \textit{McCutch en}, 133 S. Ct. at 1548.

\(^ {461}\). \textit{Id.}

\(^ {462}\). 530 U.S. 211 (2000).

\(^ {463}\). \textit{Id.} at 237. For additional discussion of \textit{Pegram}, see supra text accompanying notes 288–96.

against the plan would be barred.\textsuperscript{465} The treating physician would be protected from medical malpractice since the decision to withhold or choose a less expensive method of treatment was made by the plan official rather than the treating physician. Thus, through the settlor function, HMOs are able to insulate themselves and their physicians from certain types of malpractice claims.\textsuperscript{466}

In principle, we see no reason why HMOs, insurance companies, and self-insured plans could not further insulate physicians from malpractice claims by including clauses in the plan that participants agree not to bring a malpractice action against a physician for ordinary negligence, or not to seek punitive damages, or to forego judicial resolution of malpractice claims in favor of binding arbitration. Such plan provisions would pose challenging preemption questions if a state found them against public policy, for such provisions would certainly reduce plan costs and state failures to respect them thus would seemingly be related to an employee benefit plan. While we are not aware of such clauses today, we would be mildly surprised not to see them in the future.

\textbf{B. The Statutory Basis for the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine}

In this subsection we consider a question of textual analysis: whether ERISA’s language and structure compel the expansive scope that the Supreme Court gave to the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. This question has implications beyond its inherent academic interest, because the answer bears at least somewhat on the ability of the courts to rein in the doctrine without legislative modification of the statutory language.

As we earlier observed, the first reference to the settlor/fiduciary distinction occurred in a 1986 DOL letter to a prominent private attorney concerning whether a decision to terminate an overfunded DB plan (which enabled the employer to recover plan’s assets in excess of plan liabilities) was subject to ERISA’s fiduciary regime.\textsuperscript{467} If it were, the employer’s decision to terminate the plan—at least a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{465} See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 221 (2004) (holding that ERISA preempts malpractice claims against HMOs when a nontreating physician makes a benefit eligibility decision).
  \item \textsuperscript{466} The \textit{Davila} Court’s holding distinguished \textit{Pegram}, noting that the treating physician’s mixed eligibility/treatment decision was not a fiduciary decision and could be subject to a state malpractice action. 542 U.S. at 218. We note that it is possible to read \textit{Davila} to allow a physician to make an eligibility determination as a plan fiduciary rather than as a physician (such as whether a treatment is experimental), but this is not clear.
  \item \textsuperscript{467} Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, \textit{supra} note 114.
\end{itemize}
termination with an asset reversion to the employer—almost certainly would have violated the statute, since it would be difficult to argue that the decision to recover surplus assets was made in the exclusive interest of the plan’s participants. The Department held that it was not, “in light of the voluntary nature of the private pension system governed by ERISA.” The Department wrote that it had “concluded that there is a class of discretionary activities which relate to the formation, rather than the management, of plans. These so-called ‘settlor’ functions include decisions relating to the establishment, termination and design of plans and are not fiduciary activities subject to Title I of ERISA.” The Department, then, did not base its rationale solely, and seemingly not even primarily, on the statutory language defining fiduciary, but rather based the decision on the foundational structure of employer benefits regulation under the statute: the decision to adopt, amend, or terminate a plan is a voluntary employer decision and must be so in a system where plan sponsorship is voluntary.

The letter, perhaps significantly, also left room to pull back at least somewhat from the idea that every decision made in a settlor capacity is exempt from ERISA’s fiduciary regime. The DOL letter stated that the “decision to terminate is generally not subject to the fiduciary responsibility provisions of ERISA,” which suggests that the Department was reserving flexibility to subject some plan termination decisions (and other settlor decisions) to the statute’s fiduciary regulation if policy or other prudential concerns arose in the future that warranted it.

In contrast to the DOL, the Supreme Court has “rooted” its version of the distinction “in the text of ERISA’s definition of fiduciary,” which provides that

a person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposition of its

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468. Id.
469. Id.
470. The statute expressly provides for reversion and gives employers the authority to terminate a sufficiently funded plan. ERISA § 4041, 29 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).
471. Letter from Kass to Erlenborn, supra note 114 (emphasis added). Of course, it is possible that this potential limitation on the Department’s view of the doctrine’s contours results from less than fully attentive drafting, but the letter on the whole appears to have been carefully composed.
assets . . . or (iii) he has any discretionary responsibility in the administration of such plan.473

In its Spink decision, the Court held that the act of amending a plan is not a discretionary administrative or managerial act and thus that ERISA fiduciary standards do not apply to plan amendments.474

The statutory language, however, did not mandate this result and could have been interpreted in less absolutist terms. We do not attempt here to develop the “correct” interpretation of the statutory definition of fiduciary, because the words of the definition, and how the definition is situated within the structure of the statute, do not lead inexorably to a single correct interpretation. The correct interpretation, in such circumstances, is of course the interpretation that the Supreme Court crafts. In this section, we suggest only that the Supreme Court’s categorical determination that a person who designs a plan can never be a fiduciary was not inevitable and that the statute was susceptible to interpretations that would have permitted some judicial flexibility to treat plan amendments as fiduciary actions. These interpretations include the following:


In its Spink decision, the Supreme Court held that “amending or terminating a plan . . . cannot be an act of plan ‘management’ or ‘administration.’ ”475 “The Court observed that the plan was like a trust and a fiduciary akin to a trustee, who was to administer the plan in accordance with the plan documents, just as a trustee was to administer a trust in accordance with trust documents.476 But the statute does not require that reading. The statutory definition of fiduciary provides four circumstances in which a person is a fiduciary—one of which is exercising discretionary control or authority respecting the management of the plan, and a second is having discretionary control or authority in the administration of the plan.477 The statute, then, recognizes a difference between plan management and plan administration, but the Court’s opinion does

475. Id. at 890 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 505 (1996)).
476. See id.
not explore the statutory distinction or whether an amendment can ever be an act of plan management even if not an act of plan administration.

(2) Management or Disposition of Plan Assets.

The definition of fiduciary also provides that a person is a fiduciary to the extent that he exercises any authority or control over the management or disposition of plan assets. In a funded plan, an amendment or plan design feature will often affect the disposition or investment of plan assets. And in an unfunded plan, certain plan amendments—such as the selection of a named plan fiduciary or the selection of a closed panel HMO—will affect the disposition of plan assets and seem literally to be covered by the ERISA definition of fiduciary.

(3) Investment Direction Through Plan Amendment.

A person who provides investment advice to a plan is a fiduciary under the statute’s definition. But under the Supreme Court’s doctrine, if the investment advice is given to the plan settlor to help the settlor design the plan and the advice is incorporated into the plan design, the person who gave investment advice presumably would not be a fiduciary, for the investment advice would not be given to the plan but rather to the plan settlor. There is little reason, though, to differentiate between investment advice given to a plan designer, which would then become part of the plan document, and investment advice given to a fiduciary, which would implement the plan’s

479. The Court focused on the difference between welfare and retirement plans, although its intent seemed to be to distinguish between funded and nonfunded plans. See Spink, 517 U.S. at 890–91.
481. See supra text accompanying note 414–15 (discussing the Supreme Court’s distinction between plan design and fiduciary behavior).
investment function. If functionally the advice to shape an investment menu is the same whether given to the designer of a plan document or to the plan fiduciary, they should presumably be treated the same under ERISA’s fiduciary regulation. And if investment advice to the plan designer should make the advisor a fiduciary, then the plan designer who receives the advice and adopts a particular investment structure should presumably also be a fiduciary, in the same way that a plan official implementing investment advice would be a fiduciary.

We reiterate that we are not contending that the Supreme Court’s take on the scope of fiduciary activity is implausible or that a more expansive interpretation of fiduciary activity is more closely aligned with the statutory language. We are contending only that a more expansive interpretation was also plausible.\footnote{482} Nor are we suggesting that a more expansive interpretation would have been easier for courts to apply. Indeed, as we noted at the start of this Article, one of the virtues of the Supreme Court trilogy is that it is an easy doctrine for courts to apply. It has the simplicity and predictability of a simple chemical reaction.

A more expansive doctrine would have produced more hard cases, cases whose resolution would have required nuanced doctrine and judicial judgment. In their 1988 article, Professors Fischel and Langbein nominated the trust principle of impartiality as a “likely doctrinal rubric”\footnote{483} for resolving questions involving competition among classes of participants, or among participants and plan sponsors, for finite trust resources. In the authors’ view, courts also could have developed a doctrine that applies fiduciary analysis to plan design decisions that are functionally equivalent to management or administrative activities (for example, the selection of a menu of investments or the appointment of a named fiduciary seem clear examples of plan management decisions, whether made in designing a plan or in implementing a plan provision giving a fiduciary the responsibility to make those decisions). And courts could have focused on the statute itself, cordonning off from fiduciary analysis aspects of plan design that the statute expressly places in the ambit of employer discretion—for example, establishing a plan designed to invest in employer stock or a pension plan that provides that an employer can recover surplus plan assets on termination of the plan.

\footnote{482. Some lower courts—including in Hughes and Spink—did have a more expansive view of fiduciary action. See supra text accompanying notes 129, 143–44.}
\footnote{483. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1107.}
Decisions in individual cases would have been tougher under a less rigid settlor/fiduciary distinction, but the decision making would have focused on statutorily relevant substance rather than on a purely formalistic inquiry. And the concerns we have about future developments in plan design and employee benefits law would have been more modest if the Supreme Court had constructed a less rigid divide between settlor and fiduciary functions.

IV. PRUNING BACK THE DOCTRINE

The settlor/fiduciary doctrine operates mechanically and largely lacks nuance. It has no obvious brake or governor on its excesses and accommodates, if not invites, sharp practices. It privileges formalism over substance, prevents certain types of contractual understandings, upsets Congressional policy judgments, effectuates conflicts of interest, ignores an important part of the economics of employee benefits, and undermines national consensus on some legal issues. To us, the problems with the doctrine have become more apparent with time, and we have little confidence that the doctrine will not result in the growth of new problematic issues unless it is trimmed back, either through judicially developed limitations on the doctrine’s scope (perhaps with a hand from the DOL) or through legislative modification of the statute itself.

The prospects for either approach may not be promising. Given that there are no interest groups currently lobbying for legislative redesign of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine and that if such a group improbably appeared it would almost certainly be met by a resolute and well-heeled pension industry that has a strongly focused interest in retaining the doctrine in its broadest form, amendment of the statute to reshape the settlor/fiduciary doctrine seems unlikely, particularly in an era marked by legislative gridlock. If legislative change comes, it is likely to come in the shape of targeted provisions to address specific issues, as occurred, for example, in the late 1980s, when Congress created limitations on the ability of employers to access surplus assets on the termination of a DB plan\footnote{See, e.g., Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 2005(c)(1), 102 Stat. 3342, 3611–12.} or in 2006 when Congress added some legislative protections for participants during a conversion of a traditional DB plan to a cash balance plan\footnote{See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280 § 701, 120 Stat. 780, 982, 985, 992.}.

It would not surprise us, then, to see, for example, some additional
protections for participants affected by de-risking transactions, possibly in the form of additional disclosures. 486

Judicial revision of the doctrine may seem even more improbable than legislative modification, given the Supreme Court’s multiple pronouncements on the doctrine, which situate a mechanical and expansive version of the doctrine squarely in the statutory definition of fiduciary. Initially, then, there does not appear much room for doctrinal give, but we do have some reason for optimism. First, the doctrine could be limited collaterally, outside the language and structure of the ERISA fiduciary definition, by focusing on the statutory prohibition on enforcing a plan term that is inconsistent with the provisions of the statute, implementation of plan amendments and plan terminations, limits to ERISA’s preemptive reach, and development of a common law of ERISA. Second, some of the doctrine’s rigidity might be attributed to dicta in the Spink decision that did not distinguish between plan administration and plan management. 487 Giving content to the plan management component of ERISA’s fiduciary definition would provide room for some adjustment at the margins. Third, the Supreme Court has developed rigid doctrine on ERISA preemption and remedies only to retreat when the statute began producing outcomes divorced from the policies and concerns that seemingly undergird the statute and, arguably, from common sense. The Court has at least in one case signaled its willingness to follow a similar path with the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. 488

As we discuss, in turn, each of these potential judicial approaches to achieving a more nuanced interpretation of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, we link the approaches back to the three categories of concern we identified above in Part III. 489 Those categories are: (1) concerns related to employee expectations; (2) concerns related to undermining ERISA protections; and (3) concerns related to the creation of regulatory voids, particularly in welfare plans.

486. See supra text accompanying notes 239–43 (discussing de-risking transactions).
487. See supra text accompanying notes 129–37.
488. See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 515 (1996) (explaining that, although plaintiffs were limited in their menu of potential remedies under ERISA, granting plaintiffs a remedy was nonetheless “consistent with the literal language of [ERISA], the Act’s purposes, and pre-existing trust law”). For a discussion of Varity, see supra text accompanying notes 186–202.
489. See supra Part III.A.
A. Collateral Modification of the Settlor/Fiduciary Doctrine

We begin with the possibility of judicial modification of the doctrine itself, albeit through a collateral approach that would leave intact the Court’s grounding of the doctrine in ERISA’s statutory definition of fiduciary. Available in a variety of situations, the common thread of the collateral approach is that it would involve application of substantive ERISA provisions to set boundaries on the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. Its grounding in ERISA’s requirements means the approach could prevent the doctrine from being used to undermine ERISA’s substantive protections. Because of the range of ERISA’s substantive protections, the collateral approach may be the most useful of the three opportunities the courts have to reshape the boundaries of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine.

1. Prohibition on Enforcing a Plan Term Inconsistent with Statutory Provisions

It is the duty of a fiduciary to follow the terms of a plan document “insofar” as the document is “consistent with [the statute.]”490 This language, “consistent with [the statute],”491 could be restrictively read, as it generally seems to have been in settlor/fiduciary cases to date, to prohibit a fiduciary from enforcing a plan provision only if the term unequivocally violates another ERISA rule—for example, a vesting or accrual rule.492 Under this approach, a fiduciary may enforce a plan term if it arguably violates an ERISA general standard, such as the general fiduciary prudence standard,493 or if it violates the “full and fair review” requirement regarding participant claims,494 or the written plan requirement.495 Taking such an approach certainly has the virtue of allowing a fiduciary to follow plan terms without having to make difficult judgment calls on whether the plan conflicts with either ERISA’s fiduciary or nonfiduciary standards of behavior.

But this approach raises fundamental issues, for it permits a fiduciary to take actions pursuant to a specific plan provision even though the fiduciary’s actions might be imprudent or otherwise in violation of the statute if exercised pursuant to the fiduciary’s

491. Id.
492. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 64 (referring to ERISA’s vesting and accrual rules).
discretion or a less-specific grant of authority. For example, we have
already noted the tension that exists between the Department’s
1991 position that a person acts in a fiduciary capacity when the
person selects investments, “whether achieved through fiduciary
designation or express plan language,” and the Supreme Court’s
1999 Hughes opinion, which held that plan amendments are always
settlor actions and outside the ambit of fiduciary regulation. There
are at least two ways to bridge the tension, one using the collateral
limitation approach, which we discuss here, and a second that we will
discuss in the next subsection. The former approach would rely on the
duty of a fiduciary to discharge her duties “in accordance with the
documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such
documents and instruments are consistent with [the statute.]” If a
plan document specifies investment options that are imprudent or
that become imprudent over time, then a fiduciary implementing the
plan directions could not follow them without violating the fiduciary
duties of prudence and fealty to the exclusive interests of the
participant and beneficiaries of the plan. A problem remains,
however, in applying this concept to participant-directed 401(k) and
KSOP plans. Frequently, in those plans the only relevant fiduciary for
investment-related transactions is the entity that implements
participants’ investment directions. Those trustees are known as
directed trustees, and they only have obligations to evaluate the
prudence of investment options if they have nonpublic information
about the options or in other very limited circumstances when the
investment option consists of employer stock. Thus, typically even if
a plan’s investment menu becomes imprudent, the directed trustee
would not have any obligation, or even any ability, to take action to
remove the imprudent investment as a plan option. As a result, in
many plans relying on a fiduciary that implements plan directions to
identify and eliminate imprudent investments is not a viable option.

496. See supra text accompanying notes 114–35.
when it amended the terms of the Plan to include the retirement programs.”).
501. Id.
This understanding of ERISA's prudence requirement and the potential lack of any fiduciary to serve in that role provides a basis for courts to consider imposing a collateral limitation on the settlor/fiduciary doctrine in light of the prudence provision. Even conceding for purposes of argument that the initial selection constitutes a settlor decision when the investment menu is included in the plan terms, that only requires that the original choice of investments be outside the scope of fiduciary obligation. It need not undermine the ongoing fiduciary monitoring obligation inherent in the concept of prudence. Instead, courts could treat the plan sponsor as a fiduciary for the plan investment menu in all respects, including monitoring, other than the initial decision to include the menu in the plan terms.

We acknowledge that monitoring and determining the prudence of plan investment options will require difficult judgments by fiduciaries and courts. But, in the authors’ view the courts are well equipped to develop appropriate standards consistent with the statute and trust law underpinnings of ERISA's fiduciary obligations. And, in fact, these determinations will not be entirely new for either courts or fiduciaries. For example, courts have struggled to fashion appropriate standards to test when a fiduciary's purchase of employer stock pursuant to plan terms is imprudent (or violates the exclusive benefit rule).502 In developing standards for these cases, courts have worked to reconcile the competing dictates of prudence with the express statutory authorization of a plan designed to invest primarily in employer stock.503 They have held that a fiduciary is subject to a less probing ERISA prudence analysis when purchasing employer stock pursuant to a plan provision directing the fiduciary to do so.504 An alternative and more generally applicable approach may be to query whether the action would be permissible for a fiduciary granted maximum discretion under the plan. We note that such a test could be implemented through a mirror image in the fiduciary/settlor doctrine itself, in which a plan design feature would be a fiduciary act if it

503. Id.
504. See, e.g., Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 717 F.3d 1042, 1052 (9th Cir.), withdrawn and superseded on denial of reh'g en banc, 738 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2013) cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 134 S. Ct. 2870 (2014) (mem.); see also Taveras v. UBS AG, 107 F.3d 436, 445 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that if a reference to employer stock in plan terms was sufficient to give rise to the presumption of prudence, then the presumption would nearly always apply).
required a plan official to act in a way that would be impermissible if the plan official had merely been given broad discretionary authority.

In some circumstances, particularly those related to employee expectations, courts may look to the statute’s exclusive purpose obligation, which is often discussed in terms of the trust law concept of loyalty, to limit the settlor/fiduciary doctrine. In their seminal article, Professors Fischel and Langbein observed that loyalty in trust law typically requires a trustee to use the principle of impartiality to resolve opposing interests between trust beneficiaries. That approach could have significant power in resolving a variety of problems we observed earlier in this Article. For example, courts typically have applied the settlor doctrine to permit a plan sponsor to amend a health care plan, as happened in McGann, to eliminate a benefit of importance to one or a few employees. Instead, a court could collateral constraining the doctrine in light of both section 510’s prohibition on accomplishing the same outcome by firing the affected employees and the principle of neutrality embedded in section 510. Similarly, courts have permitted plan sponsors to convert DB plans to cash balance plans and include plan terms that impose wearaways with particularly harsh effects on the benefits of older and/or longer service employees. Here again, the obligation of loyalty, and through it impartiality, could require a more equitable distribution of the economic effects of the plan change on participants.

So far we have been discussing ways in which ERISA’s fiduciary standards might be interpreted to limit the scope of the settlor/fiduciary doctrine; other ERISA provisions might also be inconsistent with unquestioned adherence to terms of a plan. Cases such as Heimeshoff could be resolved by determining when a plan

505. Fischel & Langbein, supra note 2, at 1121.
506. See, e.g., McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407–08 (5th Cir. 1991) (permitting employer to eliminate AIDS-related coverage from its benefits plan shortly after plaintiff submitted AIDS-related claims, the Court noted “Congress did not intend that ERISA circumscribe employers’ control over the content of benefits plans they offered to their employees”).
508. See, e.g., Campbell v. BankBoston, N.A., 327 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2003) (permitting conversion to cash balance plan causing employee to lose $3,000 in benefits per year because the complaint was procedurally foreclosed); Tootle v. ARINC, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 88, 93 (D. Md. 2004) (permitting employer’s conversion of benefits plan to cash balance plan, resulting in declining benefit accrual rate as employee aged); see also Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp. 2d 812, 826 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (cash balance defined benefit pension plan did not violate ERISA pension age discrimination provision on ground that rate of benefit accrual declined with employee’s age).
provision violates the ERISA requirement that plans offer a full and fair review process for benefit denials. Plan provisions requiring a fiduciary to apply discretion (or to defer to the discretion of a nonfiduciary, as in Noorily) in determining eligibility for a benefit could be held to be in conflict with the requirement that a plan, and presumably its terms, be in a written document. Decisions on DB plan benefit structures and funding also could be reviewed in the context of ERISA’s requirements. For example, recall that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that adoption of a benefit structure that was so generous it caused the plan to become severely underfunded was a settlor action because the trustees amended the plan to specify the level of benefits. If the court had considered the collateral effects of either the fiduciary obligation of prudence or plan funding rules, the court may have drawn the settlor definition more narrowly.

A slightly different approach from relying on ERISA’s substantive provisions to cabin the settlor/fiduciary doctrine would be for courts to limit settlor functions to those that relate to benefits, benefit eligibility, and internal plan administration, but not matters that relate to judicial or executive branch oversight of plans. Under this view of the doctrine, for example, a plan provision could not reduce the time a participant would have to bring a civil action against a plan for benefits. Including such a provision in the plan document would not transform the decision into a fiduciary decision but rather would result in an unenforceable plan term.

This principle would also mean that plan terms could neither be used to limit participants’ remedies under ERISA nor to expand settlor remedies beyond those clearly enunciated in the statute. Determination of remedies, after all, is a prerogative of the judiciary and in some instances the administrative branch. Recall the recent Supreme Court decision in U.S. Airways v. McCutchen, where the Court addressed the question of whether a plan could preclude participants’ reliance on traditional equitable defenses to limit

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510. This may not be a problematic issue for the fiduciary, though, for presumably the fiduciary’s compliance with the plan terms, while perhaps challengeable in court, would presumably not result in fiduciary financial responsibility for a breach.

511. Noorily v. Thomas & Betts Corp., 188 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that an employer does not act as a fiduciary when designing, as opposed to administering, a benefits plan and that the employer has discretion in creating a plan “that furthers its business interests”).


remedies sought by the plan. 514 The essence of the Court’s decision was that, since ERISA does not prohibit plans from barring application of those equitable defenses, clear plan provisions excluding them would be enforceable. 515 However, the effect is to permit plan sponsors to rewrite ERISA remedies in their favor—a result surely not contemplated in the statute’s enactment.

2. Distinguishing Implementation from Design

The courts have already expressly identified one collateral limitation on settlor actions: the implementation of plan design features. 516 The “implementation” idea, though, is not so much a limitation on the settlor/fiduciary doctrine as it is a restatement of it: discretionary actions implementing plan provisions are fiduciary actions. The difficulty with this approach is twofold: first, in close cases, how do we demarcate where the plan design decision ends and implementation begins; and second, what does implementation entail?

We have already discussed the former in the context of the Supreme Court’s Beck decision, in which the Court held that under Title IV of ERISA the plan sponsor’s decision to terminate a plan was a plan design decision that required the purchase of annuities. 517 Ultimately, Beck teaches us that courts will need to make case-by-case determinations between plan design decisions and implementation decisions in close cases, although since Beck no close case has emerged. 518

The latter—what does implementation entail—also will require case-by-case determinations that intersect with the settlor/fiduciary doctrine in cases where conflicts of interest are particularly intractable. The application of ERISA’s fiduciary standards in these contexts is beyond the scope of this Article; however, it is useful briefly to illustrate the basic problem using de-risking transactions. One approach to de-risking, recall, occurs when a plan sponsor amends a plan to transfer benefit liabilities to an insurance company that distributes irrevocable annuity contracts to participants. 519

514. Id. at 1542.
515. Id. at 1551.
516. See supra text accompanying note 159.
518. In Varity, the Court found, or at least arguably found, that misrepresentations in a plan restructuring were part of the implementation of the plan restructuring. See supra text accompanying notes at 186–202 (discussing the Varity decision).
519. See supra text accompanying notes 239–43.
Another involves a plan sponsor’s amendment of a plan to allow a class of participants—generally among those participants who have already retired but sometimes also including former employees who have vested benefits—to elect a lump-sum payment in lieu of lifetime stream of income from the plan. 520 Both of these situations pose challenging implementation questions for a fiduciary, particularly since the plan sponsor’s settlor decisions in a de-risking are largely antithetical to the interests of the employees. How the courts and the DOL respond to these issues can either accentuate or minimize the harms that flow from the settlor decision to de-risk. Similarly, difficult considerations in application of fiduciary decision making arise in the context of ESOPs. For example, courts have struggled to define when payments in the nature of dividends or compensation rise to the level that they constitute a fiduciary breach. 521 This Article leaves those questions for another day.

3. Limiting ERISA’s Preemptive Reach

Finally, returning to the core principle that courts might constrain the settlor/fiduciary doctrine by considering the doctrine together with collateral statutory provisions, preemption may play an important role. This is especially true in the category of concerns we identified above related to the creation of regulatory voids, particularly in welfare plans. Again, though, there is a slight twist. Rather than a substantive ERISA provision limiting the doctrine, ERISA’s preemption provision would permit the application of state law. This could be most applicable in areas that are core areas of traditional state regulation, such as the regulation of medical providers.

In sum, if courts use collateral limitations based in ERISA’s substantive requirements to refine the scope of the settlor/fiduciary distinction, they will need to develop the case law on those requirements. And again, the task would not necessarily be an easy one. It would, however, help prevent plans from undermining ERISA protections that Congress included in the statute. In fact, statutory provisions are relevant to all three categories of concerns we

520. Any plan action to reduce its risk is a “de-risking” action. In addition to the two techniques discussed in the text, plan sponsors may take actions such as changing a plan’s investment strategy, their contribution patterns, etc. DAVID BUCK & JASON FLYNN, DELOITTE, CFO INSIGHTS: DE-RISKING PENSIONS: CAN IT BE DONE? 2–3 (2013), available at http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/finance-transformation/us-cfo-CFO-Insights-De-risking-pensions-01172013.pdf.

521. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 280–87.
identified above in Part III: (1) concerns related to employee expectations; (2) concerns related to undermining ERISA protections; and (3) concerns related to the creation of regulatory voids, particularly in welfare plans.

B. Treating Plan Management Decisions As Fiduciary Decisions

Rather than focusing on collateral limitations to cabin the settlor/fiduciary doctrine, an alternative approach would be for courts to acknowledge that some plan design decisions are, in fact, fiduciary decisions, pulling back from the rhetoric in Spink. As we have already noted, Spink held that plan amendments (and that presumably extends to plan design decisions in the initial plan document) are never plan administrative or management decisions and thus not fiduciary activities. But the decision conflates administrative and management decisions, which are referred to in separate clauses of the statutory definition of fiduciary and were almost certainly intended by Congress to have different meanings.

The authors conclude that the idea that plan amendments are not fiduciary in nature because they do not fit within the statutory definition of fiduciary administrative decisions does not necessarily mean that the amendments can never constitute fiduciary plan management decisions. Early in the last subsection, we described how collateral limitation could support the Department’s position that the selection of plan investments is always a fiduciary function—regardless of whether the investment options are included in the plan’s terms. Acknowledgement that there is a difference between administrative and management decisions involving the plan could support the Department’s view that both investment selection and monitoring are always fiduciary decisions. At one level, we believe that the Department’s position seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Hughes that the act of plan amendment is always a settlor function. But the identification of a person as a named fiduciary in a plan document or the selection of an investment menu for a participant defined contribution plan are arguably plan

524. See supra text accompanying note 256.
management decisions, even if implemented through a plan amendment.\footnote{526}

Moreover, the statute provides that exercise of authority or control over management of plan assets is a fiduciary action, and it is obvious, at least to these authors, that a plan provision creating a menu of investment options for a self-directed plan certainly is the exercise of authority over management of plan assets. There is, then, a basis for pulling back from the broad statement in \textit{Spink}, which was not necessary to the \textit{Spink} decision and might be considered dicta rather than the case’s holding.\footnote{527}

Consider other situations in which a court might find that a plan sponsor engages in the exercise of authority or control over management of plan assets. In de-risking transactions, the plan sponsor uses its discretion to decide to transfer plan assets to an annuity provider without terminating the plan.\footnote{528} When determining what percentage of a plan’s assets to transfer as part of a corporate reorganization or sale of the unit, the plan sponsor likewise makes a discretionary decision on transferring assets out of the plan. These discretionary transfers of plan assets in a context when the plan continues in existence may have a significant effect on the rights of participants and the ability of the surviving plan to pay benefits. As such, these discretionary decisions logically fit within Congress’ goal of ensuring that control over plan assets is subject to ERISA’s fiduciary protections.

\footnote{526} There are at least two other arguments in favor of the Department’s position. Perhaps a plan sponsor who amends a plan to set the investment menu is a fiduciary because he “renders investment advice” to the plan, although the statutory framework making an investment adviser a fiduciary requires that the advice be rendered “for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect,” ERISA § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(ii) (2012), and it is not clear that a plan sponsor receives any sort of compensation for selecting the plan’s investments. Or, perhaps the Department’s position can be seen as an exception—perhaps a singular exception—to the expansive definitional scope that the Supreme Court has given settlor (and thus nonfiduciary) functions. See, e.g., \textit{Hughes}, 525 U.S. at 443 (finding that “decision[s] regarding the form or structure of the plan” are generally settlor functions); \textit{Spink}, 517 U.S. at 890–91 (holding that employers act as settlors when they adopt, modify, or terminate welfare benefit or pension plans).

\footnote{527} The DOL’s existing guidance is consistent with this, and it could reiterate that guidance, which should receive deference from the courts as longstanding and consistent guidance.

\footnote{528} The ongoing nature of the plan distinguishes this decision from situations in which plans are voluntarily or involuntarily terminated. Supreme Court decisions, correctly in our view, confirm that those plan terminations are settlor decisions. See, e.g., \textit{Beck v. PACE Int’l Union}, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007).
Using this approach, courts could reject the *Spink*
529 dicta and recognize that plan management and control and management of plan assets are fiduciary acts as defined by the statute. In terms of the concerns we identified above in Part III, the primary effect would be to prevent the undermining of ERISA protections in such varied applications as ensuring the prudence of plan investment menus, preventing the substitution of non-ERISA annuities for retiree DB plan benefits, and precluding employers from indirectly capturing the value of plan assets by inflating the sale price of a unit. In situations such as de-risking transactions, the authors’ position is that recognizing the fiduciary nature of the decision also will protect retirees’ expectation that their benefits would be paid from the plan so long as the plan remains in existence.

C. Outcome-Oriented Decision Making

This brings us to a final point: in cases in which the facts are particularly troubling, the Supreme Court sometimes seems to blunt the harshest edges of the broad ERISA doctrines it has created. For example, in its initial interpretations, the Supreme Court used sweeping language when applying ERISA’s preemption provision.530 When considering ERISA remedies, the Supreme Court first appeared to dramatically limit remedies.531 In more recent cases, the Court has distinguished those early decisions and permitted remedies that the lower courts had presumed were foreclosed by the Court’s broad language.532

Of course development over time of increasingly nuanced doctrine is not unusual in the common law. So, it should not be surprising either that other areas of ERISA jurisprudence have developed in this way or that the same effect can be seen in the settlor/fiduciary cases, especially when application of broadly-written language would result in particularly harsh outcomes. Thus, the Court’s holding in *Varity Corp.*—that the employer’s misrepresentations to employees were made while wearing both an employer hat and a fiduciary hat533—might be explained as the Court’s implicit unwillingness to sanction abhorrent business behavior. And similarly, the Court’s holding in *McCutchen*—that the

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Court would not interpret plan subrogation language to require a participant to pay the plan medical expenses gross of lawyers’ fees in the absence of unambiguous plan language so providing—may have reflected the Court’s unease at endorsing an unusually harsh result. In other words, we might take from Varity Corp. and McCutchen a lesson that the Court will create ways to bend the settlor/fiduciary distinction to avoid egregious outcomes.\textsuperscript{535}

In our view, it would be preferable for the Court to begin refurbishing the settlor/fiduciary doctrine so that the Court does not have to engage in ad-hoc creativity to avoid such outcomes and can fashion results in other cases that better accommodate and balance ERISA’s sometimes contradictory themes and reflect the underlying economics of employee benefit plans. In the prior two subparts, we have offered approaches that courts might use to build a more nuanced doctrine. The first approach would limit the doctrine collaterally, relying on substantive ERISA provisions. The second would recognize that in Spink the Supreme Court was opining only on the “administration” prong of ERISA’s fiduciary definition.\textsuperscript{536} That leaves courts free to recognize that decisions on plan management or the control or management of plan assets are, as defined in the statute, fiduciary in nature.

\textbf{CONCLUSION}

Perhaps in a jurisprudence with a greater tilt toward legislative intent than our own (and an affinity for both whimsy and \textit{deus ex machina}), every statute would have an expiration date (say forty years) that coincides with a reunion of the legislators who enacted it and the staff who wrote it, who would then have a free hand to address the statute’s unintended consequences and to correct judicial and administrative distortions of what they had in mind (or what they would have had in mind had they been able to chart future events with unerring accuracy). ERISA is certainly a statute that has been victimized both by unintended consequences and by judicial and administrative distortion of legislative intent and statutory purpose and meaning (assuming, of course, that the legislators had a uniform understanding of what they were attempting to achieve, a fiction in


\textsuperscript{535}.  We suspect, though, that many plans will be amended to provide precisely the harsh result that we speculate the Court, sub silentio, may have been trying to avoid.

\textsuperscript{536}.  See supra text accompanying notes 129–37 for a discussion of Spink.
which lawyers reflexively engage). Nowhere has this victimization been more dramatic than with the fiduciary/settlor doctrine.

We have shown in this Article instances where the settlor/fiduciary doctrine has produced troubling outcomes and have predicted that the broad berth the courts have given the doctrine, if left unchecked, will lead to even more disturbing outcomes in the future. Indeed, in the course of working on this Article, we twice had to move a discussion of predicted outcomes to a discussion of settled Supreme Court jurisprudence.537

Why did the doctrine develop as it did? Here our story is, of course, a bit speculative. When first formulated, the doctrine provided a sensible approach to recognizing the plan sponsor’s economic interest in the plan, something that a literal application of the statute’s fiduciary standards might have prevented. But the doctrine was not well theorized, and the Supreme Court’s decision to locate its core in explicit statutory language rather than in a federal common law created doctrinal rigidity where doctrinal flexibility might have been preferable. The Court, deciding one case at a time and relying on the ease with which the doctrine leads to outcome, and without ever fully reflecting on how the doctrine might affect future application of the statute, seeded the doctrine into ERISA’s statutory language and we now seem stuck with what the Court has sown.

Or are we? We have suggested ways that the Supreme Court might retreat a bit from the doctrine, but we also recognize that rote judicial adherence to the doctrine over time has made retreat more difficult. Perhaps we will have to rely on Congress to legislate limits on the doctrine. But perhaps more judicial focus on and discussion of contexts broader than particular cases is yet possible. Indeed, we wrote this Article to help stimulate such a discussion, for hope springs eternal, even among those of us who write and think about ERISA.

537. See, e.g., supra note 267.