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Why Exempting Negligent Doctors May Reduce Suicide: An Empirical Analysis

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WHY EXEMPTING NEGLIGENT DOCTORS MAY REDUCE SUICIDE: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

J. Shahar Dillbary, Griffin Edwards, and Fredrick E. Vars[†]

ABSTRACT

This article is the first to empirically analyze the impact of tort liability on suicide. Counter-intuitively, our analysis shows that suicide rates *increase* when potential tort liability is expanded to include psychiatrists—the very defendants who would seem best able to *prevent* suicide. Using a 50-state panel regression for 1981 to 2013, we find that states that would hold psychiatrists (but not other doctors) liable for malpractice resulting in a suicide experienced a 12.8% increase in suicides. The effect is even stronger, 16.8%, when we include controls. We do not believe this is because suicide prevention doesn't work. Rather, we theorize that it is because some psychiatrists facing potential liability choose not to work with patients at high risk for suicide.

The article makes important contributions to the law of proximate cause and to the more general phenomenon of regulatory avoidance. Traditionally, one could not be liable for malpractice that caused another's suicide—the suicide was considered a superseding and intervening cause. About half of states retain the old common law rule. Others have created exceptions for psychiatrists only, or for all doctors, and some have abandoned the old rule entirely. Our findings suggest that expanding liability for psychiatrists may have an adverse affect. Accordingly, this article suggests that the best policy might be to retain or revive the traditional no-liability-for-suicide rule for mental health specialists. The implications are enormous: over 40,000 people in the United States die each year from suicide.

<u>Keywords</u>: Regulatory Avoidance, Suicide, Screening, Actual Causation, Proximate Cause, Superseding Intervening Force, Activity Levels, Care Levels, Deterrence, Psychiatrists, Doctors, Mental Health Providers, Torts.

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I. Introduction

Suicide is a large and growing public health problem in the United States. Over 42,000 people killed themselves in 2014, roughly one person every 12 minutes.¹ And since 1999, the suicide rate has been climbing.² Two leading theories for the increase are easier access to painkillers and weak family and social support, particularly among middle-aged whites.³ As to the high rate generally, the availability of firearms is commonly cited.⁴ Poor mental health care is another plausible candidate given the strong association between mental illness and suicide.⁵

This article examines a new theory for why suicide rates rise and fall: allocation of the costs of suicide by the legal system—specifically, tort law. The traditional rule is that one cannot be liable for negligence that causes another's suicide.⁶ Under this rule, a psychiatrist or non-psychiatrist doctor ("NPMD") who commits medical malpractice resulting in her patient's suicide is exempted from liability.⁷ A leading case explains that, as a general rule, "the act of suicide is considered a deliberate, intentional and intervening act which precludes a finding that a given defendant, in fact, is responsible for the harm."⁸ Plaintiffs have sought exceptions to this general rule with varying success in different states over time.⁹ Some states have gone so far as to abandon the traditional rule completely.¹⁰

It is plausible to think tort liability might affect suicide rates. Doctors, and psychiatrists in particular, are likely aware that post-suicide claims account for a large proportion of malpractice lawsuits and the highest settlement amounts.¹¹

¹ CDC, 10 Leading Causes of Death by Age Group, United States – 2014, at <u>http://www.cdc.gov/injury/images/lc-</u>

charts/leading_causes_of_death_age_group_2014_1050w760h.gif (visited June 4, 2016).

² Sally C. Curtin, Margaret Warner, & Holly Hedegaard, *Increase in Suicide in the United States, 1999-2014*, NCHS Data Brief, No. 241 (April 2016), at <u>http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db241.pdf</u> (visited June 4, 2016).

³ Mike Stobbe, '*Deaths of Despair' Drag Life Expectancy Lower for Whites*, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, at <u>http://www.usnews.com/news/news/articles/2016-06-03/deaths-of-despair-overdoses-drinking-suicides-hit-whites</u> (visited June 4, 2016).

⁴ Matthew Miller, Deboarh Azrael, & Catherine Barber. *Suicide Mortality in the United States: The Importance of Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level Disparities in the Burden of Suicide*, 33 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 393 (2012).

⁵ E. C. Harris & B. Barraclough. *Suicide as an Outcome for Mental Illness: A Meta-Analysis*, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205 (1997).

⁶ Scheffer v. Railroad Co., 105 U.S. 249 (1881).

 ⁷ Of course, psychiatrists are doctors, but are sometimes treated differently than other doctors for purposes of tort liability for suicide. Hence, this article generally uses three terms: (1) psychiatrists, (2) non-psychiatrist doctors ("NPMDs"), and, together, (3) all doctors.
⁸ McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983).

⁹ Patricia C. Kussmann, *Liability of Doctor, Psychiatrist, or Psychologist for Failure To Take Steps to Prevent Patient's Suicide*, 81 A.L.R.5th 167 (2000).

¹⁰ E.g., Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 263, 265-66 (N.Y. 1974).

¹¹ JEFFREY D. ROBERTSON, PSYCHIATRIC MALPRACTICE: LIABILITY OF MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1988).

Doctors might change their behavior in response to tort liability, and such changes matter for at least two reasons. First, doctors very often have contact with people at risk. As many as half of suicide victims had seen a mental health professional, and nearly that many (45%) saw a primary care provider *within a month* of committing suicide.¹² Second, those contacts can clearly make a difference. A recent comprehensive review concludes that the pharmacological treatment of psychiatric disorders contributes substantially to suicide prevention.¹³ Psychotherapy and electro-convulsive therapy also appear to be effective.¹⁴ "Education of primary care physicians targeting depression recognition and treatment was identified as one of the most effective interventions in lowering suicide rates."¹⁵

Expanding liability for suicide has at least two possible effects, both motivated by a desire to avoid that liability: (1) increasing the level of care exercised toward people at risk for suicide;¹⁶ and (2) decreasing activity levels – that is, leading others to avoid, if possible, interacting with people at risk for suicide.¹⁷ An example of the first might be a doctor prescribing fewer pills at a time to avoid intentional overdoses.¹⁸ An example of the second might be a psychiatrist refusing to accept new patients who are at high risk for suicide.¹⁹ Which strategy practitioners employ will depend in part on their ability to effectively screen out high-risk individuals.²⁰

The uneven evolution of tort law on suicide presents an ideal setting in which to test which of these two effects dominates. One of the authors predicted that suicide rates would decrease in jurisdictions that expanded liability on the theory that the level of care would increase. Another of us hypothesized that the second, screening effect would mitigate or even reverse that result, such that suicide rates could climb in jurisdictions after expansion. The third author, an

¹⁷ See infra Part III.B.

¹² Jason B. Luoma, Catherine E. Martin, & Jane L. Pearson, *Contact with Mental Health and Primary Care Providers Before Suicide: A Review of the Evidence*, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 909 (2002).

¹³ Gil Zalsman et al., *Suicide Prevention Strategies Revisited: 10-Year Systematic Review*, LANCET 3 (Published online June 8, 2016) at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2215-0366(16)30030-X.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 4.

¹⁵ *Id*. at 6.

¹⁶ See infra Part III.B.

¹⁸ Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907 (Ill. 1998).

¹⁹ *Id.* at 911. Some mental health care providers might even leave the field. Thomas L. Hafemeister et al., *Parity at A Price: The Emerging Professional Liability of Mental Health Providers*, 50 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 29, 87 (2013) ("To the extent that providers feel that the delivery of [mental health] care has become too onerous, it may drive them from the field and make critically needed services less available.").

²⁰ Other commentators have noted these two competing effects, though not with respect to suicide specifically. *E.g.*, Joanna M. Shepherd, *Tort Reforms' Winners and Losers: The Competing Effects of Care and Activity Levels*, 55 UCLA L. REV. 905, 908 (2008) ("On the one hand, increased liability should increase doctors' incentives to take care, decreasing deaths from medical malpractice; on the other hand, increased liability should reduce doctors' willingness to supply their services, increasing death rates.").

economist who remained neutral, judged the contest by testing the predictions using panel regression techniques.

It is a split decision. We find some evidence that expanding liability to psychiatrists, who are in a relatively strong position to screen patients, was associated with an increase in suicide rates. It must be conceded that very few jurisdictions fall into this category. Most states that expanded liability did so for both psychiatrists and NPMDs. This shift in legal regime did not significantly affect suicide rates. Neither did eliminating the old no-liability-for-suicide rule. A small victory for the increased-care-decreased-suicide position was a significantly lower suicide rate associated with NPMD liability modeled separately. In other words, the data suggest that doctors who are less well positioned to screen high-risk patients respond to expanded liability by providing better care.

This article sheds empirical light not only on fundamental questions in tort law, but also illustrates the broader phenomenon of regulatory avoidance. Take the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), which was intended to improve employment opportunities for people with disabilities.²¹ It has been less successful than hoped and our theory may help explain why. The ADA prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities and mandates reasonable accommodations in the workplace for such individuals.²² Because a hiring claim is more difficult for a plaintiff to prove than a failure to provide accommodations or a discriminatory discharge claim, employers may avoid hiring persons with disabilities.²³ Some empirical studies suggest that employers may be acting this way and the employment rate for persons with disabilities has not increased since passage of the ADA.²⁴ Appreciating the potential for regulatory avoidance is absolutely essential in incentivizing behavior across all areas of law.

The rest of this article proceeds as follows. Part II outlines the evolution of tort law on suicide. Part III first places this story in the context of literature on causation, then sets forth two competing hypotheses about how changes in tort law might impact the suicide rate. Part IV tests the hypotheses with a broad set of panel data. Finally, we offer discussion and suggest directions for future research in a brief conclusion (Part V).

II. The Law

The starting point is the United States Supreme Court's 1881 decision in *Scheffer v. Railroad Company*.²⁵ In that case, the executors of decedent's estate alleged that his suicide was the direct result of injuries sustained earlier in a train accident.²⁶ The Court affirmed dismissal of the claim as a matter of law,

²¹ 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.

²² Id. § 12112.

²³ SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 171-72 (2d ed. 2014).

 $^{^{24}}$ Id. at 172-73.

²⁵ 105 U.S. 249 (1881).

²⁶ *Id.* at 250.

explaining that "[t]he proximate cause of the death of Scheffer was his own act of self-destruction."²⁷ The suicide was a "new," "sufficient," and "intervening" cause of the harm.²⁸ *Scheffer* has been interpreted to mean that suicide always breaks the causal chain—there can be no liability for negligence resulting in self-harm.²⁹

Tort liability for suicide has expanded since *Scheffer*.³⁰ This article focuses on three expansions. Under the first expansion, a patient or the patient's family may sue a psychiatrist for negligence in resulting in suicide in a non-custodial setting.³¹ The second expansion applies this principle to all physicians, not just psychiatrists. The third expansion jettisons *Scheffer* completely and applies the usual foreseeability principles for every type of defendant. In every jurisdiction following approach (3), psychiatrists and NPMDs are potentially liable. What may be less apparent is that approach (2) means both NPMDs *and* psychiatrists.

A hypothetical illustrates. Suppose a person discusses severe depressive symptoms with their primary care physician. The doctor prescribes a low dose of antidepressant medication. After a near-lethal suicide attempt a month later, the person is seen in the hospital by a psychiatrist, who increases the dosage but declines to initiate civil commitment proceedings. A few days later, the person nervously purchases a handgun at a gun shop and shoots herself to death while still at the counter. Traditionally and in many states today (those not listed in Table 1), the family could not bring a wrongful death action against anyone. A few jurisdictions allow a claim only against the psychiatrist; more against both the psychiatrist and the doctor; and some against the gun seller too (Table 1).

Table 1: Changes to Tort Liability by Group			
State	Only		General
	Psychiatrists	All	Foreseeability
	Liable	Doctors Liable	Test
CA	1978	1978	
CT	1997	1997	2011
DC	2005	2005	
FL	1988	1988	1988
GA	2001	2001	2013
IA	2000	2000	2011

²⁷ *Id.* at 252.

 $^{^{28}}$ Id.

²⁹ Allen C. Schlinsog, Jr., *The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or Wrongfully Deceased?*, 24 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 471-73 (1991). Other cases reached the same result on the ground that suicide is wrongful. *Id.* at 471.

³⁰ Victor E. Schwartz, *Civil Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry*, 24 VAND. L. REV. 217 (1971).

³¹ A custodial relationship—medical or non-medical—is always "special" for this purpose.

ID	1995	1995	1995
IL	1998	1998	
KS	1988	1988	1988
KY	2009	2009	2009
LA	1985	1985	
MD	1990	1990	
ME	2012	2012	
MO	2011	2011	2011
ND	1994	1994	
NJ	1968	1968	1974
NM	2014	2014	
NY	1974	1974	1974
OH	1987	1987	1987
OK	1973		
RI	2000		
TN	1998	1998	1998
TX	1987	1987	
UT	1979	2015	
VT ³²	2005	2011	

The reasons for these shifts may help clarify. The first two derive from the same "special relationship" exception to the *Scheffer* rationale. Expanding liability to psychiatrists was premised on the elevated duty of medical specialists.³³ In other words, suicide is a type of harm that psychiatrists should be acting to prevent. A few jurisdictions stopped there, but most took the next step and held or implied that NPMDs may also be liable. All doctors are in a "special relationship" with their patients and have a duty to prevent suicide—the suicidal act itself does not cut the causal chain.³⁴ These two steps expanded liability for

³² Coding changes from case law was (no surprise) difficult. Though not every jurisdiction explicitly endorsed *Scheffer*, we assumed it to be the starting point everywhere. Many cases were unclear as to which rule they followed. On the theory that doctors and insurance companies would err on the side of caution, we interpreted ambiguities in favor of a law change. One very close case illustrates: in *Frizzell v. Town of Little Compton*, No. 98-0252, 2000 WL 33159170, at *4 (R.I. Sup. Jan. 28, 2000), the court denied summary judgment to a police defendant because a "qualified mental health professional or police officer" could have initiated civil commitment and failed to do so. Because this theory could apply to a psychiatrist but not a general practitioner, we coded this case as a switch to psychiatrist liability. The citation for each state is found in Table A2

³³ Schwartz, *supra* note 30, at 245.

³⁴ Phyllis Coleman & Ronald A. Shellow, *Suicide: Unpredictable and Unavoidable—Proposed Guidelines Provide Rational Test for Physician's Liability*, 71 NEB. L. REV. 643, 672 (1992) ("[B]ecause of the nature of the doctor-patient relationship and the illness for which treatment is

suicide, but did not eliminate the old *Scheffer* rule outside the doctor-patient context. In contrast, the third step overturned *Scheffer*: "the act of suicide, as a matter of law, is not a superseding cause in negligence law precluding liability."³⁵ One commentator argues that this reversal reflects a shift in the psychiatric community. The old view was that the person who committed suicide was a culpable wrongdoer. The modern view is that "all persons who commit suicide do so because they cannot appreciate the nature of their act" and are therefore not responsible.³⁶

But responsibility is not the only possible justification for retaining *Scheffer*. If no longer immune from liability for suicide, doctors may refuse to treat patients at high risk.³⁷ Of course, one could argue that increased liability would increase the level of care (at least with respect to current patients) and thereby reduce suicide. The next section sets forth more systematically relevant tort theory and our hypotheses regarding the impact each expansion might have on suicide rates.

III. Proximate Cause and Suicide Levels

In economic terms the change in the law of proximate cause means higher expected cost to doctors. We hypothesize that the increased liability impacts doctors' behavior in two possible ways. Professor Vars hypothesizes that the expected increase in liability will result in a *positive* increase in the level of care (i.e., higher quality of service). In contrast, Professor Dillbary hypothesizes that the higher expected liability could *negatively* impact care and activity levels (i.e., the result could be poorer quality and less services offered). Part III.A. below discusses the literature on the economic function of the law of causation. This literature focuses on the role of proximate cause on parties' activity and care levels—the very subject of this article. Part III.B. discusses the Vars and Dillbary hypotheses in light of the theory. Part IV tests the hypotheses.

III.A. The Economic Function of Causation

The economic role of the causation analysis has been the subject of an ongoing debate. Some, like Landes, Posner and Calabresi thought that "the idea of causation can largely be dispensed with."³⁸ For them, an injurer should be

sought, the duty of the physician to use reasonable care to protect his patient encompasses the patient's duty to care for himself.").

³⁵ Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 263, 265 (1974).

³⁶ Schlinsog, *supra* note 29, at 477-79; *see also* SUSAN STEFAN, RATIONAL SUICIDE, IRRATIONAL LAWS: EXAMINING CURRENT APPROACHES TO SUICIDE IN POLICY AND LAW 13 (2016) ("The law has always started with the assumption that suicidal people are competent, in the sense of being responsible for their actions.").

³⁷ Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ill. 1998).

³⁸ WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 229 (1987); Guido Calabresi, *Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven*, *Jr.*, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 85 (1975) ("One could do away with the but for test and employ other methods to... [determine] whether avoidance is worthwhile"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, *Causation in Tort Law: An Economic Approach*, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 124-25 (1983)

considered a "cause" of the accident if she is "the lower-cost avoider of it but not otherwise."³⁹ Others have recognized that limiting the scope of liability is important to achieve optimal care and activity levels.⁴⁰

III. A(i). Actual Causation

To understand the effect of proximate cause on the parties' behavior and why only a subset of actual causes can give rise to liability, we need to first understand the economic role of actual causation. Actual causation determines whether the act in question was a necessary link in a set of events that resulted in an injury. In the simple one-injurer-one-victim setting courts often use the but-for test to determine whether the defendant's behavior was the actual cause of the harm.⁴¹ The test asks whether but-for the defendant's tortious behavior the victim would not have been harmed. Shavell explains that this test incentivizes actors to take the optimal level of care.⁴² Suppose, for example, driving carefully comes with an expected liability of \$60, but that driving carelessly increases the expected liability to \$100. Taking care (e.g., slowing down) would reduce the expected cost of the accident by \$40 (100-60). Thus, if the cost of taking care (e.g., slowing down) is less than \$40, for example if it is \$10, taking care is socially desirable. It will reduce the expected cost of driving from \$100 if the driver fails to take care to \$70 (60+10) if she does. If the driver is liable for the harm she will invest \$10 to reduce her expected cost by \$30 (100-70). On the other hand, if the driver is not liable for the cost of the accident she will not take care. Why invest \$10 to avoid an accident for which she is not liable? Holding an injurer liable for the accident she "actually caused" thus incentivize her to take the right level of care.

Interestingly, holding the driver liable for losses she did *not* actually cause does not impact care levels negatively. To illustrate this point, suppose that in case of a car accident the driver is liable for the losses resulting from the accident and, in addition, for a \$200 loss that has nothing to do with the accident. If the driver takes care she can expect to pay \$270 (60+10+200). If she does not take care she will pay more: \$300 (200+100). Taking care will thus reduce the driver's expected cost by \$30 (300-270)—the same amount that would be reduced if she were not liable for the arbitrary loss. The conclusion is that actors will take

⁽discussing the rationale for alternative liability and noting that "we can analyze this type of case using a modified Hand formula without explicitly discussing causation"). Richard Epstein, *A Theory of Strict Liability*, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 165 (1973) ("Both Calabresi and Coase, then, share the belief that the concept of causation should not, because it cannot, play any role in the determination of liability for harms that have occurred."); MICHAEL FAURE, TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS 84 (2009) ("The original economic theory of tort law deliberately rejected an explicit role for a causation doctrine in determining liability").

³⁹ LANDES & POSNER, *supra* note 38, at 229.

⁴⁰ See infra notes 42, 44, 49, 57 and accompanying text.

⁴¹ For an analysis of actual causation doctrines in cases involving multiple tortfeasors, see Shahar Dillbary, *Causation Actually*, 51 GA. L. REV. 1 (2016).

⁴² STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 108 (1987).

optimal care even if they are subject to excessive liability—that is, even if they are liable for harms they did not actually cause.⁴³

This last insight is important to understand the impact of excessive liability on activity levels. In a perfectly operating negligence system imposing "too much" liability should not impact activity levels. Because the actors will take the optimal level of care, they will avoid liability altogether. They will thus be indifferent as to the "crushing liability" imposed on those who act negligently. The negligence system, however, is far from perfect. Its application is subject to errors and mistakes. This means that an actor who took the proper level of care may nevertheless be held liable. The literature refers to such mistakes as pockets of strict liability.⁴⁴ In an imperfect system excessive liability may adversely impact activity levels.⁴⁵ To see why, suppose that in the previous example the driver benefits \$90 from the activity. If the driver is liable only for the losses actually caused by her accident she will engage in the activity and carefully so. The reason is that driving with care comes at a cost of 70(70+10), which means that the driver can expect a net gain of \$20 (90-70). But if the driver is liable for losses she did not actually cause (e.g., because of an error), she may quit driving. With an expected loss of \$180 (90-270) if she takes care or worse if she does not (90-300), forgoing the activity becomes the preferable option. The result is suboptimal activity levels.

III. A(ii) Proximate Cause

The proximate cause analysis is recognition that not all but-for acts should give rise to liability. Only types of harm that were foreseeable from the defendant's conduct can give rise to liability. Shavell and his followers explain that the foreseeability requirement in the proximate cause analysis serves a similar function as actual causation. It imposes enough liability to incentivize the actors to take the appropriate level of care, but not too much liability that would drive them away from beneficial activities. Consider, for example, the mechanic who failed to properly service the brakes of the plaintiff's car. Suppose that because of the mechanic's failure the car sped up and reached a point at the road where it was struck by a lightning. The mechanic is the but-for reason of the victim's harm. Indeed, but-for the mechanic from liability. The reason is that holding the mechanic liable for harms she cannot foresee will not incentivize her to take additional care.⁴⁶ There is simply nothing the mechanic can do to *reduce the risk*

⁴³ LANDES & POSNER, *supra* note 38, at 236. The authors explain, however, that under certain conditions holding one liable for an accident she cannot prevent may result in excessive use of care. *Id.* at 236. *See also* FAURE, *supra* note 38, at 89.

⁴⁴ Under a strict liability regime a non-negligent actor will be held liable for harms she actually caused. *See* THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMICS APPROACH OF LAW 59-61 (2004); Marcel Kahn, *Causation and Incentives to Take Care under the Negligence Rule*, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1989). ⁴⁵ LANDES & POSNER, *supra* note 38, at 237.

⁴⁶ RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 213 (9thed., 2014).

of a lightning strike. By definition, only foreseeable harms can enter the mechanic's cost-benefit calculus.⁴⁷

For these reasons the law of proximate cause holds a defendant liable only for type of harms that the defendant could have reasonably foreseen as a risk of her conduct. The law of proximate cause exempts from liability actors like the mechanic whose breaching behavior was superseded by an unforeseeable force such as lightning. It holds liable only those whose acts or omissions increased the probability of an injury. That reasoning also underlies the "superseding intervening force" doctrine.⁴⁸

Grady provides a different economic theory of proximate cause.⁴⁹ For Grady the goal of the foreseeability requirement is to reduce the liability faced by injurers who may have been "efficiently negligent." The idea here is that even when one takes the optimal level of care she may engage in an accident due to an inadvertent lapse.⁵⁰ Imposing additional liability on such actors will be futile. It will not incentivize them to take more care (lapses aside, they already take the correct level of care).

However, excessive liability may cause actors to reduce their activity levels. The foreseeability requirement mitigates the sub-optimal activity levels concern by exempting actors from "coincidental" harms. To see how, consider with Grady⁵¹ cases where the same precaution can reduce foreseeable ("primary") and unforeseeable ("ancillary") risks. Assume that taking care to avoid the foreseeable risk was cost-justified. Suppose that the defendant did not take care and the foreseeable risk did not materialize, but the unforeseeable risk did. If the defendant had taken care—as she should—the accident would not have happened. Yet, the injurer will not be held liable for harms caused by an unforeseeable risk if the relationship between the breach and the harm is coincidental. The reason is that when an actor makes a spur-of-the-moment decision she may be efficiently

⁴⁷ To illustrate, suppose that in case of a brake-failure the plaintiff will incur a \$100 damage. Assume also that by investing \$5 the mechanic can *reduce* the chance of brake-failure from 12% to 2%. The mechanic will take care because at a cost of \$5 she can reduce her expected liability by \$10 ([12%-2%]x100). If the mechanic who fails to take proper care will also be liable for accidents due to lightning, the mechanic will take the same level of care. Taking care still reduces the expected cost of a foreseeable harm by \$10 (from \$12 to \$2).

⁴⁸ The mechanic example implies that to understand the incentive effects of liability one should consider the ability of actors to foresee harms. The incentive question hinges on whether the mechanic who failed to take care could foresee that type of harm that would result from a failure to properly service the brakes. After all, if the mechanic could not, a higher liability for such unforeseen harm would not deter her. Neither can she be considered the "best cost avoider". Even if she could avoid the harm at the lowest cost compared to others, she would not if she believes that the event she can avoid at a low cost will never materialize. *See* Calabresi, *supra* note 38, at 93-100; LANDES & POSNER, *supra* note 38, at 246-47. POSNER, *supra* note 46, at 213. For a summary of the literature, see FAURE, *supra* note 38, at 100-02. The imposition of liability may still be useful, for example, to *incentivize the actor to invest in information that would calibrate her beliefs*.

⁴⁹ Mark F. Grady, *Proximate Cause Decoded*, 50 UCLA L. REV. 293, 299 (2002).

⁵⁰ Mark F. Grady, *Efficient Negligence*, 87 GEO. L.J. 397, 400-02 (1998).

⁵¹ *Id.* at 413.

negligent. After all, it would be impossible to avoid all misjudgment even when one is taking the optimal level of care. Grady uses *Palsgraf* as an example to demonstrate this point.⁵² In *Palsgraf*, even in retrospect, there is no connection between using additional care to help a passenger board a moving train and injuries caused by an explosion that caused a scale to fall and harm the victim. Conversely, the actor will be held liable if there was a systematic relationship between the untaken precaution and the type harm (even if the harm was very unlikely).⁵³ Thus, when the defendant's failure to clean a barge that used to carry oil allowed combustible gas to develop, the defendant was held liable although lightning caused the explosion.⁵⁴ The reason is that the actor was inefficiently negligent.

Grady explains that the superseding intervening factor doctrine (SIF) serves a similar function. It incentivizes a later wrongdoer to take cost justified precaution to remedy a risk created by an earlier wrongdoer.⁵⁵ Consider for example a case in which Owen, the original wrongdoer, in breach of his duty created a risk that the plaintiff will incur an expected harm of \$100. Suppose that after Owen created the risk Laura, the last wrongdoer, can reduce it to \$10 if she takes care at a cost of 60. Efficiency requires that Laura takes care (60 < 100-10]), but Laura will not take care if she knows that liability will be split evenly between the wrongdoers (100/2 < 60). The law of proximate cause remedies this dilution problem⁵⁶ by exempting the original wrongdoer "in circumstances when it is desirable to prevent an erosion of the [last wrongdoer's] incentive to take precaution."⁵⁷ Thus when a company left blasting caps that were later found by a boy who showed the caps to his mother, the company was exempted from liability.⁵⁸ The parent had an opportunity to remedy the risk by taking the caps from her son. Her failure was therefore considered a superseding intervening factor that broke the chain of causation.⁵⁹ By holding the parent liable for the entire amount, the SIF incentivizes her to invest more care (here, simply take the caps from her son).

⁵² Id.

⁵³ Id.

⁵⁴ Johnson v. Kosmos Portland Cement Co., 64 F.2d 193, 195-96 (6th Cir. 1933); *see also* Grady, *supra* note 49, at 299 (explaining that "whether the lightning was or was not likely made no difference. The issue was whether a systematic relationship existed between the explosion [i.e., type of harm] and the defendant's allowing combustible gases to form [i.e., the untaken precaution]".)

⁵⁵ Mark F. Grady, *Proximate Cause and the Law of Negligence*, 69 IOWA L. REV. 363, 416-17 (1984) (explaining that the purpose of the SIF doctrine is "to increase the pecuniary incentive of persons other than the original wrongdoer, such as the last wrongdoer, to take precautions that compensate for the original wrongdoer's lack of care"); *see also* Grady, *supra* note 50, at 409 (explaining that SIF incentivizes the last wrongdoer to correct a risky condition created by the original wrongdoers).

⁵⁶ On the importance of dilution and anti-dilution mechanisms see generally Shahar Dillbary, *Tortfest*, U. CHI. L. REV. 953 (2013); Dillbary, *supra* note 41.

⁵⁷ Grady, *supra* note 55, at 416.

⁵⁸ Pittsburg Reduction Co. v. Horton, 113 S.W. 647 (Ark. 1908).

⁵⁹ *Id*. at 649.

The SIF doctrine could also *reduce* incentives to take care. Consider again the blasting caps case and assume now that it is foreseeable that the only way an accident would occur is if parents fail to take away the caps from their kids. Assume also that the factory can avoid the harm at a cost of \$1 and that a parent at a cost of \$10. Now, the factory is the lowest-cost avoider. Efficiency thus requires that the factory takes care, but the factory won't if it expects to be immune from liability. SIF mitigates this concern by refusing to cut off the original wrongdoer's liability when a subsequent intervening force is foreseeable. To use Grady's terminology, SIF relieves the original wrongdoer from liability when her negligence was efficient, but SIF holds the original wrongdoer liable (together with the last wrongdoer) if her negligence was inefficient. By doing so, SIF "encourage[s] the original wrongdoer to continue their efficient activities."⁶⁰ In the above example, the factory will be held liable because the parent's negligence is foreseeable. The factory will thus invest \$1 to avoid the \$100, which is the efficient result.

Grady explains that courts will be inclined to determine that an intervening force was superseding if (a) the cost of care to the intervening force is cheaper than the original wrongdoer; (b) the original wrongdoer was less negligent; (c) the intervening force was able to estimate that a risk arose from the original wrongdoer is negligence. Conversely, courts will be inclined to hold the original wrongdoer liable if an intervening force will fail to take care against the risk the original wrongdoer created.⁶¹ Liability will also be imposed on the original wrongdoer cannot. Examples are when the last wrongdoer is insolvent or does not have the capacity to take care (e.g., children or the mentally ill). The classic example is a negligent entrustment case. Grady calls such individuals "free radicals." Liability will accrue if ex ante, before the accident occurred, the original wrongdoer would have been able to foresee that her actions would encourage a free radical.⁶²

III.B. The Hypotheses

Armed with these insights we now can turn to analyze the possible impact of the change in the law of proximate causation on suicide rates and formulate our hypotheses.

The Vars Hypothesis: Suicide Rates Decrease as Liability Increases

One of us, Professor Vars, hypothesizes that the increased liability will increase the quality of health care services and result in a reduction in suicide rate

⁶⁰ Grady, *supra* note 50, at 410; *see also* Grady, *supra* note 49, at 314 (explaining that an intervening factor is not superseding if there "was no systematic relationship between the second actor's negligence and the first actor's negligence").

⁶¹ Grady, *supra* note 55.

⁶² Grady, *supra* note 49, at 309; *Dixon v. Bell*, 105 Eng. Rep. 1023 (K.B. 1816) (defendant was held liable for a shooting that occurred when a 13-year-old kid who was sent by the defendant to pick up a gun accidently killed another kid).

(everything else being equal).⁶³ The Vars hypothesis thus assumes that in jurisdictions that exempt doctors from liability for a patient's suicide the level of care is suboptimal. It also assumes that unlike the mechanic-who cannot reduce the risk that lightning will hit a car, health care providers *can* and *should* reduce the risk that a patient will commit a suicide (i.e., taking care is possible and cost-justified). In legal terms, the claim is that, with some exceptions (on which below), suicide should sometimes be deemed a foreseeable type of harm from a doctor's failure to furnish a proper treatment.⁶⁴

The Vars hypothesis is consistent with the economic theories discussed earlier. If current levels of care are indeed suboptimal as Vars hypothesizes, increasing doctors' liability would result in better care. This is exactly Shavell's insight. Those who already took the appropriate level of care should be indifferent to the increased liability imposed on negligent doctors. The result should not change even if some doctors who took proper care believe that they face a higher expected liability due to possible error or mistake. So long as the extended liability under the new regime does not have a "crushing" effect—that is, so long as it does not result in a reduction in activity levels—one would expect to see a reduction in suicide rates.

The Vars hypothesis may also be consistent with Grady's view of SIF. Under this view, a suicide should only be deemed an "intervening force" (i.e., foreseeable) if one believes that those who commit suicide are "free radicals"— that is, they cannot be deterred. In such cases imposing liability on the initial wrongdoer, the doctors, may be the only way to break the chain of causation that results in a suicide. Recall that a mentally ill person is one typical example of a free radical.⁶⁵ This observation has a special importance in suicide cases. Some psychiatric literature concludes that "*all* suicides result from mental illness" and should thus be deemed foreseeable.⁶⁶ If those who commit suicide are perceived as "free radicals," one would expect courts to impose liability on doctors to deter them (assuming the patient cannot be deterred) from providing sub-standard care.

⁶³ See generally Jennifer Arlen, Economic Analysis of Medical Malpractice Liability and Its Reform, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 37 (Jennifer Arlen, ed., 2013) ("Negligence liability is needed to induce optimal treatment.").

⁶⁴ Some have advocated an even stronger result. An early comment, for example, notes that although most courts deem some types of suicides (but not others) as foreseeable "[p]sychiatric scholars believe that *all* suicides are equally foreseeable." Schlinsog, *supra* note 29, at 467-68, 479; *see also Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Grp., LLP*, 331 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Mo. 2011) ("Modern psychiatry supports the idea that suicide sometimes is a foreseeable result of traumatic injuries" citing Schlinsog, *supra* note 24, at 749 n.76); *see also infra* note 70 and accompanying text (discussing dictum in *Fuller*).

⁶⁵ Grady, *supra* note 49, at 306.

⁶⁶ See e.g., Schlinsog, *supra* note 29, at 467-68 [emphasis added] (explaining that when the defendant inflicts a personal injury that results in mental illness that induces a suicide, the suicide is considered "reasonably foreseeable" and the original wrongdoer is held liable.). A more recent review of the evidence concluded that over 90%, but not all, of those who commit suicide suffer from mental illness. José Manoel Bertolote, Alexandra Fleischmann, Diego De Leo, & Danuta Wasserman, *Psychiatric Diagnosis and Suicide: Revisiting the Evidence*, 25 CRISIS 147 (2004).

There is some evidence that courts, which adopted the broader foreseeability approach, were motivated by such considerations. *Fuller v. Preis*,⁶⁷ is an example. In *Fuller* the defendant collided with the victim's car, causing him a physical injury. The victim, who happened to be a surgeon, consciously declined to get any help believing he was uninjured. Two days later he suffered seizures and gradually had to give up his practice and other activities. Seven months later he committed suicide. In the suicide notes the victim noted that he is "perfectly sane" and that he "kn[ew] exactly what [he was] doing."⁶⁸ The court found that the victim's premeditated and conscious act was neither superseding nor could it be characterized as a sane act. In the eyes of the court it was an "irresistible impulse" caused by the brain damage.⁶⁹ The *Fuller* court was willing to extend liability for suicide even "absent proof of a specific mental disease or even an irresistible impulse."⁷⁰

A broader foreseeability test is also justified if one believes that doctors are, for the most part, "negligently inefficient." That is, doctors systematically fail to take reasonable care to avoid primary risks, which may give rise to an ancillary risk—suicide. Consider, for example, a case like Dux,⁷¹ where the court refused to hold a NPMD liable for a medical malpractice that resulted in the patient's suicide. In Dux a doctor performed a redundant surgical procedure after the patient's biopsy was negligently switched with another patient. As a result of the unnecessary procedure (the primary negligence), the patient suffered from "sexual dysfunction" and depression (an ancillary risk) and later committed suicide. If one believes that the failure to take care was not a matter of an inadvertent lapse but rather systemic, then increasing the doctor's liability could reduce suicide rates.⁷² It would have incentivized the doctors to take additional care to avoid the unnecessary procedure that led to the patient's suicide.⁷³

⁶⁷ Fuller v. Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425 (1974). New York switched to a foreseeability paradigm in 1974 (see Table 1).

⁶⁸ *Id.* at 428.

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 434.

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 434; *see also id.* at 429 (noting also that "a suicide is a strange act and no rationalistic approach can fit the act into neat categories of rationality or irrationality".).

⁷¹ Dux v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 781, 787 (N.D. Ill. 2014).

⁷² See supra notes 49-54 and *infra* note 80 and accompanying text. The following analogy is illustrative. Consider a careful driver (doctor) who takes the optimal level of care and purposefully so. Even such a driver (doctor) may fail, for a moment, to pay attention—simply because humans cannot always pay attention. Assume that because such an unavoidable and inadvertent lapse an accident occurs. Here, the driver (doctor) is negligent (she failed to take care for that one second). But she is efficiently negligent. It is negligence due to a non-systemic lapse. Imposing on the driver (doctor) additional liability won't incentivize her to take additional care. It may, however, incentivize her to reduce activity levels (perhaps avoid driving or refuse to treat certain patients). In contrast, a driver (doctor) who is systemically fails to take care (e.g., a driver who always speed up) is inefficiently negligence. In the face of increased liability such an actor may be induced to take more care and as a result the level of accidents (suicide rate) will go down.

 $^{^{73}}$ The *Dux* court the court held that the suicide was superseding force and thus unforeseeable. *Id.* at 789.

Jurisdictions that adopted the broader foreseeability test could still carve out exceptions. For example, a patient's suicide may be deemed superseding (i.e., unforeseeable) in cases where it can be proved that the victim was not a free radical or that she was the lowest cost avoider or that she could estimate that her condition arose from the doctor's negligence and take action.⁷⁴ Consider, for example, a situation in which a doctor failed to diagnose the patient's illness although a reasonable doctor would. Assume further that as a result of the ensuing unnecessary treatment the patient suffered certain dysfunction that led to depression and later suicide. Here, the patient could be considered a SIF if she was aware of her condition before becoming depressed and could have simply alerted the doctor who could have remedied her condition (e.g., by changing medication). Exempting the doctor in such a case (e.g., by treating the suicide as a superseding force⁷⁵) would incentivize the patient to seek care.

The Dillbary Hypothesis: Suicide Rates Could Increase With Liability

Professor Vars hypothesizes that the increased expected liability will incentivize doctors to take more care, increase the quality of services and result in *lower* suicide rates. In contrast, Professor Dillbary hypothesizes that the additional liability could reduce both the quality and the quantity of services offered. Accordingly, Professor Dillbary theorizes that the increase in liability could be accompanied by an *increase* in suicide rates.

Professor Dillbary's grim hypothesis envisions a screening effect. The motivating concern is that the higher expected liability would cause some doctors to refuse treating patients with high-risk of suicide. The reasoning is simple. Under the old (limited) foreseeability rule, a doctor expects to face the same liability for their medical malpractice regardless of whether her patient committed The new (broader) foreseeability rule, however, changes things a suicide. dramatically. It creates two types of patients: (a) patients with a high risk of committing suicide who come with a higher expected liability and (b) patients with a low-risk of committing suicide patients who come with a lower expected cost. As a result doctors may engage in strategic screening. They will try to distinguish the high-risk from the low-risk patients to lower their expected liability. This is especially the case if the doctor's compensation is independent of the patient's type. For example, if they charge the same amount on an hourly basis from all patients. In such a case treating a high-risk patient comes with no additional monetary benefits. It only imposes more costs.

⁷⁴ The *Fuller* court itself alluded to such an exception when it noted that the liability will arise only if the suicide was an "irresistible impulse" caused by the brain damage. *Fuller*, 35 N.Y.2d at 430.

⁷⁵ See also Grady, supra note 50, at 417 (noting that "[t]he doctrine of assumption of the risk... would be difficult to explain were it not for the possibility that some negligent behavior [—that of the original wrongdoer—] is efficient."); see also Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907, 909 (1998) (holding that "a decedent's contributory negligence may be raised as a defense in a wrongful death suit brought against a physician whose patient commits suicide while under mental health treatment").

In a perfect legal system, under a negligence regime, there would be a "safe-harbor." A doctor who takes the proper level of care should be indifferent between the two types of patients. But the system is imperfect. First, there is no clear standard of care to which a physician must adhere.⁷⁶ Nor can there be one. As Coleman and Shellow explain, "it is virtually impossible to establish whether the reasonable physician could have prevented suicide because, using even the best indicators, physicians' predictions are correct in only one in twenty-five cases"—a success rate of 4%.⁷⁷ In their view the medical research is incapable of determining whether "a specific individual will commit suicide."⁷⁸ A psychiatrist who must decide whether to accept a patient with suicide tendencies would thus be refuse the patient out of fear that she will be held liable for not foreseeing an unforeseeable suicide. The fear of litigation is justified. "Suits for a patient's suicide represent a high percentage of malpractice claims against psychiatrists.... that could subject [a psychiatrist] to years of litigation, loss of his professional license, substantial attorneys' fees, and a large malpractice verdict."⁷⁹ Second, even if a clear standard existed, in a litigious society where the jury and courts make mistakes a doctor can be held liable even if she took the proper level of care.⁸⁰ The screening effect is exacerbated even further by the fact that doctors, like the tort system, are also imperfect. Doctors may take on average proper care but could still, due to inadvertent lapses, make an unavoidable mistake for which they will be held liable.

With no additional benefit and high expected cost accompanying the treatment of high-risk patients, one would expect doctors to try to distinguish between the two groups and treat only the low-risk individuals. To be clear, the claim is not that all doctors would engage in screening. Insurance and idealism may mitigate the concern. Some doctors may also be unable to engage in

⁷⁶ Coleman & Shellow, *supra* note 34, at 657 (offering guidelines which will serve as a safe harbor and replace the nebulous standard of care); Hafemeister, *supra* note 19, at 43 ("establishing the standard of care is challenging").

⁷⁷ Coleman & Shellow, *supra* note 34, at 657. Not only may doctors be held liable for taking too little care, but they may also be liable for taking too much care, as in the case where the doctor decides to admit a patient involuntarily.

⁷⁸ *Id.* at 644. *But see* Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 246-48 (1988) ("To hold that evaluation of a patient by a psychotherapist [to determine "dangerousness"] is so plagued with uncertainty as to be without value would raise "serious questions ... as to the entire present basis for commitment procedures.").

⁷⁹ Coleman & Shellow, *supra* note 34, at 657-58; *see also* Jon Grant, *Liability in Patient Suicide*, 3 CURRENT PSYCHIATRY (2014) (available at http://www.currentpsychiatry.com/home/article/liability-in-patient-

suicide/0aca64944eb34e9314d1ee5300a3fe00.html) (last visited on May 25, 2016) (reporting that "post-suicide lawsuits account for the largest number of malpractice suits against psychiatrists" and that "[b]ecause patient suicide risk is real, psychiatrists often worry about malpractice claims.").

⁸⁰ Coleman & Shellow, *supra* note 34, at 645-46, 648; Benjamin M. Schutz, *Legal Liability*, PSYCHOTHERAPY 75 (1982) ("The painful reality is that one may be functioning as an ethical and competent therapist on a case and still face a lawsuit; that is, ethical and competent behavior is not an absolute bar to a legitimate suit").

screening, perhaps because they are not aware of the law, because they are not privy to information that may reveal the patients' type, or because they have to assume a position that requires them to treat all patients (e.g., if they work at a state hospital). Still, the Dillbary hypothesis theorizes that a substantial enough number of doctors will actively engage in screening. All doctors, for example, are *required* to ask in the initial session about the patient's family and medical history⁸¹ and may refuse to treat those who have suicidal thoughts, violent tendencies, or who otherwise revealed their high-risk type.⁸²

The screening effect could result in lower quality and reduction of services and higher suicide rate. But it does not have to. Because the screening effect impacts the *supply* of services, there are two possible scenarios:

1. Screening Effect will either reduce or have no impact on suicide rates. Under the first scenario, suicide rates would remain unchanged or would even be reduced. The reason is that the refusal of certain doctors to treat high-risk patients does not necessarily mean that less services will be offered (i.e., lower activity levels) or that doctors will take less care (i.e., lower quality).

Consider first a simple case in which doctors do not change their care levels. Rather, they either engage in screening (i.e., refuse to treat high-risk patients); or they treat patients indiscriminately. It could be that those doctors who do not engage in screening would provide more services and fill the gap (just like a municipal regulation may reduce the number of cab drivers but the remaining drivers would drive more). In such a case suicide rates would remain unchanged if both groups of doctors (those who refuse to give care and those who

⁸¹ Coleman & Shellow, *supra* note 34, at 648 (explaining that a history of suicide in the family and certain illnesses and conditions are correlated with an increased risk of suicide); *see also* U.S. Preventative Services Task Force, *Final Recommendation Statement, Suicide Risk in Adolescents, Adults and Older Adults: Screening – Clinical Consideration* (2014) (available at http://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/UpdateSummaryFinal/suicide-risk-in-adolescents-adults-and-older-adults-screening) (last visited on May 25, 2016) (reviewing risk factors for suicide).

⁸² The concern that doctors will engage in screening or other forms of defensive medicine is not new. For example, in Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907 (1998) the Supreme Court of Illinois allowed the defendant-physician to raise a contributory negligence defense of fear that unfettered liability would result in doctor denying treatment from those who need them most. See also Hafemeister, supra note 19, at 34 (explaining that "to the extent that the cost of practicing a mental health specialty increase" less service would be offered). Another form of strategic behavior is to take excessive (defensive) care. See e.g., Almonte v. Kurl, 46 A.3d 1, 26 (R.I. 2012) ("[T]he specter of legal liability for a patient's suicide may, consciously or unconsciously, influence a physician's decision, inappropriately clouding what should be solely a medical decision.") (quoting Coleman & Shellow, supra note 29, at 646); Maggie Murray, Determining A Psychiatrist's Liability When A Patient Commits Suicide: Haar v. Ulwelling, 39 N.M. L. REV. 641, 663 (2009) ("Imposing a duty upon psychiatrists to prevent or take reasonable steps to prevent the suicide of outpatients could encourage doctors to commit more patients in order to reduce their risk."). There is reason to believe that doctors, and especially psychiatrists, will be more inclined to reduce activity levels (e.g., refuse treating high-risk patients) than taking excessive care (e.g., unnecessarily admit patients involuntarily). The reason is that (unless a special duty exists) refusing to treat a new patient does not come with liability, whereas a doctor may be held liable for taking too much care.

accept patients indiscriminately) exercise the *same* level of care. From the patient's perspective nothing changes, except the identity of the doctor. Suicide rates may even decrease if the quality of care provided by doctors who refuse to treat high-risk patients was on average lower compared to those doctors who do not engage in screening. Here, patients would experience an increase in care level.

Consider now a situation in which doctors take more care. For example, this can happen if the lower supply of services to high-risk patients results in higher prices. The additional revenues may allow doctors who treat patients indiscriminately to provide better services. So long as the price is not prohibitive—that is, so long as high-risk patients can receive treatment—suicide rates may even decline.⁸³

In the above scenarios suicide rates remained the same or decreased because of a care-level effect. Either doctors took more care or patients experienced an increase in care levels. For this reason we treat this part of the Dillbary hypothesis as being absorbed by the Vars hypothesis.

2. Screening Effect will be accompanied by an increase in suicide rates. The second scenario posits that the screening effect will negatively impact suicide rates. This can happen if, for example, a large enough number of doctors would refuse treating high-risk patients such that (a) the capacity of the remaining doctors cannot meet the demand for healthcare services (e.g., in rural areas⁸⁴); or (b) an increase in the price (e.g., due to the shrinking supply) of healthcare services will result in too many individuals forgoing treatment; or (c) the better doctors would leave the market (for example, because they are more risk averse compared to peers); or (d) the remaining doctors will compromise on quality to meet the high demand). Under the second Dillbary scenario, the result could be a reduction in activity levels (i.e., less healthcare services), accompanied by suboptimal care levels (i.e., poor quality) and accordingly a higher suicide rate.

⁸³ Suicide rates may remain the same or decrease even if activity levels are reduced—that is, even if fewer services are provided. In such a case some high-risk patients will not be treated. Still, it could be those fewer patients who do get treatment enjoy a very low suicide rate such that, in total, suicide rates are reduced. The following numerical example is illustrative. Consider a population of 100 high-risk patients. Each is facing a 20% risk of suicide that can be reduced to 18% with mediocre quality treatment and to 4% with high quality treatment. Assume also that initially all patients received mediocre care so the suicide rate was 18%. Suppose now that switching to a broader foreseeability rule will cause doctors who provide mediocre quality service to refuse treating high-risk patients. Even if only 50 patients (50% of the high-risk population) receive treatment suicide rates will nevertheless decline. It is true that the 50 individuals who cannot obtain care will face a higher risk of suicide (20%). But the entire high-risk patient population as a group will have a lower suicide rate of 12%. This is so because of the 50 patients who will not receive any care one can expect that 10 patients (50x20%) will take their lives. Of those 50 individuals who did receive a high quality care the expected number of suicides would be 2 (50x4%). The suicide rate in the entire high-risk population will thus drop to 12% ([10+2]/100).

⁸⁴ Hafemeister, *supra* note 19, at 58 (explaining the "expanding role" of primary physicians in "today's health care landscape... is driven in part by the unavailability of psychiatrists and other mental health providers in many parts of the country").

Consistent with the claim that the common law tends to promote efficiency,⁸⁵ the rule barring liability for a suicide due to antecedent negligence can be explained as a way to mitigate the screening effect. Some, like the *Hobart* court, explicitly explain that unfettered liability could result in a screening effect.⁸⁶ In *Hobart*, the plaintiff, a patient with known "suicidal tendencies," committed suicide by ingesting an overdose of antidepressant pills after her physician provided her with a one-month supply. The question before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether a physician whose patient commits suicide while under mental health treatment can raise a contributory negligence defense. Concerned with the result of a possible screening effect the court answered affirmatively. It explained that:

To rule otherwise would be to make the doctor the absolute insurer of any patient exhibiting suicidal tendencies. *The consequence of such a ruling would be that no health care provider would want to risk the liability exposure in treating such a patient, and, thus, suicidal persons would be denied necessary treatment.* Public policy cannot condone such a result.⁸⁷

The concern that a screening effect would deny treatment from high-risk patients seems to also underlie decisions outside the psychiatrist-patient context. Recall that in *Dux* the court refused to hold liable a surgeon who in breach of her duty performed an unnecessary medical procedure that later led to Dux's depression and then suicide. Dux had a history of mental illness.⁸⁸ He suffered sexual abuse as a child and post-traumatic disorder after serving in Vietnam.⁸⁹ Even before the unnecessary surgery he considered taking his life multiple times.⁹⁰ The expert psychologist described Dux as one who is "stably unstable" noting that "suicide thinking [was] part of his psychological repertoire."⁹¹ Yet, unlike New York's *Fuller*,⁹² the *Dux* court dismissed the case against the doctor. It held that with two exceptions (neither of which applied in *Dux*) a suicide is considered "an independent [superseding] event that the tortfeasor cannot be expected to foresee" and which breaks the chain of causation.⁹³ For this very reason in *Crumpton*, another Illinois decision, the court exempted from liability a

⁸⁵ See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 315-16, 713-14 (8th ed. 2010).

⁸⁶ Hobart v. Shin, 705 N.E.2d 907 (1998).

⁸⁷ *Id.* at 911 (emphasis added); *see also* Maunz v. Perales, 276 Kan. 313, 322 (2003) (calling *Hobart* "particularly persuasive"); Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104, 121 (Iowa 2011) (agreeing with *Hobart*'s public policy rationale). On the strategic response of doctors to extended liability and other forms of defensive medicine *see also supra* note 82.

⁸⁸ See *supra* notes 71-73 and accompanying text.

⁸⁹ Dux, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 784.

⁹⁰ *Id*.

⁹¹ *Id*.

⁹² See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.

⁹³ Dux, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 787.

drugstore that failed to properly fill a prescription for an antipsychotic medication that led to the patient's suicide.⁹⁴ In both *Dux* and *Crumpton* the defendants knew that the decedents suffered from a mental illness and in both neither was held liable.

The only two exceptions recognized by Illinois in non-mental healthcare settings are the insanity and the custodial exceptions.⁹⁵ Both can be explained as cases in which screening (and thus the denial of necessary treatment) is not a substantial concern. Under the insanity exception, a suicide is considered foreseeable if the decedent suffered a physical injury, especially a head injury, (e.g., in a car accident) as a result of the defendant's conduct, and that injury left "him so bereft of reason" that he took his life as a result of that condition.⁹⁶ The custodial exception arises when the defendant fails to supervise a patient with suicide tendencies who takes her life while under his supervision. An example is a case like *Winger* where a psychiatrist was held liable when the decedent committed a suicide with his shoelaces while in the defendant's care for severe depression.⁹⁷

In both exceptions the concern that doctors will engage strategically in screening is mitigated. The first exception arises in situations over which the doctor is not aware of the victim's type (i.e., whether she is high/low risk). Nor does the doctor act in his capacity as a healthcare provider. It is the negligent driving that gives rise to liability for the victim's suicide. The second exception—negligent supervision—is no different. It is not the *medical* malpractice that caused the injury. "[T]he negligence is not in the diagnosis or treatment but, rather, it is in the failure to carefully protect a patient from inflicting self-harm."⁹⁸ It is by providing the nonmedical service—supervision of another—that the doctors assumed potential liability. Indeed, the same exception is used to hold liable non-medical personnel, such as sheriffs and wardens who

⁹⁴ Crumpton v. Walgreen Co., 871 N.E.2d 905, 907, 911-13 (Ill. App. Ct., 2007)

 $^{^{95}}$ Dux, 69 F. Supp. 3d at 787 ("Illinois courts appear to recognize two—and only two exceptions"). As *Hobart* explains, a third exception applies when suicide is a foreseeable type of harm from a doctor's breach. The same three exceptions apply in other jurisdictions. *See* Rain v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580, 593-94 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ("Like courts in other jurisdictions, they have also recognized the following three exceptions to this general rule: (1) circumstances in which the defendant's negligence causes delirium or insanity that results in selfdestructive acts, (2) custodial settings in which the custodian knew or had reason to know that the inmate or patient might engage in self-destructive acts and (3) special relationships, such as a physician-patient relationship, when the caregiver knows or has reason to know that the patient might engage in self-destructive acts").

⁹⁶ Stasiof v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 200 N.E.2d 88, 92 (III. App. Ct. 1964) *aff'd sub nom* Little v. Chicago Hoist & Body Co., 32 III.2d 156, 203 N.E.2d 902 (1965), and Moss v. Meyer, 117 III.App.3d 862, 73 III.Dec. 304, 454 N.E.2d 48 (1983).

⁹⁷ Winger v. Franciscan Med. Ctr., 701 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

⁹⁸ *Id. at* 818; *see also Kent v. Whitaker*, 58 Wash. 2d 569, 571 (1961) (a case identical to *Winger*) ("This is not a malpractice case. It does not rest upon either improper diagnosis or negligent treatment; but, on the other hand, the liability of the appellant hospital superintendent is based upon the failure of the specific duty of exercising reasonable care to safeguard and protect a patient with known suicidal tendencies from injuring herself.").

fail to monitor a person who commits suicide while under their supervision.⁹⁹ Moreover, in negligent supervision cases screening is *not* a concern for another reason. Proper supervision can be done easily and at a low cost (e.g., restricting access to shoelaces in *Winger*). The supervision (unlike mental health treatment) does not require the exercise of an impossible-to-determine standard of care.¹⁰⁰ In addition, custodians who agreed to supervise individuals with suicide tendencies can likely self-insure at a low cost.¹⁰¹

The Winger dictum became law in Hobart where the Illinois Supreme Court recognized (implicitly) the special relationship exception. But it substantially limited its scope by allowing a psychiatrist to raise the decedent's contributory negligence as an affirmative defense, thus curbing the psychiatrists' expected liability. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Hobart recognized that in some cases, where the decedent was "completely devoid of reason" the defense would not apply); In Graham v. Nw. Mem'l Hosp., 965 N.E.2d 611, 616, 619-20 (Ill. Ct. App. 2012), the Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed Hobart calling the exception "rare" and limiting it to custodial cases ("the rare case where a contributory negligence instruction should not be given in a suicide case will almost certainly involve a "custodial case" where the patient is incapable of exercising ordinary care for her or his own welfare"). In contrast, courts that have refused to recognize a defense emphasized that it would "render meaningless the duty of the hospital to act reasonably in protecting the patient against self-harm." McNamara v. Honeyman, 406 Mass. 43, 55-56, 546 N.E.2d 139, 146-47 (1989) (refusing to apply a comparative negligence defense). Other courts have taken an intermediary approach recognizing a defense, but holding that the

⁹⁹ In *Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation*, 450 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn.1990), a case similar to *Winger*, the court relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 (1965) and analogized the supervision exception to other custody cases. It concluded that because the hospital voluntarily undertook the duty to protect the patient from self-inflicted injuries, it had assumed a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent that very event. *See also* Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 (Alaska 2001) (holding that "[a] jailer owes its prisoners the duty of reasonable care to protect them from reasonably foreseeable harm, including self-inflicted harm" and explaining that "the duty jailers owe prisoners is equivalent to the duty common carriers owe passengers"); Estate of Belden v. Brown County, 261 P.3d 943, 961, 962 (2011) ("penal institutions stand in a special relationship with the person they detain... [a]nd having taken custody of those prisoners...[they have a duty to take] steps to protect a self-destructing inmate from acting on those impulses].").

¹⁰¹ Recall that a third exception can give rise to liability in mental-healthcare settings. *See infra* note 95. Under *Hobart*, discussed earlier, liability may be imposed on a physician whose patient commits suicide while under mental health treatment. *See supra* notes 86-87. The reasons for the *Hobart* oft called "special relationship exception" are explained in a dictum in *Winger v. Franciscan Med. Ctr.*, 299 III. App. 3d 364, 374 (1998):

[[]T]o absolve the caregiver of liability would be imprudent and would divest the profession of any standard of care. Rather than absolve the physician of liability when self-destructive conduct is reasonably foreseeable, the better approach is to require reasonable precautions in light of the special relationship between the physician and his patient. We find that the proper standard is most ably stated in *Cowan v. Doering*, 215 N.J.Super. 484, 494-95 (1987), *aff'd*, 111 N.J. 451 (1988): "Where it is reasonably foreseeable that a patient by reason of his mental or emotional illness may attempt to injure himself, those in charge of his care owe a duty to safeguard him from his self-damaging potential. This duty contemplates the reasonably foreseeable occurrence of self-inflicted injury regardless of whether it is the product of the patient's volitional or negligent act."

Table 2: Competing Hypotheses Summary

The Vars Hypothesis	The increase in expected liability will result in a positive increase in the level of care (i.e., higher quality of service) and accordingly lower suicide rates (VH).
The Dillbary Hypothesis	The higher expected liability will result in screening, which could reduce the quality (care levels) or the amount (activity levels) of services offered and result in higher suicide rates (DH)

IV. Measurement

The Vars and Dillbary hypotheses, summarized in Table 2 above, are contradictory but equally probable. The first hypothesizes that an increase in doctors' expected liability could decrease suicide rates. The other hypothesizes that it will increase suicide rates. This part tests the hypotheses.

The empirical question has important implications to courts and policy makers. If the increased liability results in denial of treatment or other forms of defensive medicine practices, more jurisdictions would be inclined to reduce doctors' liability. Indeed, even jurisdictions that adopted the broad foreseeability view recognized the importance and potential adverse effects of defensive medicine. Wisconsin is such a jurisdiction. In *Schuster v. Altenberg* the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a psychiatrist can be held liable for failure to diagnose and treat (e.g., involuntarily commit) a patient.¹⁰² The court explicitly raised the Dillbary hypothesis as a possible reason to limit liability on public policy grounds, but rejected it for lack of empirical evidence:

¹⁰² Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 161-63 (1988).

patient's duty to self-care commensurate with her capacity. *See* Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 80 (N.D. 1994).

The developments in Tennessee law are also illuminating. *Weathers v. Pilkinton*, 754 S.W.2d 75 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988) exempted from liability, as a matter of law, a negligent psychiatrist whose patient committed a suicide. *Weathers* is a regular non-custodial medical malpractice case. The sole issue before the *Weathers* court was whether a psychiatrist who, in breach of his duty, failed to involuntarily commit a patient could be held liable for the latter's suicide. *Id.* at 77. The *Weathers* court was aware that "the fact that mentally ill persons might take their lives if adequate precautions are not taken to protect them from themselves is more foreseeable [when the defendant is a psychiatrist] than other cases." *Id.* at 78. Yet, it held that, as a matter of law, the psychiatrist could not be held liable unless the insanity exception applies. *Id.* at 78. Weather was rejected by *Winger* and was also overruled a few months later by the Tennessee Supreme Court in *White v. Lawrence*, 975 S.W.2d 525, 530 (Tenn. 1998) (rehearing denied on Oct. 5, 1998) (adopting a special relationship exception).

Additional public policy arguments propose that the imposition of liability upon a physician for failure to warn or failure to commit risks overcommitment and may discourage psychotherapists from treating dangerous patients. Similar concerns had been expressed by critics of *Tarasoff*. However, data collected in a survey of the impact of *Tarasoff* demonstrated that '*Tarasoff* has not discouraged therapists from treating dangerous patients, nor has it led to an increased use of involuntary commitment of patients perceived as dangerous.'¹⁰³

Since then, there has been some evidence presented that *Tarasoff* may have had the adverse effect suggested above.¹⁰⁴ Similar to others,¹⁰⁵ we turn to the empirics to address whether the imposition of liability on doctors may adversely impact suicide rates.

IV.A Data

The outcome we measure, suicides per 100,000 of the population, is recorded from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) WISQARS database. Data for the WISQARS database is collected from data on each death certificate¹⁰⁶ and has been found to be reliable at the state/year level.¹⁰⁷ Data on doctor liability laws were collected by the authors and are summarized in Table-1.

While we anticipate that state and year fixed effects will capture much of the unobserved covariates that influence suicide rates, we also include other variables that have been shown to play in important role explaining the variation in suicide rates. As controls for the mental health of the state, we include real mental health expenditures,¹⁰⁸ the institutionalization rate,¹⁰⁹ and each state's

¹⁰³ Schuster v. Altenberg, 424 N.W.2d 159, 174-75 (1988) (citing Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff, *Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action*, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 465-67).

¹⁰⁴ Griffin Edwards, *Doing Their Duty: An Empirical Analysis of the Unintended Effect of Tarasoff v. Regents on Homicidal Activity*, 57 J. L. & ECON. 321 (2014) (showing that the *Tarasoff* duty to warn caused an increase in the homicide rate of 5 percent); Griffin Edwards, *Tarasoff, Duty to Warn Laws, and Suicide*, 34 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2013) (estimating that states with laws requiring health care providers to warm others in breach of doctor-patient confidentiality experienced an increase in teen suicides of about 9%, but that no such effect exists among adult suicides).

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*; Steven Rushin & Griffin Edwards, *De-Policing*, CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Karen M. Travis, *Physician Payment and Prenatal Care Access for Heterogeneous Patients*, 37 ECON. INQUIRY 86 (1999).

¹⁰⁶ Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) [Online]. (2003). National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (producer). Available from: URL: www.cdc.gov/ncipc/wisqars. [2014 Nov 11].

¹⁰⁷ *Id.* Edwards, *supra* note 104, at 334.

¹⁰⁸ Justin M. Ross, Pavel A Yakovlev, & Fatima Carson, *Does State Spending on Mental Health Lower Suicide Rates*?, 41 J. SOCIO-ECONOMICS 408 (2012).

involuntary commitment minimum and maximum stay policy.¹¹⁰ Additionally, we control for states that have passed any tort reform legislation that imposes any cap on damages,¹¹¹ the proportion of the state house and senate that is Democrat,¹¹² the unemployment rate,¹¹³ urbanization rate,¹¹⁴ a dummy variable indicating state\year cells where the median age is over 40,¹¹⁵ and the logged accidental poisoning rate.¹¹⁶

IV.B. Model

The preferred empirical technique to estimate the effect of changes to doctor liability may have on suicides would be akin to a laboratory experiment where there is a treatment and control group, and the treatment group experiences changes to liability.¹¹⁷ In the laboratory setting, the researcher has complete control over which of the study's participants receive the treatment and the intensity and/or style of treatment. This ultimate authority in the lab setting allows for simple, clean statistical analyses between the treatment and control groups. The reality is that for empirical legal research many important questions are complicated and fall outside the bounds of a randomized controlled trial. While it is impossible to mimic the lab setting, it is still the "gold standard" of statistical analyses, and the role of this analysis is to draw an analogy to the lab and mirror as closely as possible a randomized laboratory experiment.

In our "experiment" the subjects are the states. Each subject (state) must choose a liability rule for malpractice resulting in one's suicide (e.g., no liability, holding only psychiatrists liable etc.). We then test how the chosen rule impacts, all else equal, suicide rates. Our "experimental" design is crippled, however, by

¹⁰⁹ Calculated from US Census group quarter residence data available from Steven Ruggles, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Josiah Grover, and Matthew Sobek. *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Version 6.0* [Machine-readable database]. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2015.

¹¹⁰ Griffin Edwards, *Involuntary Commitment Laws and Their Effect on Crime*, WORKING PAPER (2014).

¹¹¹ Ronen Avraham, *Database of State Tort Law Reforms (5th)* (May 2014). U of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. e555. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=902711 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.902711

¹¹² Joanna Shepherd et al., *The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges' Voting*, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 169 (2009).

¹¹³ See Griffin Edwards et al., *Looking Down the Barrel of a Loaded Gun: The Effect of Mandatory Handgun Purchase Delays on Homicide and Suicide*, WORKING PAPER (2016). at 10, at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2629397, for information about the use of state unemployment rates as a control for economic conditions.

¹¹⁴ Id.

¹¹⁵ *Id.* Ruggles et al., *supra* note 105

¹¹⁶ *Id.* Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. While admittedly a less than perfect metric, we include this variable in an attempt to capture some of the variation in suicide rates associated with changes in prescription mental health pharmaceutical usage. While we would have preferred a more direct measure of pyscho-pharmaceutical utilization, we figure that as prescription drug usage increases, so would the propensity to accidentally overdose, thus accidental poisoning rates should be correlated with prescription drug usage.

¹¹⁷ See Ian Ayres Mahzarin Banaji, & Christine Jolls, *Race Effects on eBay*, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891 (2015) (discussing the use and benefits of randomized, controlled trials in social science).

an important departure from a randomized controlled trial. In a randomized controlled trial, participants are randomly organized into the treatment and control groups. This randomization ensures that any statistical difference between the treatment and control group can be attributed to the treatment received by the treatment group and not some unobserved characteristic specific to the treatment group since those who ended up in the treatment group arrived there by chance (random assignment).

In contrast, the participants (states) in our study were not randomly assigned into each group but rather explicitly and intentionally sorted into either the treatment or control group.¹¹⁸ This creates a concern—a concern not relevant in a randomized controlled trial—that a common factor may exist that drives each participant into, say, the treatment group. If this were the case, and we observe some statistical difference between the two groups, we couldn't be sure if the difference was the result of the treatment or the common factor that motivated each group to form.

Stated another way, it's as if we are running a lab experiment in which participants know what the treatment will be and are allowed to decide for themselves whether to receive treatment. To address the self-selection of our treatment and control groups, we employ a difference in differences modeling approach.

This method employs a two-phased process. The first phase, for states that passed a law, compares suicide rates before the law passed to its pre-treated self. That is, the control group is the state's pre-treated self. This would, as an example, compare the average suicide rate in all years in Connecticut after 1997 to the average suicide rate for all the years prior to 1997 when the law was passed. The second phase calculates that same difference for the group of states that never passed any law. Finally, the second phase difference is subtracted from the first phase difference.

The role of the first phase difference is to capture any state specific characteristics that may be influencing both the passage of the law and the state suicide rate. These are factors that do not vary within a state from year to year but may contribute to suicide rates like weather¹¹⁹ or altitude.¹²⁰ The role of the second phase difference is to capture any common factors that may be influencing all states similarly across time, such as advances in pharmaceutical technology¹²¹ or changes to federal gun control policies.¹²² So while we are not able to achieve

¹¹⁸ Carrying forward the analogy of a laboratory experiment, consider states that are "treated", or in the treatment group, as states that have expanded tort liability laws as seen in Table 1.

¹¹⁹ Richard A White et al., *Does Suicide Have a Stronger Association with Seasonality than Sunlight?*, 5 BMJ OPEN 1 (2015)

¹²⁰ Namkug Kim, et al., *Altitude, Gun Ownership, Rural Areas, and Suicide*, 168 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 49 (2011).

¹²¹ Dave E. Marcotte & Sara Markowitz, A Cure for Crime? Psycho-Pharmaceuticals and Crime Trends, 30 J. POLICY ANALYSIS & MNGMT. 29 (2010)

¹²² Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., *Mental Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research to Policy*, 25 ANN. EPIDEMIOL. 366 (2015)

the gold standard of random assignment into each group, we are able to account for much of the non-random factors that could be influencing the results. Additionally, we are able to control for other observable characteristics associated with suicide.

Our study is further complicated since there is not one single treatment but rather a slurry of laws that apply to different tort defendants at different times. We address this in two ways.

IV.B.(i). Model 1

Our first approach is to attempt to measure the effect of the law on suicide rates as tort liability increases from no liability, to imposing liability on (a) psychiatrists only, to (b) all doctors, to (c) the general foreseeability test. The variation in these state laws correspond to Table 1 and can be seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1: State Variation in Doctor Liability¹²³

Formally, we estimate the following log-linear equation using least squares estimation techniques:

$$\ln(s_{it}) = \alpha Narrow_{it} + \beta Wider_{it} + \delta Widest_{it} + \Psi_{it} + \rho_t + \tau_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

In this equation $ln(s_{it})$ is the natural \log^{124} of the suicide rate in state *i* in time *t*, Ψ_{it} represents a vector of control variables explained further in the data

¹²³ This Figure represents the laws as they were in 2013.

¹²⁴ A standard practice in the literature (e.g. Mark Duggan, *More Guns, More Crime*, 109 J. POL. ECON. 1086 (2001); J. Ludwig & P.J. Cook, *Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act*, 284 JAMA 585 (2000); Griffin Edwards, *State Right to Refuse Medication Laws and Procedures: Impact on Homicide and Suicide*, 19 J. MENTAL HEALTH POL'Y & ECON. ___ (2016)), taking the log of the outcome, especially when it is a rate of the population, transforms the data from a skewed distribution to a more normal distribution set of data. For example, in our dataset, the distribution of suicide rates (before logging) looks like:


section, ρ_t represents the inclusion of year fixed effects,¹²⁵ τ_i the inclusion of state fixed effects¹²⁶ and ε_{it} is the idiosyncratic error term. Functionally, the state fixed effects accomplishes the first phase difference and the year fixed effects the second phase difference. Alternatively, the state fixed effects controls for any state specific time invariant factor that may influence suicide rates, and the year effects absorb any national trending factors that may be influencing suicide rates. The coefficients of interest in Model 1, α , β , and δ , estimate the effect of the scope of the law. That is, compared to states with no law passed, α tells us the effect of a narrow scope of the law that would just include psychiatrists, β the effect of defining the law more broadly to include psychiatrists and general practitioners, and γ the effect of the broadest scope of the law which would include all possible parties.

While this model addresses the effect of the scope of the law, it does not necessarily directly address the role increased liability plays to specific practitioners. To do these, we alter Model 1 to attempt to parse out the effect of increased liability to specifically liable practitioners.

IV.B.(ii). Model 2

While we don't actually observe any state in the data that extends liability only to general practitioners (but not to psychiatrists), we are able to isolate individual effects for specific practitioners through a set of overlapping dummy variables modeled in the following fashion:

$$\ln(s_{it}) = aPsych_{it} + bGP_{it} + gAllOthers_{it} + \Psi_{it} + \rho_t + \tau_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$



¹²⁵ This is a set of dummy variables—variables that only take the value zero or one—that indicate each year in the data set.

¹²⁶ This includes a dummy variable for each state and DC.

Here, all parameters are the same as Model 1, except the variables of interest are recoded to isolate the effect of changes in liability to specific groups of practitioners. The coefficient a measures the effect of making psychiatrists liable, b general practitioners, and g all others. Again, while we do not observe any state in the data that applies a rule of liability to general practitioners alone, we do observe states that first apply the rule to psychiatrists and later to psychiatrists and general practitioners, which allows us to disentangle the effect to each group.

IV.D. Results

The estimated results of Model 1 are reported in Table 3. Recall that this model tests the scope of liability laws have on suicides rates. Column 1 of Table 3 reports the estimates of coefficients α , β , and δ with the inclusion of state and year fixed effects but without any other controls, and column 2 of Table 3 replicates column 1 but with the inclusion of controls.

Table 3: Effect of the Scope Tort Liability Laws on Suicide Rates			
Scope of Liability	(1)	(2)	
Narrow: Psych Only	0.128‡	0.161‡	
	(0.023)	(0.026)	
Wide: All Doctors	-0.038	-0.030	
	(0.038)	(0.024)	
Widest: Everybody	0.000	-0.003	
	(0.038)	(0.025)	
Controls		Х	
Sample Size ¹²⁷	1683	1683	
R Squared ¹²⁸	0.891	0.917	

Consistent with the Dillbary hypothesis, the findings suggest that laws that
that would hold liable psychiatrists (but not NPMDs) for malpractice resulting in
a suicide were associated with a 12.8% increase in suicides. The effect is even
stronger, 16.8%, if we include controls. These results are statistically significant.
We find no evidence of any effect of broader laws—laws that impose liability on
general practitioners, and laws that include all defendants-on suicide rates.

¹²⁷ The sample size, reported in this and subsequent tables, reports the number of state year observations. We include in our dataset data on each state and DC, but we follow them over time which is why this number is greater than 51.

¹²⁸ The R Squared calculation, reported in this and subsequent tables, is a measure, albeit an imperfect one, of the "goodness of fit" of the model to the data. Interpreted as a percentage, an R Squared of 0.891 suggests that 89.1% of the variation in state suicide rates across the time of our dataset can be explained by our chosen model.

When interpreting the results in Table 3, it is important to note that these results only provide information on the effect of narrowly defining the law, and not necessarily the effect of increasing liability to psychiatrists, since psychiatrists are also part of the group of liable defendants in the "wide" and "widest" set of laws.

The specification in Model 1, reported in Table 3, most closely mirrors the codification of the laws as they naturally occur in society. Model 2, however, allows us to measure the effect of changes to liability by affected group and provides a more direct test of the competing Vars and Dillbary hypotheses. Those results are reported in Table 4.

Table 4: Effect of Tort Liability Laws on			
Providers			
	(1)	(2)	
NPMDs Liable	-0.075†	-0.107‡	
	(0.037)	(0.041)	
Psychiatrists Liable	0.058	0.093‡	
	(0.042)	(0.037)	
Everybody Else Liable	0.034	0.035	
	(0.029)	(0.020)	
Controls		Х	
Sample Size	1683	1683	
R Squared	0.890	0.917	

As mentioned previously, Model 2 and the associated estimated effects represent an alternative codification of the law that allows us to isolate the effect of changes to tort liability by affected group. Similar to previous tables, column 1 reports the results without controls, and column 2 with controls. So, which effect prevails? As it turns out, there is evidence to support both the Vars and Dillbary hypothesis.

When NPMDs become potentially liable, we report a decrease in suicides by a magnitude of 7.5% to 10.7% depending on the specification suggesting an increase in the quality of care provided by NPMDs. Interestingly though, we also find some evidence of the Dillbary effect when liability is isolated to only include psychiatrists. Specifically, suicide rates increase by between 5.8% and 9.3% when liability extends to psychiatrists.

While the results reported here paint a nuanced and interesting story that the effect of increasing liability for doctors depends on the doctors' discretion and screening capability, and to avoid jumping to hasty policy recommendations, it is important to remember that the codification in Model 2 and Table 4 do not reflect the laws as the actually occur in the United States. We never actually observe, for instance, a state that makes only NPMDs liable. We are however, because of the variation of the laws in the data, able to parse out each individual group's effect. This effect is further supported once we account for each state's negligence rule.

IV.E. Robustness Checks

As the Dillbary effect suggests, we present some evidence that psychiatrists may respond to increased levels of liability by screening and avoiding the patients that are most at risk for committing suicide. If this were true however, we would expect to see psychiatrists respond differently depending on the legal nature of the state's negligence laws. That is, the higher the expected liability a mental health care provider faces the stronger will be the screening effect. The test is thus: if it is in fact true that changes in liability create a screening effect for psychologists, this effect should be less pronounced in states where liability avoid is more feasible, like states with contributory negligence laws, and more pronounced in states where liability is harder to avoid—such as states with comparative negligence laws. To test this theory, we estimate the following model:

 $\ln(s_{it}) = a_1 ContPsych_{it} + a_2 CompPsych_{it} + bGP_{it} + gAllOthers_{it} + \Psi_{it} + \rho_t + \tau_i + \varepsilon_{it}$

The equation is a mirror image of Model 2 with one exception. The $aPysch_{it}$ variable, which captures the effect of increased liability for psychiatrists in Model 2, is split into two categories and sorted by states that have contributory negligence laws and passed a law that increased psychiatrist liability $(a_1ContPsych_{it})$ and states that passed a law and operate under comparative negligence rules $(a_2CompPsych_{it})$.¹²⁹ Again, the idea is that if these laws are affecting the way psychiatrists practice, the effect should be largest in circumstances where it is hard to avoid liability (comparative negligence states).¹³⁰ The results of this test are provided in Table 5.

Tuble 5. Effect of Tore Endomity Edwards	regingenee	brunduru
	(1)	(2)
NPMD Liable	-0.068^	-0.090†
	(0.038)	(0.043)
Contributory Negligence: Psych Liable	-0.022	0.020
	0.051	0.055
Comparative Negligence: Psych Liable	0.058	0.091†
	0.042	0.039
Everybody Else Liable	0.027	0.025
	(0.030)	(0.020)

Table 5: Effect of Tort Liability Laws by Negligence Standard

¹²⁹ Alternative specifications divided the data further by differentiating pure comparative negligence laws and modified comparative negligence laws resulted in statistically similar results. ¹³⁰ One question that does arise in this exercise is the extent to which contributory/comparative negligence laws may actually apply to suicide cases. We found that contributory/comparative negligence laws have been applied to suicides in all but one state.

Contro	ols	Х
Psych Liable Joint Sig	0.0045	0.0084
Sample Size	1683	1683
R Squared	0.8908	0.9176

This table reads in a similar fashion to the previous table with one added statistic reported. First, consistent with the liability screening Dillbary Hypothesis, we observe a statistically insignificant effect of making psychologists and psychiatrists liable in states with contributory negligent rules.¹³¹ That is, laws holding psychiatrists liable for suicide resulting from malpractice do not seem to have an effect in states with contributory negligence laws. Conversely, the laws seem to be having the most bite and create the most screening in states with comparative negligence laws compared to contributory negligence laws. Lastly, to address the joint statistical significance of both psychologist variables, we include in both columns the results of a statistical test of joint significance and find that in both cases these two variables together are jointly significant.¹³²

As another check to the robustness of the results, we try to identify if these laws have any effect on other types of mortality outcomes. It could be the case that the changes in these laws are associated with some sort of underlying trend in mortality generally. If this were the case, our reported results would erroneously associate changes in these laws to changes in suicide while the real cause of the effect could be due to the underlying changes in mortality. Said another way, we want to ensure that the laws are affecting the outcomes we think they should, and not some seemingly unrelated factors they shouldn't. To do this, we replicate the results above¹³³ but in place of suicides we run four separate regressions where each regression has a different mortality outcome that should not be affected by changes to tort liability laws. Those results, displayed graphically, can be seen in Table 2.

¹³¹ The flipping of the sign from negative to positive with the inclusion of controls provides further evidence of the absence of a relationship between psychologist liability laws and suicide rates in contributory negligence states.

¹³² These results are generally insensitive to alternative coding of the laws in states where reasonable people might disagree on the classification of the laws, including Rhode Island and Vermont.

¹³³ Due to limitations in the data of our placebo mortality variables, we employ a slightly different regression technique that allows us to include zero counts of mortality for the various placebo laws. To do this, we run fixed effects Poisson regressions with the population as a constrained right hand side variable. This produces qualitatively similar regressions to that presented in the main results while allowing us to still include zero counts that otherwise would get lost when logging the outcome variables.




Figure 2: Placebo Effects on Seemingly Unrelated Deaths

Each row represents a unique regression, where the outcome is listed on the vertical axis. Those outcomes are death by natural force (nature), death by overexertion, death by being struck by a blunt object (struck), and pedestrian related deaths. Suicides have been converted from rates to death counts and included in the figure for comparison. The horizontal axis measures the magnitude of the effect in terms of deaths. Each point on each row of Figure 2 represents the point estimate of the regression and the bands around the point represent a 90% confidence bound. Recall that bounds that include zero, the dark vertical line in the center of the figure, are statistically insignificant. As is seen in Figure 2, there seems to be no relationship between these laws and seemingly unrelated counts of mortality. The one exception may be pedestrian related deaths, that see a small and marginally significant increase in deaths with the change to tort liability laws for psychiatrists. This may be the result of suicide deaths being misclassified as pedestrian related accidental deaths.

V. Conclusion

We find evidence that psychiatrists faced with liability for suicide may screen out patients at relatively high risk for suicide. And those patients may receive worse or no care as a result. In particular, replacing the traditional (no liability) rule with one that imposes liability on psychiatrists for suicides was associated with an increase in the suicide rate in both of our specifications. There is some support for the opposing hypothesis that greater liability leads to better care when NPMDs are viewed in isolation: the suicide rate declined when

NPMDs were first made potentially liable. Because specialists like psychiatrists would seem to have greater ability to screen patients, these results are consistent with the Dillbary screening hypothesis and more weakly consistent with the Vars improved-care hypothesis.

These findings are supported by existing literature about "defensive medicine" and also add significantly to that literature. In one survey of 669 doctors in different specialties, 39% reported often avoiding high-risk patients.¹³⁴ This rate was by far the lowest among emergency room physicians (13%), who have the least ability to engage in patient screening.¹³⁵ The survey suggests concern with malpractice liability is at least partially responsible for screening: "[s]pecialist physicians who lacked confidence in their coverage were more than twice as likely as other specialists to . . . avoid . . . high-risk patients."¹³⁶ Attempts to assess the impact of this self-reported patient avoidance, and other effects of changes in tort liability, have not yielded consistent results.¹³⁷ Our study fills a gap in this literature.

These findings have important implications for suicide and tort law generally. Holding specialists liable for suicide without holding generalists liable may be a grave mistake because of screening. On the other hand, expanding liability just to generalists may reduce suicide rates. This suggests that the best policy might be to retain the traditional no-liability-for-suicide rule for specialists¹³⁸ and to drop it for generalists. However, further research is needed. The phenomenon of avoiding liability by avoiding potential claimants is significant for policy and tort law well beyond the context of suicide. This article provides empirical support for what is usually just a theoretical or anecdotal claim.

Because so few states held liable psychiatrists but not NPMDs, however, our more robust finding is that suicide rates were not significantly affected by holding potentially liable all doctors and other defendants. NPMDs did not appear to screen out high-risk patients. Their level of care may or may not have increased—counterbalanced by psychiatrist screening—but we can say with relatively greater confidence that it did not decline. There is no obvious mechanism that could have offset such a decline.

Should jurisdictions therefore expand tort liability for suicide? Perhaps not. Expanded liability may not have increased suicide rates, but it may have

¹³⁴ David M. Studdert et al., *Defensive Medicine among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a Volatile Malpractice Environment*, 293 JAMA 2609, tbl.2 (2005).

¹³⁵ *Id*.

¹³⁶ *Id*.

¹³⁷ See Theodore Eisenberg, *The Empirical Effects of Tort Reform, in* RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS 543 (Jennifer Arlen, ed., 2013) ("Consistent evidence of effects [of tort reform] on physician behavior and physician supply has not emerged."); see also David A. Hyman, Charles Silver, Bernard Black, & Myungho Paik, *Does Tort Reform Affect Physician Supply? Evidence from Texas*, 42 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203 (2015) (finding that strict cap on non-economic damages in medical malpractice cases did not affect physician supply).

¹³⁸ Or perhaps with a recklessness exception as proposed by Professor Stefan, *supra* note 36.

increased spending on ineffective suicide prevention activity and administration.¹³⁹ The old rule may therefore do a better job of minimizing the costs of harm, precaution, and administration---the costs of suicide.¹⁴⁰ We cannot test this hypothesis because our data include no direct measures of suicide prevention efforts, litigation, or their costs, but the theory behind it is strong.

At least one commentator has implicitly endorsed this reasoning. In a recent book, Professor Susan Stefan has advocated moving back toward the traditional no-liability position. Specifically, she argues that mental health professionals should be liable for the suicide of an outpatient only if the professional acted intentionally or recklessly, not just negligently.¹⁴¹ This limited liability proposal, she argues, would "reduce existing perverse incentives for mental health professionals to cherry-pick the healthiest and least suicidal outpatients."¹⁴² And while she does not frame her other claimed benefits in terms of precaution and administration costs, she believes her proposal would reduce over-hospitalization, involuntary interventions, along with provider anxiety and malpractice insurance bills.¹⁴³

Still, there is an opposing argument in favor of expanding liability even if it does not significantly decrease the suicide rate and may even increase costs: it better promotes fairness. Some law and economics scholars (including one of us, Professor Dillbary) contend that "fairness" should play no part in torts.¹⁴⁴ But the fairness claim here, if permissible, is compelling: the primary cost of suicide should be borne by the doctor who could foresee the risk and should have taken steps to prevent it, not the distressed and very often impaired victim.¹⁴⁵

This article is to our knowledge the first of its kind. And while it provides support for our hypotheses, it could be strengthened by future research. One obvious follow-up project would be to survey doctors and insurance companies about their knowledge of and self-reported reactions to changes in tort law. Interested parties may read the case law differently or ignore it. Doctors may assume they could be held liable even when they could not be.¹⁴⁶ Another project

¹³⁹ See STEFAN, supra note 36, at xxi ("Some clinicians who determine a person does not need hospitalization admit the person anyway to avoid potential liability").

¹⁴⁰ GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). "Fruitless" litigation is one such cost. Lewis L. Laska, *Medical Malpractice Cases Not to File*, 20 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 27, 28 (1989).

¹⁴¹ STEFAN, *supra* note 36, at 275.

¹⁴² *Id.* at 276.

¹⁴³ *Id.* Other commentators have defended the traditional rule as to outpatients. *See* Murray, *supra* note 82, at 663 (arguing that a special relationship justifying psychiatrist liability for suicide should generally "not be found to exist between psychiatrists and patients treated on an outpatient basis").

¹⁴⁴ Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, *Fairness versus Welfare*, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001).

¹⁴⁵ Dux v. United States, 69 F. Supp. 3d 781, 789 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Bertolote et al., *supra* note 66.

¹⁴⁶ *Cf.* Bruce Bongar & Ronald Stolberg, *Risk Management with the Suicidal Patient*, NATIONAL REGISTER OF HEALTH SERVICE PSYCHOLOGISTS (2009), available at <u>http://www.e-psychologist.org/index.iml?mdl=exam/show_article.mdl&Material_ID=100</u> (visited June 9, 2016)

would be to assess the dollars spent on suicide prevention and litigation. As suggested above, high enough costs of this type could tip the scales against tort liability expansion. What is clear from this first empirical examination of the question is that tort law belongs in the conversation about suicide prevention.

VI. Appendix

VI.A. Model Validity

While for our purposes the difference in differences methodology allows us to approach the "gold standard" of randomized control trials, it has been shown to perform best when the changes in the legal intervention are, after including state and year fixed effects, as good as random.¹⁴⁷ That is, the estimates provided by Models 1 and 2 are considered to be unbiased provided that there is no observable way to predict the uptake of the intervention with respect to the outcome of interest. We test this formally by looking at any relationship between previous years' suicide rates and the passage of laws. Specifically, we model the following equation:

$$L_{it} = \gamma_1 s_{it-1} + \gamma_2 s_{it-2} + \gamma_3 s_{it-3} + \Psi_{it} + \rho_t + \tau_i + \varepsilon_{it}$$

The equation estimates a linear probability model that attempts to identify factors that influence the probability that state *i* in time *t* will pass law L.¹⁴⁸ The objective of a linear probability model is to predict probabilities—in this case the probability of the passage and existence of a law. However, we are less interested

^{(&}quot;The fear of being sued probably has more widespread and deleterious effects on clinicians than actual lawsuits.").

¹⁴⁷Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?, 119 QUARTERLY J. ECON. 249 (2004). If the assignment of the treatment is not "as good as random" after controlling for state and year fixed effects, the bias that results is sometimes referred to as endogeneity. The biasing effects of endogeneity can be especially salient when looking at changes to legal regimes because laws are enacted and changed by policy makers who, conceivably, don't just randomly pass laws. It is important to note however, that in order to achieve valid estimates of an effect of law, the passage and laws need not be totally random to everything, they need only to be random (after controlling for unobserved but time invariant state characteristics and national trends) relative to the outcome variable of interest-and more specifically still, the unaccounted for and unobserved variation in the outcome. In Models 1 and 2, the unobserved variation in the outcome of logged suicide rates is represented by ε_{it} . That is, after we do our best to explain all the variation in suicide rates by including controls for changes to tort liability, state and year fixed effects, and all the other controls discussed previously, the variation in suicide rates that remains unexplained is represented abstractly by ε_{it} . In order for our empirical approach to be valid, it must hold that there is no correlation between the laws and the error term, or, $corr(L_{it}, \varepsilon_{it}) = 0$. Since, however, ε_{it} is an abstract idea not measurable in the data, we are not able to directly measure the above correlation. Fortunately for us though, we do know that there is a temporal aspect to the passage of a law, and if the above correlation were to hold, we would expect to see policy makers acting to pass laws in response to suicide rates in previous years that they do observe.

¹⁴⁸ We run this check of model validity for each of the laws of interest in models 1 and 2 that include Psych, GP, All Others, Narrow, Wider, and Widest.

in predicting the overall probability of a law passage and keenly interested in any predictive power of retrospective, or lagged, suicide rates modeled in the above equation for the last year as s_{it-1} , two years ago as s_{it-2} and three years ago as s_{it-3} .

Law makers are not randomly passing laws, but as long as the laws are not passed in a way that can directly be tracked back to observations of lagged suicide rates, we feel fairly confident that, in at least this regard, Models 1 and 2 are not biased. If it is true that Models 1 and 2 are valid, then we would expect to see that the estimated effects of γ_1 , γ_2 , and γ_3 to be statistically insignificant. The results of those estimates are in Table A1.

Lagged Suicide Rates				
	Last Year	Two Years Ago	Three Years Ago	
GP Liable	0.000	0.000	0.000	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Psychologist Liable	-0.008	-0.005	0.000	
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	
Everybody Else Liable	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Narrow: Psych Only	-0.009	-0.006	0.002	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
Wide: Psych and GP	-0.009	-0.005	0.003	
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	
Widest: Everybody	-0.002	-0.001	0.000	
With controls	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
GP Liable	0.001	0.001	0.001	
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	
Psychologist Liable	-0.009^	-0.007^	-0.002	
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	
Everybody Else Liable	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	
Narrow: Psych Only	-0.007	-0.006	0.002	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	
Wide: Psych and GP	-0.008	-0.007	0.001	
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	
Widest: Everybody	-0.002	-0.002	0.000	
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	

Table A1: Linear Probability Models to Predict Law Uptake With Lagged Suicide Rates

In this Table, every labeled row represents a unique regression where the predicted outcome is the row label, and the lagged suicide rates of interest are represented by column labels. Each regression includes state and year fixed effects, and the second half of the table includes the results replicated from above with the inclusion of all other controls mentioned previously.¹⁴⁹ Below each estimated coefficient, in parentheses, is the standard error of the estimate.¹⁵⁰ There are 36 estimated coefficients in this table that could, if statistically significant, suggest evidence of a biased model. Of those 36, only 2 are statistically significant at the 10% level, which suggests that while these laws are not being passed randomly, they are probably not being passed in a way that would bias our results.¹⁵¹

One additional concern to the validity of our preferred empirical model is the temporal nature of suicide rates. While it is a classic assumption of linear regression, it is unrealistic to assume that state suicide rates are not related to one another across years. To account for this, we adjust the estimated standard errors in each equation.¹⁵²

VI.B. Source Table

Table A2: Sources

CA Bellah v. Greenson, 81 Cal. App. 3d 614 (1978)CT Edwards v. Tardif, 692 A.2d 1266 (Conn. 1997)

¹⁴⁹ For the sake of completeness, we report the results with and without controls. In the event of a discrepancy between the two, we defer to the results that include controls, as they control for many state specific time variant factors that have been shown to be influential in explaining the variation in suicide rates. The variables we include are: real mental health expenditures, institutionalization rate, involuntary commitment minimum and maximum stay laws, caps on damages tort reforms, proportion of the state house and senate that is democrat, the unemployment rate, urbanization rate, population over 40 years old, and the logged accidental poisoning rate.

¹⁵⁰ The estimated coefficient and standard error for each variable are used to perform a standard t test of statistical significance where the null hypothesis is that there is no effect and the alternative is an effect different from zero. In each of our tables, we report the results of the test of statistical significance at different cut off levels with three symbols: 0 p<0.10 $^{+}$ p<0.05 $^{+}$ p<0.01. That is, an estimated coefficient flagged by a " 0 ", suggests a statistically significant result at the 10% level, or alternatively, that we can be 90% confident in the result.

¹⁵¹ Recall that inherent in performing tests of statistical significance is the idea that the researcher may, on occasion, run across a false positive—that is, mistakenly "reject the null hypothesis" or find an effect that does not reflect the true underlying population. The amount that we make this mistake, also called a Type 1 error, depends on how liberal we are with what we consider to be statistically significant. Something being statistically significant at the 10% level concedes that we would expect to make a mistake about 10% of the time, thus, it is not concerning that we find statistical significance in the above table in 2 of 36 cases.

¹⁵²In our specific context, this results in clustering the standard error estimates at the state level. This approach typically results in more conservative standard error estimation and has been suggested as a "fix" for the auto-correlative nature of state suicide rates. *See* Bertrand et al., *supra* note 147, at 258.

Estate of Girard v. Town of Putnam, No. CV085002754–S, 2011 WL 783599 (Ct. Super. Jan. 28, 2011)

- DC Garby v. George Washington University Hosp., 886 A.2d 510 (D.C. App. Oct. 27, 2005)
- FL State v. Rushing, 532 So. 2d 1338 (Fla. App. 1988)
- GA Purcell v. Breese, 552 S.E.2d 865 (Ga. App. 2001)Georgia Clinic, P.C. v. Stout, 747 S.E.2d 83 (Ga. App. 2013)
- IA Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000) Mulhern v. Catholic Health Initiatives, 799 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 2011)
- ID Brooks v. Logan, 903 P.2d 73 (Idaho 1995)
- IL Hobart v. Shin,705 N.E.2d 907, 911 (Ill. 1998)
- KS Wozniak v. Lipoff, 750 P.2d 971 (Kan. 1988)
- KY Bowden v. Sandler, No. 2008-CA-001279-MR, 2009 WL 1491395 (Ky. App. May 29, 2009)
- LA Argus v. Scheppegrell, 472 So. 2d 573 (La. 1985)
- MD Farwell v. Un, 902 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1990)
- ME Estate of Cummings v. Davie, 40 A.3d 971 (Me. 2012)
- MO Kivland v. Columbia Orthopaedic Group, LLP, 331 S.W.3d 299 (Mo. 2011) (en banc)
- ND Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75 (N.D. 1994)
- NJ Fernandez v. Baruch, 244 A.2d 109 (N.J. 1968) Zygmaniak v. Kawasaki Motors Corp. U.S.A., 330 A.2d 56 (N.J. Super. 1974)
- NM Silva v. Lovelace Health System, Inc., 331 P.3d 958 (N.M. App. 2014)
- NY Fuller v. Preis, 322 N.E.2d 263 (N.Y. 1974)
- OH Fischer v. Morales, 526 N.E.2d 1098 (Ohio App. 1987)
- OK Runyon v. Reid, 510 P.2d 943 (Okla. 1973)
- RI Frizzell v. Town of Little Compton, No. 98-0252, 2000 WL 33159170 (R.I. Super. Jan. 28, 2000)
- TN White v. Lawrence, 975 S.W.2d 525 (Tenn. 1998)Rains v. Bend of the River, 124 S.W.3d 580 (Tenn. App. 2003)
- TX Tex. Civ. Prac. & Remedies Code § 93.001(a)(2) (eff. Sept. 1, 1987) (as recognized in Kassen v. Hatley, 887 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1994))
- UT Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 1979) Faucheaux v. Provo City, 343 P.3d 288 (Utah App. 2015)
- VT Wilkins v. Lamoille County Mental Health Services, Inc., 889 A.2d 245 (Vt. 2005) White v. Harris, 36 A.3d 203 (Vt. 2011)